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ABSTRACT 
Science and technology have been paramount features of any modernized 
nation. In Japan they played an important role in the modernization and 
militarization of the nation, as well as its democratization and subsequent 
economic growth. Science and technology highlight the promises of a better 
tomorrow and future utopia, but their application can also present ethical 
issues. In fiction, they have historically played a significant role. Fictions of 
science continue to exert power via important multimedia platforms for 
considerations of the role of science and technology in our world. And, because 
of their importance for the development, ideologies and policies of any nation, 
these considerations can be correlated with the deliberation of the role of a 
nation in the world, including its internal and external images and imaginings.  
In Japan, narratives of the weird, fantastic and horrific have been present 
for centuries, culminating in the popularity of Japanese horror cinema with 
the worldwide success of Ringu (1998). In Japanese cinema studies, however, 
the study of these narratives is still limited, especially with regard to scientific 
narratives. This thesis is an attempt to remedy this situation. I will look into 
the way images of Japanese nationhood are mediated through male characters 
that are associated with science and technology. I argue that by analyzing these 
characters within their respective contexts and the general framework of both 
the history of science and technology as well as Japan’s postwar policies, it is 
possible to understand how the films deal with various, sometimes 
contradicting self-projected images of the Japanese nation. My study is located 
at an intersection of four particular fields: the study of Japanese cinema, the 
study of horror and the fantastic, the study of Japanese masculinities and the 
study of the history of Japanese science. The following films will be analyzed: 
Gojira (1954), Chikyū bōeigun (The Mysterians, 1957), Bijo to ekitainingen 
(The H-man, 1958), Densō ningen (The Secret of the Telegian, 1960), Gasu 
ningen daiichi-gō (The Human Vapor, 1960), Matango (1963), Tanin no kao 
(The Face of Another, 1964), Kairo (Pulse, 2001), Sakebi (Retribution, 2006), 
Doppelgänger (2006), the Tetsuo series (1988, 1992, 2009) and the three 
HAYABUSA films (2012). 
I will start by redefining “horror” and “science fiction” as “speculative 
cinema” (kaiki eiga), a cross-generic mode that as an umbrella term enables 
the analysis of both supernatural tales and more scientifically inclined works. 
In order to theorize the concept, I will draw from previous literature on the 
weird and the fantastic. Torben Grodal’s (2009) biocultural framework will be 
also utilized in order to provide one possible explanation for the prevalence of 
certain motifs worldwide. Next, I will highlight the role of men as functional 
tools for the mediation of national images. This is done by theorizing the 
notion of “scientific masculinity,” a type of masculinity that contributes to the 
creation of knowledge, as defined by Erica Lorraine Milam and Robert A. Nye 
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(2015). Scientific masculinity is a trope with a function—to mediate images of 
nationhood by calling for advancements of science and technology. The 
Frankenstein myth is present in almost all of the fictions, as manifested in 
Sharalyn Orbaugh’s (2007) so-called Frankenstein Syndrome. Shimura 
Miyoko’s (2008) concept of otoko no kaijin, the male phantom, is also useful. 
In order to understand scientific masculinity, I will draw both from the history 
of science and from studies on masculinity. Understanding the role of 
hegemonic masculinity (Connell, 1995) is particularly important, as it works 
as an ideological reference point for the fictional, non-hegemonic characters. 
This creates an interdisciplinary theoretical model that contributes to the 
understanding of the function of scientific masculinity as a representation of a 
certain national image.  
The results of this thesis suggest that Japanese speculative cinema engages 
in the process of dissecting national images—and ideals—on screen. This is 
accomplished by the use of scientifically minded masculine agents which 
subvert, challenge and negotiate ideologies that have contributed to Japan’s 
postwar history. Because of the importance of science and technology for 
social policies at various points in history, they provide a fine context for the 
dissecting of these ideas. It is clear that kaiki eiga actively participates in 
negotiating a multitude of salient national images—imperialist, pacifist, racial, 
technological, economic and, last but not least, patriarchal. These images 
reflect the changes that Japanese society has undergone since the Pacific War, 
as well as those that the society should undergo, according to the filmmakers.  
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A NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION  
In this thesis I will follow the Japanese name order where family name 
precedes the given name. This is applied to all Japanese names regardless of 
the language of the source material (English or Japanese). However, if a 
Japanese person has a last name other than a Japanese one, or a first name 
other than a Japanese one, I have decided to follow the Western name order 
although the source material is in Japanese.  
I use the revised Hepburn system in romanizing Japanese, using the 
macron for ou (ō) and uu (ū). I will also use these for words such as nō, which 
is often transliterated as Noh. However, internationally established city names 
such as Tokyo and Osaka will be written without the macron. For the term 
sarariiman, I have decided not to use the macron, since the word itself is a 
neologism from the English language. I have refrained from using the kanji for 
Japanese terminology in order to maintain the approachability of the text. The 
only exception is when I need to differentiate between the terms henshin (変
身 ) and henshin ( 変 心 ), the words for physical and psychological 
metamorphoses.  
I refer to my primary sources using their Japanese names, providing a 
translation the first time I mention them. One reason for this is to avoid mixing 
the Japanese originals with their American remakes. Hence I talk about 
Honogurai mizu no soko kara instead of Dark Water. However, direct 
citations from the films I have written in English.  
Introduction 
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1 INTRODUCTION  
 “That’s why I can’t let people know until I find a peaceful use for the 
power. I’ll destroy all the data I’ve compiled and kill myself.”1 
 
Japanese kaiki eiga, or speculative cinema, is filled with characters that deal 
with concerns regarding science and technology.2 More often than not, these 
are representative of larger social and moral concerns. In Gojira (1954), Dr. 
Serizawa kills himself in order to make sure that no one can use the weapon 
he has developed. In Gasu ningen daiichi-gō (The Human Vapor, 1960), 
military scientist Dr. Niki is killed by the subject of his experiment. Matango 
(1963) locks up academic protagonist Kenji in a psychiatric hospital, whereas 
Doppelgänger (2005), with its overworked research scientist Dr. Hayasaki, is 
a liberation fantasy of an overworked contemporary man. Tetsuo (1988, 1993, 
2009), in turn, dissects the identity of the common salaryman by making its 
subjects pure, raw technology, providing a destructive escape from the 
everyday.3 And then there is Kairo (Pulse, 2001), in which all technology is 
seen as inherently alienating—a far stretch from the image of Japan as a 
technological wonderland.  
In this thesis I will analyze fictions of science and their portrayals of 
national images. Science and technology are important and interesting 
vehicles for analyzing national subjectivity because, as Tessa Morris-Suzuki 
states, “Science and technology are the products of society; their evolution not 
only depends on the intellectual traditions from which they spring, but is also 
shaped in every generation of social structures and social conflicts.”4 Many 
fictions of science belong to the realm of the weird, the fantastic and the 
horrific. These genres have permeated Japanese society for years as written 
                                                 
1 Dr. Serizawa in Gojira (1954). 
2 I am indebted to Dr. Sharon Kinsella who, as my personal supervisor at the European Association 
for Japanese Studies Doctoral Seminar in Edinburgh in 2015, suggested I immerse myself in the 
“kaikiness” of the films, thus directing my thought toward not considering it as a genre but rather 
something like a mood. In this thesis, I will follow the definition of the word kaiki as “suspicious and 
strange thing or being,” “uncanny and eerie shape and form,” “grotesque” (Shōgakukan Dejitaru 
Daijiten). The term has been used in translations of Western scholarly works of horror cinema; for 
example, David Skal’s Monster Show: The Cultural History of Horror (1993) discusses in Japanese “the 
cultural history of kaiki films” (Japanese translation by Tochigi Reiko in 1998). 
3 As transliterated from Japanese, ‘salaryman’ is sarariiman, but I have decided on using the English 
spelling. Salaryman generally means a white-collar worker in a large company. A more detailed 
description will be provided in Section 3.3.  
4  Tessa Morris-Suzuki, “Fuzzy Logic: Science, Technology, and Postmodernity in Japan,” in 
Japanese Encounters With Postmodernity, eds., Johann P. Arnason and Yoshio Sugimoto (London and 
New York: Kegan Paul International, 1995), 125. 
Introduction 
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texts, folk tales, stage art, religious beliefs or films.5 In fact, Japanese arts have 
tended to be particularly concerned with interrogating the notion of 
separateness and highlighting the fluidity of boundaries. Tropes of 
metamorphosis and phantasmagoria of all kinds characterize many modern 
literary texts, theater and art.6 Within the long history of Japanese cinema, 
weird and fantastic films comprise an intriguing, yet underanalyzed, branch.7 
Still, to paraphrase Uchiyama Kazuki, when cinema was introduced in Japan 
at the end of the 19th century, it became a link between modern rationality and 
traditional folk beliefs. In the darkness of the cinema, the spectator was 
whisked away to worlds previously unseen to the human eye.8 In her famous 
essay The Imagination of Disaster (2009 [1965]), Susan Sontag points out 
that compared to literature, cinema has a unique strength in its “immediate 
representation of the extraordinary.”9 This inherent capability of portraying 
weird phenomena was due to the various cinematic techniques, such as 
chiaroscuro lighting, overlapping figures, stop motion, montage and double 
exposure, as well as the ability to bend time and space. This was made possible 
by healthy monetary support from film studios, since the audience proved 
willing to pay for these titillating spectacles.10  
                                                 
5 Leena Eerolainen, “Oh the Horror! Genre and the fantastic mode in Japanese kaiki eiga,” Asia in 
Focus 3 (2016): 37. 
6  Susan J. Napier, “When the Machines Stop: Fantasy, Reality and Terminal Identity in Neon 
Genesis Evangelion and Serial Experiments: Lain,” in Robot, Ghosts and Wired Dreams: Japanese 
Science Fiction from Origins to Anime, ed. Christopher Bolton, Istvan Csicsery-Ronay and Tatsumi 
Takayuki (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 2007), 39; here phantasmagoria 
means “a confused group of real or imagined images that change quickly” 
(https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/phantasmagoria). 
7 According to Uchiyama Kazuki, as early as between 1910 and 1926 there were various kaidan film 
adaptations, the most popular of which were Yotsuya kaidan (10 times), Botan dōrō (7 times), Banshū 
sarayashiki (4 times), Shin-sarayashiki (4 times), Banchō sarayashiki (3 times), Nabeshimaneko (7 
times), Okazakineko (3 times), Arima kaibyōden (7 times) and Kyūbi no kitsune (5 times) (Uchiyama, 
Kazuki 内山一樹, “Nihon eiga no kaiki to gensō” 日本映画の怪奇と幻想 [The fantastic and the weird of 
Japanese cinema], in Kaiki to gensō e no kairo: Kaidan kara J-horaa e 回帰と幻想への回路－怪談から
Jホラーへ [Route to the weird and fantastic: From kaidan to J-horror], ed. Uchiyama Kazuki 内山一樹 
(Tokyo: Shinwasha, 2008), 10). Unfortunately, only a few of these early films have gained scholarly 
attention, with much of the research focusing on postwar films, partly due to the limited or total lack of 
availability of prints.  
8 Uchiyama, ibid. 
9 Susan Sontag, “The Imagination of Disaster,” in Hibakusha Cinema: Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and 
the Nuclear Image in Japanese Film, ed. Mick Broderick (London and New York: Routledge, 2009), 41. 
10 Uchiyama, “Kaiki to gensō,” 10; Stephen Neale, Genre (London: British Film Institute, 1980), 43–
44; Torben Grodal, Embodied Visions – Evolution, Emotion, Culture, and Film (Oxford University 
Press, 2009), 100; Shimura Miyoko志村三代子, “Hōrō suru fukuinhei – Kurosawa eiga no naka no yūrei 
o chūshin ni” 放浪する復員兵―黒澤映画の中の幽霊を中心に [Wandering demilitarized soldiers: Ghosts 
in Kurosawa’s films], in Kaii – yōkai bunka no dentō to sōzō. Uchi to soto no shiten kara 怪異・妖怪文
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1.1 OBJECTIVES AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
The overall aim of this thesis is to analyze how characters in Japanese 
speculative films, including the contexts they refer to, are functionally used in 
order to represent images of nationhood. My study is located at an intersection 
of four particular fields: the study of Japanese cinema, the study of horror and 
the fantastic, the study of Japanese masculinities and the study of the history 
of Japanese science. The common denominator of these four themes in the 
films discussed in this thesis is science. This is a study of fictions of science, of 
fictional scientists who by definition are male and, finally, of how these 
fictional portrayals intersect with real-life policies, incidents and the general 
history of science. By analyzing how these strands are combined in fictions of 
science, it is possible to understand how these fictions mediate national 
images.  
Film analysis as a part of mass media and popular culture studies has an 
important status for the understanding of society, because as representations 
“film texts correspond to societal structures, through which relations of 
dominance and power also become manifest in texts.”11 According to Dolores 
Martinez, “the mass media have both a political, or ideological, dimension and 
a deeper, more symbolic and psychological aspect which allow the messages 
they convey to mean different things to different people at different times and 
to be shaped, re-worked and re-formulated over time.”12 This explains why 
films belonging to the same category (kaiki) manifest a multitude of meanings. 
As Martinez further notes, mass media in particular and popular culture in 
general are sites of negotiation where national histories, presents and futures 
are engaged with while simultaneously reconsidering various gendered, class 
and astatus identities.13 Media mediates a nation and is hence the best way to 
discuss one. 14  Furthermore, Turner states that “since ideologies are 
observable in material form only in the practices, behaviors, institutions and 
texts in society, the need to examine these material forms seemed to be 
extremely pressing.”15 It is by analyzing their meaning that it is possible to 
become aware of the hidden realities beneath the surface of everyday life. 
                                                 
化の伝統と創造。ウチとソトの視点から  [The Tradition and Creation of Yokai Culture: From the 
Viewpoint of Inside and Outside], ed. Komatsu Kazuhiko 小松和彦  (Kyoto: Kokusai bunka kenkyū 
sentaa, 2015), 219; Yoshikawa Kōzō 吉川圭三 “Horaa eiga ron” ホラー映画論 [The theory of horror film], 
GHIBLI Neppūジブリ『熱風』 (2012): 115. 
11 Lothar Mikos, “Analysis of Film,” in The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Data Analysis (London: 
SAGE Publications, Inc., 2014), 414. 
12 D.P. Martinez, “Introduction,” in The Worlds of Japanese Popular Culture: Gender, Shifting 
Boundaries and Global Cultures, ed. D.P. Martinez (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 2. 
13 Ibid. 14.  
14 Ibid., 15. 
15 Graeme Turner, British Cultural Studies: An Introduction (London and New York: Routledge, 
1996), 25. 
Introduction 
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At the very root of this study is the assumption that societal anxieties and 
national concerns are represented in kaiki cinema as embodiments of 
scientific masculinity. There are three main objectives in this thesis that 
correspond to three specific gaps in research. First, I want to redefine the 
notion of kaiki eiga as an umbrella term under which it is possible to locate 
works that contain both supernatural and scientific elements. Mieke Bal 
proposes that “[w]hile groping to define … what a particular concept may mean, 
we gain insight into what it can do. It is in the groping that the valuable work 
lies.” 16  Thus, these definitions offer but entry points to the world of the 
mysterious, weird, marvelous and fantastic, used in different ways in different 
media and in different eras. Conceptualizing these films as kaiki will allow us 
to include more films than the more narrow term of horror. In addition, this 
thesis aims to promote the overall presence of fictions of science within 
Japanese film history.  
Second, this thesis contributes to the “need for new ways of thinking about 
maleness.”17 Steve Neale (1992) has argued in his famous article “Masculinity 
as a Spectacle” that despite the fact that heterosexual masculinity is identified 
as a structuring norm, discussions about gender in cinema have tended to 
center on the representation of women.18 Although the situation has greatly 
changed, this still seems to be the case in horror film studies. This has to do 
with the overarching presence of the female ghost in Japanese horror and the 
wider discourse of Barbara Creed’s “monstrous feminine.”19 This approach not 
only excludes works of a varied nature, but also to a large extent the study of 
men. There is, however, a prominent body of fictions of science in Japanese 
cinema, where masculinities are used as vessels for negotiating the changing 
social paradigms. The aim of this thesis is to complement the numerous 
studies that have emphasized the role of women and children within the study 
of Japanese weird narratives.  
Third, Susan Sontag proposes that science fiction places ethical value on 
décor and things, not on people.20 I argue otherwise. Characters are important 
                                                 
16 Mieke Bal, Traveling Concepts in the Humanities: A Rough Guide (Toronto, Buffalo and London: 
University of Toronto Press, 2002), 17. 
17 Brian Attebery, Decoding Gender in Science Fiction (New York and London: Routledge, 2002), 
13. 
18 Steve Neale, “Masculinity as a Spectacle,” Screen 24, no. 6 (1983): 9, 19; He interprets this as a 
problem of familiarity: women are seen as a problematic mystery and a source of anxiety as opposed to 
the perceived familiarity of the ideal masculine norm. This has created a situation which has not 
promoted the study of masculinities either inside or outside cinema (ibid.). 
19 Barbara Creed, “Horror and the Monstrous-Feminine: An Imaginary Abjection,” in The Dread of 
Difference, ed. Barry Keith Grant (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1996), 35–36. The monstrous 
feminine is a concept constructed within and by a patriarchal and phallocentric ideology. It is related to 
the problem of sexual difference. Creed’s understanding of the abject is derived from the works of Julia 
Kristeva, although she criticizes her work on several points. (Ibid.) 
20 Sontag, “Imagination of Disaster,” 44. 
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for plot structure and narrative, as they call on and reflect the viewers’ 
“meanings and concepts of self, person and identity circulating in society and 
the everyday world.”21 In this thesis I will focus on how male characters as 
scientists and engineers function also as representations of ethical values, 
national identities or images of nationhood in cinema. Hence, this thesis also 
participates in what can be referred to as “cultural responses to scientific 
developments,” a field that should receive more attention from scholars.22 
Science and technology enabled Japan’s industrialization, its economic growth 
and its emergence as a technological superpower. The notion is closely 
intertwined with the nation’s history, prevalent in the images projected by the 
nation. This alone makes the analysis of fictions of science important. In fact, 
as pointed out by Sontag, science fiction films are not “about science, they are 
about disaster, concerned with the aesthetics of destruction.”23 According to 
Napier, a vision of disaster can be anything from social and material to 
spiritual. It is, nonetheless, insistent in its “concern with difference” and 
“fundamentally involved with the problem of identity.” 24  This thesis will 
provide a timely discussion on how masculinities, cinematic representations 
and societal changes as negotiated through tropes of science and technology 
are interrelated, and how social anxieties are questioned through the 
cinematic fantastic.  
 
To summarize, this thesis is guided by three key research questions:  
1) What is kaiki and how should it be defined in order to make it a useful 
concept for film studies?  
2) How should scientific masculinity be defined so that it can be used as a 
functional tool to reflect on images of nationhood? To put this 
differently, how are cinematic characters related to science used as 
functional vessels for negotiating social concerns, national images and 
national subjectivities?  
3) What are the particular contexts or social frameworks within which this 
dissecting of national images takes place? In other words, what kinds of 
contexts do the characters appear in and what is the role of men in those 
particular contexts?  
 
The importance of defining and understanding the role of scientific 
masculinity lies in the ability of the concept to shed light on the important role 
                                                 
21 Mikos, “Analysis of Film,” 416. A plot is “everything visibly and audibly present in the film” and a 
narrative “a chain of events in cause-effect relationship occurring in time and space” (David Bordwell 
and Kristin Thompson, Film Art: An Introduction [New York: McGraw Hill, 2004], 69, 71). 
22 Kawana Sari, “Mad Scientists and Their Prey: Bioethics, Murder and Fiction in Interwar Japan,” 
The Journal of Japanese Studies 31, no. 1 (2005): 91. 
23 Sontag, “Imagination of Disaster,” 41. 
24 Susan J. Napier, “Panic Sites: The Japanese Imagination of Disaster from Godzilla to Akira,” 
Journal of Japanese Studies 19, no. 2 (1993): 229–230. 
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of science and technology for Japan’s nation-building project, and how 
masculinities have been paramount features in that process. With men and 
technology being all-encompassing features of society, it is necessary to 
consider their relationship and function in fiction.  
1.2 CORE CONCEPTS  
To be able to analyze both characters and contexts, the argumentation in this 
thesis revolves around a few key concepts: scientific masculinity, hegemonic 
and hybrid masculinities, kaiki eiga, and, to some extent, nation. Whenever 
studying any film genre, it is necessary to pay attention to the matter of what 
to include and exclude, and what the selection criteria are for this. 25  A 
conscious choice on the part of the researcher is needed. I have decided to 
group the films discussed here under the term “kaiki,” defined here as 
speculative fiction. Finnish fantasy literature scholar and critic Vesa Sisättö 
has discussed speculative fiction in a few accounts. In an interview with Laura 
Andersson (2007), he defines it as an all-encompassing form of fantasy 
literature, which itself is based on a deviation from what is considered 
“reality.” 26  This is close to a definition of the fantastic as “any conscious 
departure from consensus reality,”27 and also conforms to Eric S. Rabkin’s 
suggestion that “[f]antastic worlds … come alive for us as alternatives to the 
real world.” 28  To speculate is to promote alternatives. Kaiki eiga as a 
speculative form of filmmaking is thus a neutral umbrella term for fictions that 
speculate in the most varied of ways. It is important to utilize this concept not 
only in order to include many films that have previously been difficult to 
categorize but also to see how fantastic narratives are used for portraying the 
real world.  
Characters draw their impact and force from the social realities they are 
grounded in. 29  A core concept in mediating the importance of science for 
conveying feelings about national concerns is that of scientific masculinity. 
Erica Lorraine Milam and Robert A. Nye define scientific masculinity broadly 
as any type of masculinity that contributes to the creation of knowledge. There 
are two other important sub-definitions. First, scientific masculinity is not 
limited to laboratories. Second, agents of scientific masculinity can 
                                                 
25 J.P. Telotte, Science Fiction Film (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 8. 
26  Laura Andersson, “Scifiä vai spekulatiivista fiktiota?” [Scifi or speculative fiction?], 
Kulttuurivihkot 6 (2007): 30. 
27 Susan Napier, The Fantastic in Modern Japanese Literature: The Subversion of Modernity (New 
York and London: Routledge, 1996), 9; see also Kathryn Hume, Fantasy/Mimesis: Responses to Reality 
in Western Literature (New York and London: Methuen, Inc, 1984), 21. 
28 Eric Rabkin, “Introduction,” in Fantastic Worlds: Myths, Tales, and Stories, ed. Eric S. Rabkin 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), 1.  
29 Attebery, Decoding Gender, 10, 38. 
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simultaneously also occupy other roles such as family men.30 In kaiki eiga, 
scientific masculinity is often used to convey an impression of “science-
abilities,” “tech-savviness” or, in some cases, just a direct and straightforward 
link with technologies and machines. The fluidity of the concept, as Milam and 
Nye point out, allows for the exploration of many different types of characters 
that could otherwise be difficult to include under the same analysis.31 The 
importance of scientific masculinity lies in its applicability: it works as a notion 
under which to locate many of the male characters in the films that manifest 
similar thematic concerns and share the quest of knowledge-seeking, although 
they might seem different on the surface level. In addition, it provides a lens 
for analyzing the function of “science” in the films, as opposed to the 
“supernatural” elements of tales that center on the feminine.  
In order to understand scientific masculinity, it is important to establish a 
point of reference. In Japan, negotiating masculinity is a process of navigating 
both the historical ideal of a powerful male dominating subordinate members 
of society and the perceived emasculation in the aftermath of the Pacific War, 
a feeling that was intensified in the 1990s due to the recession.32 In this thesis, 
these shifts will be dissected through the use of such concepts as hegemonic 
and hybrid masculinities. Hegemony, a term used by Antonio Gramsci, in 
general means “the cultural dynamic by which a group claims and sustains a 
leading position in social life.”33 A successful claim to authority is the mark of 
hegemony. Hegemonic masculinity refers to a culturally privileged group of 
men that maintains a successful claim to patriarchy, emphasizing the 
dominant position of men vis-à-vis the subordinate position of women and 
other men. In addition, it is a time-space practice, a configuration qua cultural 
idea that “embodies the currently accepted answer” (italics mine) to the claim 
to power.34 It is thus subject to change. Interrelated models include complicit, 
                                                 
30 Erica Lorraine Milam and Robert A. Nye, “Introduction,” OSIRIS: Scientific Masculinities 30, no. 1 
(2015): 1–2, 5. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Valerie Wee, Japanese Horror Cinema and Their American Remakes (New York: Routledge, 
2014), 126. 
33 R.W. Connell, Masculinites (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005), 77. 
34 Tokuhiro Yoko, Marriage in Contemporary Japan (Oxon and New York: Routledge, 2010), 58; 
R.W. Connell and James Messerschmidt, “Hegemonic Masculinity: Rethinking the Concept,” Gender & 
Society 19, no. 6 (December 2005): 852–853; James Messerschmidt, Hegemonic Masculinities and 
Camouflaged Politics (Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2010), 44–46; Michael A. Messner, “The 
Masculinity of the Governator: Muscle and Compassion in American Politics,” Gender and Society 21, 
no. 4 (2007): 462; Demetrakis Z. Demetriou, “Connell's Concept of Hegemonic Masculinity: A Critique,” 
Theory and Society 30, no. 3 (2001): 340, 342–343; see also Sabine Frühstück and Anne Walthall, 
“Introduction,” in Recreating Japanese Men, ed. Sabine Frühstück and Anne Walthall (Berkeley, Los 
Angeles and London: University of California Press, 2011), 2. 
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subordinated and marginalized masculinities.35 Hybrid masculinities, in turn, 
are used to describe models that include a combination of attributes, some of 
which might be ones not generally associated with being masculine, such as 
being overly emotional. Hybrid masculinities do not, however, threaten or 
oppose hegemonic masculinity. In fact, quite the opposite. Messner talks 
about “a configuration of symbols that forge a masculinity that is useful for 
securing power among men who already have it.” 36  It is merely a new 
combination of attributes that results in the overall domination of patriarchy.  
Finally, a central concept used here is that of nation. This thesis is not an 
exploration of nationalism as such, but of national images. As Benedict 
Anderson notes, “nation, nationality and nationalism – all have proved 
notoriously difficult to define, let alone analyse.”37 According to Anderson, 
nation is “an imagined political community … imagined as both inherently 
limited and sovereign.” 38  It is imagined because people from different 
locations between the borders of a nation are able to imagine a community 
they all belong to, despite never really meeting each other. Because of the 
borders—or boundaries—this community is also limited. And having its roots 
in the era of Enlightenment and Revolution, or in the Japanese case in the 
period right after the Meiji Restoration, it is also sovereign. Finally, nation is 
a community that is limited because of its borders and boundaries, based on a 
feeling of “deep horizontal comradeship” despite the presence of exploitation 
and inequality that are a part of every society in the world.39  
I admit there is a thin line between nationalism and national images, 
especially if nationalism is defined in Michael Billig’s terms as the “ideological 
means by which nation-states are reproduced.”40 It is possible to see the films 
discussed here as participating in this ideological reproduction, either 
promoting or negating some national images and values. Anderson suggested 
mass media as a premium way for the idea of an imagined community, or a 
nation, to spread. Martinez calls these narratives that are circulated in mass 
media myths: they are not false history but rather “a series of continually re-
worked narrations which reflect and reinforce the values of constantly 
changing societies.”41 In other words, mass media narratives are an important 
aspect of modern nationalism, 42  contributing directly to the creation of 
                                                 
35 Jeff Hearn, “From hegemonic masculinity to hegemony of men,” Feminist Theory 5, no. 1 (2004): 
55; Connell, Masculinities, 76–81. 
36 Messner, “The Governator,” 473. 
37  Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism (New York: Verso, 2006), 3. 
38 Ibid., 6. 
39 Ibid., 6–7. 
40 Michael Billig, Banal Nationalism (London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi: SAGE Publications, 
1995), 6. 
41 Martinez, “Introduction,” 3. 
42 Ibid., 11. 
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Anderson’s imagined community.43 However, to call the films “nationalist” 
because of their imagining of a certain national image requires theoretical 
knowledge that is outside the scope of this thesis, and hence I will stick to the 
present definition of a nation in my simplified use of the term “national 
image.”  
In the works discussed here, science and technology are used in a way that 
results in the emergence of “anomalous bodies and subjectivities.” This is due 
to the centrality of the so-called Frankenstein Syndrome.44 In addition, not 
only the syndrome but the Frankenstein myth itself is a suitable analytical 
concept for the exploration of Japan’s national identity in the postwar period. 
The myth, according to Andrew Bartlett, is based on a so-called victimary 
attitude where “the victims of the mad scientist suffer terribly [but] are far 
from being innocent themselves.” 45  This ties the Frankenstein metaphor 
together with Japan’s history and representations of national identities. The 
films clearly present images of the Japanese nation as both Frankenstein and 
his monster, both aggressor and victim. 46  Characters embodying scientific 
masculinity serve this role in the films. In addition, analyzing Japanese 
narratives through this universal concept yields understanding of the fact that 
although I discuss products of Japanese culture here, it should be contantly 
kept in mind that the themes present in the films are but culture-specific 
manifestations of universal themes. I am aware of the issue of not engaging 
with films from other cultural spheres here, but unfortunately the scope of my 
study does not allow for a broader cross-cultural comparison.  
 
1.3 METHODOLOGY 
The core concepts defined above influence the methodology of this thesis. 
Films reflect both the conditions and structures of society and individual life.47 
However, film as a subject of study can be deceiving in its easy approachability. 
                                                 
43 For a critique about the easy applicability of Anderson’s concept,” see Jussi Pakkasvirta, “Mitä 
Anderson tarkoittikaan ‘kuvitellulla yhteisöllä’?,” Tieteessä tapahtuu 37, no. 6 (2019): 49–52, 
https://journal.fi/tt/article/view/87248. 
44  Sharalyn Orbaugh, “Sex and the Single Cyborg: Japanese Popular Culture Experiments in 
Subjectivity,” in Robot Ghosts and Wired Dreams: Japanese Science Fiction from Origins to Anime, ed. 
Christopher Bolton, Istvan Csicsery-Ronay and Tatsumi Takayuki (Minneapolis and London: University 
of Minnesota Press, 2007), 175. 
45  Andrew Bartlett, Mad Scientist, Impossible Human: An Essay in Generative Anthropology 
(Aurora, Colo: The Davies Group, Publishers, 2014), 17. 
46 For a discussion about the prevalence of the victim attitude within the “postmemory” generation, 
see Takenaka Akiko, “Japanese Memories of the Asia-Pacific War: Analyzing the Revisionist Turn Post-
1995,” The Asia-Pacific Journal/Japan Focus 14, no. 20 (2016).  
47 Mikos, “Analysis of Film,” 409. 
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To distinguish between common opinions and academic analyses can be 
especially troublesome with Japanese-language source material, where the 
ending “-ron” (the theory of -) is used quite freely.  
In this thesis I will utilize a widely interdisciplinary framework for the 
analysis of the films at hand. My research is exploratory and qualitative, aimed 
at locating some main principles in a field that has previously been under-
researched. I will incorporate an inductive approach with an aim of developing 
a new framework for understanding certain phenomena. The construction of 
the conceptual framework has first and foremost stemmed from the need to 
analyze certain salient features of a number of films, rather than trying to 
incorporate a body of works into an already existing theoretical framework—
something that Standish sees as a general temptation for scholars.48 This has 
entailed revising how certain basic notions in film studies can best be applied 
to Japanese cinema.  
Based on my general definition of kaiki eiga, I selected 16 films for 
analysis.49 These films can be roughly divided into two periods: the postwar 
period (1950s/1960s) and the contemporary period (1990s/2000s). 50  The 
reason for this overall division is the relative invisibility of scientific 
masculinity in cinema during the in-between period. The reception of these 
films has also varied, ranging from the vast contemporary audience 
(9,610,000) of Gojira 51  to the quite modest worldwide box office of the 
Henshin ningen films. The material thus consists of a wide selection of films 
from different points in history and from various budgetary spheres, in order 
to demonstrate that the connection between science, masculinity and national 
subjectivities and images has indeed been a prominent and important, albeit 
under-analyzed, feature of 20th- and 21st-century Japanese cinema.  
In addition, the classification of these films generally conforms to the 
prototype theory of categorization, as suggested by George Lakoff.52 This is an 
answer to the classical view where categories are defined “in terms of common 
                                                 
48 Isolde Standish, Myth and Masculinity in the Japanese Cinema – Towards a Political Reading 
of the “Tragic Hero” (Oxon: Routledge, 2000), 15. 
49 See Section 1.3 for further discussion about the films themselves. 
50 All in all, Nihon tokusatsu gensō eiga zenshū (A complete listing of Japanese special effects and 
fantastic films) lists 603 films released between 1948 and 1996. It is noteworthy that such films were 
released by and large before the war and also after 1997. For summaries of the plots of the films included 
here, see Appendix 1.  
51 See https://godzilla.jp/history.html. This corresponds to about 10 percent of the population of 
Japan in 1954. By 2004, fifty years after the series was inaugurated, 28 films had been produced and 
seen by a total of 99,250,000 people (Katō Norihiro, “Goodbye Gozilla, Hello Kitty – The Meanings of 
Japanese Cuteness,” The American Interest Autumn (2006), https://www.the-american-
interest.com/2006/09/01/goodbye-godzilla-hello-kitty/).  
52 George Lakoff, Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal about the Mind 
(Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1987). 
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properties of their members.”53 According to Lakoff, categorization itself is a 
combination of “human experience and imagination” and to change a concept 
of a category is “to change not only our concept of the mind, but also our 
understanding of the world.”54 Hence, redefining a group of horror films as 
speculative cinema contributes to a new understanding of the world. If the 
classical view emphasized the common properties of the members of a 
category, suggesting also that the members are thus equal in status, prototype 
theory shows asymmetries between members and within categories.55 Lakoff 
argues that concepts are understood via idealized cognitive models (ICMs) 
that “may fit one’s understanding of the world either perfectly, very well, pretty 
well, somewhat well, pretty badly, badly, or not at all.”56 A film deviates from 
the prototypical concept of kaiki if the ICM does not fit the world of the 
spectator perfectly or the film referred to deviates from the meaning of the 
concept itself. But it is also noteworthy that even if not every aspect of the film 
accords with the definition of kaiki, the concept can still be applied as is the 
case with the HAYABUSA films. These are the so-called “extensions of the 
central model,” which feature both the aspects of the central model (kaiki as 
defined above) and “certain principles of extension.”57 The prototype model 
explains why the works analyzed here might greatly differ in some aspects, 
while still being included in the same category; for example, to some degree 
they all include things such as “scientific masculinity” and are based on 
“deviations from consensus reality.”  
I interpret the plots and characters of the films against general ideological 
trends and concerns related to notions of nation, science and genre in 
Japanese society. This is despite the fact that those responsible for the original 
texts may not have been aware that “ideological inventories of their society” 
were being reproduced.58 According to Mikos, there are five categories that 
can become the focus of research, or what he calls the cognitive purpose of a 
study: content and representation; narration and dramaturgy; characters and 
actors; aesthetics and configuration; and contexts. 59  I am principally 
concerned with characters and the contexts in which they appear and are 
represented. In other words, I analyze how characters related to science 
mediate certain societal ideas and ideologies in constructing a certain national 
subjectivity.  
                                                 
53 Lakoff, Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things, xii. 
54 Ibid., 8–9. 
55 Ibid., 40. 
56 Ibid., 70. 
57 Ibid., 70-71, 91. 
58 Stuart Hall, “The rediscovery of ‘ideology’: return of the repressed in media studies,” in Culture, 
Society and the Media, ed. Michael Gurevitch, Tony Bennet, James Curran and Janet Woollacott (Taylor 
& Francis e-Library, 2005), 68. 
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Fictional characters and how they fit into everyday contexts of reference 
are, in general, interpreted according to experiences and common 
knowledge.60 They “show us how a culture delimits its own boundaries, how it 
sees itself; what it respects and desires.”61 They mediate cultural meanings in 
a narrative and embody specific meanings during different cultural moments 
and in different cultural discourses. By unpacking these discourses, it is 
possible to uncover unconscious ideologies that abound in representations of 
the weird.62 Characters can be seen as functional entities: inventions that are 
transmitted culturally in order to perform certain functions, not something 
that just come to the individual mind. Torben Grodal speaks of “functional 
bundles,” universally understandable mental units that are invented and 
widely communicated, travel across cultures and symbolize themes that are 
central to human existence all over the world.63  
As functional bundles, characters not only convey feelings and ideologies 
that are culture-specific but also reveal some universal concerns. According to 
Grodal’s bioculturalist framework, universal story material is always molded 
by cultural biases and interests.64 He calls this the “historical specificity of 
universalism,” where universal forms have specific cultural variations.65 To 
                                                 
60 Mikos, “Study of Film,” 417. 
61 Asa Simon Mittman, “Introduction: The Impact of Monsters and Monster Studies,” in The Ashgate 
Research Companion to Monsters and the Monstrous, ed. Asa Simon Mittman and Peter Dendle 
(Dorchester: Ashgate Publishing, 2013), 13. 
62 Michael Dylan Foster, Pandemonium and the Parade: Japanese Monsters and the Culture of 
Yōkai (Berkeley, Los Angeles & London: University of California Press, 2009), 3; I define discourse here 
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64 Grodal, Embodied Visions, 18. 
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thousands and thousands of years. He proposes that central features of the film experience and 
aesthetics are determined by basic architecture of the brain and the functions it was made to serve. An 
embodied approach presupposes that human experiences are linked to concrete specifications of the 
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reconstruct the invisible embodied brain (and its feelings), to see how it supports and motivates visual 
and aural perceptions, and comprehend how its construction molds what is experienced (Grodal, ibid., 
145–146). It is in this embodied brain where biological universality is located. 
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understand the emergence of themes during a particular time requires an 
understanding of the underlying cultural components. 66  Basic universal 
biological attributes affect our preference to see and experience certain motifs 
on screen. It is from this biology-based universality that cultural expressions 
emerge, representing specific developments and outgrowths. There are two 
prime examples of this in my thesis. First, kaiki eiga is a form of the fantastic 
and the weird that deals with universal concerns and uses universal functional 
bundles, but locates them strictly within the Japanese cultural context. Second, 
scientific masculinity is a notion found in cultures all over the world. Its 
representations in Japanese kaiki eiga, however, deal with culture-specific 
concerns.  
Locating universal anxieties within culture-specific imagery is an antidote 
to the unfortunate analysis of essentialized Japaneseness. The bioculturalist 
stance differs from that of Ian Buruma (1984) and Gregory Barrett (1989), who 
state that these characters are not to be found in other cultures, and often 
locate their roots within Japanese culture only. Barrett, for example, analyzes 
characters as “personified representations of factors considered basic to filmic 
expressions of Japanese culture.” 67  Based on this reading, characters are 
ultimately culture-specific constructions that, over decades and in the works 
of various directors, have been used to create a sense of familiarity and 
continuity. But, as I propose, they are also products in a long line of universal 
representations whose prominence can be explained by the function they serve. 
In relation to the analysis of characters, the notion of signifying practice is 
required: “the more active labor of making things mean … of selecting and 
presenting, of structuring and shaping: not merely the transmitting of an 
already-existing meaning.”68 As Standish puts it, “the meaning a spectator 
constructs from the chain of cinematic signifiers, both verbal and visual, is 
dependent on not only the construction of the film’s narrative and mise-en-
scène, but also the socio-political context of the spectator’s own viewing 
perspective.”69  In my analysis, these contexts appear as the socio-political 
situation of Japan during the release of the films. I will explain and refer to 
these extra-diegetic contexts with the aim of providing “the other text,” which 
                                                 
66 Mathias Clasen, “Monsters Evolve: A Biocultural Approach to Horror Stories,” Review of General 
Psychology 16, no. 2 (2012): 224. 
67 These include “the inevitable human conditions of suffering and death, parts of the life-cycle 
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68 Hall, “Rediscovery of ideology,” 60. 
69 Standish, Myth and Masculinity, 4. Mise-en-scène means “putting into the scene” things that 
appear in the film frame (Bordwell and Thompson, Film Art, 176). 
Introduction 
28 
helps locate the meaning of the film and its characters. As Mizuno Hiromi 
suggests, in order to track “a critical history of fantasy,” there must be a 
process of locating “meanings, ambiguities, and possibilities … between the 
text and the context.”70 Contexts work as “the other” texts that, when put 
together with the text in question, produce meaning and make particular texts 
meaningful.71 Consequently, meaning is only acquired in relation to a specific 
context which in itself is always changing in meaning.72 The interpretation of 
the context is ultimately what enables different analyses of the same filmic 
material. 73  In fact, the very nature of storytelling demands that ideas be 
embodied in characters within social contexts. 74  Contexts create culture-
specific layers for characters that are often transnational, globally circulated 
and partially localized. Thus, masculine characters must be regarded within 
their designated institutional contexts: the state, the workplace and the family. 
Personal practices abound from institutional practices.75 
On a formalist note, Bordwell and Thompson suggest four basic ways of 
locating multiple layers of meanings present in film: referential, explicit, 
implicit and symptomatic.76 All of the films analyzed in this thesis can be 
addressed according to this multileveled model. Referential meaning works to 
establish the diegesis as a comprehensive world. This layer is strong in the 
films, as they work with real-life environments and locations with a twist of 
the fantastic. Explicitly the films are about the morality of science, 77  and 
implicitly they refer to the history of science in Japan. Finally, the most 
interesting layer—the symptomatic—is constructed of ideologies, “a particular 
set of social values.”78 In my analysis, this symptomatic layer can be divided 
along two axes: national image and gender. Particular sets of social values lie 
behind the way the films discuss national images and gender. To analyze the 
relationship between these two becomes the real target of analysis, mediated 
by the presence of scientific masculinity.  
In addition, fictions of science present particular levels of meaning-making. 
In his “Has the Empire Sunk Yet? The Pacific in Japanese Science Fiction,” 
                                                 
70 Mizuno Hiromi, “When Pacifist Japan Fights: Historicizing Desires in Anime,” Mechademia 2 
(2007): 104. 
71 John Storey, Cultural Theory and Popular Culture: An Introduction (London: Routledge, 2015), 
23. 
72 Ibid., 15.  
73 Mikos, “Analysis of Film,” 420. 
74 Attebery, Decoding Gender, 11. 
75 R.W. Connell, “The big picture: Masculinities in recent world history,” Theory and Society 22 
(1993): 602. 
76 Bordwell and Thompson, Film Art, 55–57. 
77 According to Honda Ishirō himself, Gojira is a portrayal of the conscience of a scientist (quoted in 
Takeuchi, Hiroshi 竹内博, Tokusatsu o meguru hitobito: Nihon eiga Shōwa no jidai 特撮をめぐる―昭
和の時代 [The people of tokusatsu: Japanese film, Shōwa period] [Tokyo: Waizu shuppan, 2011], 14). 
78 Bordwell and Thompson, ibid., 57. 
 29 
Schnellbächer argues that first there is “realism on the level of technical 
plausibility.” 79  Fictions of science offer wondrous portrayals of fictional 
technological innovations which, in fact, often have a real-life anchor point. In 
the films this is referred to in the actual history of science and technology in 
Japan, as well as what kinds of innovations and policies have been made. 
Second, fictions of science portray the reactions of (political) institutions to 
social events. These events are negotiated in relation to agents—principally 
male—that represent institutions. In other words, individual reactions can be 
seen as representative of a larger whole, contributing to the overall discussion 
about the events themselves. Finally, “the narrative dramatizes the emotions 
created by these events,” which creates an affective level linked with questions 
of identity. 80  This is linked with the question of positive and negative 
representations. All the male agents that work within “the realistic-scientific” 
space are coded either positively or negatively by the narrative. Consequently, 
the narrative positions them as representations of favorable or unfavorable 
national images. 
1.4 THE SELECTION OF FILMS  
The films I have selected for analysis correspond to the definition of kaiki 
discussed above. My aim has also been to include a wide array of works from 
different periods of time and different directors in order to make the results of 
this thesis as comprehensive as possible. I pay close attention especially to 
Honda Ishirō’s (1911–1993) films, starting with his paramount Gojira (1954). 
Honda continued with Chikyū bōeigun (The Mysterians, 1957) and the 
Henshin ningen series. The latter—Bijo to ekitainingen (The H-man, 1958), 
Densō ningen (The Secret of the Telegian, 1960) and Gasu ningen daiichi-gō 
(The Human Vapor, 1960)—was a part of Tōhō’s tokusatsu film cycle. The 
second film in the set was directed by Fukuda Jun (1923–2000). Matango 
(1963) is often promoted as a spin-off sequel of the series and also featured in 
this thesis. I also include Teshigahara Hiroshi’s (1927–2001) Tanin no kao 
(The Face of Another, 1964), which is based on a book by Abe Kōbō (1924–
1993), rarely analyzed within horror film studies but definitely manifesting 
themes which are similar to other films from that period, including the Mad 
Scientist motif. All of the films here are explicitly concerned with the issue of 
science without conscience. Consequently, the light in which science and 
scientific masculinities are portrayed contributes to the discussion about 
Japan’s national images during the changing times.  
                                                 
79 Thomas Schnellbächer, “Has the Empire Sunk Yet? The Pacific in Japanese Science Fiction,” in 
Robot Ghosts and Wired Dreams: Japanese Science Fiction from Origins to Anime, ed. Christopher 
Bolton et al. (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 2007), 38 
80 Ibid., 39. 
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If Honda was a prominent figure in the vast field of Japanese speculative 
cinema, more recently Kurosawa Kiyoshi (b. 1955) and Tsukamoto Shinya (b. 
1960) have created characters that are linked to the techno-scientific narrative. 
Interviewed by Michael Crandol, Kurosawa Kiyoshi states that his films do not 
belong to the genre of kaiki.81 I do not agree. His films especially are highly 
speculative in nature. Whereas scientific experimentations in the films of the 
previous era often resulted in an external metamorphosis of a character, the 
contemporary era portrays mental deviation, or so-called “mentalmorphosis.” 
Instead of creating external freaks in line with the Frankenstein narrative, 
contemporary representations of scientific masculinity deal with inner 
grotesques, presenting yet another image of the nation. This is a shift from 
henshin (変身) to henshin (変心). I have included Kairo (Pulse, 2001), Sakebi 
(Retribution, 2006) and Doppelgänger (2006) from Kurosawa, and the 
Tetsuo series (1988, 1992, 2009) from Tsukamoto.  
In order to illuminate the various, sometimes contrasting ideals of 
nationhood that the films promote, I have also decided to include three 
HAYABUSA films that were released in 2012.82 I admit that in this case I am 
slightly stretching the notion of kaiki, as these films are based on a journey of 
an actual space probe. Although fully situated in “our world,” the films 
nonetheless offer a form of cinematic fantasy where reality is challenged, 
altered, reflected and extended. These three films, HAYABUSA (20th Century 
Fox, 2011), Hayabusa – haruka naru kikan (Hayabusa – the long return home, 
Tōei, 2012) and Okaeri Hayabusa (Welcome back, Hayabusa, Shōchiku, 
2012), hence succumb to the prototype theory. 
1.5 CHALLENGES AND LIMITATIONS  
It is clear that film studies, including the study of Japanese cinema, has 
challenges and limitations. Mikos suggests that film studies is inherently inter- 
or transdisciplinary. This means that there is a need to acknowledge the 
importance of many, sometimes oppositional, theoretical perceptions for a 
comprehensive understanding of the subject matter.83 Although providing the 
                                                 
81  Michael Crandol, “Nightmares from the Past: ‘Kaiki eiga’ and the Dawn of Japanese Horror 
Cinema,” (PhD Diss., University of Minnesota, 2015), 52–53. 
82 When referring to the three HAYABUSA films as a cluster, I will capitalize the letters according to 
the original name of the probe. 
83 Carl Plantinga and Greg M. Smith, “Introduction,” in Passionate Views: Film, Cognition, and 
Emotion, ed. Carl Plantinga and Greg M. Smith (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1999), 15; David Bordwell and Noël Carroll, Post-Theory: Reconstructing Film Studies (Madison 
and London: University of Wisconsin, Kindle Edition, 2012 [1996]). This can be seen in Adam 
Lowenstein’s recent study on surrealism and digital media, in which he uses psychoanalytic and 
cognitivist frameworks simultaneously; see Adam Lowenstein, Dreaming of Cinema: Spectatorship, 
Surrealism, and the Age of Digital Media (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015). 
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best means for a comprehensive study, this approach is also one of the 
weightiest tasks. First, in order to understand the full meaning of a particular 
film, it is necessary to familiarize oneself with the history of science in Japan, 
Japan’s postwar social conditions, general studies on masculinities and gender 
and, finally, the history of Japanese cinema in general and studies on horror, 
science fiction and the fantastic in particular.84 Needless to say, an exploration 
of any of these fields would make a dissertation of its own. This thesis thus 
represents but a scratch of the surface of what could become a lifelong career. 
However, it is exactly in this “scratching” that the novelty value of this thesis 
lies. It is the process of combining all of the aforementioned themes that 
creates a framework where new meanings can be located.  
Second, when discussing national images within Japanese studies, one 
must tread carefully. Yoshimoto Mitsuhiro has criticized earlier studies on 
Japanese cinema where, according to him, “stereotypes of the Japanese 
national character and culture essence are routinely used to explain thematic 
motifs, formal features, and contextual backgrounds of Japanese films.”85 By 
this he seems to refer to the incorporation of ideas of nihonjinron into 
academic discussion. Nihonjinron came to the fore in the 1960s and reached 
wide popularity in the 1970s, connecting the period of economic growth with 
inquiries into what it means to be Japanese.86 It can be defined as “a body of 
discourse which purports to demonstrate Japan’s cultural differences from 
other cultures and Japan’s cultural uniqueness in the world and thus tries to 
establish Japan’s cultural identity.”87 Manabe and Befu come to the conclusion 
that nihonjinron is the worldview of an older male with a higher standard of 
living; while this worldview and the ideology of the establishment may be 
espoused by less than a majority in a numerical sense, those who espouse it 
are in the majority in the political sense.88  
It is noteworthy that this idea of “Japaneseness” was based on ignoring the 
“Others” of Japan, instead drawing a parallel between the past and present 
                                                 
84 I define “postwar Japan” here, in accord with John Dower, as equivalent to the latter part of the 
Showa period (1945–1989), which he sees as a popular and reasonable equation; see John Dower, “The 
Useful War,” Daedalus 199, no. 3 (Summer, 1990): 68. 
85 Yoshimoto Mitsuhiro, Kurosawa: Film Studies and Japanese Cinema (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 2000), 10. 
86 Roger Goodman, “New Research Trends in the Anthropology and Sociology of Japan,” Japan 
aktuell – Journal of Current Japanese Affairs 3 (2006), 64. The theoretical predecessors of nihonjinron, 
however, have been around for centuries. The “uniqueness” of Japan was perhaps first introduced by the 
Meiji Government in their establishing of an imperial ideology that emphasized the distinctiveness of 
the Japanese nation; see Mizuno Hiromi, Science for the Empire: Scientific Nationalism in Modern 
Japan (Stanford: Standford University Press, 2009), 2–3. 
87 Manabe Kazufumi and Befu Harumi, “Japanese Cultural Identity – An Empirical Investigation of 
Nihonjinron,” Japanstudien 4 (1993): 124.  
88 Ibid., 100. 
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Japanese.89 The “Others” in this case refer to minorities within Japan. Within 
the international framework the Anglo-Americans, or ōbeijin, have generally 
been the reference point. Nihonjinron is generally considered a publishing 
genre because it “lacks the internal coherence to qualify as a system of 
knowledge” that is required of a discourse.90 As Ivy notes, the conclusion of 
what it means to be Japanese may be positive or negative, but it is still a sign 
of the uniqueness of the Japanese.91 Nihonjinron, as noted by many, is not 
unique as a discourse of national identity, but the amount of publications 
about Japan’s uniqueness, or the historical materials used to recreate a 
national culture, can often be considered so.92 Thus, in research one must be 
careful with one’s sources, because there is always the risk of ending up 
portraying Japan in an essentialist light.93  
Finally, in addition to literature and film, anime, too, is a prominent 
medium within which techno-scientific narratives play a large role. Starting 
with the paramount Astroboy, various images abound. Neon Genesis 
Evangelion offers an outlook on scientific femininity with its emphasis on 
female scientists, such as Akagi Ritsuko or Shinji’s late mother Ikari Yui. In 
addition, there is also a vast body of anime or manga adaptations that deal 
with scientific matters. I have, however, decided to exclude live action films 
that are based on anime or manga, such as Cutie Honey (2004, 2016), 
Yatterman (2009), Sky High (2003), Casshern (2004), and anime films such 
as Akira (1988) and Kōkaku kidōtai (Ghost in the Shell, 1995, also based on 
                                                 
89 Funabiki Takeo 船曳健夫 , ‘Nihonjinron’ saikō 「日本人論」再考  [Reassessing Nihonjinron] 
(Tokyo: Kōdansha, 2010), 4, 7. 
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92 Burgess, “Nihonjinron,” 3; Sugimoto Yoshio, An Introduction to Japanese Society (Cambridge, 
New York, Port Melbourne, Madrid and Cape Town: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 2. 
93 The study of Japan has had its roots in a line of thought that has constantly compared it to “the 
West.” This is true of some of the earliest accounts of Japan, made by Basil Hall Chamberlain, George B. 
Sansom and Edwin O. Reischauer, who all isolate a so-called Japanese essence, an essential Japan 
(Richard H. Minear, “Orientalism and the Study of Japan,” The Journal of Asian Studies 39, no. 3 [1980], 
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manga),94 although many thematic similarities are to be found between kaiki 
eiga and anime. Some scholars include anime as part and parcel of Japanese 
cinema, “within expanded cinema studies” as Lamarre states, 95  whereas 
others analyze it as a clearly separate medium with its own traditions, rules 
and limitations. I agree with the latter stance, although thematic anime studies 
do provide interesting viewpoints to consider and take into account.  
1.6 THESIS STRUCTURE  
This thesis is divided into eight main chapters which form two distinct parts. 
Chapters 2 and 3 identify the research gaps, frame the research questions, and 
create a conceptual framework within which the issue of scientific masculinity 
as a representation of national images may be approached. Chapters 4, 5, 6 
and 7 form the core analysis of this thesis, which is divided thematically 
according to four different national images addressed by the films: Japan as a 
militarist nation, Japan as a pacifist nation, Japan as an economic superpower 
(“Japan as No. 1”)96 and Japan as a technological superpower.  
Chapter 2 is concerned with genre. I will discuss previous literature on 
Japanese horror cinema with the aim of locating some obvious gaps in the 
research. The chapter illuminates the need to (re)define the notion of kaiki 
eiga. The aim of this chapter is not only to shed light on the way Japanese 
horror has been analyzed in the recent past, but also to illuminate the general 
framework within which my analysis works. I will conclude the chapter with 
my definition of kaiki as speculative fiction.  
In Chapter 3, gender becomes the main concern. I will first point out how 
gender is present, and has been analyzed, with regard to a variety of 
speculative fictions. Once a background has been established for the study of 
gender, I will move on to theorizations of the topic with the aim of providing a 
suitable toolkit for analysis by highlighting and defining concepts such as 
hegemonic masculinity and hybrid masculinity, as well as their roles and 
representations in Japan. Finally, I will illuminate the overall role that the 
history of science and technology has had in Japan, as this provides a 
framework for an understanding of the concept of scientific masculinity.  
In Chapter 4, I will analyze narratives that mediate Japan’s militarist past 
through the figure of the scientist. These narratives most clearly derive from 
                                                 
94 This is mostly due to the page count of this thesis but also because, as Lamarre points out, there 
is a certain specificity in anime that is due to its nature as a medium combining cinema (moving image) 
and art (drawing/painting), art “techniques” (drawing, painting, compositional techniques, and so forth) 
and film “apparatuses” (the movie camera and film projector) (Thomas Lamarre, Anime Machine: A 
Media Theory of Animation [Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 2009]: 12, 16). 
95 Lamarre, Anime Machine, xxii. 
96 Referring to Ezra Vogel’s famous book Japan as No. 1: Lessons for America (Cambridge and 
London: Harvard University Press, 1979). 
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the universal Mad Scientist motif, dealing with topics such as Japan’s human 
experimentation projects, warfare and weapon development. Many of the 
films utilize the notion of fukuinhei, the demilitarized, returning soldier—a 
Japanese-style return of the repressed. Chapter 5, in turn, is a positive 
antithesis to the narratives of the previous chapter, highlighting images and 
stories where scientifically minded men often not only solve problems that 
Japan is dealing with but also become symbolic saviors of the whole world. In 
many cases, pacifism is suggested through narratives of a nuclear threat or a 
worldwide threat spreading from Japan.  
Economic nationalism and the image of Japan as No. 1 are dissected in 
Chapter 6.97 This is achieved by deconstructing the daikokubashira98 ideology. 
Many films quite directly challenge the notion of “working,” providing 
alternative role models or narratives of escape from the ideal that Japan’s 
economic growth was based upon. On the other hand, there are also narratives 
that, highlighting the dissolution of paternity in the family, become larger 
representations of the dissolution of patriarchy itself.  
Chapter 7 continues with this theme, placing the discourse within the 
framework of technological nationalism. I will point out how robot policies are 
used as real-life reference points for fictional narratives and how technological 
nationalism and the idea of the building of the science-technological 
superpower find their fictional representations. I will also point out how 
gender roles within the sphere of technology are slowly beginning to be 
questioned and the traditional hierarchy subverted. 
                                                 
97 Economic nationalism can be defined as “economic policies which are adopted to defend and 
strengthen the state against foreign competition” (James Mayall, Nationalism and International Society 
[Cambridge, New York, Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1990], 72).  
98 Daikokubashira means the central (supporting) pillar of the house and here refers to the role of 
the male breadwinner.  
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2 GENRE AND THE STUDY OF KAIKI EIGA  
This chapter deals with issues regarding genre. According to most critics, 
genres provide the formulas that drive production; they constitute the 
structures that define individual mainstream films. For example, 
programming decisions are based primarily on generic criteria, and the 
interpretations of generic films depend directly on the audience’s generic 
expectations. All of these aspects are covered by the single term “genre,” 
although its meaning remains confusing.1 This confusion is present also in the 
way Japanese horror cinema has been theorized, analyzed and categorized 
previously. 
Horrific, weird and fantastic narratives have been a popular category in 
Japanese cinema for decades. In fact, Japanese cinema has experienced three 
such booms during its history: the 1910s, the 1950s and the 1990s. There are 
two differing opinions on the prevalence of horror and supernatural tales. First, 
there is the idea that horror booms tend to appear within certain periods of 
time: with no imminent crises looming on the horizon, people are able to enjoy 
fictional horror; alternatively, as horror films are often cheap to make, 
economic downturns also provide an opportunity for the production of these 
films. By contrast, others see that the popularity of horror and sci-fi films 
correlates with times of economic and political anxiety because they allow the 
expression of the “sense of powerlessness and anxiety that correlates with 
times of depression, recession […] galloping inflation and national 
confusion.” 2  In addition, there is another explanation to be considered in 
relation to the popularity cycles of horror. In “desensitization through 
habituation,” a certain style attracts until habituations set in and the style 
becomes worn. Once a certain period has elapsed, the desensitization 
disappears and a forgotten older style may be find renewed interest.3  
In this chapter, I will first point out how general confusion around the term 
“genre” has contributed to what works have been included in analysis of 
“Japanese horror.” I will introduce two notions, J-horror and Asia Extreme, 
and look at how these have created some boundaries for what is considered 
                                                 
1 Rick Altman, Film/Genre (London: British Film Institute, 1999), 11, 14. 
2 See Eerolainen, “Oh the Horror!,” 40. The quote is from Noël Carroll, “Nightmare and the Horror 
Film: The Symbolic Biology of Fantastic Beings,” in Film Quarterly: Forty Years – A Selection, ed. Brian 
Henderson and Ann Martin (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 1999), 
159. This statement is echoed in Yomota Inuhiko’s Kaiki eiga tengoku Ajia 怪奇映画天国アジア [Asia, 
the paradise of weird films] (Tokyo: Hakushūsha, 2009), in which he states that not only Japan but also 
South Korea and other countries in Southeast Asia have produced a wide range of horror films, especially 
in the early 2000s. Common for all of them is that they went through serious financial crises and political 
changes (Yomota, ibid., 281).  
3 Grodal, Embodied Visions, 49. 
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horror. This is done in order to highlight the need for a more all-encompassing 
category. In the second subchapter, I critique previous research for 
inconsistencies that are partly related to the genre issue, as well as the 
obviously essentialist outlook that some studies have. Third, based on the 
obvious gaps in research, I will add my own interpretation of the word kaiki, 
proposing that it should be used as a starting point for analysis of weird, 
fantastic and horrific narratives on screen. It should be noted, however, that 
“genre” does provide an easy concept that instantly addresses potential 
spectators and allows for the exchange of words and ideas in everyday 
conversation, despite all its shortcomings. 
2.1 GENRE CONCERNS 
Despite its prevalence, much of the previous research in both Japan and the 
West has tended to overlook the presence of kaiki. Anderson and Richie 
mention ghost and monster films for a total of two pages in their seminal work 
on Japanese film, stating that “the stories are all alike … The films are made 
cheaply and unimaginatively,” while the audience nonetheless responds to this 
“well-known stimulus.”4 For them, ghost stories were for the masses to enjoy 
but not for scholars to analyze. Instead, previous studies have concentrated on 
directors,5 Japanese cinema as “Other” from Western cinema,6 genres and 
                                                 
4 Joseph Anderson and Donald Richie, The Japanese Film: Art and Industry (Princeton and New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1982), 262. 
5 On Kurosawa Akira, see Stephen Prince, The Warrior’s Camera: The Cinema of Akira Kurosawa 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991); Donald Richie, The Films of Akira Kurosawa (Berkeley, 
Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 1965); Yoshimoto, Kurosawa. On Ozu Yasujirō, 
see Donald Richie, OZU (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 1974); 
Woojeong Joo, The Cinema of Ozu Yasujiro: Histories of the Everyday (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2017); Wayne Stein and Marc DiPauolo, eds., Ozu International: Essays on the Global 
Influences of a Japanese Auteur (New York, London, New Delhi and Sydney: Bloomsbury Academic, 
2015); Choi Jinhee, ed., Reorienting Ozu: A Master and His Influence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2018).  
6 See, for example, Noël Burch’s canonical To the Distant Observer: Form and meaning in the 
Japanese Cinema (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1979).  
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eras,7 and the industry in relation to general history.8 Recently, many volumes 
discuss Japanese cinema and its individual films from a multitude of 
perspectives.9 These are but a few of the approaches to be found in the lively 
scene that comprises Japanese film studies in the West. Naturally, some of the 
most encompassing volumes on Japanese film history are published in 
Japanese,10 despite Yoshimoto Mitsuhiro’s (2000, 2006) argument that the 
Japanese government has not been willing to admit cinema as a significant 
part of Japanese culture. 11  A similar point is made by Aaron Gerow, who 
suggests that “after the industry went into decline in the late 1960s and 
subsidies were needed, the Japanese government did not intervene in part 
because of long-held beliefs that film was merely a crass entertainment 
unworthy of government support.”12 Hence, not only kaiki eiga but cinema at 
                                                 
7  On period dramas, see Darrell William Davis, Picturing Japaneseness: Monumental Style, 
National Identity, Japanese Film (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); on classical Japanese 
cinema during the Golden Age, see Catherine Russel, Classical Japanese Cinema Revisited (New York 
and London: Continuum, 2011); on nuuberu boogu and cinema of the 1960s and 1970s, see David 
Desser, Eros Plus Massacre: An Introduction to the Japanese New Wave Cinema (Bloomington and 
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1988) and Isolde Standish, Politics, Porn and Protest: Japanese 
Avant-Garde Cinema in the 1960s and 1970s (London and New York: Continuum, 2011); on the “new” 
New Wave, see Tom Mes and Jasper Sharp, The Midnight Eye Guide to New Japanese Film (Berkeley: 
Stone Bridge Press, 2005).  
8 See Isolde Standish, A New History of Japanese Cinema: A Century of Narrative Film (New York 
and London: Continuum, 2007); Donald Richie, A Hundred Years of Japanese Cinema (Tokyo, New 
York and London: Kodansha International, 2001); Anderson and Richie, The Japanese Film. 
9 See Arthur Nolletti, Jr. and David Desser, eds., Reframing Japanese Cinema: Authorship, Genre, 
History (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1992); Keiko I. McDonald, Reading 
a Japanese Film: Cinema in Context (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2006); Julian Stringer and 
Alastair Phillips, eds., Japanese Cinema: Texts and Contexts (London and New York: Routledge, 2007); 
Dennis Washburn and Carole Cavanaugh, eds., Word and Image in Japanese Cinema (Cambridge, New 
York, Melbourne and Madrid: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Daisuke Miyao, ed., The Oxford 
Handbook of Japanese Cinema (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2014). 
10 See Aaron Gerow, ed., Nihon eiga wa ikiteiru 日本映画史は生きている [Japanese cinema is alive], 
an eight-volume series named no doubt after the current “crisis” in Japanese cinema and the apparently 
bleak future it has been projected to have in public discourse. See also the thematically arranged 15-
volume Nihon eigashi sōsho 日本映画史叢書, Satō Tadao’s four-volume series Nihon eigashi 日本映画
史 and the three-volume Nihon eiga no kyoshōtachi 日本映画史巨匠達. 
11 Yoshimoto, Kurosawa, 43. His critique stems from a view that Japanese cultural studies is mainly 
concerned with “the institutional legitimation of Japanese literature programs and Japanese studies” 
where “the wholesale incorporation of film … will erode the luster of Japanese culture as high culture” 
(ibid., 42). See also Yoshimoto Mitsuhiro, “The University, Disciplines, National Identity: Why is There 
No Film Studies in Japan?,” The South Atlantic Quarterly 99, no. 4 (2000): 697–713.  
12 Aaron Gerow, “Recent Film Policy and the Fate of Film Criticism in Japan,” Midnight Eye, July 
11, 2006. www.midnighteye.com/features/recent-film-policy-and-the-fate-of-film-criticism-in-japan/. 
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large could be seen as a form of mass culture unworthy of support or scholarly 
attention.  
A newly found scholarly interest in Japanese horror cinema appeared in 
the wake of the success of the original Ringu and the subsequent Hollywood 
adaptations of contemporary Japanese horror films. Some have tried to paint 
a historical overview from the early 1950s to the 2000s,13 possibly highlighting 
the role of Japan’s traditional stage arts,14 whereas others have concentrated 
on contemporary works.15 There are comparative studies between Japanese 
horror cinema and the horror cinema traditions of other nations,16 as well as 
between Japanese horror films and their American remakes.17 There are also 
many texts regarding individual works, such as Gojira (1954),18 Ringu (1997)19 
                                                 
13 See Colette Balmain, Introduction to Japanese Horror Film (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 2008); Jay McRoy, ed., Japanese Horror Cinema (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
2005); Eerolainen, “Oh the Horror!” 
14 See Richard J. Hand, “Aesthetics of Cruelty: Traditional Japanese Theatre and the Horror Film,” 
in Jay McRoy, ed., Japanese Horror Cinema (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2005), 18–28; 
Jay McRoy, Nightmare Japan: Contemporary Japanese Horror Cinema (Amsterdam and New York: 
Rodopi, 2008); Balmain, Japanese Horror; Yau Shuk-ting Kinnia, “A “Horrible” Legacy: Noh and J-
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Kong, Taiwan to Japan and South Korea (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 101-124; Kyōko Hirano 
“The Rise of Japanese Horror Films: Yotsuya Ghost Story (Yotsuya Kaidan), Demonic Men, and 
Victimized Women,” in Alisa Freedman and Toby Slade, eds., Introducing Japanese Popular Culture 
(London and New York: Routledge, 2017), 204-215; Hirose Ai, “Eiga ‘Yotsuya kaidan’ kō: Nakagawa 
Nobuo no jikkenteki kaikihyōgen” 映画『四谷怪談』考: 中川信夫の実験的怪奇表現 [A study of 
Yotsuya Kaidan: In a case of Nakagawa Nobuo’s experimental expression of horror], Shōkei gakuin 
daigaku kiyō 尚絅学院大学紀要 61, no. 62 (2011): 47–62. 
15 See McRoy, Nightmare Japan; Jim Harper, Flowers from Hell – The Modern Japanese Horror 
Film (Hereford: Noir Publishing, 2009); Iles, The Crisis of Identity. 
16 See Choi Jinhee and Mitsuyo Wada-Marciano, eds., Horror to the Extreme: Changing Boundaries 
in Asian Cinema (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2009); Steven T. Brown, Japanese Horror 
and the Transnational Cinema of Sensations (Basingstoke and Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019); 
Park Myoungsook, “Hollywood’s Remake Practices under the Copyright Regime: French Films and 
Japanese Horror Films,” in Fear, Cultural Anxiety, and Transformation: Horror, Science Fiction and 
Fantasy Films Remade, ed. by Scott A. Lukas and John Marmysz (Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2009), 
107-128. 
17 See Wee, American Remakes; Adam Lowenstein, Dreaming of Cinema; Sarah Arnold, Maternal 
Horror Film: Melodrama and Motherhood (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). 
18 See Chon Noriega, “Godzilla and the Japanese Nightmare: When ‘Them!’ Is U.S.,” in Cinema 
Journal 27, no. 1 (1987); Yomota Inuhiko, “The Menace from the South Seas: Honda Ishiro’s Godzilla 
(1954),” in Texts and Contexts, ed. Julian Stringer and Alastair Phillips; Schnellbächer, “Has the Empire 
Sunk Yet?” 
19 For a comprehensive volume-length study on the Ringu-phenomenon alone, see Kristen Lacefield, 
ed., The Scary Screen: Media Anxiety in The Ring (London and New York: Routledge, 2010); see also 
Leena Eerolainen, “Perheonnea ja sorretun kostoa,” http://widerscreen.fi/2009-2/perheonnea-ja-
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and Kairo (2001). 20  Many works concentrate on markers of historical 
trauma21 and, recently, the curse that spreads through technological devices is 
highlighted as a metaphor for a virus.22 A few recent PhD dissertations, too, 
provide valuable discussions on the topic.23  
In Japanese, horror has been analyzed by the filmmakers themselves24 in 
relation to wider Asian horror traditions,25 as well as Japan’s own cultural 
traditions and folklore.26 Family forms one important theme.27  One of the 
paramount books in the field is Uchiyama Kazuki’s edited volume Kaiki to 
                                                 
sorretun-kostoa/, accessed December 5, 2015; Washitani Hana 鷲谷花, “Ringu” sanbusaku to onnatachi 
no media kūkan: kaibutsuka suru “onna,” muku no “chichi” 『リング』三部作と女たちのメディア空間
―怪物化する「女」、無垢の「父」[The “Ringu” trilogy and the media space of women: Women who 
become-monstrous and immaculate fathers], in Kaiki to gensō e no kairo: Kaidan kara J-horaa e 怪奇
と幻想への回路―階段から Jホラーへ [The route to the weird and fantastic: From kaidan to J-horror], 
ed. Uchiyama Kazuki 内山一樹 (Tokyo: Shinwasha, 2008), 195–224. 
20 See Steven T. Brown, Tokyo Cyberpunk: Posthumanism in Japanese Visual Culture (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); Wee, American Remakes.  
21 See Linnie Blake, The Wounds of Nations: Horror Cinema, Historical Trauma and National 
Identity (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005); Adam Lowenstein, Shocking 
Representations: Historical Trauma, National Cinema, and the Modern Horror Film (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2005); Fabio Rambelli, “Gods, Dragons, Catfish, and Godzilla: Fragments 
for a History of Religious Views on Natural Disasters in Japan,” in When the Tsunami Came to Shore: 
Culture and Disaster in Japan, ed. Roy Starrs (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 50-69.  
22 See Carlos Rojas, “Viral Contagion in the Ringu Intertext,” in The Oxford Handbook of Japanese 
Cinema, ed. Miyao Daisuke (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 416–437. 
23 For an analysis of horror films made in Asia, see Danny Boey, The national specificity of horror 
sources in Asian horror cinema (PhD Diss., Queensland University of Technology, 2012); for a 
discussion about the figure of the cyborg in science fiction and horror, see Lan Kuo-Wei, Technofetishism 
of posthuman bodies: Representations of cyborgs, ghosts, and monsters in contemporary Japanese 
science fiction film and animation (PhD Diss., University of Sussex, 2012); for an analysis of the 
monstrous child in both literature and film, see Lindsay Nelson, Embracing the Demon: Monstrous Children 
in Japanese Literature and Cinema, 1946–2008 (PhD Diss., University of Southern California, 2012).  
24 See, for example, the various writings of Kurosawa Kiyoshi.  
25 Yomota, Kaiki eiga tengoku.  
26 See Ōshima Kiyoaki 大島清明, J-horaa no yūrei kenkyū Jホラーの幽霊研究 [Ghost research of 
J-horror] (Tokyo: Akiyama shoten, 2010); see also Ichiyanagi Hirotaka 一柳廣孝 and Yoshida Morio’s 
吉田司雄 contribution to the field in their edited series Naitomea sōsho ナイトメア叢書 (Seikyūsha, 
eight volumes published between 2005 and 2012), which includes volumes on horror film, Japanese 
horror, mutating women, yōkai, weird literature et cetera.  
27 For discussion about the family in Japanese horror cinema in a book that was published in the 
field of sociology, see Leena Eerolainen, “Kazoku no shiten kara mita J-horaa” 家族の視点から見た Jホ
ラー [J-horror from the viewpoint of the family], in Media kontentsu-ron [メディア・コンテンツ論, 
Theory of media contents], ed. Endō, Hideki 遠藤英樹  and Okamoto, Takeshi 岡本健  (Kyoto: 
Nakanishiya-shuppan, 2016), 123-140; see also Washitani, “Ringu sanbusaku.” 
Genre and the study of kaiki eiga 
40 
gensō e no kairo (The road to the weird and the fantastic, 2008).28 Uchiyama’s 
volume provides academic essays and readings of a multitude of films 
throughout the history of kaiki eiga in Japan, including many films not 
featuring in Western scholarship of Japanese horror. Still, despite the few 
volumes described above, the study of Japanese horror films has not been a 
part of the larger film studies circle in Japan. Recently, however, a change has 
been promoted by Hirano Kyōko, author of Mr. Smith Goes to Tokyo: 
Japanese Cinema under the American Occupation, 1945–1952 (1994), a 
brilliant and well-known study on Occupation-era Japanese cinema. In her 
book Nihon no eigashi, 10 no teema (Ten themes in Japanese film history, 
2014), she proposes that J-horror is to be taken seriously as a part of Japanese 
film history and, thus, as a topic of serious academic consideration. A similar 
stance is promoted by Yomota Inuhiko, whose fieldwork in Indonesia, 
Malaysia and Thailand shows that Japanese cinema is known there in the form 
of films or series like Gegege no Kitarō (originally a yōkai [spectre] manga 
series created by Mizuki Shigeru in the 1960s) or Ringu (1998). These 
countries are known for the richness of their own fantastic and supernatural 
storylines and a similarly long tradition of public performances of mysterious 
tales, which also explains the popularity of Japanese horror.29 
2.1.1 J-HORROR 
The emergence of J-horror collided with the overall promotion of Japanese 
popular culture outside Japan’s borders. This soft power, or “Gross National 
Cool” as Douglas McGray (2002) calls it, was seen to be of growing importance 
to Japan’s economy, international relations and image abroad. 30  Suddenly 
Japanese popular culture became a worldwide wonder with J-horror in tow. 
Interestingly enough, however, there also exists a deep-rooted tendency 
toward protectionism: a representative of the Cool Japan fund has explicitly 
                                                 
28 In Japanese, gensō means fantasy. According to a search in the collections of the National Diet 
Library in Japan, the notion of “gensō eiga” is rarely used alone but rather combined with words such 
as kyōfu, kaiki or tokusatsu, suggesting the inherent similarity of all of these terms. 
29 Yomota, Kaiki eiga, 51–52, 281. 
30 “Cool Japan,” a notion coined by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry in 2002, adapted 
various film-related policies such as the “Plan for Promoting Japanese Film and Image Media,” proposed 
by the Committee on Film Promotion, which was coined “by the Agency for Cultural Affairs but had 
participants from various ministries and film institutions” (Gerow, “Recent Film Policy”). These 
strategies were not, however, central to the Cool Japan strategy. As suggested by Adam Torel, it is 
apparent that it has still left much to hope for: “It’s only cooperating with the really big companies. 
Representatives of the Cool Japan Fund haven’t even talked to the producers of mid-budget films” 
(“Fixing Japanese cinema's image problem,” Tokyo International Film Festival 2015 roundtable 
session). This emphasis on other forms of popular culture, such as anime and manga, is interesting 
considering the fact that Japan has one of the most prominent film industries in the world. For a general 
definition and a summary of meanings of popular culture, see Storey, Cultural Theory, 5–13. 
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stated that “I think it’s most important to present something that is 
authentically Japanese to the world market. We should be proud of our old-
fashioned style of film-making.”31  
Japanese horror cinema and the consequent study of it emerged in an 
environment in which the polarized nature of the Japanese film business was 
becoming explicit. Japanese horror cinema, as well as other works that drew 
from its popularity, has been an important cultural export, despite the 
unwillingness on the part of the government to admit it. Together with the 
popularity of anime and manga, it has increasingly led to the recognition of 
Japanese popular culture as a suitable and “serious” topic for academic 
analysis, at least beyond Japan’s borders. However, in general the field of 
study is still undervalued and popular culture as a study choice is often 
questioned.32 Even so, Japanese horror is interesting not only because of its 
worldwide popularity, but also because it might be telling of what is sometimes 
referred to as a crisis in the Japanese film business, often seen to go hand in 
hand with the emergence of the seisakuiinkai system. 33  Beyond Japan’s 
borders the field continues to exert its power, although the J-horror 
phenomenon itself is starting to wane twenty years after its initial 
appearance.34 The recycling of old narratives in works such as Sadako 3D 2 
(Hanabusa Tsutomu, 2013) or Sadako vs. Kayako (Shiraishi Kōji, 2016) is 
representative of the way in which old film cycles and especially popular 
manga adaptations have been squeezing original productions out of the Top 
20 of Japanese films since 2004 in the quest for profit. 35  They are also 
representative of the process of desensitization through habituation also 
present in the multiple sequel trend in American horror cinema.  
The problematic nature of J-horror is symbolized by the question of the 
roots of J-horror. “Japanese horror” often appears as synonymous with “J-
                                                 
31 Nagai Nobuhiro, “Fixing Japanese cinema’s image problem,” Tokyo International Film Festival, 
2015.  
32 Personal communication with numerous academics in Japan. 
33 Defined by Joo, Denison and Furukawa as “groups of Japanese companies that come together in 
order to produce a particular franchise through ‘media mix’ strategies. They dominate the media 
production landscape in Japan, creating sometimes long-standing collectives that reduce competition as 
companies join together to create pre-planned media franchises” (Joo Woojeong, Denison Rayna and 
Furukawa Hiroko, “Manga Movies Project Report: Transmedia Japanese Franchising,” AHRC Research 
Project [University of East Anglia, 2013]), 2.  
34 See, e.g., a call for chapters in an H-Net mailing list on April 20, 2019 for an edited volume 
Japanese Horror: New Critical Approaches to History, Narratives and Aesthetics, ed. Subashish 
Bhattacharjee, Ananya Saha and Fernardo Gabriel Pagnoni Berns.  
35 Joo, Denison and Furukawa, “Manga Media Report,” 22. The critique here undoubtedly questions 
the quality of these films as compared to “the golden oldies,” since it has been these sorts of adaptations 
that have allowed Japanese films to retake a majority box office share in their home market since 2006.  
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horror.” The two should not, however, be confused.36 While Japanese horror 
has been around for several decades, even centuries, J-horror has commonly 
come to mean Japanese horror films from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s, 
and even more narrow definitions are readily available.37 J-horror has its roots 
in the aftermath of the collapse of the studio system. In 1961, Japanese studios 
were responsible for releasing altogether 547 films. Ten years later the number 
of studio-released films had fallen to 160, with a total of 367 films being 
released. Like elsewhere in the world, falling audience rates were largely 
blamed on the emergence of television. However, this did not mean that 
Japanese film studios ceased to exist, despite frequent mentions of the 
collapse of the studio system. Rather, instead of producing films, studios 
started concentrating on distributing them. As a result, directors became 
independent as filmmakers but increasingly dependent on multimedia 
financing and distribution by the major film companies.38  
After the decline of studio-made films, new currents appeared in the film 
industry. Alternative and cheaper production models were founded with many 
self-funded projects and concentration on direct-to-video (V-Cinema) releases 
in the 1980s.39 This progress was directly related to the emergence of J-horror. 
As Kurosawa Kiyoshi points out in an interview, low budgets were central to 
the creation of J-horror’s atmospheric creepiness: “You look at a J-horror 
movie and you see that it’s all about how the characters have relationships to 
people dead and alive, to inanimate objects and folklore and their living 
spaces.” He continues: “The Japanese often attach their darkest emotions—
and fears—to seemingly trivial phenomena. This is the secret to making really 
scary movies on a very low budget.”40  
                                                 
36  Ichiyanagi and Yoshida’s edited volume Horaa Japanesuku no genzai (“The contemporary 
Japanese horror,” 2005) illustrates the multimedial nature of Japanese horror and provides an 
exemplary entry point into its various manifestations, from literature to film to storytelling practices. 
37 McRoy, Nightmare Japan, 8–9; Zahlten and Kimata applaud Tsuruta Norio for reinvigorating 
kaidan as one of Japanese cinema’s most durable and economically viable film genres with his Hontō ni 
atta kowai hanashi (Scary True Stories, 1991) saga, shifting the emphasis from the bloody spectacles of 
the 1980s to intense atmospheric tension based on showing less. They explain that “not only did he turn 
the horror methodology around 180 degrees, but also established extremely successful and resilient 
storylines and iconography, influencing all the big names in Japanese horror cinema today” (Alexander 
Zahlten and Kimata Kimihiko, “Norio Tsuruta,” last modified December 20, 2005, 
http://www.midnighteye.com/interviews/norio-tsuruta/). 
38 Mitsuyo Wada-Marciano, “J-horror: New Media’s Impact on Contemporary Japanese Horror 
Cinema,” in Horror of the Extreme: Changing Boundaries in Asian Cinema, eds. Choi Jinhee and 
Mitsuyo Wada-Marciano (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2009), 16. 
39 Jishu eiga, for example, are completely funded, produced and distributed by the directors and 
their production teams. Not having to pay for studio personnel, the production costs are often lower. 
Jishu eiga can be considered a hit if enough money is made to produce the next film. 
40 The Japan Times, October 21, 2015. 
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The filmmakers themselves often talked about japaniizu horaa, 
deliberately using the word in katakana as opposed to “Nihon no horaa.” This 
places the J-horror movement against the backdrop of the “J-culture,” despite 
the renowned scriptwriter Takahashi Hiroshi arguing that there was a feeling 
of unease about the use of the letter. For Takahashi, J-horror is a “hybrid form 
of cinema that combines particular subgenre of the kaidan [ghost story] 
tradition … with elements drawn from non-Japanese cinematic traditions.”41 
As Kinoshita points out, J-horror is not a genre per se, but rather a body of 
works with a definable historical background and thematic concerns; it may 
be described as a local movement in the late 1990s that was comprised of films, 
TV series and film critiques from filmmakers, and it placed particular 
emphasis on everyday life and media. 42  According to Kurosawa, J-horror 
specifically refers to a group of relatively low-budget horror films made in 
Japan which concentrate aesthetically on the low-key production of 
atmospheric and psychological fear, capitalizing on urban legends proliferated 
through mass media and popular culture.43  
One of the narrowest definitions of J-horror is that Japaniizu horaa 
includes the works based on Suzuki Kōji’s hit novels, which were shown in 
double bills and became popular because of their end-of-a-millenium 
(seikimatsu) mood.44 This seikimatsu mood could be described as the anxiety 
toward recent happenings and the general societal unease.45 Writings of the 
filmmakers themselves, most of whom belong to the same generation, became 
an integral part of the movement,46 much like the writers of modern Japanese 
pulp fiction, who “gathered within the space of supposedly ‘lowly’ pulp not 
                                                 
41 See Brown, Cinema of Sensations, 5. 
42  With regard to the latter, it is similar to the nuuberu baagu (Nouvelle Vague, New Wave) 
movement of the 1960s, where directors created thematically like-minded films that were informed by 
both the changing Japanese society and film studio policies. 
43 For analysis of Kurosawa Kiyoshi’s statements, see Kinoshita Chika, “The Mummy Complex: 
Kurosawa Kiyoshi’s Loft and J-horror,” in Horror of the Extreme: Changing Boundaries in Asian 
Cinema, ed. Choi Jinhee and Mitsuyo Wada-Marciano (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2009), 
103–105. It should be noted, however, that the spreading of fear through mass media was present even 
in the films of the 1950s. Henshin ningen films, for example, regularly narrate the story through 
newspaper images.  
44 See Ōshima, Yūrei kenkyū, 33. 
45 Yoshikawa, “Horaaeiga-ron,” 117. 
46 Kinoshita, “Mummy Complex,” 104–105; Brown summarizes that Kurosawa Kiyoshi was college 
friends with the director Nakata Hideo and a roommate of the scriptwriter Takahashi Hiroshi, as well as 
a teacher and mentor to Shimizu Takashi (Brown, Cinema of Sensations, 29). Kurosawa, Nakata and 
Shimizu Takashi all began their careers as V-Cinema directors and lacked the extensive 35-mm training 
formerly provided by studios. They were thus quick to embrace new media, whether through digital 
media or computer editing, in order to trim their production budgets and schedules (Wada-Marciano, 
“New Media’s Impact,” 18).  
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only to express their own opinions but also to exchange sophisticated and 
potentially subversive ideas with others.”47  
2.1.2 ASIA EXTREME 
The metamorphosis of Japanese horror from a folkloric notion to a 
multicultural profitable commodity was paralleled with the establishment of 
the so-called “Asia Extreme,” a DVD label from Tartan that was flexible enough 
to include a range of Asian films that seemed exportable.48 Wada-Marciano 
points out that this led to a distortion in the Western-based analysis of 
Japanese horror because the non-horror films of the 1960s were packaged as 
precursors to J-horror. Onibaba (Shindō Kaneto, 1964), for example, was 
originally marketed as minwa mono (folktale film) or dokuritsu puro 
(independent film), but it is now categorized as horror in Lowenstein’s (2005) 
analysis of its being an allegory of Hiroshima. Wada-Marciano criticizes the 
way the forerunners of Western research on Japanese horror cinema tend to 
ignore the historical context of the genre, including such works as Masumura 
Yasuzō’s Mojū and Ōshima Nagisa’s Ai no koriida. 49  As the following 
delightful quotation from Jasper Sharp’s suggests,  
why so many studies so far have delimited the subject by looking at 
“the origins, themes and conventions of Japanese horror cinema from 
1950 to date (Balmain 2008)” when works based on the kaidan such 
as Yotsuya kaidan were being made in the 1910s, early German 
precursors to the genre such as The Golem (1915), The Cabinet of Dr. 
Caligari (1920) and The Student of Prague (1913) were making it to 
Japan within years of their domestic releases, and the ero-guro 
literary genre led by writers like Edogawa Rampo thrived in the 1920s. 
And why, oh why, do so many insist on looking at Nikkatsu Roman 
Porno films such as the Angel Guts series as being made for the horror 
market?50 
 
For Wada-Marciano, this is not solely a matter of genre categorization, but a 
failure in acknowledging certain connections among text, its historical context, 
and the discursive subject. 51  This is ultimately why she criticizes McRoy’s 
                                                 
47 Kawana, “Mad Scientists,” 119. 
48 Choi Jinhee and Mitsuyo Wada-Marciano, “Introduction,” in Horror to the Extreme: Changing 
Boundaries in Asian Cinema, eds. Jinhee Choi and Mitsuyo Wada-Marciano (Hong Kong: Hong Kong 
University Press, 2009), 5. It can be seen as a complementary category of J-horror, encompassing 
directors like Miike Takashi and Tsukamoto Shinya, whose works are often labeled as “horror” but who 
are not part of the J-horror movement itself. 
49 Wada-Marciano, “New Media’s Impact,” 33, 37. 
50 Jasper Sharp, review of Introduction to Japanese Horror Film by Colette Balmain, last modified 
March 9, 2009, http://www.midnighteye.com/books/introduction-to-japanese-horror-film/. 
51 Wada-Marciano, ibid., 34. 
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Japanese Horror Cinema. Although Wada-Marciano does not deny McRoy’s 
editorial achievements and the quality of individual essays in the volume, she 
points out that the contributors take the view of what constitutes Japanese 
horror cinema far beyond the historic context of the genre. Mizoguchi Kenji’s 
Ugetsu monogatari, Kurosawa Akira’s Kumonosu-jō or Fukasaku Kinji’s 
Battle Royale were never associated with the horror genre with a reference to 
either the films’ production or distribution in Japan.52 More recently, although 
Nakata Hideo’s Gekijōrei (Ghost Theatre, 2015) was marketed as J-horror, it 
belongs more to the kaiki category of the strange and fantastic, as scriptwriter 
Takahashi Hiroshi (2015) points out. So does Zan’e (The Inerasable, 
Nakamura Yoshihiro, 2015), which contains a terrific sense of mystery. 
Furthermore, what of Kurosawa Kiyoshi? As I have pointed out, “Kurosawa is 
often called ‘a horror film director’, but in light of the expectations delivered 
by this moniker, these films are sure to disappoint: Akarui mirai (2003) has 
weirdly multiplying medusas, but that does not make a film horrific. 
Doppelgänger (2003) almost becomes a farce when the battle of the minds 
between the protagonist and his alter ego accelerates, or when the protagonist 
gets chased by an enormous disco ball.”53  
As the above attests, “Asia Extreme” has not only become synonymous with 
J-horror but also representative of the image of 21st-century Japanese cinema 
in the West. This is simply because the image of a national cinema is largely 
constituted by the works that are distributed beyond its borders. The basic 
statement visible in Horror of the Extreme is that J-horror, used by the 
filmmakers themselves, becomes something close to a production category, 
whereas Asia Extreme is used as a distribution term. They are similar in that 
both emerged in relation to the collapse of the studio system, with new media 
and global DVD distribution boosting their popularity.  
2.2 ESSENTIALISM AND INCONSISTENCIES IN 
PREVIOUS RESEARCH  
In Japanese (horror) film studies, essentialism unfortunately—and hopefully 
unintentionally—manifests in a plethora of ways. Valerie Wee argues that 
Japanese horror film incorporates an unquestioning acceptance of 
supernatural things, as opposed to Western horror where logic and 
medical/scientific explanations are emphasized. 54  This statement is 
problematic. It seems to argue that Japanese horror does not include works 
that are concerned with the scientific. In other words, only works that belong 
to the category of the supernatural can be called horror. Japanese horror 
cinema, however, includes works where the role of science plays an important 
                                                 
52  Wada-Marciano, “New Media’s Impact,” 34. 
53 Eerolainen, “Oh the Horror!,” 41. 
54 Wee, American Remakes, 40. 
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part, a trajectory that has its roots in literature. In addition, Wee’s study 
reconstructs a model of seeing ongoing tensions between premodern and 
modern as a crisis troubling Japan even today. This is what Harootunian refers 
to as an image of “an unmoving social order at the heart of a society in constant 
motion.”55 Claims regarding the feudal remnants in modern Japanese society 
virtually eliminate historical specificity.56 This correlates directly with the key 
ideas of nihonjinron: Japan is forever haunted by its nostalgic past, producing 
a spatio-temporal cultural hybrid unlike any other country in the world. This 
seems to suggest that the main societal concern in Japan is the past instead of 
anxiety for tomorrow,57 as proposed by Lowenstein’s framing of Ringu as a 
representation of “the connections and tensions between the modern and 
premodern, domestic and global.”58 However, as Jasper Sharp emphasizes, 
one does not need to stay in the country long before recognizing that “the 
Japanese problems” are in fact the problems of any post-industrial society.59 
This is an important statement. In this thesis I focus on Japanese society, but 
one should constantly bear in mind that the concerns present in the films are 
by no means limited to Japan.  
There is also the issue of Japan as a nation defined by a trauma. First, 
despite horror cinema being a popular genre even before WWII, McRoy argues 
it was because of the war’s traumatic end that Japan experienced “an explosion 
of tales of terror and apocalypse.”60 This national trauma is seen to be present 
in a plethora of works, all of which are also open to other interpretations. Many 
see Onibaba manifesting a structure in which a country (Japan) is torn 
between two leaders (the Emperor and General Douglas MacArthur), who 
represent the lingering past and the present.61 Linnie Blake, in turn, analyzes 
Ringu as decoding “the traumatic changes wrought to Japanese society and 
hence national self-image by the militaristic build-up to the Second World War 
and its apocalyptic closure,” if set against and read in the light of both the 
classics of postwar Japanese horror and Gore Verbinski’s Hollywood 
remake.62  
                                                 
55 Harry Harootunian, Overcome by Modernity: History, Culture and Community in Interwar 
Japan (New Jersey and Oxfordshire: Princeton University Press, 2000), 316. 
56 Yoshimoto, ibid., 18–19. 
57 For a discussion of phantasms that haunt the Japanese society of today without any trace of 
essentialism, see Marilyn Ivy’s key study Discourses of the Vanishing: Modernity, Phantasm, Japan 
(1995). 
58 Lowenstein, Dreaming of Cinema, 81–82. 
59 Sharp, “Introduction to Japanese horror film.”  
60 McRoy, Nightmare Japan, 6. 
61 Lowenstein, Shocking Representations, 91; Jyotsna Kapur, “The Return of History and Horror: 
Onibaba and the Atomic Bomb,” in Horror International, eds. Steven Jay Schneider and Tony Williams 
(Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2005), 92. 
62 Blake, Wounds of Nations, 10. 
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McRoy draws a relationship between Japan’s status as the only nation to 
have suffered a direct attack by atomic weapons and scenes of annihilations of 
major cities by monsters in film.63 Statements like these are problematic on 
two accounts. First, as Japanese cinema embraced its second Golden Era in 
the 1950s, there was an explosion of film production in general. Naturally, the 
amount of genre films rose as well. I would rather agree with Yomota’s 
proposal that after WWII the Japanese horror genre was influenced by 
modern ideas and began to have more diversity. 64  According to this 
interpretation, World War II was one, albeit very grave, incident that molded 
and shaped the film culture of the time, but it was by no means the only source 
of inspiration in horror. Second, these statements run the risk of trivializing 
prewar products of the horror genre. Although Japan’s experience may have 
paved the way for definitive scenes that reverberate in the audience, this 
statement refuses to acknowledge the history of Japanese monster movies 
(and horror) as a transnational localized product.65 Not many scholars who 
propose the connection between Hiroshima and Japanese horror have taken 
the earlier Japanese kaiki eiga from the 1910s and 1920s into account. It was 
during these two decades, however, when Japanese film started to show 
overtly subjective, psychological anxieties associated with German 
expressionism: increasingly disorienting and fragmented visuals, a growing 
disruption of linearity, ambiguity, dislocation, self-reflexive questioning, and 
so forth.66 These influences are rarely discussed, however. This tendency to 
ignore the influence of early European horror and to locate the roots of 
Japanese horror in its tradition of ghost stories is an interesting contrast to the 
way in which general Japanese film histories “typically stress the foreign 
origins of the movie camera.”67 
A tendency to construct Japan as a perverse and/or violent nation is also 
present. In previous literature on horror, Colette Balmain makes whopping 
generalizations when saying that much of Japanese horror, especially in the 
1970s and 1980s, was concerned with sexual violence, issues around gender 
representations, and “the theme of rape as a major trope of Japanese culture” 
(italics mine).68 Sharp strongly criticizes this orientalist stance, according to 
which there is an inherent layer of violence within the Japanese people and the 
Japanese social body that must be somehow made visible.69 A similar theme 
                                                 
63 McRoy, Nightmare Japan, 7–8. 
64 Yomota, Tengoku Ajia, 49. 
65 Unfortunately there is no space for a more detailed analysis of horror and science fiction motifs 
according to theories of globalization and localization. While it is not the central point of this thesis, it 
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66 Wee, American Remakes, 36. 
67 Lamarre, Anime Machine, 14. 
68 Balmain, Japanese Horror, 8. See Section 3.2 for a brief look into the rape allegory regarding 
Japanese national identity.  
69 See Sharp, “Introduction to Japanese Horror Film.”  
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is echoed in McRoy, who cites Jack Hunter (1998) that “the evisceration of the 
female body is reminiscent of rituals like ‘hara kira’ (sic), an ancient act in 
which female votives would offer up the ‘flower’ of their entrails and blood by 
a self-inflicted knife wound.”70 These kind of statements construct a stereotype 
where “extreme” Asian films “represent the inscrutable, violently irrational 
Orient.”71 In addition, narratives of female mutilation are not anything new. 
Kawana points out that, in fact, as early as the 1920s Edogawa Rampo and 
other detective writers had their women (moga, the new representations of 
young urban female consumers) slaughtered and dismembered, with their 
body parts showcased publicly. According to Kawana, modernity took the 
moga “out of the confines of the home onto the streets, only to be watched, 
stalked and killed.”72 It is thus interesting that many critics see the emergence 
of such narratives as due to some inherent layer of “Japaneseness,” rather than 
the filmmakers being influenced by previous works. Therefore, academic 
research that generates “sweeping statements on Japanese culture made 
without any consideration for its relationship to social practices and history”73 
should be rebutted. 
Finally, one dangerous path is to use Japanese cultural concepts without 
an understanding of the contexts in which they appear. As Kuwayama points 
out, many of the emic (original) Japanese concepts first appeared within the 
nihonjinron genre.74 Language unfortunately often ties previous research to 
nihonjinron-esque ideas. Yoshimoto argues that there is a lack of Japanese-
speaking scholars who are able to conduct fieldwork and research in Japanese 
and provide an accurate commentary on society, which is both visible in and 
acts as a backdrop for films. 75  Wee, for example, falls into the trap of 
embracing a seemingly non-critical acceptance of Japanese cultural concepts 
as a basis for interpretation. Concepts such as giri, ninjō, amae, mujō, uchi, 
soto, honne and tatemae are frequently used to explain the main concerns of 
each film.76 As Yoshimoto points out, “the haunting effect of the essentialized 
Japaneseness often reinforces the national stereotypes.” 77  This is “the 
inversion of question and answer; that is, what should be scrutinized through 
a careful analysis of films is used precisely as the answer to interpretive 
                                                 
70 See McRoy, Nightmare Japan, 24. 
71 Brown, Cinema of Sensations, 18. He proposes use of the term “cinema of cruelty” (ibid.).  
72  Kawana Sari, Murder Most Modern: Detective Fiction and Japanese Culture (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2008), 70. 
73 Yoshimoto, Kurosawa, 11. 
74 Kuwayama, “Japan’s Emic Conceptions,” in The Cambridge Companion to Modern Japanese 
Culture, ed. Yoshio Sugimoto (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 44. 
75 See Yoshimoto, Kurosawa.  
76 These can be translated as giri = obligations, ninjō = emotions, amae = co-dependence, mujō = 
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77 Yoshimoto, ibid., 18. 
 49 
questions raised by those films.”78 Although my study also discusses Japanese 
national images, I will steer away from concepts that are used to discuss the 
nature of the Japanese themselves. National images should be explored, 
investigated, crystallized and engaged with, all the while remembering that 
they are as heterogeneous and constructed as the people, as cultural beings.  
Apart from essentialism, inconsistencies in previous research should also 
be highlighted. As I have shown, many films that are included in the “horror” 
category have not originally been considered horror. They have nonetheless 
become part and parcel of the (mostly Western) scholarship on Japanese 
horror. Colette Balmain, for example, discusses the rape-revenge film and 
Japanese slashers, as well as Japanese zombie, cannibal and living dead films. 
What is noteworthy is that Balmain defines the films in Western terms. The 
Japanese language discourse does not mention rape-revenge, nor does it 
mention Balmain’s category of kaidan pinku eiga. “Japanese horror” could 
benefit from a stance that regards it as an interpretative and imaginary 
category that contains works with some horrific aspects.  
Furthermore, a vast body of works is largely missing from the previous 
English-language research and, consequently, from the history of actual 
Japanese horror cinema. This probably has to do with the definition of 
monsters and the monstrous. When analyzing representations of cinematic 
monsters, it is possible to say that one is contributing to the larger 
interdisciplinary field of monster studies. Jeffrey Jerome Cohen’s edited 
volume Monster Theory: Reading Culture (1996) is one of earliest books 
dedicated to a thorough dissecting of monsters as cultural signs. This stance is 
continued in Asa Simon Mittman and Peter J. Dendle’s The Ashgate Research 
Companion to Monsters and the Monstrous (2013). Essays in the former 
scrutinize the monster as “a code of pattern or a presence or an absence that 
unsettles what has been constructed to be received as natural.”79 The latter 
continues from this, analyzing the impact and meaning of monsters in various 
cultures. Other definitions include monster as “the extreme version of 
marginalization” whose boundaries overlap with the ones constituting a 
culture. 80  In addition, they can be seen as “phantasmagoric and weird 
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79 Jeffrey Jerome Cohen, “Preface: In a Time of Monsters,” in Monster Theory: Reading Culture, 
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existences,” 81  “cultural constructions of the threatening Other that may, 
inexplicably and with no warning, appear in our midst,”82 “surprisingly lively 
metaphors for comprehending broader national-cultural paradigms”83 or as 
“embodiments of a certain cultural moment – of a time, a feeling and a place”84 
and “a fearful phenomenon or the spiritual entity that causes it.”85  
Kaiki eiga includes two categories of monsters that rarely appear in English 
scholarship. Kaibyō or bakeneko (ghost cat) films are explored in detail by 
Shimura Miyoko (1999, 2001, 2008) before her immersion into the study of 
otoko no kaijin (male phantoms). Some kaibyō films, such as Yabu no naka 
no kuroneko (Shindō Kaneto, 1968), have been discussed in relation to kaidan 
or Balmain’s “Edo gothic,” 86  but these have mainly been studies that 
concentrate on the theme of revenge, which is similar to other films 
incorporating the avenging spirit motif. According to Shimura, kaibyō films 
have seen three distinctive phases in the history of Japanese cinema: early 
trick pictures (26 films), between 1937 and 1940 (21 films) and between 1953 
and 1958 (13 films). Originally the cat was a kigurumi (a person wearing a 
fluffy costume). This changed as the cat became a distinguishable female, 
changing its role from a secondary figure in the early films to a central one.87 
Later bakeneko films are explicitly concerned with femininity, relying heavily 
on the status of the actresses who performed the roles of the cat. “Vamp 
actresses,” as Shimura calls them, were made to perform as cats during the 
second boom. Their outlook was feminine, but their movements derived from 
chambara (sword-fighting) films, highlighting the general anxiety concerning 
an active female transformation. The female body was emphasized over the 
monstrosity of the cat.88  
Yōkai films form another under-analyzed subcategory of kaiki. Yōkai 
erupted onto the popular culture stage during the latter third of the Edo 
period.89 Whereas supernatural elements had been a staple of Japanese stories 
                                                 
81  Stéphane Audeguy スタフェヌ・オーデギー, Monstaa no rekishi モンスターの歴史  “Les 
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83 Ibid., 26. 
84 Jeffrey Jerome Cohen, “Monster Culture: Seven Theses,” in Monster Theory: Reading Culture, 
ed. Jeffrey Jerome Cohen (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 4. 
85  Komatsu Kazuhiko, “Supernatural Apparitions and Domestic Life in Japan,” The Japan 
Foundation Newsletter XXVII, no. 1 (1999): 2. 
86 See Balmain, Introduction to Japanese Horror Cinema. I find the emphasis on the periodization 
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87 Shimura Miyoko, “Onna ga neko ni naru toki,” “女が猫になるとき,” [When a woman becomes a 
cat].” Iconics – Eizōgaku 映像学 67 (2001), 42. 
88 Shimura, “Onna ga neko ni naru toki,” 43–48. 
89 Foster, Pandemonium, 17. Komatsu Kazuhiko (2015: 47–51) proposes five different periods of the 
appearance of yōkai: 1) between the 12th and 15th centuries in the form of literature; 2) between the 14th 
 51 
for centuries, the Meiji period with its framework of rational scientific thinking 
offered a perfect environment for more academic discussions about the nature 
of yōkai.90 Friedman suggests that the Japanese monster has one of the most 
active lives worldwide, one feature of which is its role in intellectual culture.91 
However, despite having been a prominent presence in Japanese popular 
cultural history, such monsters seem to be analyzed only within the field of 
yōkaigaku, not horror film studies.  
In cinema, Daiei was responsible for a series of yōkai films. Shimura points 
out that in the strict studio system, Daiei’s knowhow of monster films was 
accessed through business mergers, combining Nikkatsu’s tradition of 
hengemono and Shinkō Kinema’s ghost cat narratives. 92  In the wake of a 
Mizuki-influenced yōkai boom in manga and television, Yōkai daisensō (The 
Great Yokai War/Big Monster War, 1968) became a hit.93 However, as noted 
by both Papp and Shimura, yōkai films ultimately came to be targeted at 
children, much like the later installations in the Gojira series, leading to their 
exclusion from horror film studies. 94  Recently, however, the yōkai film 
Kuchisake-onna (2007) again highlighted the thin line between yōkai and 
horror. Kuchisake-onna first appeared in the 1970s as an urban legend and 
soon came to be regarded as yōkai. This “reveals a nostalgic desire for 
continuity with the premodern referential landscape, between the past and the 
present, the rural and the urban, the local and the national.”95 To construct 
Kuchisake-onna as yōkai worked to exclude it from analysis of Japanese 
horror. 
Whereas the films belonging to the J-horror movement have been 
overemphasized, some important works such as Eko eko azarak (Satō 
Shimako, 1996) or Tomie (Oikawa Ataru, 1999) hardly appear. Eko eko azarak 
provides a window into Japanese occult films and, consequently, explorations 
of occultism in Japan. It is directed by one of Japan’s few female horror film 
directors. Ōbayashi Nobuhiko’s Hausu (House, 1977) is mentioned, but I am 
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yet to read a full-fledged scholarly analysis of the film which would provide 
both thematic and stylistic material in abundance. In addition, even though 
national trauma is seen to manifest itself in a plethora of works, interestingly 
many works explicitly concerned with WWII, such as the Henshin ningen 
trilogy, are almost completely omitted from previous analysis.96 Kyūketsuki 
Goke Midoro (Goke, Body Snatcher from Hell, 1968), a film utilizing the 
famous body snatcher motif, is rarely mentioned, as are the vampire films by 
Shin-Tōhō.  
2.3 KAIKI EIGA AS SPECULATIVE FICTION 
While many previous studies work extremely well on a detailed case-study 
level, there are many moments of confusion related to the general 
understanding of what to include in an analysis of horror. The films by Sion 
Sono provide an example. There are various faint elements that can be derived 
from supernatural films and which are buried deep within the structure of his 
films, although not many of the films can be called horror as such.97 As Barry 
Keith Grant points out, the notion of “horror” is too versatile and complex to 
be encapsulated by any one theory or interpretation.98 The same assumption 
is made by Rabkin in his discussions of the fantastic, which he argues is “too 
large to constitute a single genre.”99 Timothy Iles does not even try, rather 
lumping together “mystery, detective thriller and horror” in his analysis of 
identity in Japanese film.100 As becomes clear in my analysis, often this is not 
the case.  Torben Grodal talks about “genres such as science fiction or horror, 
which involve the significant use of ‘nonstandard physics’ or fantastic and 
supernatural scenes.”101  
Regarding the difference between science fiction and horror, J.P. Telotte 
suggests that science fiction actually belongs to the category of the fantastic, 
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dealing with various inconsistencies and hesitations.102 In addition, although 
science fiction sports an iconography that calls for analysis of it as a separate 
entity, there are nonetheless many moments when “the form seems to bulk 
into the realm of horror.” 103  To make a complicated matter very simple, 
Attebery defines science fiction as a genre that challenges standard notions of 
nature and culture.104 According to him, science fiction could be negotiated as 
an “attitude or stance” toward contemporary technoscientific reality, less 
concerned with “fully imagined cultural futures” and more concerned with 
“the technoscientific features of the everyday.”105 Larsen points out that there 
is universal interest in fictions of science, because in many cases they present 
us with a mirror image through which to examine our own mortality as well as 
ethicality.106 As can be seen, there are as many definitions as researchers.  
Michael Dylan Foster criticizes horror film scholar Andrew Tudor for 
asking “Why horror?” instead of “Why do these people like horror in this place 
at this particular time?” 107  Motifs flow from country to another, gaining 
culture-specific meanings and, in the process, possibly losing some of the old 
ones. Some are more successful than others because semantic fields “vary 
markedly from culture to culture,”108 and translating them is always rough 
because different sense-making systems may not provide exact equivalents.109 
In Japan, based on kaiki/mystery/horror film trailers from the 1950s, it is 
apparent that words such as kaiki, kyōfu, misemono, torikku, kaii and senritsu 
are used interchangeably. All of these mean varying degrees of horrific and 
fantastic phenomena. Yoshikawa speaks of crossovers between horror, 
monster films, ghost stories, mystery and science fiction.110  
A popular approach offering a basis for study has been to divide the study 
of Japanese horror along two axes: the avenging spirit narrative, kaidan, and 
the disaster narrative or the daikaijū eiga (giant monster film). 111  This is 
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commonly debunked by Japanese spectators. In my discussions with Japanese 
friends and colleagues, all systematically refused to use the word “horror” or 
even its Japanese counterpart kyōfu for monster films, calling them tokusatsu 
(special effects) films instead. In addition, kaidan, ghost stories, have 
traditionally been considered an altogether different category of storytelling. 
As Noriko T. Reider explains, these tales of the strange became especially 
popular in the Edo/Tokugawa period (1600–1867), which is generally 
considered a peaceful one in Japanese history. They were often told as a form 
of early urban legends and collected into anthologies, and they are often 
adaptations of Chinese stories. The Japanese refer to ghost stories by the word 
kaidan, in which kai means “strange, mysterious, rare, or bewitching 
apparition” and dan in turn refers to “talk” or “recited narrative.” Thus, kaidan 
are “stories broadly modeled as tales of the supernatural, which are sometimes 
surrealistic and may strike us as strange, weird and frightening.”112 In trying 
to trace the definition of kaidan, Edogawa Rampo concludes that mystery is 
more important than horror. If we are to define kaidan like this, about half of 
Japan’s detective fiction actually belongs to the category of kaidan.113 With 
regard to cinema, Satō Tadao continues, stating that Kurosawa Kiyoshi’s 
works, such as CURE (1997), Charisma (1999) and Akarui mirai (2003), can 
only be explained in terms of kaidan, despite not including ghost characters.114 
The ubiquitous presence of the vengeful spirit motif in Japanese kaiki eiga 
has led to the situation where ghosts seem to provide an instant index of 
horror.115 In film studies, Noël Carroll’s The Symbolic Biology of Fantastic 
Beings (1981) and The Philosophy of Horror: Or, Paradoxes of the Heart 
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(1990) are some of the most quoted studies of screen monstrosity. 116  His 
theorizations often form the basis for dissecting monstrosity, especially if a 
dichotomy is made between Freudian and cognitive approaches. 117  Carroll 
famously suggested that monsters are category mistakes: cognitive threats to 
common knowledge, unknown to ordinary social intercourse. 118  In other 
words, as Cohen points out, they are “a category that is itself a kind of limit 
case, an extreme version of marginalization, an abject epistemological device 
basic to the mechanics of deviance construction and identity formation” and 
an “ontological liminality” that “refuses easy categorization.”119 For Carroll, 
the source of horror is a so-called “paradox of the heart”: we know the monster 
is not real but still we feel intense fear. This is especially true of the J-horror 
films that brought with them a whole new representation of a cinematic ghost. 
However, as I have argued elsewhere (2016), the presence of a ghost might be 
horrific but it does not automatically make a film horror. In Ōbayashi 
Nobuhiko’s Ijintachi to no natsu (1988), the protagonist spends most of his 
time with benevolent ghosts. There is a malevolent entity, but the overall tone 
of the film is one of mystery. Ōbayashi uses ghosts as metaphors for the 
chaining effect of nostalgia.120 In Ugetsu monogatari, both benevolent and 
malevolent spirits are present, but reality is presented as more horrendous 
than any ghost. If we want to call Ugetsu horror, it is because of its unfair and 
horrifying treatment of its women, not because of the emergence of a ghost.121  
It is clear that the division of kaidan and daikaijū eiga offers a framework 
in which to locate much of the earlier research on Japanese horror, if not the 
vast field of the subject matter itself. This is reminiscent of a general tendency 
in Japanese film scholarship “to stay within pre-established discursive 
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traditions.”122 As Laeticia Söderman suggests, our text-related built-in models 
set us on a certain route of interpretation, allowing us to overlook the signposts 
inherent in the text itself. This is a common problem in every field that 
concerns the interpretation of texts. For Söderman, the process of rethinking 
and renewing enables us to shed more light on the questions that interest us, 
as well as to avoid ideas from becoming stagnant and to offer fresh and original 
interpretative angles.123 Hence, limiting research only to the genre of horror 
will not reveal the whole potential that this vast body of fantastic films has to 
offer. As Napier points out, both monsters and ghosts belong to the realm of 
the fantastic.124 The division of these narratives into separate categories is but 
artificial. 
In Western academia, classical studies of the strange and extraordinary are 
best exemplified by studies of the fantastic.125 Many critics see fantasy as a 
separable, peripheral phenomenon as opposed to the “real.”126 It is exactly 
because of this departure from consensus reality that fantasy becomes such a 
valuable mirror of reality. Napier points out that while all fiction inherently 
defamiliarizes the “real,” the very raison d’être of fantastic fiction is the 
contrast it provides to the real. All of the works she analyzes maintain a varied 
and complex relationship to reality; in her case, this comprises the history, 
society and official ideology of twentieth-century Japan.127 In fact, Figal sees 
Japanese modernity as having been born of fantasy and embodying 
transformation, a change of modes, and thus being akin to the root definition 
of bakemono (a thing that metamorphoses). As early as the Meiji period, when 
Japan embarked on its path to recognition by other nations, the popular 
fantastic beliefs of the common folk provided an imaginary enemy that could 
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Hume, Fantasy and Mimesis. 
126 Hume, ibid., 8. 
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be conquered with new national-scientific ideologies.128 In particular, yōkai 
were used as real political tools instead of mere fictional tales.129  
In Japan, kaiki is the term for weird, fantastic, horrific and mysterious 
phenomena, and it can be roughly translated as “the fantastic.” Originally from 
literature studies, kaiki shōsetsu (weird novels) has been the native term for 
fictions of the strange and/or extraordinary.130 Kaiki shōsetsu emerged when 
Chinese ghost stories came to be recycled as kaidan in Japan and the genre 
departed from the earlier Buddhist moral setsuwa tales. In literature, writers 
such as Nanboku Tsuruya (1755–1829) and Ueda Akinari (1734–1809) were 
important for the establishment of the genre, followed by modern writers such 
as Izumi Kyōka (1873–1939). Before WWII, kaiki literature was mainly 
marketed within detective fiction, but after the war, especially because of the 
writings of Hoshi Shinichi (1926–1997), it became more widely 
disseminated.131  
Regarding film, kaiki eiga as a concept has been defined previously by 
Michael Crandol in his Ph.D dissertation “Nightmares from the Past: ‘Kaiki 
eiga’ and the Dawn of Japanese Horror Cinema” (2015). It is noteworthy that 
our understanding of the term differs greatly. Crandol discusses kaiki as a 
genre that has, to some degree, influenced J-horror and generally falls under 
Tzvetan Todorov’s notion of “the marvelous.”132 For Crandol, kaiki is an old 
generic label which relies on “the sense of the stylized, anti-realistic 
atmosphere evoked by artificial sets.” 133  Furthermore, “the word kaiki by 
definition points to an atmosphere of the strange and bizarre, rather than the 
emotional affect of horror”; to conclude, he says that “an essential ingredient 
of kaiki is its evocation of an Othered time and place, a world spatially alien or 
removed from our own mundane, contemporary existence.”134 Crandol places 
                                                 
128 Gerald Figal, Civilization and Monsters: Spirits of Modernity in Meiji Japan (Durham and 
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kaiki into the past era of filmmaking, a nostalgic and atmospheric subgenre of 
the fantastic-horrific.  
As Bowers notes, many of the problems of definition arise because of the 
frequent difficulty of placing texts into narrowly defined genres and 
categories.135 In horror film studies, there is a tendency to draw a straight line 
between the ghost films of the 1950s and their contemporary “counterparts,” 
but, as Komatsu Kazuhiko argues, they cannot be said to belong to the same 
genre as such, as they portray entirely different eras.136 By this, Komatsu refers 
to the widely acknowledged division of Japanese film into jidaigeki (period 
drama) and gendaigeki (contemporary drama).137 Komatsu’s argument makes 
sense if one is adamant in analyzing Japanese cinema according to this 
division, but as I myself have suggested, a lot of confusion around this matter 
could be solved by placing these works under the moniker kaiki. Like Outi 
Hakola points out in her dissertation, generic narrations need to be 
understood as dynamic and functional cultural processes.138 She states that 
“any group of films may at any time be generically redefined by contemporary 
critics” and that “one of the founding principles of genre study is the 
importance of reading texts in the context of other similar texts.”139 In this 
thesis, this cinematic context is “speculation.”  
In my opinion, the closest definition for kaiki eiga is “speculative cinema.” 
Speculation is to jump into the unknown140 and, as author Margaret Atwood 
suggests, to narrate things that could happen.141 Anne Leinonen speaks of the 
narratives of “what ifs” and the narratives of alternative histories. 142  In 
addition, speculative fiction is concerned both with the representation of 
alternatives and the investigation of these very alternatives: it is a mode suited 
to exploring and transgressing boundaries.143 It allows us to study how social 
realities are deconstructed, challenged and criticized. It inverts elements of 
this world, recombining its features into new models in order to produce 
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something strange, unfamiliar and apparently “new,” “other” and different.144 
It may allow us to see the world from a perspective outside of that which has 
attained consensus in society.145 It can be seen “as a site of difference, one that 
privileges the alien, the illusory, and the irrational in contrast to a vision … that 
subsumes all difference under a bland rubric of homogeneity, materialism, 
and rationality.”146  
Leinonen argues that the difference between the fantastic and speculative 
fiction is that for established authors to use the notion of speculative fiction is 
to place themselves outside so-called entertainment fiction.147 This links the 
concept to hierarchies of genres. Even Vesa Sisättö admits that speculative 
fiction is free from the load of images carried, for example, by science fiction,148 
or the fantastic. Speculative fiction works the best as an umbrella term. It 
allows for the investigation of a varied group of fictions—or genres—together 
without any artificial boundaries.149 Moreover, it is to be seen as a mode. Jeoff 
King has proposed that comedy is a mode—a manner of presentation.150 The 
same can be stated of speculative fiction. This is my interpretation and an 
answer to one of the fundamental problems in the selection of the speculative 
material: the difficulty in deciding whether these works form in a meaningful 
sense a genre, a mode, a cultural concept or an attitude toward reality.151 I see 
speculative fiction as “something more than a particular kind of narrative 
complex … an archive of stories with particular themes, motifs, and figures.”152 
What I refer to here as modality has previously been defined as something that 
“assumes different generic forms” and “from which a number of related genres 
emerge.” 153  However, instead of saying that speculative cinema assumes 
different generic forms or is a source for many genres, I propose we call it a 
mode. Speculative fiction includes a variety of sub-categorical concepts that 
“are difficult to consider in terms of one unifying genre” and should thus be 
“seen as constituting particular narrative modes.”154 These narrative modes 
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can be present across many genres, but they are not genres per se. Therefore, 
speculative cinema is a cross-generic umbrella category within which to locate 
a wide selection of thematically similar films, despite their differing surface 
levels.  
Of course, using an umbrella term such as kaiki or “speculative fiction” is 
also subject to critique. Vesa Sisättö argues that using “speculative fiction” 
brings nothing new to the critique. For him, the old terminology still works the 
best: fantasy for works that contain supernatural elements and science fiction 
for the ones where the world is based on scientific thought.155 However, as the 
discussion around supernatural femininity and scientific masculinity in the 
next chapter demonstrates, Sisättö is over-simplifying. Also, as Bowers argues, 
many scholars settle for an umbrella term that becomes their working 
definition.156 But is this necessarily a bad thing? I do not think so. If properly 
justified, using these new working terms promotes fresh and innovative ways 
of approaching old material. 
2.4 CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter illuminated how Japanese horror cinema has been studied in the 
past, as well as some general themes and trends present in the analyses. Much 
of the previous literature can be addressed from the viewpoint of “a genre.” It 
is apparent that using the Western concept of “horror” as the basis for analysis 
is flawed and leads to a distorted view of the vast field of horrific cinema in 
Japan. This chapter has demonstrated that many scholars mix the production 
category of J-horror with Japanese horror or, more in detail, the distribution 
label of Asia Extreme. It is clear that this textual presupposition has affected 
the way in which many important works are in fact omitted from previous 
research. In addition, some of the previous studies end up broadcasting a 
distinctively essentialist stance, which, especially in the light of nihonjinron 
theories, is a disconcerting feature. Japanese horror cinema is seen as a 
manifestation of merely Japanese traits and some inherent notion of 
“Japaneseness,” instead of being regarded as a truly transnational and 
multimedial category of filmmaking. This thesis thus proposes a departure 
from the notion of horror in favor of developing a new outlook on these films, 
in order to gain truly new insights. This new outlook, kaiki, is a term that not 
only functions as an answer to the general confusion around genre that I 
discussed in this chapter, but it can also be seen as a methodological starting 
point for selecting the films for analysis.
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3 GENDER AND FICTIONS OF SCIENCE  
One of the central arguments this thesis makes is that fictional characters in 
Japanese speculative cinema are used to convey an idea of a certain national 
image and identity. This calls for an understanding of three specific 
frameworks: speculative cinema, fictional characters, and national images, all 
of which are imagined within the field of science and technology.  
This chapter is divided into three main parts. In the first subchapter I will 
address how gender has been discussed within studies of the weird in Japan. 
Japanese cinema knows many genres that promote certain types of gender 
representations but in kaiki eiga this representation is quite strictly divided 
into scientific masculinity and supernatural femininity.1 The notion of gender 
can be defined as a methodological tool, “a way of assigning social and 
psychological meaning to sexual difference” and “usually conceived as a pair 
of mutually exclusive ‘opposites’: masculine and feminine.”2 Hence, differing 
social and psychological meanings are assigned to both men and women by 
coding them as feminine or masculine. As Attebery argues regarding science 
fiction, “most signs … such as robots and psychic powers, can function as 
gender markers.”3 This subchapter also illustrates how gender conventions of 
kaiki eiga draw comprehensively from literature, cinema, folklore and other 
traditions of popular culture worldwide.  
The second subchapter defines my main theoretical concepts regarding 
masculinities, the study of which in general is a vast area.4 I will establish 
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hegemonic masculinity as the underlining ideological construct that the films 
constantly, but often implicitly, refer to. Hegemonic masculinity as a 
theoretical concept is well suited to exploring Japanese masculinities because 
of the strong emphasis on the salaryman ideal and the gender-based division 
of labor. Related to the concept is hybrid masculinity, which at first might 
seem to challenge the ideal of hegemonic masculinity but on closer inspection 
often ends up reinforcing it. Although no salarymen as such appear in the films, 
the ideal is often implicitly engaged with. Hegemonic masculinity as the 
dominant ideology structures our way of seeing and is the surface against 
which alternative ideologies are posited.5 As Frühstück and Walthall suggest, 
“distinct modes of masculinity become visible only if pitched against an actual 
or imagined Other.”6 The films present hegemonic masculinity not only as “an 
ideological reference group,” 7  but ultimately as something Other, too. To 
construct hegemonic masculinity as Other is an interesting idea and in accord 
with the interpretation of kaiki as something subversive. This will be further 
analyzed in the forthcoming chapters.  
Finally, the third subchapter will address the connection between 
masculinity and science. Science and technology provide a valuable site 
through which national images can be dissected, challenged and reconstructed, 
because in the films they often serves as a metaphor for national images. 
Furthermore, national images and ideas about masculinity are manifest in 
embodiments of scientific masculinity. Depending on the cinematic function 
of scientific masculinity—which differs in each film—it intersects with this 
ideal in order to create images of positive and negative masculinities and, 
consequently, of national identities. The third subchapter will thus illuminate 
the discourse around science and technology in Japan, as well as focus on the 
subsequent importance and definition of scientific masculinity.  
3.1 SUPERNATURAL FEMININITY AND SCIENTIFIC 
MASCULINITY 
According to Vivian Sobchack, both science fiction and horror deal with chaos 
that threatens “the order of things,” but in different ways. Horror includes 
moral chaos and disruption of the natural order, and a threat to the harmony 
of the hearth and home, whereas sci-fi is frequently about social chaos, 
disruption of (man-made) social order, and a threat to civilized society. 8 
                                                 
see Connell, Masculinities; Mike Donaldson, “What is hegemonic masculinity?,” Theory and Society 
22 (1993): 643–657. 
5 Lacey, Image and Representation, 104. 
6 Frühstück and Walthall, “Introduction,” 7. 
7 Sugimoto, Japanese Society, 40.  
8 Vivian Carol Sobchack, The Limits of Infinity: The American Science Fiction Film (New York: A.S. 
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Supernatural femininity and scientific masculinity correspond to this 
suggestion. Edogawa Rampo, in turn, makes a difference between detective 
stories and kaidan in the Japanese context, theorizing that, despite being 
inherently similar, the former is rational and the latter is irrational. As Grodal 
points out, modern science has increased the fear evoked by the loss of control 
associated with any supernatural violation of natural laws. 9  However, 
irregular detective fiction (henkaku tantei shōsetsu) mixes these.10  
Edogawa’s assertion is important in two ways. First, it blurs the line 
between science fiction, detective stories and ghost stories, suggesting the 
underlining presence of the kaiki mode. Second, it seems to provide one 
possible explanation for the preference for scientific masculinity and 
supernatural femininity. Both are used for the same purposes, but when the 
narrative requires a rational outlook, the expressive behavior is coded as 
rational and scientific masculinity is preferred, whereas storylines regarding 
beliefs associated with supernatural traditions and elements are “irrational” 
and the expressive behavior is thus coded as feminine.  
Another explanation is provided by Kume Yoriko, who draws from Saitō’s 
ideas on representations of girls’ and boys’ worlds in anime. This is also related 
to the notion of metamorphosis. In general, previous studies on 
transformation feature analyses on literature, 11  folklore, 12  anime and 
superheroes,13 as well as the aforementioned discourse on yōkai. In particular, 
horror film studies are abundant with discussion about metamorphosis.14 One 
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of the most illustrative works is Ichiyanagi Hirotaka and Yoshida Morio’s 
edited volume Onna wa henshin suru (2008), which provides short essays, 
interviews and scholarly case studies about female mutation mainly (but not 
only) in Japanese cultural products.  
Kume posits that girls’ and boys’ worlds in popular culture are two distinct 
cultural zones representative of two discrete cultural spheres in Japanese 
society: the private and the public. Supernatural femininity is used as a 
functional trope to discuss matters within the private sphere, whereas 
scientific masculinity appears in narratives that deal with the public one. 
According to Kume, boys’ and girls’ worlds function as imitations of their 
mothers’ and fathers’ lives: girls are taught to fall in love and concentrate on 
all private matters, whereas boys are taught to “combat” the very public enemy.  
Supernatural femininity often manifests in mahō shōjo (magical girl) 
narratives that consist of the so-called “girls’ sphere.”15 This is the culture of 
Cinderella and Snow White, romances where an unlikely girl is given an 
opportunity of marrying a prince. In the girls’ world, metamorphosis (henshin) 
takes place as keshō, or make-up, as the girls are transformed into adult 
females. However, in the “boys’ sphere,” henshin is called busō, a momentarily 
suiting-up of an individual in a special combat outfit. According to Saitō, this 
is traditional henshin, reminiscent of the earlier henshin hero plays (henshin 
hiiroo mono) based on legends, such as Momotarō, where heroes fight 
monsters and destroy the enemy. 16  In contemporary kaiki works, science 
provides the means for combat and the victory of young men. Kume argues 
that ultimately these henshin heroes exist only to socialize us into Japanese 
culture and normative gender roles, which for boys is that of a corporate 
soldier.17 Thus, scientific masculinity and supernatural femininity correspond 
to some distinctive features of both genres and society.  
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3.1.1 VENGEFUL GHOSTS 
Issues of gender are central to the horror genre, whether one prefers to 
examine horror films in terms of universal fears or culture-specific anxieties.18 
McRoy states that supernatural forces in the kaidan films often assume the 
form of a wronged, primarily female entity.19 This interest in femininity is not 
merely academic; on a popular level, Shoji Kaori of The Japan Times has 
articulated these fears in an article called “Female fears at the dead center of 
J-horror.”20 Kaiki to gensō e no kairo promotes “the women of kaidan” as one 
of the central themes around which discourses can be structured. According to 
Park Myoungsook, Japanese horror includes what he calls “the three 
semantics of horror”: the virus structure, the female avenger and “the 
culturally specific signification of the female high school student.” 21  The 
emergence of young victims and aggressors highlights “the growing social 
anxiety regarding the growing divide between older (conservative) generation 
and the new generations rejecting traditional ideas.” 22  However, Park’s 
suggestions underscores the presence of and emphasis on the feminine in 
Japanese horror film studies. While it cannot be denied that female avengers 
and schoolgirls both appear as central figures in many of the stories, proposing 
them as central to the semantics of horror in Japanese culture poses a risk of 
downplaying the role of masculinity.23  
The approach on the study of femininity in kaidan has been twofold: to 
concentrate on canonical works such as Tōkaidō Yotsuya kaidan (The Ghost 
Story of Yotsuya, Nakagawa Nobuo, 1959), Ringu, Honogurai mizu no soko 
kara (Dark Water, Nakata Hideo, 2002) and Juon (The Grudge, Shimizu 
Takashi, 2003), and to emphasize the central role of motherhood and children 
in the narratives. This concern is present as early as the Yotsuya kaidan 
narratives. Kinoshita Keisuke’s version of 1949 emphasized the wife aspect of 
being a female because of the postwar times of poverty and scarcity during 
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which it was released. Nakagawa Nobuo’s version, released ten years 
afterwards, in turn painted a picture of a strong union between Oiwa and her 
child, having been released during an era when Japan’s economy had started 
to grow and new children were gladly welcomed. Becoming a mother is seen 
as an important part of being a woman in Japan, even so important that if one 
willingly or unwillingly does not manage to achieve this ideal, the whole society 
is considered to suffer.24 The appearance of an avenging female yūrei (ghost) 
or onryō (avenging spirit) has led to extensive literature within horror film 
studies on the role and status of women in Japanese society.25 In addition, 
research on the monstrous mother prevails because of its direct consequences 
for their children, imaginary or real.26 
Attebery points out that “the need for a more equitable treatment of women 
is always a part of the gender picture.”27 This resentment that the ghost in 
Japanese horror narratives represents can be seen as a Japanese equivalent to 
rebellious sentiments. It is not merely about being a mother, but being a 
woman in a highly patriarchal society. Barrett states that “the grudge borne 
one man could be extended to include a male-dominated society that 
oppresses women.”28 As Samuel L. Leiter states, “one of the chief ways in 
which women who have been trampled on become empowered is to turn into 
vengeful spirits after they have died. The entire world of selfish, unfaithful 
                                                 
24 According to Barrett, the ghost of Lady Wakasa in Ugetsu monogatari is a muenbotoke, a spirit 
without descendants to remember her; due to having missed out on an important part of life, she bears 
a grudge against the living (Barrett, Archetypes, 103).  
25  See Eerolainen, “Perheonnea ja sorretun kostoa” and “Kazoku no shiten”; Kinoshita, “The 
Mummy Complex”; Washitani, “Ringu sanbusaku”; Balmain, Japanese Horror; Wee, American 
Remakes; Hirano, “Yotsuya Ghost Story”; Yokoyama Yasuko横山泰子, “Yotsuya kaidan eiga no Oiwa-
tachi: Kabuki to wakare, betsu no onna e” 四谷怪談映画のお岩たち―歌舞伎と別れ、別の女へ [Oiwas 
of the Yotsuya Kaidan films: From kabuki to another woman], in Kaiki to gensō e no kairo: Kaidan kara 
J-horaa e怪奇と幻想への回路―階段から Jホラーへ [Route to the weird and fantastic: From kaidan to 
J-horror], ed. Uchiyama Kazuki 内山一樹  (Tokyo: Shinwasha, 2008), 145–170; Shimura, “Yōkai 
sanbusaku”; Robert Hyland, “A Politics of Excess: Violence and Violation in Miike Takashi’s Audition,” 
in Horror to the Extreme: Changing Boundaries in Asian Cinema, ed. Choi Jinhee and Mitsuyo Wada-
Marciano (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2009), 199–218. This interest in femininity is not 
merely academic: on a popular level, Kaori Shoji of The Japan Times has articulated these fears in an 
article called Female fears at the dead center of J-horror (Special to The Japan Times, October 21, 2015). 
26 See the narratives of Asakawa and her son in Ringu, Kayoko and her son in Juon, Shibata Reiko 
and her mother in Sakebi, Michi and her mother in Kairo, the intertwined relationships between various 
daughters and mothers in Chakushin ari, etc.  
27 Attebery, Decoding Gender, 13. 
28 Barrett, Archetypes, 98. 
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husbands and lovers must take cover when one of these women comes back 
from the other world to seek revenge on those who have wronged her.”29  
Vengeful spirits are also analyzed as cultural tropes (or archetypes, as 
Barrett calls them). A woman with a vengeful mission appears both in 
Kurosawa Akira’s Ran (1985) and in Miike Takashi’s Audition (1999), but only 
the latter is considered horror. Gregory Barrett also points out that the Sasori 
series of the 1970s was in fact representative of the vengeful spirit archetype.30 
Similarly, the Inoshika Ochō films (1973) could be included. Still, although a 
spirit appears, I am yet to see Kurosawa’s masterpiece Rashōmon (1950) 
analyzed as horror.31 Ghosts can be mere hallucinations, as is the case with 
Kinoshita Keisuke’s two-part Shinshaku: Yotsuya kaidan (The Ghost Story of 
Yotsuya: A New Interpretation, 1949), released during the Occupation era. 
Kinoshita received production permission because he situated the story firmly 
in postwar Japan, with Oiwa being only a hallucination of a sad man.32 This 
illustrates how the production of films—not only horror—was affected because 
of the censorship practiced by the General Headquarters (GHQ) after the end 
of the war.33 Especially kaidan were put under strict regulation because they 
were considered a part of the jidaigeki genre, the films of which were in many 
cases banned because of their emphasis on questions of loyalty, dedication and 
self-sacrifice.  
In many cases, the anger of a ghost is tied to the notion of a disease or a 
virus, as noted by Park (2009) and Ōshima (2012). Nakamura has discussed 
this in relation to literature where men, touched by monstrous women, are 
disfigured and hybridized, turning into monsters. According to her, diseases 
came to be narrated with a rhetoric of fear that portrayed them as “enemies” 
that invaded healthy bodies. The discovery of bacteria only assured people that 
                                                 
29  Samuel L Leiter, “From Gay to Gei: The Onnagata and the Creation of Kabuki’s Female 
Characters,” in A Kabuki Reader: History and performance, ed. Samuel L. Leiter (Armonk: M.E. 
Sharpe, 2002), 225. 
30 See Barrett, Archetypes, 113–115. 
31 Eerolainen, “Oh the Horror,” 40.  
32  Keiko I. McDonald, Japanese Classical Theatre in Films (London and Toronto: Associated 
University Press, 1994), 89. 
33 Of course, this was not the first time that the Japanese film business was strictly regulated. 
Previous to World War II, the Japanese government had assumed control of the Japanese film industry 
because, as Richie proceeds to quote a nameless authority, “films are like bullets which we cannot give 
to the private sector” (Richie, Japanese Cinema, 96; Hirano Kyōko, Mr. Smith Goes to Tokyo: Japanese 
Cinema Under the American Occupation, 1945–1952 [US: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1992], 15). A 
new “Film Law” was enforced in 1939, according to which the government was given absolute power to 
decide the fate of any film studio and actor and make directors convey the imperialistic strategy (Satō 
Tadao, Currents in Japanese Cinema [Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1982], 100–101; Hirano, Mr. 
Smith, 16). 
Gender and fictions of science 
68 
it was impossible to detect the enemy with one’s own eyes.34 To code this 
“disease-ness” as feminine highlights the fact that women are not dangerous 
only because they are women but because of their power to shake the gender 
hierarchy to its core.35 Park sees as a general worry that Japanese society as a 
whole is the target of an avenging spirit in the narrative.36 Ōshima calls this 
the logic of utsuru kaidan, in which fear becomes reality once the story ends.37 
This strategy draws heavily on urban legends and jitsuwasei (being seemingly 
based on a true story).38 Ultimately horrific is the steady dissolution of a stable 
identity, morphing into the very opposite.39 The horror of the films comes 
ultimately from how their diegetic world works as a twisted mirror for the 
contemporary society—what is perceived as “natural” is nothing but a well-
constructed simulacrum. Horror springs from the logical deduction that, as 
the film mirrors our own world, anyone in the system can be the next 
monster—even the spectator himself. Anyone is easily infected.  
In kaidan, the monster is not only a double of the main female 
protagonist—the monster is the female protagonist. This corresponds to Linda 
Williams’s (1996) insights about the affinity between monster and woman.40 
This personification of the monstrous is achieved through henshin, where a 
previous beauty is transformed into a hideous ghost. This is possibly best 
exemplified by Oiwa’s transformation in the Yotsuya kaidan narratives. This 
emphasizes explicitly the role of the feminine in the process of the 
personification of the monstrous because, as Hand states, “the perfect woman 
[…] is dignified, graceful and demure, but her antithesis is unruly and 
hideous.”41 The aforementioned argument draws a parallel between Japanese 
ghost narratives and a more general tradition of stories that feature a 
transformation or a metamorphosis, where protagonists transform from 
                                                 
34 Nakamura Miri, Monstrous Bodies: The Rise of the Uncanny in Modern Japan (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2015), 19. 
35 Ibid. 29. 
36 Park, Remake Practices, 119. 
37 Ōshima, Yūrei kenkyū, 52, 90. 
38 Iwasaka and Toelken define this as a “storytelling tradition set in everyday settings that exemplify 
many of the narrative traits associated with legends, whether urban or rural” (Iwasaka Michiko and Barre 
Toelken, Ghosts and the Japanese: Cultural Experience in Japanese Death Legends [Logan: Utah State 
University Press, 1994], 58). 
39 Wee, American Remakes, 198, 200. 
40 See Linda Williams, “When the Woman Looks,” in The Dread of Difference, ed. Barry Keith Grant 
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 1996), 15–34. 
41 Examples of this monstrous-feminine abound in classical Japanese theater, and the demonic 
women in the nō kyōjo-mono or shūnen-mono subcategories, or the akujo (evil women) or dokufu 
(poison ladies) in kabuki are great icons of their respective forms (Hand, “Aesthetics of Cruelty,” 24). 
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inside out “as a spectacle of growth, enormity and excess.”42 For women, many 
times the transformation is supernatural: they transform into ghosts, from 
beautiful women into animals and birds, or from normal schoolgirls into 
magically endowed girls and witches.  
However, there are few works that allow for the so-called techno-scientific 
transformation of the female protagonist. Women-as-cyborgs become 
important manifestations of the theme. Recently, supernatural femininity has 
found its champion in anime and manga, although there are many series that 
include works that make use of the techno-scientific metamorphosis, too. 
Technological femininity—the merging of woman with a machine—also 
became a popular motif in the 21st-century kaiki eiga by Iguchi Noboru and 
Nishimura Yoshihiro, such as Kataude mashin gaaru (The Machine Girl, 
2008), Sentō shōjo: Chi no tekkamen densetsu (Mutant Girls Squad, 2010), 
and Helldriver (2010). However, scientific femininity is still but a minor 
presence in kaiki eiga, despite history containing many female explorers and 
research scientists. A delightful exception is Kurosawa Kiyoshi’s Kairo. 
Although outside the scope of this study, a further inquiry into these films is 
needed. 
Supernatural women do not represent the haunting premodern behind 
Japan’s modernity but can be seen as functional entities used to question how 
these modern ideologies have affected the Japanese masculinities. It is a 
process of challenging and questioning the persuasive image of Japanese 
hegemonic masculinity. When power and authority assigned to men “by the 
patriarchal social order are seriously undermined by national traumas […] 
their masculinity is brought to crisis” and femininity is both “the actual victim 
and a symbolic symptom of that crisis.” 43  Thus, to emphasize monstrous 
females in fact works to dissect not only the threat of emerging, alternative 
masculinities, but also, as Connell notes in her theorization discussed above, 
the way femininity can pose a threat to the hegemonic masculinity. In kaiki 
eiga, masculinity is thus under attack from both genders. It is through strong, 
supernatural women that masculine ideals and ideologies of power are 
dissolved. If scientific masculinity and supernatural femininity appear within 
the same film, the demise of the rational scientific masculinity is in many cases 
due to this supernatural female agent. This role of women in facilitating male 
action is visible not only in cinema but society at large.44 
                                                 
42 Ian Conrich, “Metal-Morphosis: Post-Industrial Crisis and the Tormented Body in the Tetsuo 
Films,” in Japanese Horror Cinema, ed. Jay McRoy (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2005), 
99.  
43 Cho Eunsun, “The Stray Bullet and the Crisis of Korean Masculinity,” in South Korean Golden 
Age Melodrama: Gender, Genre and National Cinema, ed. Kathleen McHugh and Nancy Abelmann 
(Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2005), 99, 101 
44 See Anne Allison, Nightwork: Sexuality, Pleasure and Corporate Masculinity in a Tokyo Hostess 
Club (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1994) for a discussion about the role of 
hostesses; Amy Borovoy, The Too-Good Wife (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of 
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3.1.2 DADS AND MAD SCIENTISTS  
Media as a cultural institution “often portrays men as active people and the 
main characters of the story.”45 Regarding the study of Japanese (speculative) 
cinema, men and masculinities are yet to receive the attention given to women. 
An early attempt to discuss men in Japanese cinema is provided by Satō Tadao, 
one of the paramount Japanese critics of Japanese cinema. Satō (1984) 
suggests that jidaigeki and gendaigeki prefer different types of masculinities, 
which are representative of two differing models of historical-ideal 
masculinities: in Japan, bushidō (the way of the samurai) emphasized man’s 
loyalty toward his master and absolute compliance, whereas in the West 
kishidō (the way of the knight) emphasized love stories and a man’s love that 
conquers all. These were combined with gendered types from kabuki, leading 
to a situation where the protagonist of jidaigeki is tachiyaku, strong and able, 
skilled, smart and loyal above anything else. However, his loyalty is directed 
to his master, not his wife. The gendaigeki equivalent of tachiyaku is nimaime, 
a sweet and innocent character who was created as entertainment for female 
spectators and consequently spent his time whispering sweet nothings into the 
ear of the female protagonist. Unfortunately, the nimaime was also weak—a 
characteristic that often resulted in the heroine’s untimely death.46 Recently, 
fictional representations of the salaryman have received their fair share,47 as 
have fictional representations of other types of alternative masculinities.48 
One of the most comprehensive studies on gender representations in 
Japanese cinema is provided by Gregory Barrett in his Archetypes, where all 
                                                 
California Press, 2005) for an analysis of the role that wives play  in their husbands’ drinking habits; and 
Ogasawara Yuko, Office Ladies and Salaried Men: Power, Gender and Work in Japanese Companies 
(Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 1998) for an outline of the way that 
office ladies can in fact significantly affect the working results of the salarymen in the same companies.  
45 Kahn, Introduction to Masculinities, 25. 
46 Satō, Nimaime no kenkyū, 19–47. 
47 See, for example, Bart Gaens, “(R)emasculation of the Salaryman: Representations of Japanese 
White-Collar Employees in the Manga Shima Kōsaku,” in New Perspectives from Japan and China. vol. 
27, ed. Iwatake Mikako, (Helsinki: Renvall Institute Publications, 2010), 222–246; Ishiguro, Kuniko and 
Peter Matanle, “Sarariiman manga ni miru danjo no raifu kōsu: ‘Shima Kōsaku’ ‘Sarariiman Kintarō’ 
shiriisu kara no kōsatsu,” (サラリーマンマンガにみる男女のライフコース―『島耕作』『サラリーマン
金太郎』シリーズからの考察 , Understanding men’s and women’s life courses through salaryman 
manga: Case studies from the Shima Kosaku and Salaryman Kintaro series), in Raifu kōsu sentaku no 
yukue – Nihon to Doitsu no shigoto ・ie ・sumai ライフコース選択の行方―日本とドイツの仕事・家
・住まい [Beyond a Standardized Life Course: Biographical Choices about Work, Family and Housing 
in Japan and Germany], ed. Tanaka Hiromi, Maren Godzik, and Kristina Iwata-Weickgenannt (Tokyo: 
Shinyōsha, 2013); Shinjitsu Ichirō 真実一郎, Sarariiman manga no sengoshi サラリーマン漫画の戦後
史 [The postwar history of salaryman manga] (Tokyo: Yōsensha, 2010).  
48  On nagaremono, see Standish, Myth and Masculinity and Yoko Tokuhiro, Marriage in 
Contemporary Japan (Oxon and New York: Routledge, 2010); on Otoko wa tsurai yo, see Yomota, 
Sengo no shinwa and Ian Buruma, A Japanese Mirror (Croydon: Atlantic Book, 2012 [1984]). 
 71 
of the archetypes are discussed as culturally significant functional components 
situated along the gender axis.49 Barrett has created a vocabulary with which 
to discuss characters and their relationship to society. According to him, this 
relationship can be conservative, problematic or oppositional. 50  A similar 
approach is visible in Ian Buruma’s A Japanese Mirror (2012 [1984]), a book 
about heroes and villains as they appear in the products of Japanese popular 
culture and contribute to the process “in which Japanese imagine and 
reimagine themselves.” 51  Although Barrett’s and Buruma’s studies can be 
criticized on various accounts, they nonetheless promote a stance that is close 
to mine: exploring the functionality of characters as vessels for reflecting 
national concerns. Isolde Standish’s Myth and Masculinity in the Japanese 
Cinema: Towards a Political Reading of the “Tragic Hero” (2000) should also 
be noted. It is one of the few book-length studies on men in Japanese cinema 
to date. Her aim has been to “use a political analysis on how masculine 
subjectivity interacts with the past in the light of the present, in relation to the 
‘tragic hero’ narrative structure dominant in Japanese film.”52 Hence, much 
like me, she concentrates on a narrative trope and its social function, 
emphasizing the molding of these traditional types to answer certain political 
needs at specific moments in history. 
In horror cinema, men have received prominently less attention. As 
pointed out above, ghosts in Japanese horror are mainly women. Balmain 
points out that male ghosts tend to be secondary figures to the vengeful yūrei 
or ghosts of warriors long dead.53 One type of supernatural male monster was 
introduced in the form of a vampire, but, as Mittman notes, monstrosity does 
not necessarily “translate to others’ Others.”54 Stein (2009) points out that due 
to Japan having no traditional vampire folklore, some of the initial attempts 
                                                 
49 According to Barrett, the archetypes are: the Loyal Retainer and the Tormented Lord, the Chaste 
Warrior, the Yakuza Hero, the Wanderer, the Vengeful Spirit, the All-Suffering Female and the Weak 
Passive Male, the Prodigal Son, the Forgiving Parent and the Self-Sacrificing Sister. 
50 Barrett, Archetypes, 20: Barrett proposes that secularization has played an important role in the 
shift in the representations of characters. Especially during the Occupation, ideals of freedom and 
individual autonomy, as opposed to authoritarianism and submission, were promoted (ibid., 179). 
51  Buruma, Japanese Mirror, xi. As Buruma himself notes in the preface for the latest edition 
(written in 2012), his was a study that, during its publication, probably provided the average person with 
an interesting view of Japanese society, shedding light on characters and phenomena such as yakuza, 
Takarazuka, the Chūshingura tale et cetera. Nowadays, however, these belong to the mainstay of 
Japanese cultural studies, which may consequently make his book look outdated or even naïve.  
52 Standish, Myth and Masculinity, 2. 
53 Balmain, Japanese Horror, 83, 85. One exception of a male ghost protagonist is to be found in 
Ōshima Nagisa’s Ai no bōrei (Empire of Passion, 1978) but, as Balmain notes, the male ghost who was 
murdered by his wife and her lover appears as a sympathetic figure, appearing in an unthreatening 
manner, unlike most female yūrei. Balmain suggests that the real difference between him and the female 
ghosts is the fact that he has not come to terms with his death (ibid.).  
54 Mittman, “Introduction,” 5–7. 
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to implement Dracula narratives were both critical and financial failures 
because the lustful figure of a Western vampire did not translate to the 
Japanese audience.55 Only when Japanese vampires started to possess the 
characteristics of wandering spirits, which made them doomed tragic figures, 
were the directors on the right track. To Westerners, death itself is horrifying, 
but to the Japanese and other Asian cultures influenced by Buddhism, a more 
terrible fate is getting trapped in the liminal space between life and death.56 
Should we apply Grodal’s terminology to Stein’s arguments, the Japanese 
lacked the innate mental dispositions that would have allowed for the vampire 
to succeed in its original meaning. In Attebery’s terms, these would have been 
presuppositions and a social constructivist reading would speak of culturally 
informed mental dispositions.  
Satō’s dichotomy paints a simple picture of masculinities in Japanese 
cinema. In relation to horror, Shimura introduces yet another term: otoko no 
kaijin, a male phantom or male monster.57 Tsukamoto Shinya refers to them 
as futsū saizu no kaijin, phantoms of regular size.58 What is common for the 
relatively less-known films utilizing the male phantom motif is that they are 
not situated in the past like many of the kaidan films before the contemporary 
J-horror movement; instead, they reflect the social conditions of the postwar 
society. One prominent expression is the problematic portrayal of fatherhood, 
which has found its place in previous research. Hyland proposes that in Miike 
Takashi’s Audition, patriarchy is portrayed as monstrous, but, unable to face 
its own monstrosity, it consequently projects that monstrosity upon the 
innocent woman, Asami. Proposing a Jungian reading, he sees Asami as the 
anima of patriarchal Japan, the inner woman within a masculine society that 
plays on masculine fears. The hegemony needs to be reinforced and the 
woman contained. 59  In Juon, the murder of Kayako at the hands of her 
husband Takeo is, according to Valerie Wee, a representation of “patriarchal 
anger” during an era in which both genders are expected to undergo a change. 
Juon describes this paternal anxiety and the “loss of power, control, and 
dominance,” creating a tangible site of failure that infects all that come into 
                                                 
55 Kida suggests that this is first and foremost due to a differing religious basis (Gensō to kaiki, 235). 
56 See Wayne Stein, “Enter the Dracula: The Silent Screams and Cultural Crossroads of Japanese 
and Hong Kong Cinema,” in Draculas, Vampires and Other Undead Forms: Essays on gender, race 
and culture, ed. John Edgar Browning and Caroline Joan Picart (Maryland, Toronto, New York and 
Plymouth: Scarecrow Press, 2009), 235–260; see also Inoue Yoshitaka 井上嘉孝, “Gendai Nihon ni 
okeru kyūketsuki imeeji ni tsuite” “現代日本における吸血鬼イメージについて” [The images of 
vampires in modern Japan], Kyōto daigaku daigakuin kyōikugaku kenkyūka fuzoku rinmatsukyōiku 
jissen kenkyūsentaa kiyō 14 (2010), 36–50 for further analysis of the vampire in Japan. 
57 Shimura, “Hōrō suru,” 220. 
58 This term comes from his short film of the same name, released in 1986. 
59 Hyland, “Politics of Excess,” 205, 215. According to Jung, the persona is masculine and the anima 
feminine: the persona is “the self constructed in transactions with the social environment,” while the 
anima is “the self formed in the unconscious out of repressed elements” (Connell, Masculinities, 12).  
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contact with it.60 Thus, it negotiates “the consequences for society when men 
and fathers feel threatened by socioeconomic, political, and ideological 
changes.”61 Finally, Washitani makes a similar point in claiming that Ringu is 
ultimately about paternity. As an antidote to the spreading curse, the film 
promotes fathers as necessary figures for the purification of the feminine, 
helping them (through self-sacrifice) and guaranteeing their sanctity. Through 
that process, in the aftermath of Sadako being murdered by her own father, 
they restore the authoritative power of the male-dominated society. 
Consequently, the traditional view of family is also restored.62  
Otoko no kaijin have a long history in Japan and are also an importance 
presence in fictions of science, as many prewar writers already started 
implementing scientific ideas into their works. 63  Kawana points out that 
although works in the detective genre have been popular in Japan ever since 
the late 19th century, “the genre itself has defied rigid categorization and 
resisted strict definition.”64 Nakamura Miri defines irregular detective fiction, 
henkaku tantei shōsetsu, as a genre that “differed from the more objective and 
rational methods of regular detective fiction (honkaku tantei shōsetsu)” and 
which, because of its scientific themes, “is now treated as the forerunner of 
contemporary Japanese science fiction.”65  
Scientific masculinity and irregular detective fiction have also gained 
popularity due to the rise of “eroguro nonsense,” or erotic-grotesque nonsense. 
Nakamura explains that there was a huge consumer market for everything 
bizarre, which “un-doubtedly affected these popular writers’ decision to depict 
a ‘nightmare of machines’ rather than the ‘utopian dream’.”66 Detective fiction, 
according to Kawana, tried to make sense of the modernizing world, becoming 
“antidotes to the modern epidemics of angst and anxiety, the roots of which 
remained obscured in the shadows of everyday life.” 67  From Grodal’s 
biocultural point of view, the popularity of crime fictions stems from their aim 
to provide orientation and moral surveillance in the new social jungle and also 
activate a series of innate dispositions, like hiding from dangerous others.68 
Science fiction scholar Tatsumi Takayuki (2000) places Japanese science 
fiction writers into four main generational groups. He notes that the first 
                                                 
60 Wee, American Remakes, 123–133. 
61 Ibid.  
62 Washitani, “Ringu sanbusaku,” 201–214, 218. 
63 See Edogawa, “Kaidan nyūmon” and Nakamura Miri, “Horror and Machines in Prewar Japan: 
The Mechanical Uncanny in Yumeno Kyusaku’s Dogura Magura,” in Robot Ghosts and Wired Dreams: 
Japanese Science Fiction from Origins to Anime, ed. Christopher Bolton, Istvan Csicsery-Ronay, Jr. and 
Tatsumi Takayuki (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 2007), 3–26. 
64 Kawana, Murder Most Modern, 1. 
65 Nakamura, “Horror and Machines,” 4. 
66 Nakamura, ibid., 9. 
67 Kawana, Murder Most Modern, 8. 
68 Grodal, Embodied Visions, 8. 
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generation appeared in the 1960s with names such as Abe Kōbō, Komatsu 
Sakyō and Hoshi Shinichi.69 Their original works have also regularly provided 
source material for films such as Tanin no kao and Nihon chibotsu. Hoshi 
Shinichi, known for his very short science fiction stories, also scripted Honda 
Ishirō’s Matango. Thus, in tracing the origins of “Japanese horror”—or the 
fantastic, as I would prefer to call it—it is necessary to take into account its 
connection with literature. If the filmmakers were influenced by American and 
European film history, the influence was doubled, because as Tatsumi points 
out, many of these “founding fathers” of Japanese science fiction literature 
were influenced by 1950s Anglo-American sci-fi.70 As opposed to detective 
fiction, Tatsumi sees the origins of Japanese science fiction as an organized 
movement [italics mine] belonging to the 1950s and the successful publication 
of Uchūjin and Hayakawa’s SF Magazine. There are thus similarities between 
this and the J-horror movement. Many of the prewar writers, such as Yumeno 
Kyūsaku and Unno Jūza, incorporated styles that “ranged from scientific 
fantasy to sociopolitical extrapolation.”71 Especially Unno Jūza is an important 
figure for the understanding of the earlier manifestations of the Mad Scientist 
motif in Japan. Unno, who was a government engineer, was interested in 
creating stories with the theme of improving the human body. In Fushū (1934), 
Muroto was a surgeon who aimed to create a superhuman. He ends up 
operating on his own body, creating a monster in the process. In addition, the 
question of using the unlimited power of technology for engineering a 
superman becomes central in Hae otoko (Fly Man), where Dr. Shiota 
experiments on a corpse that later becomes the villain of the story.72 Similar 
narratives abound in the works I will analyze in this thesis, although not within 
the J-horror movement. 
As the above attests, the Mad Scientist was a central feature of Japanese 
science fiction, too. In the universal “Mad Scientist” narrative, “Prominent but 
deranged agents of science—such as research scientists, engineers, and 
doctors—started to appear more often as serial killers than as models of 
scientific morality.”73 Generally speaking, the Mad Scientist narrative is based 
on distinctive features: immoral intent, immoral methodology and an immoral 
result from an experiment carried out in secret. 74  John Rieder traces the 
origins of “the deviant renegade scientist” to the late 20th century and to 
                                                 
69 Tatsumi, “Generations and Controversies: An Overview of Japanese Science Fiction, 1957–1997,” 
Science Fiction Studies 27, no. 1 (2000): 105. 
70 Ibid., 106. Tatsumi argues that the second generation appeared in the 1970s, the third in the 1980s 
and the fourth in the late 1980s and 1990s. All of these have distinctive concerns, ranging from New 
Wave ideologies to (pre-) cyberpunk, cyborg feminism and “yaoi politics” (ibid., 106).  
71 Tatsumi, “Generations and Controversies,” 105. 
72 Kawana, “Mad Scientists,” 113, 115–116. 
73 Ibid., 89. 
74 Larsen, “Frankenstein’s Legacy: The Mad Scientist Remade,” 47–48. 
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Stevenson’s Dr. Jekyll, Wells’s Dr. Moreau or Shelley’s Victor Frankenstein.75 
In fact, Rieder sees Victor Frankenstein as the very first modern mad scientist, 
differing in essence from his predecessor Faust. Whereas Faust operated 
within the Christian universe and gained knowledge and power through his 
deal with the devil, Frankenstein (and his contemporaries) were secular 
figures: “The framework of his desire is not the supernatural realm of the 
unholy alliance but rather the resolutely modern and secular arena of the 
professional career… Just as Victor Frankenstein is a secular transformation 
of Faust, his creation myth, and its failure is a version of the Fall.”76 Andrew 
Bartlett, too, recognizes the similarities between modern mad scientist 
narratives and the Faust legend, with their shared thematic concern with 
forbidden knowledge. Faust, however, is contextualized within “theistic 
supernaturalism,” not “atheistic materialism.”77  
Bartlett (2014) has analyzed the so-called “Frankenstein myth” in detail. 
According to him, at the core of the storyline “a mad scientist plays God by 
trying to re-enact the origin of the human, and disastrously fails.”78 He calls 
these scientists “dramatic embodiments of scientism,” also referring to them 
as vain scientists; they are above all overconfident in their own abilities and 
scientific powers.79 In addition to the presence of the mad/vain scientist and 
the monster created by him—an impossible human—the works incorporating 
the Frankenstein myth have a distinctive narrative pattern: an experiment, 
partial success, a defect, dialogue, violent revenge, and death. These are 
components that originally appeared in Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein and, 
according to Bartlett, must appear in all of its variations. In addition, the Mad 
Scientist must aim to create an especially anthropomorphic monster with 
whom he has a conversation. 80  As Rieder also points out, “The scientist-
creature dyad is without question an item of standard science fiction 
equipment picked up from the sf stockroom.”81  
The Mad Scientist “disregards the ethical considerations and regulations of 
society in general, professional organizations, and the scientist’s nation.”82 It 
is used to criticize the widely embraced notion of scientism, the “unconditional 
faith in science and its agents.”83 More to the point, Bartlett points out that the 
Mad Scientist narrative and the Frankenstein myth criticize the notion of 
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76 Rieder, “The Mad Scientist,” 93–95. 
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scientism—not science—which he sees as “a reductionist ideology based on a 
metaphysical position neither required nor necessitated by the practices and 
institutions of scientific research itself.”84 The films in this thesis illuminate 
the general role of scientific masculinity, which appears as criticism of 
scientism, providing an important new outlook on the study of masculinities 
within Japanese cinema, as well as pointing out the influence of literature that 
has often been ignored in previous studies.  
3.2 CONCEPTUALIZING MASCULINITY: THE 
HEGEMONIC SALARYMAN  
The emergence of the women’s liberation movement in the West in the late 
1960s resulted in the first wave of research about gender and sex roles. The 
issue of gender was further highlighted by the advent of gay movement, 
leading to overall “cultural turbulence around themes of masculinity.” 85 
Previously masculinity had been present in research but not as the real target 
of analysis. In Japan, the popularity of the studies on the Japanese lifetime 
employment system provides a fine example of this. 86  These studies 
emphasize men but not their masculinities, defined by Connell as “historical 
configurations of practice structured by gender relations.”87 Since then, the 
need of problematizing the “concept of ‘men’ as a category” has become 
evident.88  
The concept of hegemonic masculinity is one of the main theoretical 
concepts of masculinity studies, originating as late as the 1980s in Australia.89 
It started out with a narrow conceptual model that became a widely used 
framework between the late 1980s and early 2000s.90 It emerged as an answer 
to the realization that masculinities and femininities are plural phenomena: 
there is never only one.91 Hegemony itself refers to “the cultural dynamic by 
which a group claims and sustains a leading position in social life,” leading to 
a situation where the attributes of this particular group are culturally exalted. 
The notion originates from the writings of Antonio Gramsci, who in the 1920s 
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and 1930s theorized that the most powerful method of rule for a dominant 
class is to gain the consent of the masses: if the working classes did not feel 
oppressed, they were willing to consent to the rule of the dominant classes.92 
The cultural and ideological relations between ruling and subordinate classes 
thus have less to do with the domination of the latter and more with “the 
struggle for hegemony – that is, for moral, cultural, intellectual and, thereby, 
political leadership over the whole society.”93 
As a concept, hegemonic masculinity is as influential as it is criticized.94 
Being generally subordinate to Gramsci’s definition, it means the domination 
of a particular type of masculinity over women and other men, referring to “the 
pattern of practice that allowed men’s dominance … to continue.”95 However, 
as societies develop, hegemonic masculinity also finds new forms. The 
hegemonization of one particular form of masculinity is a result of a process 
that takes place in specific socio-historical contexts with individuals making 
use of context-specific gender practices in order to “achieve an ascendant 
position in relation to other men and women.” 96  As Connell and 
Messerschmidt emphasize, hegemonic masculinity is never ahistorical nor 
static; it is continuously challenged by the other, produced and reproduced in 
social practice, open to changes and, most importantly, subject to the general 
public’s situational consent.97 Sexual and racial differences, too, are important 
for the ideal of hegemonic masculinity. Hegemonic masculinity suggests that 
men comply with social norms of masculinity by subordinating women and 
marginalizing other men. These are referred to as external and internal 
hegemonies.98  
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In Japan, negotiations of masculinity are divided into discussions of its 
hegemonic manifestations99 and, more recently, the ways in which hegemony 
is challenged.100 In addition, some scholars discuss more specific attributes 
that may define a certain kind of masculine self, which can be further situated 
still within the dualism of the salaryman hegemony and its alternatives.101 
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Overall, it can be deduced that masculinity has started to become 
problematized partly due to the collapse of the virtues of postwar capitalism 
that constituted the baseline for class and gender claims in Japan.102 
Harding points out that “gender appears only in culturally specific 
forms.”103  In Japanese, ‘masculinity’ can be translated as otokorashisa, or 
manliness. One of the leading figures of Japanese masculinity studies, Itō 
Kimio, has provided one of the first studies on masculinities in his 
“Otokorashisa” no yukue (1996 [1993]), wherein he discusses what he calls the 
crisis of masculinity vis-à-vis femininity, a trajectory that was created by the 
Women’s Liberation Movement. Itō’s main point, that men in many cases are 
forced to change although social institutions, is yet to be acknowledged. He 
has also penned an article “Otoko no sei mo hitotsu dewa nai” as a contribution 
to a book on Japanese feminism, emphasizing the plurality of masculinities. 
“Other” masculinities constitute important minority groups that act as a 
counterpart to the hegemonic ideology.104  
Culture offers different ways of representing masculinities, as well as 
different ways of being masculine. In Japan, the construction of masculinity 
has historically been closely related to the needs of the state,105 and a level of 
self-sacrifice and social embeddedness is needed. 106  Taga Futoshi has 
translated hegemonic masculinity as ichininmae no otoko—the exemplary 
man. This exemplary ideal requires a man to marry a female, support his 
family through his economic power and, as the head of the family, take 
responsibility for it.107 In the postwar society, this took place in the figure of 
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the salaryman. The salaryman is an embodiment of a form of masculinity that 
is culturally and politically specific, a figure that has ruled the popular 
understanding of Japanese masculinity from the start of the period of high 
growth until the 1990s and the Lost Decade.108 Through the economic activity 
of the salaryman, emasculated postwar Japanese men regained their power; 
because of this, the working man came to occupy the role of “the most 
prominent symbol of heterosexual adult Japanese masculinity.”109 
Generally speaking, the salaryman was representative of Japan’s new 
middle class, a white-collar, male company employee in the private sector who 
was able to reap the benefits of lifetime employment, seniority-based wages 
and corporate paternalism by expressing loyalty, diligence, dedication and 
self-sacrifice. 110  As Sugimoto explicates, he “embodies all the stereotypical 
images associated with the Japanese corporate employee: loyalty to his 
company, subservience to the hierarchical order of his enterprise, devotion to 
his work, a long and industrious working life, and job security in his career.”111 
While the term was originally used to specifically refer to middle-class, white-
collar workers of large companies, many company workers or civil servants 
who receive a monthly salary call themselves salarymen.112  
The discourse and hegemonization of the salaryman began building up 
during the prewar years, even as early as the 1920s. However, it was correlated 
with a lower social standing until the 1960s, when there was a rapid increase 
of households with salaried workers. Becoming a salaryman became the 
blueprint for Japanese masculinity in the postwar decades, with the term 
being naturalized in the 1950s, replacing the earlier gekkyū tori (monthly 
earner) of the early Showa period. For better or worse, the salaryman 
embodied the so-called “New Japanese Male.”113 The creation of the salaryman 
could be an extension of so-called “samuraization.”114 The term not only points 
to the fact that in the late Tokugawa period many redundant samurai became 
the predecessors of white-collar workers, but also refers to a process through 
which such characteristics as loyalty, perseverance and diligence, said to be 
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held by elite samurai, were gradually extended through propaganda, education, 
and regulation to cover the whole of the population in order to create a 
national ideology.115  
To directly call salarymen contemporary-era samurai, however, is nothing 
but ahistorical reductionism, which does not take into account the gaps 
between different periods.116 It seems to be a manifestation of nihonjinron. 
Still, as processes “salarymanization” and “samuraization” are not so different 
after all. In addition, they are not “monolithic ideals but rather indefinite 
notions containing contradictory elements.”117 Thus, although Roberson and 
Suzuki are correct in stating that “samuraization” as a term should be avoided 
due to its connections with nihonjinron, the process itself—namely, the 
embracing of the connection between the state and the ideal masculinity—is 
similar. As Morris Low suggests, throughout the process of Japan’s 
modernization, men were linked to the state through “rigid constructions of 
the masculine” in institutions that promoted conformity, discipline and 
submission.118 The way salarymen were tied to the company resembles this 
strategy. However, Hidaka states that this kind of corporate masculinity, 
which derives from the power of the company, is ultimately the most 
vulnerable.119  Power in this hegemonic model lies with the company: “the 
disguise of the corporate warrior hides the experience of the company-tamed 
submissive salaryman.”120 This is apparent in the comments made by Dower 
and Sugimoto that “[m]uch of the genuinely innovative entrepreneurial energy 
that lies behind Japan’s postwar economic takeoff … has come from … smaller 
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enterprises”121 and that “though powerful and influential, large corporations 
constitute a very small minority of the businesses in Japan.”122 
The self-evident image of the salaryman came to be doubted in the 1980s. 
Psychologist Watanabe Tsuneo published his Datsu dansei no jidai (Escaping 
the age of men) as early as 1986.123 This “escape” is recalled, for example, by a 
recent book that summarizes contemporary men’s anxieties around themes 
that range from childrearing to work and marital relations, stemming from 
actual discussions at a men’s help phone line.124 During the Lost Decade, the 
system upon which salaryman masculinity was based became difficult to 
sustain. Suddenly the whole idea of “defining oneself by one’s economic status” 
was “revealed not only as problematic, but also as meaningless.”125 With the 
economic stagnation of the 1990s and 2000s, the ideal started to change and 
its grip “on the emotion-scape of urban Japan” dissolved. 126  Rising 
unemployment rates forced middle-aged men in particular to doubt their 
identities. 127  Consequently, popular culture presented images of “the often 
pathetic and even morally suspect salaryman” in the 1980s and 1990s.128  
The salaryman ideal is nonetheless important for any discussion about 
Japanese men, because it is generally considered a hegemonic form of 
masculinity.129 These men, as Romit Dasgupta argues, came to represent both 
corporate and masculine ideals. The salaryman was the everyman, the one 
responsible for the postwar economic miracle and, more importantly, the one 
who was both the beneficiary and the victim of the fallouts of this system.130 
Roberson and Suzuki promote a multifocal approach on salaryman 
masculinity, proposing that he can simultaneously be seen as a social symbol, 
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a social-cultural construction, a state/corporate ideology and a social-
historical reality. 131  The salaryman model corresponds to the process of 
shaping masculinity on a general level to fit the needs of the corporate 
economy, accompanied by an individual process of shaping masculinity to fit 
the needs of corporate work.132 However, hegemonic masculinity is neither the 
most common model of masculinity nor the most powerful.133 The salarymen, 
for example, are unanimously referred to as the hegemonic model of 
masculinity even though they only constituted only one third to half of the 
labor force.134 Still, while not necessarily the norm, hegemonic masculinity is 
definitely normative.135 Donaldson defines it ultimately as both a personal and 
collective project to emphasize common sense around breadwinning 
manhood.136 
The salaryman as a manifestation of hegemonic masculinity wielded 
symbolic power over other men and women. The films in this thesis challenge 
this manifestation of power in a myriad of ways. Raewyn Connell proposes 
interrelated forms of masculinities for the existence of other. These are 
complicit, subordinated and marginalized masculinities. Complicity means 
masculinities that benefit from “the patriarchal dividend” but are not 
hegemonic representations of it.137 They exist close to the circle of power but 
not inside it. Subordination refers to practices of expelling some groups from 
the “circle of legitimacy,” whereas marginalization is the process of gender 
interacting with other structures, such as class and ethnicity, the relationships 
constructed within the domination of subordinated groups. 138  All of these 
appear in the films, posited against the cultural ideal of dominant, hegemonic 
masculinity. Recently, a new term of “hybrid masculinities” has also started to 
gain ground.139 Generally it refers to “the selective incorporation of elements 
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of identity typically associated with various marginalized and subordinated 
masculinities and … femininities into privileged men’s gender performance 
and identities.”140 While this might sound quite positive, scholars in many 
cases agree that it is a model that continues to reproduce and sustain existing 
systems of inequality, simultaneously obscuring this process. 141  Demetriou 
speaks of a “hegemonic bloc,” which develops Connell’s idea of hegemonic 
masculinity in a more hybrid direction, all the while entailing that these are 
practices from diverse masculinities that aim at reproduction of patriarchy.142 
By this he refers to the fact that whereas traditional hegemonic masculinity 
has been heterosexual and white, the hybrid masculine bloc can include 
straight, gay, black and white elements. It is thus a non-dualistic model. 
Contrasting opinions are available, too. Eric Anderson and Rhidian McQuire 
discuss Anderson’s “inclusive masculinity theory,” which suggests that men 
are indeed allowed “increased social freedom in the expression of attitudes and 
behaviors that were once highly stigmatized.”143  
In Japan, hybridity manifests itself, for example, in relation to two types of 
“new” masculinities promoted by Japanese magazines (sōshokukei danshi, 
“herbivore boys,” and gyaru-o, the male counterpart of the gyaru subculture), 
which “while reproducing mechanisms of hegemonic masculinity… 
semantically expand the male habitus and body language.”144 They seem to 
challenge hegemonic masculinity, but a closer analysis reveals that, in fact, its 
mechanisms are merely reproduced with a differing exterior. It is a process of 
incorporating “Others” into the hegemonic model, of strategically and 
symbolically reframing oneself as a part of a socially subordinated group.145 
The films in this thesis, especially the more recent ones, take an opposite 
stance. They invert the logic of hegemony and Otherness, making hegemonic 
masculinity the Other by centering on alternative masculinities. The role of 
scientific masculinity, which I will discuss further in Section 3.3, is thus not 
only a means to discuss national images but also to mediate the shift in the 
ideology of hegemonic masculinity.  
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3.3 SCIENCE, FICTION, NATION AND MEN 
As I have established, speculative fiction is an important tool for narrating 
social reality. This subchapter creates a contextual framework for 
understanding fictions of science and scientific masculinity as imaginings of 
nationhood. Regarding the study of the history of science in Japan, possibly 
the most comprehensive take on the subject is provided by Morris Low’s three-
volume edited series Science, Technology and Research and Development in 
Japan (2001), which discusses a wide range of topics, from individual 
scientists and intercultural exchange to specific fields, institutions and the role 
of science in both local and global economies. Application of scientific thought 
and technology provides one more important framework, for example, in the 
discussions about eugenics, 146  bioethics, 147  robotics 148  and Japan’s wartime 
science.149 In addition, the topic has been approached from the point of view 
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of general history, 150  differentiated eras, 151  gender, 152  institutions, 153 
technology policies and management,154 and the relationship between Japan 
and other countries.155  
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Science and technology provide a means for voicing concerns about 
“Japaneseness,” “Japanese national identity,” and “Japanese nationhood.” As 
Lamarre argues, it is possible “to read Japanese cinema in terms of divergent 
series rather than national boundaries, which is a call not to dispense with 
questions about the nation and formation of national cinema but to locate the 
sites where cinema troubles the imposition of national values, policies, or 
boundaries.”156 Fictions of science provide such a site, challenging this process 
or nation-building through questioning and subverting. Moreover, the history 
of fantasy in Japan becomes almost a mirror-image of its relationship with the 
West.157 In Japan, the ominous political realities of the 1920s and 1930s called 
for escapist fantasies, but since the war the use of fantasy has become more 
radical, indicating a rejection of the government and media-controlled vision 
of a rosy, harmonious society.158 In the global postwar environment, science 
fiction cinema became a way of discussing political, social and economic 
opinions in a roundabout way that did not disturb the delicate status quo.159  
According to Torben Grodal, “stories of scientific … intervention may be 
described in terms of the human desire for control,” inventing new dangers 
and providing means to cope with them.160 This human desire for control is 
the reason for the popularity of fictions of science, although the specific forms 
it takes may vary between various time-space axes. To equate science with 
control provides one interpretational framework for my understanding of 
science fiction as a vessel used for negotiating images of nationhood. In cinema, 
masculine agents function as important vehicles for this correlation of science, 
technology and national imagining, and thus some key terms regarding their 
study must be introduced.  
3.3.1 PUTTING “SCIENCE” INTO SCIENCE FICTION: A HISTORICAL 
OVERVIEW  
Judy Wajcman argues that scientific knowledge is affected by the society in 
which it is developed.161 In Japan, everything boils down to the debate about 
the “Western” roots of “universal” science and how this was localized and 
made a part of the national imagery in Japan. Western science as “established, 
compartmentalized edifices”162 was introduced in Japan after the period of 
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isolation (sakoku) ended.163 The nearest term the Japanese had for “science” 
was kyūri (the investigation of principles),164 which was preceded by rangaku 
(Dutch studies), primarily concerned with medicine and other natural 
sciences.165 The term kagaku (science), which first appeared in an essay in 
1871, came to refer to “a spectrum of specialized research topics and methods 
that produce experiment-based systematic, rational knowledge of a part of the 
world.” 166  Research in Japan, as elsewhere, began as a local practice that 
focused on finding problems to regionally specific problems.167 In many cases 
it was the samurai who first educated themselves in Western science and 
technology, due to their need for a new profession after the Meiji Restoration 
and the subsequent redundancy of the warrior class.168 
Modern Japanese science proceeded in three stages: a period of around 30 
years after the Meiji Restoration, the World War I period and the period until 
the end of World War II. A so-called “scientific turn” occurred after the Russo-
Japanese War (1904–1905); despite the fact that the Meiji government had 
done its best to modernize Japan for already three decades, this marked 
“Japan’s entry into the group of elite civilized sovereign nation-states and its 
strengthened embarkation onto the path of Western modernity.” 169  Scott 
Schnell states that although “the term ‘modernity’ evokes images of 
enlightenment and progress, and of extending advanced technologies into 
needy backward regions … [t]hese images are so persuasive that we rarely 
question the purported benefits that modernization entails.”170 With emphasis 
on the wide-ranging questioning of the progressiveness of Western modernity, 
“science became the vessel through which the ‘true nature’ of human behavior 
and society could be discerned.”171 Within the first few years of its inception, 
the Meiji government made the promotion of science—and the importation of 
                                                 
163 Mizuno, Scientific Nationalism, 3; Sone, Robot Culture, 11.  
164 Nakayama, Scientific Traditions, 203; Screech, Lens Within, 2, 42–43; Bartholomew, Formation 
of Science, 4. See Sugimoto Masayoshi and David L. Swain, Science and Culture in Traditional Japan 
(Rutland, VT and Tokyo: Tuttle, 1989) for a detailed explanation about the history of science in 
premodern Japan, which was affected not only by modern Western concepts but also by Chinese ideas 
and traditions.  
165 Morris Low, Japan on Display: Photography and the Emperor (Oxon and New York: Routledge, 
2006), 6.  
166 Robertson, Robo Sapiens, 16. 
167 Nakayama, Scientific Traditions, 220. 
168 Nakayama, ibid., 205–206; Morris-Suzuki, Technological Transformation, 23.  
169 Konishi Sho, “Provincialising the State: Symbiotic Nature and Survival Politics in Post-World 
War Zero Japan,” in New Worlds from Below: Informal life politics and grassroots acti on in twenty-
first century northeast Asia, ed. Tessa Morris-Suzuki and Soh Eun Jeong (Canberra: ANU Press, 2017), 
17, 19. 
170 Scott Schnell, Review of Civilization and Monsters: Spirits of Modernity in Meiji Japan, by 
Gerald Figal, Asian Folklore Studies 61, no. 1 (2002): 186. 
171 Ibid.  
 89 
technology, in particular—a top priority, as this knowledge was immediately 
pertinent to the industrialization and militarization of the country.172 Science, 
together with imperialism, formed two dominant narratives of modernity, 
whereas technology as a concept constructed by Japanese engineers became a 
central focus only later. 173  The growing fervor for science and progress 
continued into the Taishō and early Shōwa eras with the 1920s being its 
heyday.  
World War I marked the beginning of state-led science and technology 
mobilization for total war, as the government took the initiative to 
systematically fund various scientific research projects which had previously 
been financed by donations from private foundations.174 Whereas science was 
universal, technology was considered a nation-specific product of a highly 
developed country. By the 1930s, gijutsu was deemed important for the 
industrialization and militarization of the nation.175 A multitude of concepts 
were used to convey the will to establish Japanese technology as a national 
product around the universal notion of science itself. First, the concept of 
fukoku kyōhei (rich country, strong army), despite not originating in Japan, 
was established as a means of dissolving the feudal system and promoting 
modernity, and “the formal ideological foundation of industrial and 
technological development.”176 The ideology started to appear already in the 
bakumatsu era (the late feudal era), and the creation of a strong army soon 
became one of the main emphases of the newly modernized country. 
Technology was harnessed for that purpose. To quote Tsutsui, “In the Meiji 
drive for fukoku kyōhei the technological achievements, organizational forms, 
and ideological constructs of the industrial West were feverishly studied and 
earnestly emulated.”177  
A strong army needed strong technology. The term wakon yōsai (Japanese 
spirit/Eastern ethics, Western science) was coined in order to bridge the gap 
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between national means and universal measures and to answer the dilemma 
of wanting, on the one hand, to be recognized by the West as a modern, 
civilized nation and, on the other, to unite the people through the celebration 
of the nation’s particularity. 178  In practice, wakon yōsai allowed for the 
strengthening of political authority by incorporating the imperial ideology, as 
well as the absorption of technical know-how and the latest scientific 
knowledge needed to build industry and a military that could compete with the 
West.179 In a so-called “scientific turn” that really took off after the Russo-
Japanese War and promoted increased scientism (kagakushugi), there 
emerged an unconditional faith in science and the idea that financial profits 
should become the servants of science and technology, rather than vice 
versa. 180  Scientism promoted a potentially dangerous elitist view where 
science was a top-down process, something for the masses to believe in, not to 
understand. 181  People were to be educated on the benefits of scientific 
advances, but the use of science was to be for the prosperity of the state. As 
Robertson notes, the new scientific worldview operated under nationalism and 
empire-building.182  
World War I had demonstrated that science and technology were no longer 
things that could be reliably imported from the West because of a possible halt 
of exports. Rather, Japan needed homegrown science and technology.183 Still, 
contradictory understanding also prevails. Nakayama, for example, states that 
although “industrialized science” had emerged in relation to the mobilizations 
of World War I in Europe and America, Japanese government and business 
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circles were yet to realize its potential. 184  By the 1930s at the latest, and 
especially when Japan attacked China in 1937, the harnessing of science for 
military purposes became a national imperative, with the emergence of 
slogans such as “scientific Japan” (kagaku Nihon) and “do science” (kagaku 
suru).185  This all aimed at the establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-
Prosperity Sphere (Dai tō-a kyōeiken). Central to this vision was the term 
kagaku gijutsu (science and technology), which was coined by prewar 
technocrats in order to promote their own political power and, ultimately, to 
realize their vision of a scientific Japanese empire. It also emphasized the role 
of technology as the purpose of science, not a mere tool for science.186 In this 
formula, the agents of scientific masculinity were the creators and technology 
the end rather than the means.187  
The link between science, technology, nationalism and, consequently, war 
has been discussed by Mizuno Hiromi, Aaron Stephen Moore and Janis 
Mimura.188 The state measures for the promotion of science and technology 
paved the way for the emergence of scientific (or technological) nationalism. 
Dower explains that between the ten years from 1935 to 1945, the number of 
technical schools increased from 11 to over 400. At the same time, “in-firm 
technical training designed to create a highly skilled cadre of blue-collar 
workers became a widespread practice.” 189  Those who attended science 
schools were generally exempt from conscription. 190  According to Mizuno, 
scientific nationalism both assumes that science and technology are the most 
urgent and important assets for the integrity, survival, and progress of the 
nation, and calls for the development of science and technology for the sake of 
the nation, advocating national and cultural changes to further that goal.191  
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Throughout Japan’s modern history, the government’s interest in science 
has been tied to national interests. 192  Modernization was based on 
technological innovation and assimilation. Militarist imperialism did its best 
to harness the power of science and technology in order to proceed with the 
creation of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. After the war, 
economic growth was mainly due to the success of the Japanese 
manufacturing industries, which linked science, technology and Japan’s role 
in the world closely together. Finally, with the coining of the term “information 
society,” Japan emerged as an information technology superpower that also 
worked to promote itself as a robot kingdom.  
However, scientific nationalism is also linked to what Sharalyn Orbaugh 
calls the “Frankenstein Syndrome.” After the opening of Japan’s borders in the 
19th century, “the technology gap was a national humiliation to a proud 
people.”193 Ever since, the goal in relation to science and technology has always 
been to catch up to and surpass the West. 194  According to Orbaugh, the 
Frankenstein Syndrome “refers to the tendency of developing countries, those 
defined as ‘monstrous’ … by the already developed nations, to see themselves 
in those same terms.”195 The concept is related to the way Japan absorbed the 
“scientifically proven” idea of the country as “Other” to the West, a culture that 
was considered racially and culturally inferior. In addition, despite having 
become a member of the League of Nations in the wake of the First World War, 
Japan’s otherness persisted due to the unwilling stance of the other nations to 
incorporate a statement of basic racial equality in the League charter. Even 
having achieved enormous technoscientific powers did not save the country 
from “the curse of monstrosity in the eyes of the West.”196 
Nonetheless, science and technology was the field where excellence could 
be—and indeed was—demonstrated. Even if monstrous in the eyes of the West, 
Japan played a completely opposite role in Asia. Intellectual discourse held 
that Japan displayed its cultural exceptionalism by being the first Asian nation 
to achieve technological excellence. 197  The fact that Japan as a non-white 
nation was able to achieve something like this was seen as somewhat of a threat 
to Western countries. This concern was especially prominent during the 
period of high growth, 198  which allowed Japan to overcome its suggested 
historical inferiority complex. But for that very reason, the fall after the burst 
of the bubble was all the more devastating.  
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3.3.2 SCIENTIFIC MASCULINITY  
The term “scientific masculinity” is used by Erica Lorraine Milam and Robert 
A. Nye (2015) in their introduction to the volume of OSIRIS that deals with the 
topic. They define scientific masculinity as any type of masculinity that 
contributes to the creation of knowledge, as I have already established in the 
introduction. The presence of men as scientists, engineers and doctors is 
historically ubiquitous. Hence, although there are many other professions that 
also contribute to the creation of knowledge in society, scientific masculinity 
is often correlated with technological masculinity. This is derivative of the 
more general trend where “technology can be seen as belonging to a popular 
image of masculinity, or rather to various forms of masculinity.”199 In men’s 
studies, this connection forms one subcategory, although Mellström argues its 
role it still quite small.200  
Milam and Nye point out that early studies on science and gender 
emphasized the so-called “masculinist domination of nature.”201  In fiction, 
this finds its representation in the myth of creation.202 Historical Japanese 
scientific masculinity is closely connected to this male myth of creation, which 
can also be seen as an answer to the biological ability of women to bear 
children. Scientific masculinity is posited as a cultural male form of creation, 
as opposed to to the maternal, natural form. This was visible in the function of 
engineers during the Second World War. After Japan embarked on its war with 
China, engineers were promoted as the brains of the empire instead of mere 
members of the proletariat with specialized degrees. This discourse is one of 
“technological patriotism” (gijutsu hōkoku), which placed Japanese male 
engineers at the center of the empire and the creation of a “scientific Japan.”203 
Men of (technological) intellect were promoted as “social managers, or 
‘imagineers’” in prewar and wartime Japan.204 Technocrats in prewar Japan 
used the word “creation” (sōsaku) for their work and promoted Manchuria as 
the place for their creation. This signified “a more grandiose and imperialist 
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role of the engineers.”205 In other words, universal science offered culture-
specific technological creations in this self-made myth of male creation. Moore 
speaks of “technological imaginary” in order to refer to the multitude of ways 
in which various groups used the term “technology” to promote their own 
ideas and ideologies.206 In cinema, this male myth of creation with its real-life 
connotations is present in the fictional representations that draw on the 
Frankenstein myth with the scientist-creator/monster-victim dichotomy at 
the center of the narrative. 
The link between technology and masculinity is a socially constructed one. 
“Technology” has been made to mean something created and controlled by 
men, and engineering as a male practice is ascribed high value and female-
related areas low value.207 In other words, technology and masculinity have 
become intertwined because of the way in which society has created preferable 
spheres of action for both genders. Furthermore, this has led to the 
masculinizing of technology itself.  
In the 1970s and 1980s, many feminists saw this as an issue of accessibility, 
rather than suggesting that technoscience itself was somehow gendered. 
Kuwahara points out that it was only after the end of the war that women were 
allowed to enroll at research universities, with a few exceptions, especially in 
the liberal Taishō era. Even this hopeful trend soon disappeared with the 
period of economic growth. In fact, a new policy was adopted in 1958 that 
strengthened traditional gender roles through one’s exposure to technology: 
girls in junior high schools studied home economics while boys studied 
technology. At the start of the new millennium, Japanese women made up only 
10 per cent of the scientific community and the percentage of female 
professorship ranged from a mere 0.4% in engineering to 2.5% in the natural 
sciences.208 The language of technology and the skills that are required were 
embedded in the masculine culture and cast in terms of male activities. It is no 
wonder that the prototype inventor is still often cast as a male. 209 
Consequently, whereas men have been responsible for “hard” sciences 
(robotics, weapon development, automation and manufacturing), women 
have been associated with “citizen science” (a non-state-led science where 
social activists use scientific tools for social change).210 
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Wajcman divides masculinities within the world of technology into two 
dominant forms: one based on mechanical skills (and physical toughness) and 
one based on professional, calculative rationality in the form of a technology 
specialist. Both are expressive forms of masculinity that conceptualize how 
men construct identity in relation to machines and technology.211 The second 
especially concerns the so-called academic or rational masculinity. In society, 
intellectual practice has been tied to specific categories created for the exercise 
of this intellectual function. 212  To quote Antonio Gramsci, “all men are 
intellectuals but not all men have in society the function of intellectuals.”213 
This corresponds to Connell’s proposal that the forms of masculinity have 
been divided into two differing categories: those organized around direct 
domination (e.g., corporate management, military command) and those 
organized around technical knowledge (e.g., professions, science). The latter 
in particular, which Connell also refers to as “rational masculinity,” she sees 
as having challenged the former for hegemony but without complete 
success.214 
Milam and Nye point out that that scientific research—conceived as a 
masculine practice—was used to define the “bodies” that society is based on, 
including the physical body of an individual, the social body representing the 
community and, finally, the national body and its status in the world.215 If in 
reality science was used to strengthen the national body, fictional scientific 
masculinity is used as a platform for testing out various national identities. 
Mimura argues that the wartime Japanese political division was not, in fact, 
between “militarists and peace-loving citizens,” but between “advocates of 
technocratic reform and defenders of the capitalist status quo.”216 As the films 
in this thesis demonstrate, these spheres are closely interlinked, creating a 
thread of a techno-economic nation-building project, which calls for closer 
inspection as it is manifested in the forms of the characters. Scientific 
masculinity, it seems, is a suitable vessel for this investigation, because of the 
interrelated nature of science, technology and Japan’s national agenda.  
3.4 CONCLUSIONS  
This chapter has traced the conceptual basis regarding the relationship 
between science, fiction, nation and gender. It is clear that gender concerns 
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remain an important hallmark of Japanese horror cinema. Supernatural 
femininity has been one of the leading markers of “horror,” but not without 
inconsistencies in its application. Scientific masculinities and mad scientists, 
in turn, have largely appeared in literature and anime, yet underanalyzed in 
cinema.  
Regarding masculinities, I established hegemonic salaryman masculinity 
as the ideological reference point that the films implicitly allude to. Hegemonic 
masculinity provides an anchor to reality, a consensual model which fictional 
representations of masculinity either deviate from or work to strengthen. It 
represents the “official” image of the nation, an image against which scientific 
masculinities are mirrored. It must be emphasized here that this is not a study 
of masculinities but of how ideas about masculinities are used as attributes of 
fictional characters, and how images of nationhood are mediated through 
these characters by referring to real-life ideas about masculinities. In the films 
featured in this thesis, national subjectivity is coded as individual subjectivity, 
which draws its power from science and technology, as the means of creating 
a modern nation. Scientific masculinity is a trait embodied by fictional 
characters who, in some way or another, contribute to the creation of 
knowledge in society.  
In addition, science and technology have been indicators of Japan’s 
abilities and worth, first after the Meiji Restoration and second after the Pacific 
War, and especially from the 1980s onward. Their popularity is correlate with 
the country’s efforts to recreate its international and internal image. The 
history of science and technology provides a lens through which to analyze the 
films, providing the context needed for the understanding of the subject 
matter. As I have shown, scientific and technological masculinities are an 
important presence not only in Japan but anywhere in the world. It is through 
understanding both the function of scientific masculinity as opposed to 
supernatural femininity and the history of science and technology as an 
important part of Japan’s nation-building project that it is possible to decipher 
the underlying meaning of the films. 
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4 REFLECTING (ON) JAPAN’S MILITARY 
PAST 
The collapse of the Japanese Empire and the experience of being occupied by 
the United States are two important moments in history that cannot be 
overlooked. On the 14th of August, Emperor Hirohito, “the ‘sovereign overseer,’ 
[… and] the ‘supreme commander,’”1 announced that Japan was to surrender 
unconditionally. Devastation and defeat also marked the end of a period called 
kurai tanima (the dark valley), which referred to the decade and a half of 
militarism and repression from the 1930s onwards, followed by the 
Occupation-era idea of a demilitarized and democratized “new Japan,” and 
finally “the Japanese miracle” achieved in the 1960s and 1970s.2  
With sixty-six major urban centers having been heavily bombed in the last 
year of the war, it was estimated that the war in its entirety destroyed one-
quarter of the nation’s wealth.3 In the aftermath of the war, many questioned 
the wartime actions of both their government and themselves. Especially 
prevalent was the question “why did so many educated people willingly submit 
to the ideals of the wartime fascist government?”4 Science fiction provided a 
perfect vehicle for considerations about the topic. The main interest of this 
chapter is the way in which speculative cinema deals with matters related to 
militarism and, in some cases, imperialism. Thomas Schnellbächer points out 
that although postwar artists rejected military nationalism, they needed “to 
refer back to it because it is so intimately associated with Japan’s 
modernization, which continued to be a mainstay of Japanese self-
identification after 1945.”5  
Central to all of the films is the connection between the prewar and postwar 
periods. Released in the first years of the period of high economic growth, the 
films discussed in this chapter project a seemingly positive outlook for the 
future, which is later compromised by a quite tangible threat from the past. As 
Dower points out, the quest for identity in postwar Japan was mirrored against 
a broken society which, on the one hand, was finally able to embrace an 
individual freedom but, on the other, was very much based on the model of the 
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“old” Japan, rooted in “the dark valley of early Showa age.”6 Dower also points 
out that much of the discussion around Japan’s defeat is concerned with the 
notion of a certain kind of total change from militarism to democracy. 
However, “the end of the war” in itself was a fluid notion as many continued 
to wait for their loved ones’ return for years.7 Second, he states that there was 
no “new Japan” to rise from the ruins of the old. Because of the quite developed 
nature of Japan’s militarized economy, whole sectors of the postwar social 
order were able to be accelerated by building on advances made during the 
war.8  
In cinema, works of a speculative nature provided a means to encounter 
the past in a roundabout way. There are two main ways in which the films deal 
with the military past: dealing with the form of the demobilized ex-soldier and 
emphasizing the activities of weapon development. I will analyze both in order 
to reveal how postwar Japanese speculative cinema made use of the famous 
Mad Scientist motif in order to make a statement about Japan’s national image. 
These concerns are present in Gojira, Densō ningen, Gasu ningen daiichi-gō 
and, to some extent, Matango.  
4.1 FEAR OF EX-SOLDIERS  
After the war, possibly the most important question for both the repatriated 
individual and the nation-state was “who am I?” As Edwards suggests, the 
Japanese people’s sense of national history crumbled, and people suddenly 
had to look for a new understanding of their past and for different ways to 
define who and what they were.9 During Japan’s militarization, the idea of 
“militaristic manliness” embodied by “the self-sacrificing soldier” was 
propagated in schools and through military training itself, 10  although the 
unquestioning willingness of self-sacrifice was, in most cases, probably due to 
resignation to one’s fate.11 As a symbol of shifting ideologies, demilitarized 
soldiers (fukuinhei) became one of the central concerns in postwar Japan. 
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There were 6.5 to 7 million Japanese distributed around Asia during the war, 
around 3.5 of them being soldiers. Japan’s national territory, however, was 
reduced by 40 percent due to the loss of overseas colonies, leading to large 
numbers of Japanese returning home as demobilized soldiers or repatriated 
citizens.12 This created an influx in the population and, as Dower notes, had a 
serious effect on the distribution of work because they needed to be 
reintegrated into the postwar economy.13  
In cinema, the earliest prototypes of fukuinhei appeared in Kurosawa 
Akira’s and Ozu Yasujirō’s films. The emergence of demobilized soldiers can 
be seen as a site for negotiating war memories and the shift from 
ultranationalism to democracy. Their portrayal as threatening was in stark 
contrast with the portrayal of soldiers in wartime kokusaku (national strategy) 
films, where they were generally portrayed as humane. 14  In Kurosawa’s 
Norainu (Stray Dog, 1949), one of the first detective films in Japan, the 
criminal is an ex-soldier. Ozu’s Kaze no naka no mendori (A Hen in the Wind, 
1948) in turn presents a tale of a desperate mother who is forced into 
prostitution in order to pay for her son’s hospital bills during the war. After 
the end of the war she confesses this to her husband, who has returned from 
the fight. He pushes her down the stairs and flees. Shimura argues that by 
looking at the cruel back of the husband, who leaves his wife unconscious—she 
might be dead for all he knows—it is possible to witness the true darkness in 
the hearts of the demobilized soldiers.15  
In speculative cinema, one of the first films to deal with this topic was Tetsu 
no tsume (1951), a story about an ex-soldier who had been infected with a curse 
of transformation (jūka mōsō) into a gorilla during his years of service 
somewhere in the South Pacific. Although the protagonist is portrayed in a 
sympathetic light, it is nonetheless clear that his existence is seen as a 
detestable and ominous reminder of the war.16 In fact, Sandra Wilson sees 
demobilized soldiers as an alternative reality of the 1950s that contradicts the 
popular story of a new beginning.17 Ex-soldiers were not treated as heroes. In 
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fact, quite the opposite: they were losers whose “unkempt appearance seemed 
a mockery of the heroic ideals and imagery that had saturated wartime 
propaganda.”18 As Kawana points out, whereas the “brave but violent soldiers” 
had been regarded with anxiety during the war, this soon turned to hatred.19 
Many returning soldiers who simply thought they had done their duty were 
shocked to find themselves referred to as monsters who had committed 
unspeakable acts. 20  Illuminating the reality that the demilitarized soldiers 
faced, Izbicki points out that on their return to Japan they “were confronted 
with a blighted domestic landscape, a lack of jobs, loss of families and homes 
due to the fire bombings, and a huge hole in what had been a well-defined 
notion of nation and national purpose in which they had been major actors 
and on which they had literally staked their lives.”21 The films play on this 
general imagery, portraying demobilized soldiers as a potential source of 
danger, especially if granted the power of science.  
4.1.1 HIGHLIGHTING THE MILITARY PAST 
According to Igarashi Yoshikuni, there are two central features of postwar 
cultural representations in Japan. First, Igarashi proposes that postwar 
Japanese culture was based on a so-called “foundational narrative,” the main 
purpose of which was to render comprehensible the end of the war, the 
explosion of an A-bomb and the ensuing transformation of the relationship 
between Japan and the U.S. Second, the foundational narrative portrays 
Hirohito as an “enlightened yet reticent sovereign” whose “crucial decision to 
save Japan” is strengthened as the source of Japan’s prosperity. This is, of 
course, very much related to the issue of war responsibility, since the 
foundational narrative worked first and foremost to explain the relationship 
between enemies-turned-allies Japan and the U.S. and to separate the 
emperor from political conditions and decisions.22  
Both of these concerns are present in Gojira. Because there were no prior 
monster films made in Japan, the film was both excitingly novel and risky.23 A 
mix between the newly found free expression of wartime memories and 
foreign catastrophe films, Gojira was a pureblooded horror film. As the 
producer Tanaka Toshiyuki notes, humans created the bomb, which took 
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its revenge on humans.24 In general it drew from two general trends: the 
nuclear disaster of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and popular Hollywood 
narratives, including giant beasts, such as King Kong and The Beast from 
20,000 Fathoms. The creators of Gojira have readily admitted that 
(Hollywood) monster films with their urban destruction scenes, bombs and 
dialogue between military and scientific means of getting rid of the monster 
comprised one of the inspirations behind the emergence of Gojira. However, 
inspiration does not mean mere imitation, and the original Gojira ends up 
raising a whole different set of emotions than its American counterparts.25  
Gojira includes two scientists: Dr. Yamane, a senior paleontologist who 
wishes to save the monster Gojira and study it in order to understand the 
effects of radiation, and the enigmatic Dr. Serizawa, a secretive and sullen ex-
soldier who possesses a weapon to kill it. The narrative revolves around the 
stances represented by these two and the way people try to act according to 
their idea of “moral science.” The latter is best exemplified by Dr. Serizawa’s 
proclamation, “[T]hat’s why I can’t let people know until I find a peaceful use 
for the power. I’ll destroy all the data I’ve compiled and kill myself.” 
The films of Honda Ishirō and his team often feature fukuinhei, presumably 
because Honda himself was a sergeant in the Japanese Imperial Army and a 
war prisoner in China.26 In Gojira, this role is allotted to Dr. Serizawa, being 
stated as much by Ogata: “The war hurt him enough, he lost an eye.” The scene 
where a research party led by Yamane takes off to Ōdoshima to conduct more 
research on the initial appearance of Gojira is the first time Dr. Serizawa 
appears. People on deck wave cheerfully while an upbeat marching tune plays 
in the background. The departure is a big event that allows Japan to celebrate 
the postwar peaceful proceedings of its science. Serizawa’s appearance is 
monstrous in form, compared to those who stand around him; it is highlighted 
by a patch he wears on one eye, a tangible marker of loss. Wearing a black suit 
and sunglasses with a somber expression on his face, among the cheery folk 
his appearance is almost like an omen. Or, rather, his appearance is like an 
unwelcome breeze from the past better left untouched. 
Igarashi argues throughout his book that monstrous bodies were 
substitutes for tangible markers of loss in 1950s Japan. Gojira itself is a 
reminder of Japan’s fallen soldiers, being both a threat and a victim, a 
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metaphor arriving from the South Seas.27 It is seen as a symbol of postwar 
Japan’s various problems,28 “a scar, a marker of trauma.”29 In addition, it can 
be seen as referring to “lost Japanese territories” and “technical expertise 
‘misdirected’ into war.”30 But, if Gojira is a marker of a trauma, so is Serizawa. 
The external marks that he bears marks a possible underlying threat. As 
Kawana suggests, disfigured ex-soldiers in particular hinted at wartime 
atrocities and provoked public aversion. The body of a demobilized soldier 
became “both an object of curious gazes and a menace to postwar Japanese 
drive for renewal,” as well as “a significant disadvantage in being accepted 
back into the community.”31 The returning soldiers represented the aggressive 
side of wartime Japan, and this is the function of Serizawa, too.  
Serizawa’s ominous scientific power, which is very much related to Japan’s 
military past, is emphasized by a scene where a newspaper reporter asks 
Emiko, the daughter of Dr. Yamane and a childhood friend of Serizawa, to 
introduce him to Serizawa. The reporter states that he has heard from “a 
German friend who lives in Switzerland” that Serizawa “certainly knows how 
to kill Gojira.”32 This is an obvious reference to history, positing Japan and its 
allies as opposed to the U.S. on a scientific as well as military front. Fujino 
points out that Japan had looked to Germany as a model in medical matters 
ever since the Meiji era and saw it as natural “to follow the lead of the Third 
Reich.”33 This admiration toward German technological and scientific skills 
was also demonstrated by Kishi Nobusuke, prime minister between 1957 and 
1960, who was influential in implementing state control over economic, 
industrial and cultural policy during the war and whose postwar aim was to 
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rearm Japan and revise the new constitution.34 References to Germany in the 
1950s should not be left unnoticed. 
Serizawa physically exhibits the invisible scars that Gojira evokes. As an 
explicit fukuinhei, Serizawa is both an antidote and a threat—a threat that is 
ultimately eliminated through his suicide. His oxygen destroyer is an invention 
“that holds philosophical, moral, destructive values,” and some see Serizawa’s 
sacrifice as an attempt to represent the conflicting views of those who 
developed the atomic bomb.35 Still, Gojira does not permit the interpretation 
of Japan as purely a victim. Rather, it constantly acts as a reminder of the 
country’s aggressive side.36 Destructive science is not present only in the form 
of the Western bomb but also very much developed by “innocent” Japan itself. 
Hence, Serizawa’s suicide at the end of the film is highly symbolic. First, it 
illuminates the complete loss of one’s ibasho, the place to return to, and 
highlights the unwanted and problematic nature of the soldiers that actually 
survived the war. The “dark spell-binding force of the Emperor-system”37 
destroys Serizawa. Through the successful application of the oxygen destroyer, 
Serizawa redeems his value and demonstrates the victory of Japanese science. 
Allsop points out that Serizawa’s confusion and hesitation over the use of the 
weapon can be seen as a reflection of the opinions of those who created the 
world’s first nuclear bomb, the effects of which were horrifyingly felt in Japan. 
There were thus some very real similarities between the real-life nuclear 
weapon discourse and the fictive one portrayed in Gojira.38 While Japanese 
science prevails, Serizawa as a marker of war must perish. Scientific 
masculinity is the lens through which to dissect the continuation between 
prewar and postwar periods and the underlining anxiety concerning this shift.  
A more direct reference to the past is made in Densō ningen, a revenge 
story with a scientific twist. As part of Tōhō’s Henshin ningen trilogy, the film 
explicitly highlights Japan’s militaristic past. The film is a story of revenge 
about an ex-soldier, Lance Corporal Sudō from Japan’s Imperial Army, going 
after his former comrades, who, according to him, have betrayed both him and 
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the Japanese nation. For his revenge he uses an old telepathic machine 
developed by a military scientist who has been declared dead. Trying to solve 
the mystery are the scientist journalist Kirioka and his girlfriend, the 
outspoken and brave office lady Nakajō Akiko.39 The story begins when a man 
is brutally stabbed in an amusement park with an old Army sword. The only 
lead is a military badge found at the site. As the plot progresses, it becomes 
clear that the murder has something to do with a group of ex-soldiers: Taki, 
Ryū and Ōnishi. In fact, scientific masculinity is used to create a picture where 
ex-soldiers not only lost their identities but returned with new monstrous 
ones.40 In addition, the film paints an image of a nation whose soldiers were 
anything but loyal and trustworthy. 
Densō ningen engages with the past in various ways. First, there is the 
uncanny appearance of old military badges, which appear at murder scenes 
and are delivered to the victims. Second, newspapers highlight the fact that the 
first victim was killed with a Japanese Imperial Army Ground Force blade. 
Third, some parts of the plot seem to revolve around a military-themed cabaret 
club where male employees are dressed in military attire and the menu 
includes drinks such as “Missile.” Although it can be argued that this is a way 
of neutralizing—or even ridiculing—Japan’s past, the fact that the club is in 
fact owned by the Korean military spy Ryū makes its role more ambivalent. 
Ryū is referred to as sangokujin,41 an outsider who worked as a spy for the 
Japanese military. The fact that it is a zainichi Korean who has decided to 
commercialize Japan’s experience of war ridicules Japan’s efforts and 
underlines the country’s defeat. Ryū is, however, soon killed by Sudō, who 
appears in military attire at the night club. Soon after Ryū’s murder, Taki, 
breaking under pressure and in fear of his own life, narrates the past. One 
fateful day after the war, Taki, Ōnishi, Tsukamoto, Ryū and Sudō were ordered 
to transport gold used for weapon development under the command of the 
teleportation and telekinesis specialist Dr. Niki. However, Ōnishi soon makes 
clear that instead of helping Niki, the men aim to rob the gold. He states: 
“Doctor, Japan has lost. There is no space for research now – from now on, it 
is a world ruled by money.” This leads to Sudō accusing Ōnishi, a lieutenant, 
of betraying not only Niki but the whole Japanese nation.  
                                                 
39 “Office lady” (OL) means “a female employee who generally has no chance for promotion and 
mainly serves as an assistant for male employees” (Ogasawara, Office Ladies, 12). Although the term was 
coined in 1963, no official governmental strategy made use of it, nor was it introduced by any dictionary 
during the release of her book. The usage has been quite open to interpretation (ibid., 23, 27). 
40 Kanō, “Fukuinhei,” 93–94. 
41 A derogatory term during the postwar era that was used to describe people who were neither 
Japanese nor Allied occupiers, hence referring to Japan’s former colonial subjects (Tessa Morris-Suzuki, 
Borderline Japan: Foreigners and Frontier Controls in the Postwar Era [New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010], 100, 240).  
 105 
Dower points out that brutality and corruption among officers was no 
secret, especially after the war. 42  The military hierarchy was based on 
“authoritarian coercion that transferred oppression downward,” where fear 
instead of loyalty was used as a means for command. After the war, murders 
of former officers were not unheard of; ex-soldiers felt antipathy toward 
military leaders due to the way they had treated not only their military subjects 
but the civilian population, too.43 Sudō’s narrative is reminiscent of this, or 
what Kanō refers to as the crimes committed by the former special forces men. 
To paraphrase Kawana, a part of the equation was that rumors were already 
widely circulated about the cruel actions of Japanese soldiers during the war. 
Stories about “the madness of drafted soldiers” were as popular as stories of 
bravery, although officials did their best to suppress them. It did not really 
matter if the rumors of soldiers and demilitarized soldiers were genuine; the 
overall sentiment “allowed people to believe them even though … extreme and 
bordering on implausible,” and thus the general anxiety concerning any 
soldier quickly turned to hatred.44  
Both Serizawa and Sudō, despite having very different histories, capitalize 
on these rumors. In their cases, scientific masculinity—Serizawa as a wielder 
of scientific power and Sudo as a symptom and manifestation of that power—
is used as a means of encountering Japan’s past and mediating its image as a 
militarist country. Despite the general sense of liberation that Dower refers to, 
kaiki eiga in this case is interested in the anxieties this liberation brought 
about or which could finally be addressed. Scientific masculinity proved a 
useful vehicle. 
4.1.2 SITES OF MILITARISM  
Noël Carroll proposes that monsters emerge from “marginal, hidden, or 
abandoned sites,” and “it is tempting to interpret the geography of horror as a 
figurative spatialization of the notion that what horrifies is that which lies 
outside cultural categories, and is, perforce, unknown.” 45  Densō ningen 
utilizes this idea of problematic ideologies located somewhere at the edges of 
society. The rural periphery of Karuizawa in the Japanese countryside enables 
the lingering of the imperial system away from the emerging capitalism and 
shining new façade of modern Tokyo. The existence of Dr. Niki, the scientist 
responsible for the emergence of the monster, is discovered when the two 
protagonists embark on a journey to Karuizawa to investigate the weird case 
of a radiator ordered from Akiko’s company. Sudō and his mentor Niki have 
                                                 
42 Dower, Embracing Defeat, 59. 
43 Ibid., 58; Vogel, The Salary Man, 91. 
44 Kawana, Murder Most Modern, 205–206. In regard to media, Kanō, for example, highlights a 
serialized novel Fukuin satsujin jiken (1945–1960), which portrayed demobilized soldiers with uneven 
identities and whose return resulted in the breakdown of their families (“Fukuinhei,” 94). 
45 Carroll, Philosophy of Horror, 35. 
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been living in their Karuizawa cabin for 14 years since the accident, where they 
were presumed dead. Their countryside life is symbolic, since many Japanese 
soldiers and civilians were repatriated first and foremost to the countryside 
because of the general lack of food in the destroyed cities.46 The emergence of 
Sudō, a soldier of the Imperial Army, from the outskirts of society can be seen 
as a means of revenge of the nation against suppressing forces. However, this 
is by no means posited as a desirable outcome but rather one that is a sign of 
repression and the will to forget. 
In Gojira, the love triangle between Ogata, Serizawa and Emiko is as 
important as the emergence of the monster, and the most important scene is 
played in Serizawa’s underground laboratory. The scene where Serizawa 
slowly descends into his laboratory with Emiko in tow becomes highly 
emblematic. It is followed by the revelation of his destructive weapon and 
Emiko’s fainting. During the scene of the departure to Ōdoshima, Ogata 
remarks: “It’s a wonder he came to see us off. He rarely exits his laboratory.” 
Sontag notes that the scientist in science fiction narratives often has a 
laboratory in the basement. 47  Rather than being a neutral space, this 
underground space connects Serizawa’s scientific masculinity to the 
monstrous. Toward the end of the film, Ogata makes a figurative rescue when 
all three are in the basement. Ogata and Emiko confront Serizawa about his 
oxygen destroyer and the possibility of using it against Gojira, which he refuses. 
Ogata tries harder, which results in Serizawa punching him. This burst of 
violent energy from an ex-soldier leaves both Ogata and Emiko stunned, with 
Emiko tenderly wiping blood off of Ogata’s face. In this scene it finally dawns 
on Serizawa that Emiko has chosen Ogata over him, despite the fact that they 
are already betrothed. The look on his face is one of utter betrayal and loss.  
This scene marks the moment in the narrative when Serizawa ultimately 
loses his will to live, and Emiko’s behavior is partly to blame. Stating that she 
still loves Serizawa like a brother, her actions tell another tale. Noël Carroll 
suggests that “fear, disgust, powerful physical revulsion, surprise, [and a] 
bodily sense of fear” are among the emotional features normally attributed to 
characters attacked by monsters. According to Carroll, these act as a set of 
instructions about the appropriate way to respond to monsters in what he calls 
“an emotion-mirroring effect.”48 Interestingly, while not as strong as the ones 
suggested by Carroll, Emiko’s reaction is definitely not a reaction expected 
from a close childhood friend. She shies away, projects a bodily sense of fear 
before Serizawa’s experimentation and, in the scene where Serizawa has come 
to the harbor to see Emiko, Ogata and Dr. Yamane off for their excursion, her 
stance is hesitant. Her reactions and ultimate betrayal of Serizawa highlight 
                                                 
46 Mock, “Japan’s Rural Periphery,” 3. 
47 Sontag, “Imagination of Disaster,” 40. The basement is, of course, also a popular psychoanalytic 
motif, probably best exemplified by Alfred Hitchcock’s Psycho (1960), where it represents the hidden 
Freudian psyche of Norman Bates.  
48 Carroll, Philosophy of Horror, 14–19, 31. 
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his abject monstrosity. This illuminates the way “the uncanny aura emitted by 
the disfigured soldiers was quite real for those who stayed on the home 
front.”49  Bodily injuries symbolized psychological distance and deformities 
provoked public aversion. 50  In Emiko’s choice to marry Ogata instead of 
Serizawa, Gojira promotes the power of the healthy over the damaged. 
Scientific masculinity in this case represents a national identity better 
forgotten, which is also manifested on the level of personal relationships.  
Hutchinson and Williams point out that in the process of repatriation and 
reunion, many soldiers felt “a new sense of alienation … in the culture shock 
of arriving back in Japan.” 51  While many of the soldiers were warmly 
welcomed back by their families, they still faced the problem of how to start 
rebuilding their identities. Serizawa’s character draws from this contrast 
between the traumatized survivors of the war and those who were enjoying the 
democratic atmosphere and economic wealth of postwar Japan. 52  As a 
fukuinhei, Serizawa embodies what Kanō calls the loss of the place where one 
belongs (jibun no ibasho).53 His silent suffering is constantly posited against 
the budding happiness of Emiko and Ogata. Through its human relationships, 
the film projects “characteristic postwar themes of war guilt, sense of loss, 
regression, and new beginning.”54 
Upon hearing a lamenting tune drifting from the radio in the aftermath of 
Gojira’s destruction of Tokyo, Serizawa finally decides to use his weapon. He 
has been doubly betrayed by Emiko, first by her refusal to commit to him in a 
romantic sense and second by her decision to tell Ogata about Serizawa’s 
weapon, despite her promise not to. This betrayal leads to Serizawa’s suicide. 
Serizawa functions as a vessel through which “the audience ‘returned’ to and 
found means to exorcise the monsters of the past” in a way that allowed them 
to not confront the past directly, as such a practice was prohibited by the 
                                                 
49 Kawana, Murder Most Modern, 206. 
50 Ibid., 207; Dower, Embracing Defeat, 61. 
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foundational narrative.55 In other words, together with the horrors caused by 
the monster itself, he makes the spectator face past atrocities, which are then 
safely removed from the present. But at what cost? The film offers no 
consolation and the ending is downright gloomy. “It worked beautifully. Be 
happy with Emiko,” echo Serizawa’s last words.  
Gojira ends with a shot of the ocean with everyone mourning Serizawa. 
Schnellbächer argues that the ocean is representative of Japan’s geopolitical 
situation. 56  Monsters of the past have emerged from the ocean, but 
simultaneously it “also receives them at the end in merciful oblivion.”57 The 
moment of Serizawa’s death is explicitly stated to be his greatest moment. 
Citing Schnellbächer, it “responds to the Japanese postwar myth of a new 
beginning, which integrates both national identity and all manner of hopes 
seen as progressive.”58 Also, like Carroll’s monsters, it is Serizawa’s fate to 
disappear into the great unknown; the abject, hidden space of the ocean.  
4.1.3 USHIROMETASA  
The notion of revenge in kaiki eiga has been best exemplified by the 
paramount avenging female motif—an archetype that represents the motif of 
justice through revenge.59 In Densō ningen, however, the notion of revenge is 
tied to relationships between men and to Japan’s past. It is central to the plot 
and understanding of the characters. The emergence of Sudō in his military 
attire, hailing the glory of the Emperor, could be called “the return of the 
repressed.” This familiar theme is of importance here: this thesis uses its 
Japanese equivalent, ushirometasa, which means to feel guilty about 
something and/or to feel the gaze of the past behind one’s back.60 It stands for 
improper acts, as “anyone secretly watching would surely disapprove.”61 As 
Iwasaka and Toelken point out,  
In the actions of an angry ghost, feelings of guilt, selfishness, jealousy, 
and betrayal can be acted out in metaphorical tableau scenes which 
would be repressed in everyday life. That is, human emotions which do 
indeed exist and animate much of the culture can be dramatized and 
perceived vicariously through a ghost character who represents in 
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57 Ibid., 35. 
58 Ibid., 31. 
59 Barrett, Archetypes, 98. 
60  Komatsu, interview; see also Komatsu, “Supernatural Apparitions”; Itō Kimio 伊藤公雄 , 
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physical form … emotion which would normally be too volatile to 
express in personal interaction.62 
 
Thus, monsters appear as symbols for human conscience,63 which in this case 
is tied with the discourse of remembering the war. Sudō, presumed dead, is 
quite literally a ghost, a so-called functional spiritual entity.64  In addition, 
Cohen’s notion about monsters as “difference made flesh” is useful here. He 
proposes that “in its function as a dialectical Other […] the monster is an 
incorporation of the Outside, the Beyond – of all those loci that are rhetorically 
placed as distant but originate Within.”65  
The concept of ushirometasa allows us to dissect the monstrosity of Sudō, 
which is linked to his ties with the former militarist, nationalist and imperialist 
agenda. His victims, however, are no better. Densō ningen portrays former 
Japanese soldiers as beings without conscience, who only try to maximize their 
profits instead of dedicating themselves to the greater good. In fact, Sudō has 
not been wronged by an enemy but his own kin. The motive for his revenge is 
not oppression but betrayal. 
Katō Norihiro, the writer of the influential but controversial Haisengo-ron 
(Post-Defeat Discourse, 1997), suggests that Hirohito’s acceptance of his 
transformation represented “a shameless betrayal of those who had died in his 
name, and while the United States saw this as unavoidable if the 
democratization of Japan were to succeed, it played havoc with the nation’s 
moral fiber.”66 Densō ningen deals with these emotions in a straightforward 
manner. Sudō’s fictional betrayal becomes a representation of what Katō calls 
“a spectacular national betrayal.” By this he refers to the fact that survivors 
carried on without having to face the dead. 67  In fact, many did not feel a 
collective sense of guilt because of the strong feeling of having been forced to 
go to war against their will by the militarists.68 Sudō appears as an abandoned 
and vengeful ushirometasa of the surviving people seeking to move on, a 
representation of the will to forget what really existed between the wartime 
generations and those born afterwards. 69  While Sudō’s revenge may be 
                                                 
62 Iwasaka and Toelken, Ghosts and the Japanese, 38. 
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justified, he is nonetheless but a ghastly apparition from the past, which the 
nation more or less wants to forget. Foster calls this sort of a monster a hybrid, 
an oxymoron which has numerous elements that complement and contradict 
simultaneously, so that its meaning comes not just from the pieces that have 
been combined to create it but also from the complementary and contradictory 
aspects of those pieces.70  
Igarashi proposes that the desire to encounter the past in an in-between 
location found various mass cultural expressions in the 1950s, although such 
encounters were not direct confrontations with past memories since “such a 
practice was prohibited by the foundational narrative.”71 Even Densō ningen, 
which explicitly refers to the war and the monstrous acts committed by 
Japanese soldiers, works within the context of the foundational narrative: it 
presents the enemy as coming from within Japan, not from outside in the form 
of the U.S. This ultimately is what makes Sudō an ushirometasa of Japanese 
society as a whole. Komatsu points out that spiritual surveillance by a deity is 
one layer of the concept of ushirometasa. As a blast from the past and an 
unwanted memory, Sudō brings with him the “dark spell-binding force of the 
Emperor-system.” If the transformation of the emperor into a “people’s 
emperor,” as Morris Low suggests, emphasized the democratic nature of 
postwar Japan,72 as an ushirometasa Sudō contrasts this, creating unwanted 
parallels with the past. He is the monster of Doctor Frankenstein, 
Frankenstein in this case being Japan itself.  
Teleportation provides a scientific means for the appearance of this 
“spiritual” gaze, making the invisible threat visible. Without the machine Sudō, 
too, is nothing but an ordinary, resentful human being. This is not only a 
representation of a warped process of becoming a superhero, but it also 
highlights the general anxiety around the role of science and technology. 
Monsters are often evoked to explain and narrate the “correct” application of 
modern sciences.73 In Sudō’s case, anxiety around science and technology is 
present in the film through images of machinery. Sudō is a scientifically 
created freak who is obsessed with revenge. In a way, he incorporates both 
versions of Edogawa’s mystery: the rational and the irrational, only in this case 
it is the scientific which is irrational, paving the way for the repressed past to 
emerge.  
The film addresses this hybridity through its depiction of both scientific 
masculinity and the application of science. The application of science in 
wartime Japan is immoral. However, Niki’s scientific masculinity is in fact 
quite moral in comparison with the other masculinities represented by the 
surviving soldiers. The experience of war on the front served to disorient 
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Japanese soldiers, shifting the reference points in relation to which their ideals 
of manhood were based.74 On the one hand, Sudō represents past ideals of 
feudal loyalty that became forbidden in the postwar constitution. His four 
victims, on the other, are disloyal and monstrous in their self-centeredness. It 
is difficult to decide which scenario is more horrific: a postwar society ruled by 
monstrous, greedy and selfish ex-soldiers or the lingering notion of the past 
which, in some ways, is still imagined as more moral.75 Scientific masculinity 
is used to convey these ambiguous feelings.  
Despite conforming to a quite traditional revenge crime film format, Densō 
ningen stresses the nature of Japan’s wartime techno-scientific development 
and thus works to problematize the narrative around Japanese science and 
technology in general. A monster is literally born due to military weapon 
development. Figuratively, as I have already discussed, he is born earlier, 
during the moment of betrayal. Densō ningen places the blame as much on 
military and scientific nationalism as on the emerging economic nationalism. 
Apart from Sudō, the monstrous is also personified in the surviving group of 
soldiers, whose greed was fueled by Dr. Niki’s invention. It highlights the 
immersion into any type of nationalist ideology and also maintains a picture 
of the potentially unstable mental state and untrustworthiness of demilitarized 
soldiers.  
With the introduction of Dr. Niki, Densō ningen stresses the familiar 
discourse of good and bad science. As posited against the surviving posse of 
Taki, Ryū and Ōnishi, Niki is actually quite moral and clear-headed. Still, it is 
his connection with the past and Japanese militarism that makes him a threat. 
Postwar speculative fiction not only discusses “the fundamental ethical 
ambiguity of scientific endeavor”76 but, more importantly, it underlines the 
ethical ambiguity of wartime science and highlights the dangers it might pose 
for the democratized society. Niki is a paramount example, an ex-military 
scientist, who, unknown to the public, has continued his seemingly harmless 
scientific experimentations. Although Niki never aimed to reveal his results, 
they are made public by Sudō in his will to avenge. The film shows that the 
annihilation of such a threat is not easy. With the Japanese unable to deal with 
their monstrous past, as embodied by Sudō, it depends on nature to end 
everything. Finally it is the deux ex machina-like eruption of Mt. Asamayama 
that destroys Sudō mid-transportation. His freezing frame becomes a tangible 
reminder of the liminal, in-between state in which he existed. His final 
screams are horrible, reminiscent of the voice of Gojira itself. This is also a 
symbolic destruction of wartime kagaku gijutsu. If scientific nationalism and 
weapon development in prewar and wartime Japan relied heavily on 
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harnessing natural resources, in Densō ningen scientific progress is destroyed 
by nature’s power.  
As time passed, the threat of demobilized soldiers diminished. The soldier, 
however, did not disappear from Japanese speculative cinema. As Aaron 
Gerow (2006) notes, the history of Japanese cinema knows many instances of 
turning to war for story material. 77  Contemporary representations can be 
found from films like Tetsuo and HAYABUSA. Although I have decided to 
exclude anime, it is worth pointing out that anime narratives often tie the 
notion of ever-continuing war with the representation of masculinity.78 These 
are narratives of future worldwide danger, where the relentless efforts of the 
male hero are needed.79 Despite the heroic storyline, these fantasies are not 
always benign. As Mizuno argues, the fictional crew of the space battleship 
Yamato, for example, is related to a historical period of the past not yet tainted 
by the imperialist and militarist ideology. Men become beacons in this 
“ultimate fantasy of postwar Japan, a wish-fulfilling rewriting of the history 
that takes place in distant future and space” that “helps the viewer to forget [or 
not to learn] about Japan’s role in World War II.” 80  Saitō is more 
straightforward in suggesting that the mentality of Yamato is the ultra-
nationalistic mentality of the old Japanese military, the revised vision of the 
Second World War which Japan won.81 In both cases, masculinity is used as 
an ideological vessel to negotiate nationalist concerns.  
4.2 HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION PROJECTS 
The end of the war changed the course of Japan’s social history in many ways. 
It also necessitated a re-evaluation of the purpose of Japanese science and 
technology. Nakayama explicates that because of the new postwar 
Constitution and its prohibition on rearmament, science was free of its 
military connotations in the minds of Japanese scientists themselves.82 With 
wartime science being ignored and postwar science celebrated, scientists were 
able “to erase the connection they themselves had made.”83 However, it is 
necessary to bear in mind that the legacy of war was “human, not 
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organizational”: with the enormous increase in the number of trained 
scientific and technological researchers, the postwar social order was bound to 
be based on the deployment of these skills, despite the fact that many of the 
country’s institutions as such were dismantled. 84  In addition, the military 
nature of Japanese technology continued long into the postwar era. The GHQ 
had crafted Japan as a base camp during the Cold War, and the Occupation 
authorities (SCAP, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers) allowed 
and even required Japan to produce weapons during the Korean War. In fact, 
the Korean War indirectly boosted Japan’s economy so much that the 
economic planning bureau pronounced that the postwar era had passed.85 
In order to understand fictional narratives of human experimentation, it is 
necessary to highlight Japan’s real-life experiences with the issue. In cinema, 
Densō ningen utilizes this trope to some extent, as does Teshigara Hiroshi’s 
Tanin no kao (The Face of Another, 1966). I have chosen to concentrate on 
Gasu ningen daiichi-gō, a sad tale of a military scientist creating a mutated 
monster during the postwar era; here the motif plays an important role. It is 
noteworthy that these films tend to diminish the role of the scientist and 
emphasize the role of the monster. In Densō ningen, the narrative of Sudō is 
treated in much more depth than that of his mentor, Dr. Niki. The monster of 
Gasu ningen, Mizuno, is in fact the protagonist.  
4.2.1 UNIT 731 AND THE MALE MYTH OF CREATION 
The case of Unit 731, Japan’s most notorious wartime research laboratory, 
“exposed the deadly possibilities of modern technology when harnessed to the 
pursuit of national glory,” as noted by Tessa Morris-Suzuki. 86  As Kawana 
points out, too, “When a fanatical devotion of the agents of science … finds 
convenient allies in these destructive ideologies [nationalism and 
imperialism], the mission to improve human beings or create new species 
better equipped for survival becomes an even more relentless pursuit of 
scientific advancement at the expense of human ethics.”87 
Unit 731 was established for the research of bacteria and viruses and, 
during its heyday, it posed a potential for “creating sufficient bacteria to kill 
the world’s population several times over.”88 The Unit is also notorious for 
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experimenting on humans, a fact that has never been directly denied. In 
exchange for their research notes on diseases, no scientist was convicted for 
war crimes in the Tokyo War Trials. This was “an immunity deal in exchange 
for scientific knowledge.”89 Medical scientists operating on the home front 
also remained unscathed. As Williams and Wallace note, “they resumed their 
places in a reconstructed Japanese society and were, and are, numbered 
among the most senior and respected names in the Japanese scientific 
community.”90  
In addition, human experimentation in imperialist Japan was not limited 
to Unit 731. In 1989, bones from more than a hundred bodies of different Asian 
ethnicities were found at a construction site for the Ministry of Health and 
Welfare’s Research Center for Preventive Hygiene, the area that had 
accommodated the Army Medical College in the prewar and wartime eras. 
Considering the age of the bones, Tsuneishi Kenichi concludes that not only 
did they belong to victims of medical crimes but also that such atrocities were 
widely practiced in Imperial Japan.91 Together with Unit 731, they reveal what 
Tsuneishi refers to as the barbarism among military doctors. Tsuneishi 
suggests that through openly published research papers containing data that 
was obtained through brutal practices on humans, it is easy to prove the 
existence of widespread human experimentation during, and even after, the 
war. The medical community itself was indifferent to the issue, possibly 
because the people within the community may have considered their everyday 
work unrelated to such ethical and moral questions; this can also be seen as 
one of the leading causes for the relatively open stance regarding the highly 
controversial matter.92  
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Although according to some accounts the existence of Unit 731 was 
completely hidden—at least until 1981, when Akuma no1 hōshoku, a non-
fiction account of the Unit, was published93 —Dickinson (2007) and Tsuneishi 
(2007) argue otherwise. It is true that the Japanese might have “an 
international reputation for historical amnesia,” but, as Dickinson points out, 
this forgetfulness is but a result of the country’s postwar politics.94 In fact, in 
the 1950s many craved information about what happened during the war.95 
Dickinson also notes that the actual availability of information must be 
differentiated from the lack of inclusion of certain information in primary and 
secondary textbooks, the latter being a political decision that does not 
necessarily correlate to how much material regarding certain topics has been 
released in general. Indeed, although English-language literature on the 
subject has been sparse, a wide selection of material on Unit 731 is available in 
Japanese.96 Morris-Suzuki suggests that the Japanese, in general, were aware 
of the wartime uses of science and technology, which led to the critical stance 
toward their use in the postwar era. 97  Thus, while the motif of human 
experimentation is by no means an original one, in the Japanese context, and 
especially in the works that in one way or another refer to the Pacific War, it is 
bound to raise questions. This is not only a prominent theme in Densō ningen, 
with its explicit emphasis on the lingering wartime threat under the peaceful 
postwar exterior, but in Gasu ningen daiichi-gō as well.  
Gasu ningen starts with a mysterious bank robbery. After the second 
robbery, everything points in the direction of the Kasuga residence, a clan of 
famous nō actors. Somehow everything seems to be connected with the last of 
the line, the beautiful Kasuga Fujichiyo. When stolen money is found at the 
residence and Fujichiyo is arrested, the film moves from the realm of detective 
fiction to that of the fantastic by introducing Mizuno, a man who can turn into 
a human vapor. He has been a target of an experiment by Sano Kyūko, a 
university professor in the Faculty of Medicine and a board member of the 
Japan Space Association. Feeling bitter, he accepts Professor Sano’s 
suggestion to become his research assistant. Sano’s appearance, albeit very 
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short, is the underlying cause for the emerging monstrosity, the definitive 
factor that ties together Japan’s wartime and postwar scientific practices. His 
mutilated face draws a parallel between him, Dr. Serizawa and Dr. Niki, all of 
them demobilized soldiers. In Japan, technocrats paved the way for a sort of 
self-made myth of creation. In kaiki eiga, the male myth of creation is 
manifested in stories of human experimentation.  
Gasu ningen illustrates how Japan’s wartime research “exposed deadly 
possibilities of modern technology when harnessed to the pursuit of national 
glory.”98  Science and technology not only prove a fictional vehicle for the 
negotiation of Japan’s past versus its present, but in fact “the practice and 
ideology of technocratic control … is certainly among the most conspicuous 
and controversial of the wartime legacies to contemporary Japan.”99 In Gasu 
ningen, Sano, a redeemed academic who has a military history, promises to 
enhance Mizuno’s body, to build it afresh cell by cell. Mizuno is given an 
injection, after which he remembers sleeping a total of 240 hours. When he 
wakes up, he has transformed into a human vapor, which comes as a shock to 
Sano as well. Mizuno kills Sano in a fit of rage after discovering how many 
other victims Sano has sacrificed in order to create his vision of an ultimate 
human being. This is the dark, hidden nature of Sano, who was celebrated as 
a leading figure in his field. Much like in Shelley’s Frankenstein, this 
exploration takes place in an institutionalized context within a university.100 
In Gasu ningen, the “sf topoi of the mad scientist and the failed experiment 
derive their power and durability from […] the way it explores the project of 
reason or enlightenment and its limits.”101 In addition, this can be seen as 
revelation of the true status quo behind Igarashi’s foundational narrative, 
which protected Japan from its own past to the degree that even the war 
atrocities were transformed into useful information for the U.S. to use during 
the Cold War.102  
Dr. Sano’s story in Gasu ningen contributes to the questioning of “putting 
progress ahead of ethics.” This is underlined by connecting scientists to ijinden 
(biographies of great men), where their dubious decisions are glorified “for the 
betterment of science and humankind.” 103  This is exactly the framework 
within which Sano’s narrative works. Once other scientists hear about Sano’s 
murderous experiments, they react with shock, referring to his exemplary 
status within the community. Great men work for the betterment of the 
Japanese state but, in the postwar context, putting progress ahead of ethics 
could also refer to economic progress and postwar reconstruction. Gasu 
ningen acknowledges the danger in this, a danger that extends to this day. 
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Sano’s aim to create a superman is a major motif of science fiction worldwide, 
but when mirrored against the backdrop of the postwar, it calls for an 
inspection of the way in which scientists—and especially the ones at Unit 731—
were treated after the war. The intention of the state is underlined by Sano’s 
role as an elite scientist during the war and his respected status even 
afterwards.104 This reconstruction of the role of both science and technology 
and the scientist worked to maintain the foundational narrative.  
Bartlett has proposed that the victims of mad scientists should be regarded 
as “impossible humans” because they are “not quite human.” He calls the 
process of humanizing the victims of mad scientists “victimary thinking,” even 
when done with compassionate intentions.105 In Japanese cinema there is a 
subcategory of sentimental war films which did not allow the voice of Japan’s 
imperialist and militarist agenda to appear.106 In Gasu ningen, and to some 
extent Densō ningen, victimary thinking is made a central feature. In fact, the 
film gives a voice to the victims of any -isms—militarism, imperialism, 
economic nationalism—that constrain an individual. The revelation of 
Mizuno’s identity is a key moment in the narrative. Although Mizuno is first 
introduced as the antagonist of the story, the more his story starts to unravel, 
the more the spectator is invited to engage with his narrative. He is given 
greater psychological depth than the others, even the main protagonists, the 
prominent alpha male Detective Okamoto and his girlfriend Kyōko, an 
outspoken young reporter. His experience as a man in postwar Japan reflects 
the cost of democratization and the initial fervor of economic growth.  
Mizuno’s feelings of inferiority lead him to participate in Sano’s experiment. 
Sano, in turn, is posited as the almighty scientist with the ability “to cure.” The 
film promotes a scenario where natural reproduction is supplanted by its 
scientific, technological counterpart, exploring “the effects of techno-scientific 
manipulation upon the natural and social worlds.” 107  However, instead of 
representing a holy power of creation, the subjects of the scientists’ 
experiments, such as Mizuno, become monstrous and “unfit offspring” that 
the society wishes to deny. He resembles the literary character of Hae otoko: 
the subject of a heartless human experiment, he uses his extraordinary talents 
not to assist law enforcement, but to destroy. Mizuno, too, directs his anger at 
the utterly irresponsible application of science and technology,108 the male 
myth of creation that works within Japan’s eugenic ideas. This also makes him 
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a parallel to the protagonist of Yumeno Kyūsaku’s paramount book Dogura 
Magura (1935);109 although he is a murderer, the real culprit is the scientist 
“who had no qualms about creating a human being solely for the purpose of 
scientific experimentation.”110 Such sinister representations of scientists are 
somewhat at odds with both the contemporary state ideology toward and the 
popular understanding of science.111 However, considering Dower’s proposal 
of the linkage of the two periods on a structural level, it makes perfect sense. 
The reinvention of Japan after the war took place with the materials that were 
already present in the prewar society: personnel, institutions and the 
trajectory of technological and economic development, as well as bureaucratic 
and technocratic activities, to mention a few. In other words, the “postwar 
state rested on organizational pillars that were firmly planted in the past.”112 
The films highlight this issue, questioning the various what-ifs it poses.  
Unit 731 is implicitly present in Gojira, too. Dr. Serizawa does not 
experiment on humans, but his self-sacrifice is an act of making sure that no 
one (“devils,” as Serizawa refers to them) will ever find his research notes. This 
bears an uncanny resemblance to the situation in Unit 731, where the 
Occupation forces confiscated all the unit’s research notes on Japan’s human 
warfare development in order to ensure that the Russians would not find and 
use them. 113  This undercurrent problematizes the notion of Serizawa’s 
victorious Japanese science.  
4.2.2 EUGENIST VISIONS 
Rieder has discussed the “the ideology of male self-creation” in length. 
According to him, the male creation myth was constructed “to naturalize male 
power over women, animals, and the world of objects.” 114 But instead of a 
Judeo-Christian framework, in this case the scientist-creator is situated firmly 
within the discourse of social Darwinism and general scientific nationalism in 
Japan. Karen Schaffner locates the roots of the eugenic movement in the 
feelings of uncertainty that Japan faced amidst its opening to the world during 
the Meiji Restoration. By adopting “modern” practices and scientific 
ideologies, such as social Darwinism and eugenics, Japan wished to be counted 
among the “civilized” nations of the world and thus develop a national 
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identity. 115  Eugenics, science and national imagining are therefore closely 
related. In the early stages of its introduction, “science became the vessel 
through which the ‘true nature’ of human behavior and society could be 
discerned.” 116  Eugenics, in turn, provided a way to apply science to social 
problems.117 This is why, as Watanabe Masao points out, social Darwinism 
eventually came to be rooted in Japan. If science provided ways for analyzing 
the “true nature of human society,” the theory of evolution could be used for 
the same purpose. Darwinism was taken as a natural law and applied to human 
society with the emphasis on the “struggle for survival” and “victory of the 
superior, defeat of the inferior.” This stance was actually embraced by both 
reform bureaucrats and conservatives alike. The idea of natural selection soon 
became one of artificial selection and race improvement.118 And, as Jennifer 
Robertson demonstrates, these practices gained popular ground through 
eugenic beauty contests or hygiene exhibitions that promoted fertile citizens 
and the so-called shin-nipponjin (the new Japanese). 119  In fiction, social 
Darwinism is present in the male myth of creation, which is based on the real-
life happenings of 20th century Japan.  
Japan started to emphasize the importance of the bodies of its citizens in 
the wake of the Meiji Restoration.120 Especially before the start of the war, 
eugenic intervention was possible for unsound bodies.121 A nationwide survey 
in 1936 had revealed how physically unfit the nation as a whole was, with many 
draft-age males being unfit for service because of malnutrition, diseases or job-
caused disabilities.122 In popular media, images of healthy, “normal” bodies 
proliferated and voices against “abnormal” and “deviant” bodies intensified.123 
Igarashi points out how members of society were pressured into adjusting 
their physical and psychological features in accord with what the state 
required—or otherwise they were mercilessly discarded. With the blossoming 
imperialism and militarism, Nakamura Miri paints a picture of an empire that 
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upheld the well-trained physiques of its soldiers while monitoring the bodies 
of the unhealthy in an effort to efface them from the national image. The 
modern Japanese empire was “hell-bent on improving the bodies of its citizens” 
because bodies needed to be seen as “collectively constituting the nation, as 
something inseparable from the national body politic (kokutai).”124 Originally 
a Meiji-era ideology, Robertson describes kokutai as the imperial nation-state 
that was imagined to have an organic, corporeal form constituted by its 
kokumin, or citizens. 125  Kokutai centered not on “power” but “descent,” 
emphasizing the superiority of Japanese blood. 126  As bodies collectively 
constitute the nation and are inseparable from the national body politic, the 
health of an individual body was increasingly linked to the health of the 
nation.127  
This idea was extended to the postwar society. The production of healthy 
bodies (both individual and national) continued into the postwar era, when 
the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP) regarded the ailing 
Japanese bodies as a threat. Thus, it was of utmost importance to produce 
healthy bodies that constituted the healthy, democratic society.128 Igarashi has 
argued in many instances that in the postwar era, bodies were central for 
negotiations of the past. They retained their ambivalence even after the war. 
This is because of the way that both periods emphasized physical health, “a 
healthy nationalistic body” or “a clean democratic body” of an individual.129 In 
the postwar era, the purpose of the 1948 Eugenic Protection Law, passed by 
the Japanese government and the Occupation administration, was “to prevent 
the birth of ‘unfit offspring’ (furyō na shison).”130 It was only in 1996 that the 
clause regarding “unfit offspring” was removed from the law and maternal 
health came to be its central aim. The name of the law simultaneously changed 
to “Maternal Protection Law.”131 
Jennifer Robertson comments that bodies were conceived of as “plastic” 
that could be molded.132 Teshigahara Hiroshi’s Tanin no kao combines the 
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notion of a plastic body with the hibakusha discourse. It features a story of 
Okuyama, an engineer injured in a work-related accident. His face is badly 
disfigured and he is shamed, his life ruined. He visits a psychiatrist, Dr. Hira, 
who promises to create a bio-mask for him. Hira’s omnipotence and 
Okuyama’s role as an experimental object are foregrounded in the establishing 
scene of the film, where the human face is contrasted with anatomical maps 
and plastic body parts. Humans are nothing but living and breathing plasticine, 
a scientist’s playdough. Kawana describes this as “a human desire to engineer 
a superman using the seemingly boundless power of technology.” 133 Hira’s 
intentions are good, but postwar scientific masculinity is still dangerous in its 
potential to create subversive monsters that challenge the normative existence 
of “the everyman.” In Okuyama’s case, this is represented by his biomask. 
Empowered by and hidden behind his mask Okuyama seduces his wife in a 
chain of events that lead to a final psychotic break.  
The motif of a mask supports Nakamura’s proposal that uncanny fear 
comes from uncertainty about whether the object of attention is normal or 
abnormal. 134  This is the perceived shift from metamorphosis to 
mentalmorphosis. Okuyama’s case demonstrates this, with his mask 
concealing the mentalmorphosis that takes place underneath it. The mask 
makes him anonymous, but anonymity only works to confuse the borders of 
normalcy. The mask and the power of science have not cured him, and his 
power over the mask lasts only briefly. In the final scene of the film, his identity 
consumed by the biomask, Okuyama aimlessly wanders the hostile streets of 
Tokyo. People on the streets are all portrayed only as white faces with black 
eyes. They are numerous but anonymous, tangibly strangers with 
unrecognizable features. Referring to Abe’s original vision, Napier describes it 
as “anarchic and despairing” with characters who are “trapped in worlds of 
supposed harmony or healing whose inner core is something dark and 
horrible.”135  
Bartlett describes the Mad Scientist as an individual who tries to repair, 
complete or replace what God or evolutionary processes have failed to do. 
These characters act out a singular desire, “to create a new set of creatures a 
little like humankind but better than humankind, a new race or species enough 
like the human to be its rival but sufficiently distinct to outdo it—outperform 
it, outlast it, outlive it.”136 As a representation of the male myth of creation, the 
Mad Scientist is also related to, and can be explained within, the framework of 
hubris, that is, the will and ambition to be god-like, which always results in 
tragedy.137 In Tetsuo III, both the parents of the protagonist Anthony have 
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participated in a so-called Tetsuo project which, despite its initial aim of 
creating better bodies for sick children, has a militaristic outcome. This results 
in much sorrow and destruction. In Tanin no kao, amidst the faceless crowd 
Okuyama stabs and kills Dr. Hira. The notion of omnipotent scientific 
masculinity is originally posited as an answer to the needs of an individual 
which, to a great extent, are representative of the needs of the society.  
In that Okuyama’s burns are comparable to the scars of hibakusha, they 
recall history. Hira’s scientific masculinity is used to cure this condition, to 
create a human able to once more contribute to the benefit of society. However, 
Okuyama is no longer able to get rid of his mask. This is an ultimate victory for 
Hira’s scientific project, a total symbiosis of the man and mask, entailing the 
restoration of health in an individual body. However, the present does not 
bring Okuyama any happiness. To become a model citizen of the new Japan 
brings only despair, enhanced by the unfriendly streets of Tokyo. Tanin no kao 
highlights the disappearance of individual responsibility. This issue is not 
restricted to fictions of science. In Yotsuya kaidan, the true horror of the story 
is located not so much in the way Iemon organizes his wife’s death as in the 
way he casts on everyone else blame for actions he himself has taken, endlessly 
avoiding responsibility. 138  This irresponsible behavior can be analyzed 
together with what Buruma calls “the diffusion of responsibility”: real power 
is often “diffused as much as possible so that nobody has to take complete 
responsibility for anything.” 139  In addition, responsibility is always shifted 
upwards until it arrives at the Emperor, who, as Tatsumi points out, is exempt 
from all responsibility.140 Scientific masculinity in Tanin no kao is an emblem 
of irresponsibility: despite the will to do good, it mediates various instances in 
which responsibility is endlessly avoided.  
The issue of responsibility is highlighted in Gasu ningen as well. Mizuno’s 
anti-authority stance is also due to the fact that the scriptwriter of the film, 
Kimura Takeshi, used to participate in leftist movements.141 Thus, Mizuno 
represents the voice of not only the victims of the war (through his 
victimization in the hands of Sano) but also the leftist student movements who 
rebelled against the postwar prosperity that stemmed from the joint treaties 
between Japan and the U.S. The radicalness of the human vapor is that he has 
the power to “accidentally” destroy the Japanese from the inside. The main 
responsibility lies with the militaristic past. People who were active in war 
continue to spread horrors, even to the next generation. This can be seen as an 
allegory to the way Kishi Nobusuke remained in power despite his connections 
with the Japanese military.142 This is connected to the issue of trust: if a former 
                                                 
138 Ōsawa, “Yotsuya kaidan,” 85, 91.  
139 Buruma, Japanese Mirror, 151. 
140 Tatsumi, Full Metal Apache, 25. 
141 See Takeuchi, Tokusatsu o meguru, 41. 
142  See also Wilson, “War, Soldier, Nation,” 194–196 for a discussion about military men who 
participated in local, regional or national politics in the 1950s. 
 123 
campaigner of militarism was suddenly hailed as a representative of peace, 
what were the people to believe in?143 Thus, the existence of the human vapor 
is not to be viewed merely as a problem of a differing worldview, but rather as 
a very physical problem that ultimately leads to his own isolation from the 
world. 144  This isolation can be catastrophic for the society. The overall 
impression is that Mizuno had no choice but to rebel. The state is to blame. 
Still, it is clear that the antagonist of the film, Mizuno, is “unfit” by many 
postwar standards.  
Before his transformation, Mizuno was but a normal library assistant 
working at a university library. He had a dream of becoming a pilot in Japan’s 
Self-Defense Forces (SDF) but failed the entrance exam. “What should a high-
school graduate unable to enter university do?,” questions Mizuno, 
emphasizing the harsh environment within which masculinity was expected to 
be performed. During the time of the film’s release, the competition was 
starting to get increasingly intense. At the point of completion of their formal 
education, men were expected to move to permanent employment and change 
their status from a student to a full-fledged member of society. Most men were 
able to make this transition smoothly, but further success often depended on 
one’s academic record.145 Such success was denied Mizuno. He demonstrates 
a clear rupture from the suggested model, calling for an inspection of the 
process by which the most desperate members of society became its outcasts 
during the years after the war.146 His failing the SDF entrance examination 
marginalizes him in a society where boys must study hard in order to compete 
in the “examination war,” which will make entrance to the top universities and 
jobs easier for them.147 The issue around the SDF itself is a contradictory one. 
The SDF was generally connoted with the word “military,” and even the police 
were regarded with some caution.148 As Frühstück notes, after the end of the 
war military heroism continued as a narrative construct in the SDF, where 
emphasis was placed on the will to risk one’s life for the public.149 Military men 
still represented leadership.150 Mizuno is denied this, too. Instead of giving 
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him a chance to sacrifice himself for the greater good, the public ends up being 
sacrificed for his purposes.  
Morris-Suzuki explains that originally “[i]nterest in the science of race … 
did not necessarily imply a thoroughgoing belief in the importance of ‘racial 
purity’, though it did suggest a belief in the importance of genetics in 
determining the fate of peoples.”151 Yoshino speaks of “socially constructed 
races” where race is defined according to the social actors’ definitions. Race, 
as such, has no biological basis in this case. It can be defined as “a human 
group that perceives itself and/or is perceived by other groups as different 
from other groups by virtue of innate and immutable phenotypical and 
genotypical characteristics.”152 It is, in a way, an imagined community. This 
heterogeneity is shaken by Mizuno, who ultimately internalizes his situation 
by proclaiming, “I am not a human being, so I won’t obey rules made by 
humans.” Whereas the end of the war was celebrated as a liberation of 
bodies, 153  Mizuno demonstrates that the liberation of bodily borders is 
ultimately related to the liberation of the mind. This is the reason why these 
antagonists are ultimately antisocial and unregenerate.154 The police come to 
the conclusion that, having acquired a superior but monstrous existence, 
Mizuno causes anxiety in the orderly society just by existing. He must be 
exterminated. His is the storyline of abject, marginalized and oppositional 
masculinity, which is perceived as a threat for the whole society. Mentally unfit 
even before, his transformation makes him doubly monstrous. Similarly, it 
reveals the attitude of the general public toward anything Other. 
The end of Matango also calls for the questioning of “hygiene”: not only 
“racial hygiene,” which, according to Morris-Suzuki, was concerned with both 
establishing hierarchies of racial superiority and inferiority and debating 
issues of “racial mixing’” but “mental hygiene.” This theme continues 
especially in Tetsuo III. Japan’s Mental Hygiene Act (seishin eisei-hō) was 
established in 1950. Kitagaki describes mental hygiene as a medical practice 
which is carried out in order to protect people’s life from mental disease and 
illness, but also as a policy measure which protects normal people from the 
mentally ill or mentally disordered.155 In Matango, Kenji, an embodiment of 
rational scientific masculinity, has been locked up at a psychiatric hospital and 
observed from behind the bars by a group of psychiatrists. Psychiatrists were 
included in the medical treatment of patients and the protection of society by 
isolating the patients elsewhere. 156  In the outlook of the psychiatrists, “a 
profound social elitism directed toward the ‘lower orders’ of the national 
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population itself” 157  can be seen. Some have called eugenics a form of 
“scientific racism” 158  and the “deep-rooted tendency toward social 
protection.”159 In Matango, this social exclusion is due to contact with the 
external, namely, the U.S. This corresponds to Noël Carroll’s definition of 
monsters as threatening, uniformly dangerous and impure.160 Impurity is one 
of the main undercurrents of Kenji’s situation. His transformation is made 
monstrous by the clinical gaze of the onlookers, all of whom represent a form 
of scientific masculinity different from his own. To see these men observing 
each other is to see monstrosity mirrored on both sides. However, only one is 
deemed mentally unfit.  
4.3 CONCLUSIONS  
In studying the monsters of the past, we study our own demons.161 The role of 
science for Japan’s imperialist agenda was all but erased from the postwar 
narrative. Similarly, war memories continue to exert political power over the 
contemporary society.162 The narrative of science without a conscience can be 
seen as a metaphor for the image of a nation without conscience in the films 
discussed in this chapter. Simultaneously they draw from the friction between 
masculinities organized around dominance and around expertise or technical 
knowledge, of which the latter had received a whole new meaning with the 
application of science in weapon development. 163  This demonstrates the 
importance of engaging with historical narratives in order to provide timely 
commentary on even recent films, although a simplistic approach of merely 
referring to “war trauma” must be avoided.  
In this chapter, I have dealt with representations of Japan’s militarist past 
in kaiki eiga, the encounter with which is enabled by scientific masculinity. 
The films, drawing from the otoko no kaijin tradition introduced by Shimura 
Miyoko, introduced a multitude of ways in which scientific masculinity was 
used to dissect the past. Highlighted issues included the fear and ambivalence 
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of ex-soldiers and their role in the postwar order, Japan’s human 
experimentation projects and the questions of responsibility they posed, as 
well as Japan’s eugenic policies and conceiving of a racially pure ethnicity. This 
is broadcast in the Golden-era films, where human beings are made to 
transform into vessels of bio-weapon development, but also more recent male 
fantasies presented in the Tetsuo trilogy with its subplots of human betterment. 
These scenarios of scientific creation toy with the idea of scientific, enlightened 
and rational superiority, but ultimately this fantasy is destroyed by the results 
of the experimentation. Simultaneously they destroy the notion of superior 
Japanese science and highlight its problematic nature. 
Demilitarized soldiers have appeared in films such as Gojira, Densō ningen 
and Gasu ningen. In Gojira, Dr. Serizawa’s wounded body is an ambivalent 
marker of the past. Depending on the point of departure, he can be seen as a 
hero or a monster, a symbol for victorious Japanese science or a reminder of 
its dangers. The latter two films, however, were more directly concerned with 
the potentially dangerous nature of Japanese wartime science itself, painting 
ambiguous or downright monstrous portrayals of science at the hands of 
fukuinhei who have not been able to fully integrate into the postwar order. 
Sano’s and Niki’s appearances are uncanny blasts from the past, highlighting 
the general anxiety around the process of demilitarization. In Densō ningen, 
Dr. Niki’s motive was to create a superhuman soldier for the Japanese army. 
The same is echoed in Gasu ningen, where Dr. Sano works to create a 
superhuman able to exist in space. These films most closely correspond to the 
universal Frankenstein myth and the Mad Scientist narrative. In this case, 
Japanese is allotted a monstrous identity, bespeaking the critical way the 
filmmakers related to the past.  
Through depictions of scientific masculinity in the above films, the military 
past of Japan is deemed highly problematic. The films all negotiate the issue 
of continuity and, to a lesser degree, responsibility. If bodies were the only 
thing the survivors of war managed to rescue from the destruction, 164  the 
scientifically created mutants or monstrous and disfigured representations of 
scientific masculinity appear as a total destroyal of this one sign of survival, of 
the continuity between the prewar and postwar cultures, and of the perceived 
stability. As such they elicit the forgotten past, calling for the need to counter 
these memories. If the American discourse sought the medicalization, 
sanitization, cleansing and normalization of Japanese bodies,165 the postwar 
mutants, being results of militarist scientific masculinity, mock this. Similarly, 
they mock the Japanese eugenicist ideas of healing the unfit. The function of 
scientific masculinity as embodied by the fukuinhei scientist characters I have 
analyzed in this chapter is to remind the public about Japan’s military past 
during a time when the period of high growth was already fast approaching. 
Their relationship to society is problematic; it is not fully oppositional, because 
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there has been some degree of integration in the postwar society, but as the 
films demonstrate this process is not without its questions. In contrast, the 
freaks that scientific masculinity has given birth to are fully oppositional.  
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5 PACIFIST JAPAN 
Susan Sontag points out that the “bellicosity of science fiction is channeled into 
the yearning for peace.” 1  This is true of many of the kaiki eiga released 
relatively soon after the end of the war. In addition, kaiki eiga provided a 
means for discussing the role of Japanese science and technology, both 
historically and during the era of rebuilding. This role, in fact, was quite 
controversial. Despite the will of the nation to promote itself as a techno-
scientific superpower, the emperor himself wrote that Japan had lost the war 
not only because of its overconfidence but also because of the way their “armed 
forces put too much emphasis on the spiritual side and forgot science.” This 
affected the attitude of the general public toward the fact that Japan had lost 
because of its inferior science and technology.2 This discourse was manifested 
on top of the understanding of all the horrors that could be created with an 
immoral implemention of science and technology.  
The films discussed in this chapter redeem this felt inferiority about 
Japan’s science and technology, promoting a new identity for the country as a 
pacifist mediator of scientific knowledge and overall lbeing a peace-loving 
nation in the postwar world order. This can be seen as a means of overcoming 
Orbaugh’s Frankenstein Syndrome. Manga artist Tezuka Osamu has pointed 
out that after the war, it was a wish of the publishers “to stress a peaceful future, 
where Japanese science and technology were advanced and nuclear power was 
used for peaceful purposes.” 3  This is telling of the general change in the 
attitudes toward science and technology that is visible in the films as well. 
As Mizuno points out, science was transformed overnight from a tool of war 
into the means for Japan’s peacetime reconstruction. Especially Japanese 
scientists and promoters of science considered it important for the 
reconstruction of Japan, even though many of them had been accomplices of 
military science in the past.4 The slogan of a “scientific Japan” is generally 
considered to be a typical idea of postwar Japan. Within this framework, the 
films address this shift to a democratic, peaceful use of science and technology 
for the benefit of not only Japan but the whole world. In the films, scientific 
masculinity is not embodied only by the mad scientists but also by characters 
possessing clear-headed and down-to-earth rationalism, a key to averting the 
temptations of unethical science and ideologies such as militarism.  
This chapter demonstrates how the promotion of Japan as a peaceful 
nation took place on an international level and was aligned with nuclear 
narratives. The nuclear discourse, “a set of artistic and political utterances on 
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the use of nuclear power for both military and peaceful purposes,” 5  for 
example, was utilized in order to position Japan as a victim but, more 
importantly, to promote its science (and Japan as a nation) as inherently 
pacifist. Related to these are the strategies through which this effect was 
achieved, such as emphasizing the role that the scientists have within a team 
or introducing scenes of international negotiations. Even scenarios of saving 
the whole Japanese race appear.  
The films that most directly address these are Bijo to ekitainingen, Gojira 
and Chikyū bōeigun. A bleaker vision of postwar Japan is provided by Honda 
Ishirō’s Matango. These are narratives that utilize scientific masculinity in 
order to reveal the inner grotesques of the “demilitarized and democratized” 
nation. I will approach these from the viewpoint of “unmasking” the costs of 
democratization and the recreation of Japan as a pacifist nation. Although the 
narratives discussed in Chapter 4 also dealt with this topic of unease, this 
chapter deals with these inner grotesques as representations of anxiety toward 
the present, not the militarist past.  
5.1 NUCLEAR CONCERNS 
In Japan, the effects of the bomb could not be discussed in the immediate 
postwar era and during the Occupation. In 1952, the San Francisco Treaty 
marked the end of the Occupation and allowed for the expression of the 
nuclear trauma on screen.6 Genbaku no ko (Children of Hiroshima, 1952, 
Shindō Kaneto), the first film to discuss the trauma of the atomic bomb, 
was released already in August, just before the San Francisco Treaty was 
ratified in September. Representation of the horrors of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki was by no means an easy task.7 Even today, the fear of radiation 
and the image of nuclear reactors have been studied more as a political protest, 
less in terms of artistic expression.8 This chapter answers this gap by pointing 
out how the films utilized the nuclear narrative to promote an image of Japan 
as a pacifist nation. 
As Hutchinson points out, although the fear of a nuclear attack is a 
universal one, there is also a parallel narrative at work, which represents 
nuclear power in good or at least neutral terms, as opposed to destructive 
weaponry. 9  Despite being the only country to have experienced the 
consequences of a nuclear bomb, Japan embarked on a journey to become a 
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nation that embraced the idea of nuclear power.10 In fact, it is quite interesting 
that a country with firsthand experience of the dangers of nuclear weapons 
started its commercial nuclear power program almost immediately after the 
Occupation, becoming a world power in the development of civilian nuclear 
technology.11 Yoshii (2007) argues that despite the memory of the bomb being 
strong in the 1950s, nuclear power was celebrated as a counterpart to the “bad” 
nuclear science: nuclear power plants became household examples of the 
peaceful and useful use of nuclear power, which directly lowered the living 
costs of a nation recovering from the devastating war and a housing shortage. 
With the help of science, the threat of the nuclear bomb had been domesticated 
and harnessed for the use of the people as nuclear power and “atoms for 
peace.” 12  Important for this new application was also the terminological 
change from kakujikken (nuclear testing) to genshiryoku (atom energy).13 
Penney calls this “nuclear nationalism,” a form of technological and economic 
nationalism that promoted “an unshakable official confidence in the safety of 
Japanese nuclear technology” in the 1980s, which also helped people in 
remote areas with high unemployment rates to benefit from Japan’s economic 
miracle through the operation of nuclear power plants.14 All this, however, was 
compromised by the Fukushima nuclear power plant accident in March 2011.15  
5.1.1 THE DAIGO FUKURYŪMARU INCIDENT 
A subgenre of science fiction that explored fears of nuclear war was prevalent 
worldwide from the late 1940s to the 1980s.16 According to the biocultural 
reading, the popularity of these sorts of narratives is based on the way human 
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cognition has been hardwired to deal with dangers in the environment.17 In 
this case, nuclear attack represents an uncontrollable environmental threat. In 
Japan, it also has a distinctly culture-specific layer. To paraphrase Hutchinson, 
most of the 20th-century popular culture texts concerned with nuclear power 
implied atomic weaponry, Japanese victimhood at foreign hands, the 
importance of preserving world peace, respecting rather than abusing the 
formidable power of nuclear energy and avoiding the past mistakes of others, 
namely the U.S.18 Kalat points out that while American monster films used 
radiation to get the creature up and running around, Honda Ishirō saw his 
monster as a narrative device to discuss the terror of the nuclear age.19  
In the 1950s, many science fiction films revolved around the fear of 
radiation, not the bomb itself.20 This threat of radiation was highlighted by the 
U.S. testing incident of a hydrogen bomb at Bikini Atoll in March 1954, which 
resulted in the radiation poisoning of Japanese fishermen on the fishing boat 
Daigo Fukuryūmaru.21 Words such as “South Pacific Sea,” “nuclear testing,” 
“ashes of death” and “radiation poisoning” became popular features of some 
of the new Japanese films. 22  The Bikini incident not only allowed for 
expressions of criticism toward U.S. politics, but also marked a start of 
opposition toward nuclear policies, a watershed incident prior to which no 
anti-nuclear information had been permitted to be distributed.23 The director 
of Gojira, Honda Ishirō, saw the incident as a chance to insert serious meaning 
in his films. Despite underlining that the key idea of Gojira was to entertain, 
he has admitted that nuclear symbolism was present for those who wished to 
see it.24 This statement draws a connection between some of Honda’s films and 
Japan’s nuclear discourse. 25  Present in Gojira and Chikyū bōeigun, the 
discourse also appears in a compelling form in Bijo to ekitainingen and 
Matango. It should be noted, however, that in Gojira radiation is less of a 
concern than the testing of an H-bomb—an act by the U.S. which must not be 
mentioned. The monster Gojira is not a mutation per se; rather, its sleep was 
disturbed by the bomb.  
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Closely related to the Bikini incident, Schnellbächer argues that especially 
between 1945 and 1970s the Pacific Ocean became an important metaphor for 
discussing Japanese national identity, because the idea of Japan as a Pacific 
sea power was an important attribute of the pre-1945 imperialism. 26  In 
addition, screenwriter Sekizawa Shinichi has also told that he implicitly 
incorporated his wartime experiences of starving on isolated islands in the 
South Pacific into his scripts.27 This creates a real-life focal point for fictional 
events. In Gojira, this fear is made prominent in the beginning, when one 
fishing boat after another disappears into the sea. Samara Lea Allsop sees this 
also as a reminder of the naval battles lost by Japan during the Pacific War.28 
Matango, in turn, takes its protagonists to a faraway island in the South Seas: 
when a group of young (elite) Japanese get shipwrecked in a storm and drift 
toward a mysterious island, they find an abandoned ship with some interesting 
biological experiments. One by one, the crew have their mental state 
deteriorate, with their transformation into human-shaped mushrooms being 
an outward representation of this inner process. Mushroom bodies also 
resemble nuclear explosions.29  
Bijo to ekitainingen is a story of mutated, men-like liquid monsters 
appearing in Tokyo, and how detectives and scientists must work together to 
solve this problem and save mankind. The story is played out against the 
backdrop of a more traditional crime fiction where, as Kawana argues, writers 
“were quick to exploit the omnipotent aura of science.”30 According to Honda 
himself, the thriller format found its reference points from the various drug-
related stories splashed across newspapers and mass media.31 Bijo starts with 
a hellish scene at sea: an explosion, a flash of orange light, a mushroom cloud 
and then a news announcement of an H-bomb test and the subsequent loss of 
lives in the South Pacific Sea. After a shot of an empty, eerie ship, the film cuts 
to rainy Tokyo where a man is hit by a car. When the driver and police inspect 
the scene, there is no body to be seen—just empty clothes. It is quite evident 
that this unnatural disappearance is somehow caused by the H-bomb test in 
the beginning of the film.  
As in Gojira, real events are used as explanations for fictional fear, which 
transforms into a very real fear. The more the story progresses, all the more 
real become the references to actual occurrences.32 The police soon discover 
that everything seems to be related to members of a certain drug gang. 
However, it soon becomes clear that something more sinister is at work. To 
find out the truth, the police must—unwillingly at first—collaborate with Dr. 
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Masada, a professor at the local university. Dr. Masada is interested in the 
strange effect that hydrogen radiation might have on human beings. He 
extrapolates that there is a connection between the happenings in Tokyo and 
the disappearance of the sailors of Daini Ryūjinmaru (a direct reference to 
Daini Fukuryūmaru). The narrative offers an explanation in a flashback for the 
weird events that happened on board Daini Ryūjinmaru. The ship’s logbook 
reveals that on the day of the Bikini incident, six fishermen disappeared and 
23 were marked as “unknown.” The number “23” is a direct reference to real 
events, as 23 members of the crew of Daigo Fukuryūmaru were diagnosed with 
radiation poisoning.33 Although these films’ visions are fictitious, because of 
the period of their release members of the audience “are sure to have felt a 
sense of the ‘too real.’”34 The effects of “too real” are enhanced by the use of 
words such as “Christmas Island,” “caesium-137,” “strontium-90” and 
“nuclear explosion,” which can lead the audience to recollect earlier stories in 
the media about the possible perils of nuclear testing.35  
Bijo also recalls the effects of the bomb and nuclear testing on people. 
Dower notes that a new class of “improper” people developed in Japan soon 
after the war, including, for example, people who had been tainted and 
polluted by radiation. 36  The hibakusha (exposed to radiation), a term 
generally used to describe the victims of the A-bomb,37 are often portrayed as 
women, such as “a tragic young heroine suffering from atomic-related illness,” 
which “enables a historical narrative of forgetting, where victimization 
replaces responsibility for aggression.” 38  Interestingly, when the mutated 
monsters of the film, the so-called “H-men” are tainted by radiation, they are 
only seen as the “Second Human Race.” As Igarashi argues, “Although 
memories may have become visible in the cultural realm of postwar Japanese 
society, they remained suppressed in political discourse.” 39  Honda’s 
speculative cinema politicizes these memories in the form of the monstrous 
bodies onscreen. 
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Grodal points out that films capture our attention only if they include at 
least one agency that has intentions and emotions. This is especially central to 
supernatural and counterintuitive narratives, because they abound with all 
sorts of weird beings. Instead of random dangers, it is intentional killers that 
people still fear, because the human mind has been trained to look for 
potentially dangerous agents. 40  When cabaret dancer Chikako, the female 
protagonist of Bijo, witnesses a human transforming into an H-man, she 
questions whether they remain alive or not. This is the ultimate issue 
concerning the H-men and underlines the general anxiety around the possible 
consequences of metamorphosis due to radiation. It is stated, however, that 
the H-men still seem to have all the mental activity of a human being, 
especially the intentionality of their actions. Thus, although stripped of some 
basic human attributes, they are not stripped of their agency.  
In the final scenes of Bijo, the police lure the H-men into the sewers of 
Tokyo and scorch them. This expresses humanity’s triumph over the 
monstrous but, as Kalat notes, this is also an ultimate sign of cruelty, where 
the Japanese torture their enemies.41 Saitō calls this “world nationalism,” the 
war to exterminate all things that are different.42 A similar logic is visible even 
sixty years after the release of Bijo. Nihon igai zenbu chinbotsu (Everything 
Sinks But Japan, 2006) is a parody version of Nihon chinbotsu, where Japan 
is the only country to stay afloat while the rest of the world sinks away. 
Outsiders seek refuge in Japan, which reveals the degree of bigotry and racism 
that bubbles under the polite façade of the homogeneous Japanese race, which, 
despite shedding its kokutai past, was still a prominent postwar image.43 The 
film evokes Bakhtinian carnivalesque laughter in the face of an extremely 
serious matter. The true colors of the Japanese are revealed during the disaster, 
and these colors are not pretty. World nationalism is presented as a will to save 
the world, but in fact it is nothing but ethnocentric nationalism. The antidote 
is provided by Dr. Masada, whose role will be discussed further in this chapter.  
5.1.2 NAMING THE UNNAMEABLE 
Schnellbächer’s idea of the sea as a barrier is engaged in both Gojira and Bijo. 
A monster trespasses this barrier, but the monster itself is quite equivocal. It 
is a creation of foreign science but, at the same time, something very Japanese. 
In both cases, the monster arrives from the South Seas. Yomota explains that 
in Japanese mythology, the South Seas have been considered a utopia and a 
gate to the world of the gods. Nonetheless, the Japanese should die in their 
own land because otherwise the souls of the deceased will continue their 
wandering. In Gojira, the monster brings home the wandering souls killed in 
                                                 
40 Grodal, Embodied Visions, 107–108, 148. 
41 Kalat, Toho’s Godzilla, 60.  
42 Saitō, Kōittenron, 16–17. 
43 Ko, Cinema and Otherness, 14. 
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the war, reminding the democratized society of the cost of the shift from 
militarism to democracy.44 Bijo duplicates this narrative. In addition, while 
both Gojira and Bijo constantly refer to the presence of the U.S., they never 
address it directly. 
Even after the end of the Occupation, Japan was economically and 
politically too dependent on the U.S. to openly discuss the role it had 
played in Japan’s defeat. Igarashi argues that popular culture provided a 
vessel by means of which it was possible to encounter an otherwise 
concealed foundational narrative that projected “continuity with Japan’s 
past in order to mask the historical disjuncture of Japan’s movement from a 
former enemy to an ally.” This “suppression of history was an important aspect 
of the postwar cultural discourse.”45 In relation to cinema, this “the occupied 
screen,” as named by John Dower, provided “a fictional world where tangible 
things disappeared”: even English-language signs were forbidden, because the 
U.S., much less its role in the bombings of Nagasaki and Hiroshima, was not 
to be portrayed in film.46 However, the U.S. appeared as vague images of 
otherness. Igarashi sees it as “a mimetic embodiment of abject” embodying 
both Japan’s loss and the U.S. that inflicted that loss. Although inseparably 
tied to the U.S., this had to remain unnamed.47 Consequently, mass culture 
moved back and forth between its expression of the otherness of America as 
“either absent or monsterized.” 48  This was despite that fact that relations 
between the U.S. and Japan were crafted as “those of nations which, as 
sovereign equals, cooperate in friendly association to promote their common 
welfare and to maintain international peace and security.”49  
In the films, the foundational narrative manifests itself as a structure in 
which the presence of the U.S. is constantly hinted at but never explicitly 
referred to. 50  In Bijo, the H-men, previous to their metamorphosis, were 
laborers earning their living by sailing the seas. Through their monstrous 
metamorphosis they gain superpowers, transcending Japan’s victimhood. But 
this superiority is not free of politics. Bartlett notes that for Victor’s 
Frankenstein’s monster, the ultimate horror is the definite fact that he now 
lives in a world unlike ours. It is a world “dominated by the oppressive 
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omnipresence of Victor as the one who made him ineradicable ugly.” 51 
Similarly, the overarching presence of the U.S. looms over the H-men, its 
foreign science having made them monstrous. Despite having been given a 
second life, this is by no means an existence of ultimate freedom. Rather, it 
becomes an allegory of the real-life political situation of postwar Japan and, 
accordingly, a means of problematizing images of Japanese nationhood. The 
dreadful feeling that pervades from the H-Men can be understood in terms of 
this debate. Like pollution or a curse, they wander around the town, with 
newspapers spreading fear among the people.52  
The H-men enable an encounter not only with the past but also with the 
present. This is what Matango does, too. The protagonist of the film is 
Professor Kenji Murai, the only truly rational member of the shipwrecked 
team. After the shipwreck the crew of the destroyed ship seek shelter from an 
abandoned ship, where they discover scientific samples collected by its lost 
crew. These include “definite examples of mutation caused by radiation.” In 
addition, as Kenji notes, the nationality of the ship is unknown, as if it has been 
concealed on purpose. This is a strong statement regarding the purposeful 
concealment of the role of the U.S. in the creation and structuring of the 
postwar society. In other words, Matango corresponds to the logic of the 
foundational narrative, referring to but never mentioning it.  
In this case, it is clear that scientific masculinity functions as a sign of 
rational superiority and the ability to stay strong in the face of adversities. The 
violation of nature caused by the U.S. testing is resisted by Kenji until the very 
last minutes of the film. In film analysis, there is always a threat of 
overanalyzing. In this case, however, the political nature of Matango is made 
clear by comparing the ending scenes of the original Japanese version and the 
English dubbed version. In the final scene, where Kenji is seen narrating his 
story, his words in the English and Japanese versions differ. In the Japanese 
version, Kenji says that he had done everything he could to protect himself and 
his lover Akiko from transforming. He then turns to face the spectator, yelling 
that it was all for nothing. It becomes clear that despite never eating the 
mushrooms, Kenji, too, has started to metamorphosize. The scence is highly 
symbolic. It highlights the unwavering nature of Kenji’s rational scientific 
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masculinity as a symbol of Japan’s strength. It also directly visualizes the 
unwritten role of the U.S. in the transformations of postwar Japan—the role 
that Igarashi argues was always hidden in order to maintain the image of two 
allied nations willingly participating in a process of mutual progress. In the 
English-language version, however, Kenji’s words are dubbed as “I ate them, 
too!” Thus, the reason behind the mutation is blamed on the individual, Kenji.  
Monsters challenge common knowledge because they are unknown to 
ordinary social intercourse. 53  Honda sees the mushroom form as a 
manifestation of happiness; through transformation, people would gain a 
greater understanding of life, forget their contemporary existence and reach 
the true happiness of a psyche.54 Metamorphosis appears as a way to nirvana. 
At the same time, however, because of its grotesque nature, it becomes an 
antithesis of enlightenment. In both cases the hideous transformation is 
caused by American science, but in the latter case it is clear that the U.S. places 
the ultimate responsibility for the metamorphosis on Japan. If this is to be 
seen as an allegory of social change, the American version conceals the role 
that that nation has played in the postwar history of Japan. The Japanese 
version, in turn, clearly manifests the frustrated stance of a defeated nation 
where transformation was imposed forcefully. Metamorphosis as a 
representation of immersing oneself in the postwar order is resisted by Kenji 
until the very end. Kenji’s resistance, portrayed against the gradual and willing 
immersion of the others, is not a critique of democracy but rather a description 
about the ambiguities of the process of democratization. It was also something 
very violent, as Matango demonstrates when the shipwrecked crew starts 
fighting—and even killing—each other. In addition, the state of contentment 
can only be maintained with other me(n)ta(l)morphosized people. The U.S. 
version, in turn, creates a picture of a people who willingly embrace the foreign. 
Kenji’s resistance has crumbled and he, too, has voluntarily embraced the 
future form of life. It is because of his act of eating the mushrooms that he has 
started to change, not because of the destructive science developed by the U.S. 
It is only one sentence, but the image it carries about the Japanese nation is 
totally different. Matango not only unmasks the misery behind the glittering 
image of pacifism but also the role of the U.S. in the current situation. 
5.2 PROMOTING WORLD PEACE  
Nakayama points out that since the late 1950s, the job market for scientists 
flourished, leading to increased governmental policies for the promotion of 
technological innovations. A scientifically trained workforce came to be in 
huge demand by the industrial sector, one reason for which was the 
development and assembling of consumer durables, which had a direct 
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positive influence on people’s lifestyle, as quickly and as cheaply as possible.55 
Thus, scientific masculinity was also useful for mediations of positive images 
of nationhood. The Association of Democratic Scientists (Minshushugi 
kagakusha kyōkai, Minka) was established in 1946 with the aim of 
emphasizing the role of the democratic production and dissemination of 
science for the future of Japan.56  
The Daigo Fukuryūmaru incident became an important means of 
promoting this new identity. The scientists of Minka played an important role 
in disseminating information about the incident, 57  mediating scientific 
knowledge and expertise for the public. The incident situated them “in a 
pacifist position” and lent them extra leverage as political actors.58 Similar 
characters appear in Gojira, Bijo, Chikyū bōeigun and, more recently, Nihon 
chinbotsu (2006) and Shin-Gojira (2016). Apart from promoting the peaceful 
use of science, this also symbolized new ways of influencing global politics. As 
argued by Billig, nations seek recognition from other established nations and, 
in order to be approved by other nations and to forge its own particularity and 
identity, a new nation must resemble these others. In other words, nationalism 
always involves an international perspective. If not, it is not nationalism but 
mere “secluded ethnocentric mentality.”59 The will in the films to promote 
Japan as a part of the greater world is to reconstruct its national image from 
one of secluded ethnocentricity to an internationally acclaimed champion for 
peace. This can be seen as representative of the situation faced by Japan after 
the war. Not being a new nation per se but nonetheless a nation faced with the 
task of constructing its national identity anew, it was vital to reassess country’s 
role among other nations. 
5.2.1 INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL IMAGES  
International relations are recalled in various ways in the films discussed in 
this thesis. If the monster in Gojira represents destructive American science, 
Dr. Yamane and Dr. Serizawa represent both the civilian and military sides of 
Japanese kagaku gijutsu, respectively. As opposed to Serizawa, who is 
referred to as the successor of Yamane, the connection between war and 
Yamane is never made, although by his age he is bound to have participated in 
it. Yamane’s role is to portray a humane side of scientific advances, stressing 
the peaceful nature of Japanese science as opposed to the destructive power of 
                                                 
55  Nakayama, Science, Technology and Society, 31–32, 61, 139; Morris-Suzuki, Technological 
transformation, 204; Yoshikawa Hiroshi, Japan’s Lost Decade (Tokyo: International House of Japan, 
2002), 8. 
56  Bartholomew, Formation of Science, 278; Nakayama, Postwar Japan, 18–20; Nakayama, 
Science, Technology and Society, 18–19; Mizuno, Scientific Nationalism, 176.  
57 Morris Low, Science and the Building of a New Japan (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 2. 
58 Nakayama, Science, Technology and Society, 153; Low, ibid., 30. 
59 Billig, Banal Nationalism, 83, 85. 
 139 
American science. He portrays a somewhat naïve scientific masculine 
authority, the pure will for a greater understanding of things. “Don’t kill it! 
Learn amazing secrets of life from it,” he suggests. While a greater 
understanding of the monster can ultimately work toward the development of 
an antidote for radiation sickness, for example, nothing like this is stated as 
Yamane’s motive. Rather, his scientific knowledge is closely tied to the context 
of research for the sake of research, a space that is excluded from the politics 
of science.  
Yamane’s unpolitical science situates Gojira firmly within the foundational 
narrative. The continuing presence of the U.S. is referred to but never directly 
addressed. Especially telling is the scene where women—presumably relatives 
of the fallen sailors, among others—demand the exposition of Gojira, whilst 
the government refuses. “Everyone must know!” shouts one woman, 
countered by a man who asks, “How can we tell people that the H-bomb testing 
brought Gojira to life?” But why not? It is not Japan that did the testing; its 
government is not to blame. Rather, Japan and its inhabitants are (and were 
in real life) the victims. The following remarks make clear the workings of the 
foundational narrative: through making Gojira’s presence known, 
“international relations will be harmed,” which would lead to “uncontrollable 
economic and diplomatic confusion.” It does not matter that, as pointed out 
by the women, it is a known fact that Gojira was awakened by the H-bomb 
testing. Revealing this—and accusing the U.S.—in 1954 would have had too 
grave an effect on the development of Japan’s postwar society and the 
country’s international relations.  
Yamane’s character is an attempt to return to the “innocent” history of 
science, an embodiment of an alternative past of positive “what-ifs.” Originally, 
research scientists were an elite group able to dedicate their lives for the 
greater understanding of science itself. This purity was tainted by technocrats 
with their ambitions, related to Japan’s military expansion,60 symbolized by 
Serizawa. Yamane exorcises these malevolent spirits, all the while remaining 
politically untouchable. If science fiction requires “a (pseudo) rational, 
physical explanation for any unusual occurrence,” 61  it is Yamane’s role to 
provide that, with comments such as “[t]he sand in Gojira’s feet belongs to the 
Bifrocutus formation,” “[a] trilobite is a prehistoric crustacean” and “analysis 
indicates a strong presence of Strontium-90.” Only the last one only slightly 
refers to any current political topic. The other statements construct Yamane’s 
scientific wisdom as something that transcends daily political battles. Whereas 
his humanist views are suppressed and excluded from the narrative until the 
very end, he reappears as the consciousness of science: “As long as they keep 
experimenting with deadly weapons, another [Gojira] will appear, somewhere 
in the world.” There could not possibly be a stronger statement for pacifism.  
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This ominous warning stated by a Japanese scientist is echoed in Honda’s 
Chikyū bōeigun. In the film, Japan is under attack by the Mysterians, a space 
race whose planet has been destroyed in a nuclear war. Landing their 
spaceship with Mount Fuji in the background, the external threat is 
visualized.62 The Mysterians tell that they attacked the Japanese in what was 
a demonstration of the power of their extraterrestrial science. Despite this, 
they state that they come in peace and wish to negotiate. Honda also makes a 
clear allegory to the Cold War with two superpowers that are willing to use 
ever bigger and more dangerous weapons, including nuclear warfare. 
Japanese technology, in turn, is promoted as a world-changing science. What 
started in Japan soon becomes an international threat, but the solution, too, 
is offered by Japan.  
Chikyū bōeigun includes various scenarios of international negotiations 
about military cooperation in one huge peace-maintaining project. As Dr. 
Adachi states, “the unluckiness of Japan today is the unluckiness of America 
tomorrow.” At the U.N. roundtable, everyone speaks Japanese; after all, this 
is speculative fiction. Interestingly, however, the main references to the West 
are in the form of Richardson (an ambassador from the U.S.) and Immerman 
(it can be deduced by his name that he is from Germany). Chikyū bōeigun ties 
Japan’s wartime and postwar histories together, weaving a network of 
international relations of support and mutual understanding in the face of an 
external threat. Indeed, as Billig further points out, “The consciousness of 
national identity normally assumes an international context, which itself 
needs to be imagined as much as the national community.”63 Science and 
technology in science fiction are “conceived as the great unifier,”64 but in the 
case of Chikyū bōeigun, it is Japanese science that is ultimately superior. In 
the 1950s and 1960s, the space race between the U.S. Soviet Union regarding 
military supremacy was taking place in earnest. 65 Chikyū bōeigun situates 
Japan among these two world powers as a nation promoting peace. Their 
interest is not in the militarization of space; they are innocent victims of the 
alien attack. However, they do their best to save not only Japan but the whole 
world. This is a promotion of a new type of national identity within the postwar 
world order.  
This need to rebuild Japan’s identity in the international context was 
followed by the need to reassess its internal image in the aftermath of the 
mishandling of the Kobe earthquake in 1995 and especially the triple disaster 
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of 2011. Historically, natural disasters have also been a prominent narrative 
motif in Japanese kaiki eiga. Chikyū bōeigun not only recalled war but also 
showed natural calamities—such as earthquakes and landslides—bound to 
have caused even greater anxiety in the spectator. The Mysterians are doubly 
horrifying, not only because of their connection to radiation, but also because 
of their ability to cause such natural calamities. Whereas manmade threats are 
often nullified by the strength of Japanese science, disasters and the power of 
nature are frequently portrayed as being stronger, as suggested by the ending 
of Densō ningen, where the eruption of Asamayama destroys Sudō. 
In Nihon chinbotsu, Japanese science saves its people. A sacrifice is needed, 
but it is not that of the scientist. Shin-Gojira (2016), in turn, creates a far more 
complicated picture. The nuclear narrative is recalled when Kayoko Anne 
Patterson, a half-Japanese, half-American Special Envoy for the President of 
the U.S. informs Yaguchi, the Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary, of America’s 
intent to drop an H-bomb on Japan unless Gojira is stopped. Japan’s pacifist 
stance is highlighted, as other nations halt the U.S. in its plans, due to their 
trust in Japan to find a techno-scientific solution. This scene frames Japanese 
science and technology once more as pacifist. Shin-Gojira is inherently 
technonationalist in its way of emphasizing Japan’s pacifist role in the world 
and its technological prowess. Just as the nationalisms of democracy are not 
always benign (see Billig, 1995), technonationalism is not always malign. 
However, the science that ultimately stops Gojira is, in fact, quite nuts and 
bolts, by no means something that would be expected of a “technological 
superpower.” The scientists themselves—one of whom is portrayed by 
Tsukamoto Shinya—are a bit “nuts,” too. Thus, Shin-Gojira contrasts the 
governmentally promoted technonationalism with a version that ironizes it.  
In addition to engaging with the narrative of technonationalism, Shin-
Gojira directly opposes military nationalism, presenting scene after scene of 
futile attacks by Japan’s SDF. Only with a powerful shot by the U.S. forces 
present in Japan is Gojira harmed, before unleashing its radioactive beam and 
destroying not only half of Tokyo but also the helicopter that was carrying 
Japan’s Prime Minister to shelter. This is reminiscent of the scene in the first 
Gojira film, where the monster stomps on the National Diet Building. In both 
cases, indecisive politicians, whose reputation in the 21st century had also 
become tainted with bribery and other scandals, are annihilated and order is 
restored with more moral leaders; this represented in Shin-Gojira by the 
ideological figure of Yaguchi. Whereas Dr. Yamane was quite idealistic in his 
will to merely study the monster in 1954, the contemporary society has 
renounced such naïve views. Coexistence is the only choice, and science must 
be used for that purpose. This time it is not merely about the moral scientist, 
but the morality of science in combination with moral politics. In Nihon 
chinbotsu (2006) and Shin-Gojira (2016), the confusion of the politicians in 
the face of a natural disaster becomes a mirror for the confusion of the nation, 
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because, as Billig notes, “politicians represent the nation to itself.” 66  In 
addition, with the emergence of shimin shakai, or civil society, which 
symbolically seems to have heralded a dramatic change in the relationship 
between individuals and the state, it is no longer assumed that people in the 
position of authority are there by right.67 They have to earn their place.  
5.2.2 SCIENTISTS AS TEAM MEMBERS  
Because masculinity is inherently a relational construct, scientific 
masculinity—and its perceived “goodness” or “badness,” too—is constructed 
within relationships between men. The ambiguity of scientific masculinity is 
pointed out by Connell, who argues that “technical rationality is not 
completely integrated into a hierarchical social order.”68 Regarding fiction, 
Susan Sontag points out that an individual scientist, often bearing the image 
of being shut in his basement and neglecting all his familial duties, is treated 
negatively. This is seen in the portrayal of Dr. Serizawa in Gojira. In his case 
there is always the underlying threat of misuse of scientific knowledge, should 
one stray from the course of morality. However, Sontag points out that one 
way to nullify the threat of a scientist and integrate him into society is to situate 
him within a team.69 She speaks of the “savior-scientist,” who promotes reason 
over feelings, idealizes teamwork and takes part in the consensus-creating 
activities of science.70 This universal functional bundle also becomes a culture-
specific representation: the scientist as a team member corresponds to the way 
a (Japanese) boys’ world always includes “orderly organization,” a “command 
system” (meirei keitō), and “industrial technology.” A boys’ world, in fact, is 
representative as such of the postwar Japanese society, Japan, Inc. (kigyō 
shakai, or enterprise society).71 Scientists as members of a team strengthen 
this ideal.  
In kaiki eiga, the notion of a team is stressed in the way the status of a 
character is defined, either by how other characters speak of him or how they 
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react.72 In other words, scientific masculinity is defined in the relationship 
between men. Gojira and the Henshin ningen films utilize this strategy. The 
image and meaning of the scientist are not only products of his own actions 
but also the words of those around him, especially in conversations held with 
other men. In Gojira, this is represented in the relationship between Dr. 
Serizawa and Ogata, Emiko’s love interest. Ogata always explains Serizawa’s 
character, such as the connection between him and the war and the emphasis 
on Serizawa’s dedication to science. In turn, Serizawa has no access to any 
information on Ogata. In Gojira, Ogata wields symbolic power over Serizawa. 
As a sailor working in Nankai Salvage, the Japanese Coast Guard, Ogata 
represents a new, healthy masculinity. Generally, the heroes in the Gojira 
series tend to be figures of authority, members of elite groups, and people such 
as reporters, scientists, detectives, or leaders of the Self-Defense Force—brave, 
intelligent, resourceful individuals capable of coping with monsters and 
criminals of various sorts.73 The former group also corresponds to Milam and 
Nye’s definition of scientific masculinity.  
The inclusion of the Coast Guard is an important symbolic notion, as it did 
the dangerous job of clearing the wartime naval mines around Tokyo.74 Some 
have seen Gojira as a representation of a mine, having merely stayed put, 
waiting.75  As a member of the Coast Guard, Ogata represents change and 
optimism, bravery and the tangible act of moving on. He is allotted the positive 
qualities of masculinity: a healthy body and mind, loyalty, perseverance, and 
diligence. Not surprisingly, these are the qualities that belong to the 
hegemonic Japanese salaryman model, although in 1954 that hegemonization 
was still at a very early stage. This is not the case with Serizawa. Although 
wielding the power of science and rationality, he is handicapped and implicitly 
traumatized. His marginalization is emphasized by the fact that throughout 
the narrative, it is Ogata who is worried about him, not Emiko. Indeed, Morris 
Low proposes that “masculinity is about both the power of men over men, and 
the power of men over women.”76 The love triangle between Serizawa, Ogata 
and Emiko is a fine representation of this. In fact, the spectator is initially 
invited to draw the conclusion that Emiko and Ogata are romantically involved. 
Only 33 minutes into the film is it revealed that, in fact, it is Serizawa who is 
Emiko’s fiancé.77 
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Kawana points out that in speculative fiction, science was traditionally an 
ally to the detective.78 Because the National Police Reserve was established by 
the U.S. Occupation in 1950, only to later become the SDF Ground Forces, 
using policemen or detectives as heroes of the story or representations of 
postwar new men was not allowed in postwar works due to the underlying 
anxiety surrounding the police.79 As Vogel notes, attitudes toward the military 
may have been transferred to the police to some extent.80 This can be seen as 
one possible reason for the oft-implemented combination of a scientist and a 
detective, present in both Bijo and Densō ningen.  
In Densō ningen, a team is formed when Kirioka, a journalist in charge of 
the science section of the newspaper, bumps into his old university friend 
Kobayashi, who is in charge of the Sudō murder case. Kirioka and Kobayashi’s 
relationship highlights the differing masculinities at work. Kirioka is 
constructed as an intellectual through the words uttered by his “other,” 
Kobayashi. He is, for example, “a man whose grades were always the best.” 
Kobayashi also teases Kirioka for not drinking a lot when the two visit a cabaret 
club, highlighting Kirioka’s solemn nature. Embodiments of “good scientific 
masculinity,” through which men can be integrated as parts of the postwar 
order, are dedicated, solemn and able to resist worldly temptations.  
This storyline is parallel to that of Bijo, where Detective Tominaga and Dr. 
Masada form a complementary pair. Although intellectually superior, Masada 
is constantly referred to as socially somehow inferior by Tominaga, although 
in a form of friendly banter. Tominaga, for example, is clearly amazed at the 
fact that Masada has been to a cabaret club, also explaining to his colleagues 
that Masada is a highly dedicated “research devil” (kenkyū no oni) who 
absolutely loves his work. Masada’s expertise can be seen as a symbol for 
Japan’s struggle of reestablishing itself as a member of the international 
community. Bijo establishes Japanese rational men as important—if not, in 
fact, the most vital—parts of postwar society. Although constructed as 
somewhat solemn and even innocent through the words of Tominaga, Masada 
nonetheless wields the ultimate power. This not only addresses the shift in 
masculinities after the war, but also suggests a field within which Japan could 
and should excel. A critical stance toward history is maintained throughout the 
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narrative but, regarding science, it is Japanese science that is pacifist, as 
opposed to destructive American science. In Densō ningen this is not the case, 
as the narrative of Dr. Niki demonstrates.  
A scientist who works as a member of a team most often gets respectful 
treatment.81 Dr. Masada and the reporter Kirioka do not belong to the police 
force but become members of its inside circle. Teamwork is emphasized with 
the scientist working as an important member of the well-oiled machinery 
seeking to nullify the threat to the society. Simultaneously, it aims to nullify 
the threat of dormant imperialism through its emphasis on rationality. In 
Densō ningen, Kirioka’s presence works as an antidote to a world in which 
vengeful imperial subjects reappear. This construction of Kirioka as the 
paramount wielder of scientific knowledge begins when he finds a small 
component from the crime scene and helps to identify its function with the 
help of a university professor. Kirioka’s presence and knowledge are used to 
neutralize the threat. As a reporter of science and technology, Kirioka 
contrasts with the earlier use of scientific magazines in the mobilization of the 
Japanese. 82  In this case, scientific masculinity is mobilized as an ally for 
democracy, which contradicts the militarist application of science represented 
by Dr. Niki. Through him, Japanese wartime science can be figuratively denied 
while scientists themselves are simultaneously accepted as integral parts of 
society. 
5.2.3 SAVING WOMEN AND THE JAPANESE RACE  
As men returned from the war and unemployment soared, a safe option to 
guarantee work for the soldiers was to situate women back in the home.83 As 
Anne Imamura explains, the postwar Japanese family was directed at 
economic growth. With the invention of the “corporation as family,” the wife 
was also made a member of the corporate family, provided with economic 
security that came from her husband’s job stability, which he in turn was able 
to attain because he did not need to concentrate on household management. 
This signaled a total commitment of the self to the company, which also 
promoted perceived gender equality, as both sexes were given a way to 
contribute to the benefit of society.84 Still, despite the ideal being maintained 
by state policies regarding labor, education, reproduction and welfare, 85 
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particularly younger women were earning wages instead of staying at home.86 
This is visible in many of the earlier films addressed here, which include a 
range of independent female characters. In some cases they are presented as 
equal to men (Kyōko in Gasu ningen and Akiko in Densō ningen), or at least 
as economically independent (Chikako in Bijo). It is made clear that Chikako 
earns enough to support herself, to purchase the latest technology and to 
consume. This seems to be in contrast with the assertion that weak women 
make strong men because masculinity gains power through taking control.87 
Thus, it is important to analyze the types of women the scientists engage with 
in order to dissect the exact gender ideals that the films try to promote. These 
are quite obviously related to the perceived image of Japan itself.  
Attebery adds, “Once women begin to demonstrate their independent 
existence, males too become gendered. Men are forced to reexamine 
themselves, and the comforting image of a stronger, more creative, more 
rational sex breaks down.”88 Simultaneously, the image of Japan as a creative 
and rational country breaks down. In Gasu ningen, Mizuno, the victim of the 
failed human experiment, is in love with the nō artist Fujichiyo. The crimes he 
commits are to provide Fujichiyo with monetary support to practice her art. 
The tone of Gasu ningen is gloomy from beginning to end, filled with remarks 
that question the nature of humanity itself. In a discussion between Mizuno 
and Fujichiyo, both outsiders in a new society, Mizuno asks, “Is there anyone 
who really cares about others instead of just wanting to use them?” This seems 
to be the essence of the film. Mizuno is not only inferior to other men but also 
to women. In the end, it is Fujichiyo who destroys Mizuno in an act of betrayal 
that exceeds that of Emiko in Gojira, killing both herself and Mizuno on the 
night of their upcoming wedding. Symbolically, it represents the victory of 
tradition over side-products of modernity that are affiliated with the 
militaristic past. The aftertaste, however, is sour, and Mizuno’s death is not 
cathartic. In Gasu ningen, it is the female journalist Kyōko’s fierce 
independence that stands in greatest contrast against the hardships faced by 
Mizuno. This contrasting picture underscores how gender signals in the 
postwar period were sometimes radically obscured and, as a result, the 
postwar feeling of the emasculation of the Japanese male was once more 
intensified.89 
Whereas Serizawa’s abject monstrosity is highlighted by the fact that even 
his supposed fiancé shies away from him and Mizuno, the experimental freak 
with superpowers, is killed by his fiancé, Dr. Masada in Bijo to ekitainingen is 
the exact opposite. He not only demonstrates superior scientific knowledge 
but is also the only character in the film allowed a blossoming romantic 
relationship. This is an important factor if Masada is seen as embodying a new 
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male ideal. According to Hidaka, marriage is perceived as an essential element 
of hegemonic masculinity, making men “men” and not merely adults.90 This is 
denied Dr. Serizawa in Gojira, quite possibly because of his status as a 
fukuinhei; it is also not granted to Mizuno. In Bijo, there is no such 
connotation. Rather, the film promotes scientific masculinity as a hybrid 
model of masculinity, which assimilates a rational worldview as an important 
part of being a man. The film calls for an interpretation where Masada is 
ultimately provided the chance of becoming a daikokubashira, a privilege 
strongly suggested by his relationship with Chikako. He is made doubly 
powerful, accommodating both intellectual and human skills. He is an early 
manifestation of a hybrid masculinity but, as his case shows, the inclusion of 
softer attributes into his masculinity does not necessarily contribute to the 
emancipation of women. 91  Chikako is saved and her independence is 
symbolically neutralized.  
In the 1960s, especially the nuuberu baagu movement was keen on making 
a connection between the female body and the national body. A genre called 
nikutai eiga (films of the flesh) emerged in the 1960s as a continuation of a 
literary genre of the same name, containing “risqué displays of female nudity” 
and utilizing actresses with “well-endowed bodies,” all with a political 
purpose.92 Dancing scenes in the henshin ningen films can be seen as a direct 
nod to the “rediscovery of sexuality and senses.”93 Joanne Izbicki (1996) has 
analyzed women in post-Occupation cinema. She pays special attention to 
“scantily clad dancers or strippers in theaters and nightclubs.”94 According to 
Izbicki, the emphasis on female nudity as a public and paid form of 
entertainment can be seen as “a vehicle for constructing a masculinized notion 
of liberation,” where the defeated Japanese male is portrayed as a conqueror 
in command of the conquered woman. This seems to be the case with Dr. 
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Masada. In scenes of cabaret dancing, “elaborate men’s stories”95—not only 
Bijo but the other henshin ningen films, too—place masculine concerns at the 
center. A night club provides the locus for male interaction, a tradition not so 
different from what Anne Allison (1994) described in her Nightwork: 
Sexuality, Pleasure and Corporate Masculinity in a Tokyo Hostess Club 
thirty-five years later. The freedom to look means freedom from “the 
debilitating effects of disintegrated codes and disrupted practices previously 
engaged to delineate gender and national identity.”96 This is the case with Dr. 
Masada, who is not only allowed to look but to conquer. In her discussion 
about war widows, Kanō argues that these “occupations of the flesh” represent 
the hardships endured by women in postwar Japan.97 Although Chikako is 
quite capable of earning her own wages, Masada’s symbolic possession 
removes her from the sphere of hardships. Masada’s falling in love with 
Chikako redeems her as a respectable woman and Japan as a respectable 
nation.  
However, another view attests that this dancing, fascinating, liberated 
female body became a contradictory sign of the guilty feelings of the men who 
survived the war.98 In Bijo, the nightclub is the place where the H-Men wreak 
total chaos, killing numerous people. In the space where the re-masculated 
postwar male was supposed to be enjoying liberation fantasies in the form of 
barely clad female bodies, they fall under attack by the metamorphosed 
mutants. As Izbicki notes, these scenes of male liberation are ultimately only 
teasers, with true liberation being resisted. 99  In Bijo, the mutants who 
suddenly appear at the night club act as reminders of the presence of the U.S., 
the one who conquered Japan. They force historical memories into the space 
reserved for postwar Japanese male fantasies. American science is a disruptor 
of both the reconstruction of Japan and its national identity. Masada’s 
function is to provide a solution to this very problem, nullify the threat and, in 
the process, promote a rational and peace-loving image of Japan. Masada is 
given authority as a representation of a rational form of masculinity, which 
becomes a symbol for what Japan in the postwar period needed in order to get 
back on its feet. It is Masada’s expertise that beats American science, 
comprising a symbolic win for the Japanese nation and its men.  
Masada is a hybrid: rational in order to resist destructive ideologies, 
dedicated to his work in order to promote the importance of economic growth 
and, finally, emotional in order to form families. Like other forms of hybrid 
masculinities, his relationship with Chikako also restores the power of 
patriarchy. However, it manifests in a way that is soft and “democratic,” as 
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opposed to the previous Confucian ideals. Masada’s symbolic possession of 
Chikako relocates Izbicki’s male “fantasies of possession” out of the realm of 
entertainment and into the realm of the everyday. In the form of the humble, 
likeable and dedicated Masada, scientific masculinity is promoted as a means 
of integrating the emasculated Japanese men back into society. This plays 
against the general idea of science as an integral part of the development of 
society.  
Rescuing female bodies is also an important allegory for the rescuing of the 
Japanese race. Darwin is a source of inspiration for many SF writers who look 
for “significant scientific hooks to hang their narratives on.”100 Chikyū bōeigun 
has a narrative that is simple enough to have been entertaining to the public, 
especially when coated with many innovative fighting scenes. Nonetheless, the 
message it carries is quite dark. The Mysterians claim that they wish to have 
no more than one square kilometer of land—and the right to mate with 
Japanese women. Ethnicity, in this case, is “the symbolic boundary process of 
organizing significant differences between ‘us’ and ‘them,’” a process where 
Japanese identity is “affirmed by formulating the images of the Other .”101 As 
Saitō Minako points out, this motif of the earth versus an infiltrator can be 
seen as an enlargement of the motifs of Japan versus an infiltrator from 
another country or Japanese nationality vs. non-Japanese nationalities.102  
In Chikyū bōeigun, infiltration takes place on the level of women’s bodies. 
It is up to the scientists to save them and the Japanese nation in a quest for 
national identity inscribed on the issue of women’s sexuality.103 Five years 
after the end of the Occupation, this is a straightforward take on the issue of 
gender and power. The Mysterians represent real-life invaders: “a dominant 
figure over conquered and occupied Japan” that “brought an enormous 
number of foreign soldiers to postwar Japan.” 104  Protecting Japanese 
“respectable women” from invaders became a central concern. 
Countermeasures included, for example, the establishment of the Recreation 
and Amusement Center (RAA).105 Women, both in film and in real life, are 
seen as cultural artifacts, not really as human beings. As Koikari notes, this 
was to defend the nation from being tainted by foreign blood, to preserve “the 
purity of the Japanese race” and “contribute to the maintenance of the national 
body (kokutai).”106 She points out that the democratization of Japan involved 
meddling with the country’s gender politics. While on the one hand promoting 
the independence of women, on the other hand the conquerors also requested 
sexual services that had a large effect on the way the Japanese started to treat 
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their women. Mating with an outsider, be it a Mysterian or an American, 
highlighted the threat toward the national body from within.107 At the center 
of the anxiety regarding the foreign intrusion—or “penetration”—was the 
worry about mixed blood (konketsu).108 “Pure blood” and “purity” were ideas 
that started to spread in the late 19th century and metaphorically referred to 
the body (including the national body) as being free of pathogens and pollution. 
Ideal bodies were seen to successfully expand the empire.109 Chikyū bōeigun 
highlights these issues.  
The film includes three scientists as main characters: astrophysicist Dr. 
Shiraishi, astronomer Dr. Adachi and his apprentice scientist, Dr. Atsumi. 
According to the Mysterians, Scientists are much more trustworthy than 
politicians. Only scientists are invited to the spaceship, promoting a worldview 
in which scientific masculinity is superior to that of other types of authority. It 
might not be the hegemonic model if compared with the amount of power an 
individual has, but it can be hailed as an intellectually ideal model. The 
Mysterians trust that the scientists understand their call for “peace,” 
underlining the notion of scientific masculinity as a beacon for pacifism.  
However, the pacifist nature of Japanese science is compromised by the 
reappearance of Dr. Shiraishi, who originally found the planet and 
subsequently disappeared. On board the Mysterian ship, he bellows, “It is not 
Mysterians nor humans that will rule the Earth, but science!” This is the 
moment Shiraishi becomes a derailed agent of science instead of an expert 
provider of knowledge, which he had been referred to before. Shiraishi’s 
megalomania is symbolically cured by Dr. Atsumi. He becomes a savior-
scientist whose actions and wise words ultimately make Shiraishi change his 
opinions: “This is an example to all of us. Don’t misuse science. Don’t repeat 
the tragedy.” It is the combined efforts of Dr. Atsumi and Dr. Shiraishi that 
finally save Japanese women from their horrible fate and, consequently, that 
prevent Japanese blood from being tainted. In a suicide mission like that of 
Serizawa, Shiraishi destroys the Mysterian ship and redeems himself. An 
external threat in the form of the Mysterians had been a portrayal of an 
internal ambivalence and threat all along, a metaphor for the moral layer of 
science and technology.  
Shiraishi’s narrative, like Serizawa’s, is reminiscent of the “tragic hero” 
myth analyzed in detail by Standish. According to her, this narrative “grew to 
prominence after the Second World War and was instrumental in providing a 
figurative structure around which the Japanese people could interpret the 
events of the war, offering the spectators avenues of exculpation from a 
foreign-imposed sense of guilt that followed the War Crimes Trial.” 110  As 
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Standish points out, the tragic hero expressed Japan’s purity of spirit through 
a willingness to die for a cause. The allegoric meaning of death increasingly 
became encoded as victimization and not sacrifice, as previously.111 Thus, both 
Shiraishi and Serizawa align Japan with victimhood caused by an external 
threat. In the later works such as Bijo, Densō ningen and Matango, this self-
sacrificing scientist disappears. Instead the quest for the status quo is 
channeled into the rescue of others: Masada enters the sewers moments before 
the torching of the H-men in order to rescue Chikako from the drug gang, Kenji 
tries to keep Akiko from becoming a mushroom monster, and Kirioka saves 
Akiko from Sudō.  
However, even the almighty savior-scientist is not always able to save the 
Japanese race from contamination. Slowly but surely, the source of anxiety 
shifted from bodily fears to psychological mediations. Social events 
contributed to this threat. An assassination attempt on the U.S. Ambassador 
Edwin O. Reischauer in 1964 by an adolescent who had undergone treatment 
at a mental hospital caused a great sensation; for example, one heard of there 
being “a psychopath at large.”112 This is representative of the contemporary 
fear of musabetsu hanzai jiken, in which anyone can become a victim of a 
violent outburst.113 As noted by Ōkubo, it is never just the body which changes: 
human relationships, status in society and individual consciousness all assume 
a different shape after metamorphosis.114 The notion of changing outside is 
always accompanied by the notion of changing inside. Audeguy proposes that 
this corresponds to a wider shift in cinematic motifs, where human monsters 
such as psychokillers and mass murderers appeared as a new type of criminal. 
The essence of contemporary monstrosity is that no one knows what kind of 
transformation they are capable of.115 
5.3 CONCLUSIONS  
In this chapter, I have discussed scientific masculinity as a representation of 
pacifism in Japan. The strategies to achieve this are threefold: to frame Japan 
against its nuclear tragedy, to introduce scientists who promote world peace 
and, finally, to have scientists act as dedicated and loyal team members 
reminiscent even of the hegemonic salaryman ideal. In this chapter, the 
function of scientific masculinity has been to act as an agent of the national 
agenda, as a tool to mediate Japan’s role with other nations, and as a face of 
its internal image under construction. Scientific masculinity functioned as a 
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means to separate men from their past deeds and to reestablish Japanese men 
as integral parts of society. As a beacon of pacifism it was used to oppose 
destructive outer forces, promoting “good” Japanese science as an answer. If 
the depictions in the previous chapter revolved around wartime science, 
human experimentation and weapon development, this time the discourse is 
tied around the idea of democratic science and scientists who act as mediators 
of knowledge.  
In the narratives discussed in this chapter, scientific masculinity is tested 
as a new model of masculinity in the postwar times, a sort of hybrid that is not 
easily located along oppositional, problematic or conservative axes. 
Rationality is promoted as an important postwar ideal, specifically when 
connected with the notion of pacifism. Historically, even the ideals of universal 
rationality and progress did not stop fascism from spreading, which in turn 
called for a stronger system of ethics to prevent its rise in the future.116 In this 
case, rationality is correlated with pacifism in order to introduce an antidote 
to succumbing to destructive ideologies. This “pacifist turn” is achieved by 
contrasting the “bad” American science, which in the films is represented in 
references to the Bikini H-bomb testing and the subsequent nuclear threat, 
and “good” Japanese science that works to restore world peace and do away 
with the threat. Scientific masculinity is used to convey this peaceful message.  
Some films project a twofold approach, dealing with both the wartime past 
and the peaceful present. One such film is Gojira, where Dr. Yamane is a 
counter to the threat posed by Dr. Serizawa. He is never connected with war 
and, placed truly above any underlying political agenda, he is the embodiment 
of pure science in contrast to Serizawa’s dangerous applicable 
experimentations. A similar narrative thread pertains in other films, too. Both 
Bijo to ekitainingen and Densō ningen not only introduce dubious scientific 
developments but also characters that nullify this threat. In Bijo, this role is 
allotted to Dr. Masada, whose rationality is presented as an overall favorable 
feature. In Densō ningen, it is the reporter Kirioka who works as the 
intermediator between science and the public. It is noteworthy, however, that 
Gasu ningen daiichi-gō lacks characters whose role is to emphasize the 
positive side of science, instead only presenting science in a very destructive 
sense. 
A vast array of strategies is utilized to promote an image of Japan as a 
peace-loving nation. Narratives that deal with the nuclear threat emphasize 
Japan’s status as a victim, simultaneously also enabling the recreation of the 
nation as an important worldwide provider of knowledge. Individual scientists 
are presented as team members in order to avoid the threat of the renegade 
mad scientist and to promote a sense of fighting together with rationality for a 
better future. Japan is often placed on the center stage in world affairs, being 
present in the omnipotent scenes of international negotiations. In these 
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narratives, Japanese scientists warn other nations of the emerging danger, 
glossing the international image of Japan.  
On the other hand, scientists such as Serizawa are most explicitly 
subordinated and marginalized because of their connection with the past. 
Scientific masculinity in this case represents a national identity better left 
forgotten. This negation is manifested also on the level of personal 
relationships. Characters with a connection to destructive science are not 
allowed to reap the benefits of hegemonic masculinity. Instead, they are 
doubly oppressed, not only by other men but also by the women around them. 
They are also betrayed. The savior-scientist, a hybrid model that promotes a 
rational model of masculinity, in turn is shown as a new type of ideal man. Dr. 
Masada, for example, symbolically integrates emasculated Japanese men into 
the society. His possession of Chikako is soft, and the national identity in 
question is not only that of a pacifist nation but also a new type of hybrid, soft, 
democratic patriarchy. The emphasis placed on his ability to work promotes 
the future model of a salaryman as hegemonic and preferable. But why make 
him a scientist? It can be argued that at the time of the release of the film, there 
was still an underlying scientific threat that needed to be solved in a rational 
manner. Hence, in the films of the postwar era one finds an extremely 
polarized outlook on scientific masculinity.  
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6 DAIKOKUBASHIRA AND JAPAN  
If the scope of the previous chapter was international, in this part it is 
interpersonal. Scientists in the international field were portrayed as public 
figures, being prominent representations of Japan’s new role in the world. This 
chapter, however, illuminates their personal and private relationships, already 
touched upon briefly in the previous chapter. Scientific masculinity is used to 
both promote and subvert the idea of Japan as a patriarchal nation, on the one 
hand, and Japan as economically No. 1, on the other. Both discussions take 
place within the larger framework of gender relations, where “masculinity” 
only exists in relation to “femininity” and both concepts only make sense if 
women and men are treated as bearers of polarized social roles.1 In Japan, 
according to the gender-based division of labor, men contribute to the 
economic and political spheres, subsequently wielding both economic and 
political power. In contrast, women have been seen as mothers who have the 
power at home.  
There are two main trajectories along which my discussion will take place. 
The first part of this chapter deals with Japan’s economic nationalism and the 
role that scientific masculinity had in it. The films question how the salaryman 
ideal is challenged by using alternative, technology-mediated masculinities. 
This questioning takes place in gender and family relations, in regard to the 
individual body as well as public space. This is manifested in Tsukamoto 
Shinya’s Tetsuo series, where the process of “suiting-up the salaryman” 
highlights the subversive inner feelings of the everyman, as well as Kurosawa 
Kiyoshi’s Doppelgänger, where the scientist-salaryman finds a new sort of 
freedom by violently tearing himself away from his former life. The second 
part of this chapter will focus on the way scientists are portrayed as members 
of the family. This highlights the role of the Japanese male as daikokubashira, 
“the great pillar that supports the house,”2 referring to the role of the men as 
the main breadwinners supporting the family. As a concept, daikokubashira 
became a powerful cultural and social ideology when Japan embarked on its 
period of high economic growth, underpinning the privilege of postwar 
generations who entered the workforce. According to this ideal, the male 
                                                 
1 Connell, Masculinities, 68. 
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should be a father and husband, as well as a salaryman.3 The Tetsuo films 
continue explorations of this particular theme as well, as does Kurosawa 
Kiyoshi’s Sakebi.  
6.1 SUITING-UP THE SALARYMAN  
In the late 1960s, the future was bright for those who swore loyalty to their 
companies.4 According to Morris Low, the emasculated Japanese man was 
provided an escape from his weakened state and a chance to rebuild his dignity 
and confidence “through the activity as ‘salarymen,’” who drew their force and 
power from the contemporary Japanese urban environment.5 For many, the 
salaryman represented “a secure path to moderate success,” 6  and the 
emerging salarymen of the late 1950s and early 1960s generally had very 
positive sentiments about Japan.7 The salaryman represents “a product of the 
very platform of national reconstruction established to remake the country 
after the war through economic prosperity.”8 Furthermore, being a salaryman 
came to be correlated with “some kind of inherent characteristic of Japanese 
‘national culture’, especially in the official discourses of the 1960s and 1970s.”9 
The times offered a model of “bright and light” masculinity connected with 
leisure, recreation and few obligations, a side product of Japan’s miraculous 
economic growth.10 
However, the situation started to change. The country’s economic success 
came to a halt with the burst of the economic bubble and the subsequent 
recession, which also brought an end to Japan’s postwar social structure. 
Previous to that, datsu-sara, or “the escaping of the salaryman,” had its roots 
in the early 1970s when, despite its overall positive image, the role of a simple 
salaryman was first questioned. 11  Connell and Messerschmidt refer to “a 
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cultural figure of the ‘salaryman escaping.’” 12  The so-called “crisis of 
masculinity” really began in the 1990s when the old ideology of otokorashisa 
(manliness) started to wane and “the contradictions centering on salaryman 
masculinity began to become pronounced” because “[v]arious social, 
economic, and cultural factors that accompanied Japan’s transition to a late-
capitalist society worked in combination to highlight the inherently unstable 
nature of this culturally privileged, apparently immutable discourse.”13 Rapid 
growth had already started to wane earlier, but it was now that postwar 
Japan’s social problems really became apparent.14  
With the bursting of the asset bubble, Japan entered what is commonly 
known as the “Lost Decade(s),” the longest and most severe recession in the 
postwar era. 15  The writings of Jeff Kingston provide an entry point to the 
turmoil that Japan encountered. He describes this as a period when “the 
economy imploded, the asset bubble collapsed, banks teetered on the edge of 
insolvency, unemployment skyrocketed, suicides increased and the leaders of 
Japan, Inc. were tarnished by exposés of pervasive corruption. The nation of 
the ‘economic miracle’ found itself looking into the abyss.”16 And what was 
lost? Again, to cite Kingston, simply “everything the Japanese social structure 
was based on: mountains of money, a sense of security, stable families, the 
credibility of the nation’s leadership, hubris and confidence about the future. 
The traditional face of Japan is fast becoming unrecognizable and the social 
relationships, assumptions, and norms characteristic of postwar Japan began 
to unravel with stunning speed.”17 Yoshikawa calls this nothing less than “a 
human disaster.”18  
Nowadays, in a transforming national and international landscape 
informed by increasingly reimagined gender roles, Japanese men are faced 
with many challenges. Hidaka summarizes that these include economic 
changes related to the bursting of the Japanese bubble economy, social 
changes with an increasing emphasis on individuality, and changes in gender 
relations with the introduction of legislation and policies that promote gender 
equality. In addition, irregular workers nowadays provide another type of 
masculine working model, which points toward “the potential for changes in 
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hegemonic masculinity in association with socio-economic circumstance as 
well as reflecting an individual pursuit of happiness or ikigai.”19 But, as the 
relentlessly working male—the salaryman—can be seen as a symbol of Japan 
itself,20 the crisis of this masculinity is first and foremost a crisis of Japan’s 
national identity.  
6.1.1 “SUITING-UP”  
During the war, soldiers were constructed and promoted as the defenders of 
their country who fought off the hated enemy.21 With the end of the war this 
ideal vanished and the general anxiety around demobilized soldiers increased. 
The growing economy metamorphosized Japan and the prevailing ontological 
darkness dissipated. 22  In the bright and positive atmosphere, stories of 
fukuinhei slowly disappeared from the media, and the salaryman replaced 
other models as the new masculine ideal. 23  The emphasis on “fighting” 
nonetheless prevailed. Salarymen came to be called kigyō senshi (corporate 
warriors), and this comprised a vital part of their identity. Itō suggests that 
men did not have to admit the need for re-evaluation of their identity as long 
as they kept figuratively fighting.24  
This notion of kigyō senshi gains a whole other meaning in Tsukamoto 
Shinya’s Tetsuo films. Tsukamoto, born in 1960, has suggested that the 
liberation of the salaryman in the film is a parallel to his own datsu-sara: 18 
months of leading a salaryman life taught him about the hardships and costs 
of this hegemonic ideal. 25  Tsukamoto made his escape in 1986 when he 
decided to concentrate fully on independent filmmaking. In Tetsuo, 
Tsukamoto himself plays the agitator who causes the metamorphosis of the 
salaryman, acting like a twisted mirror for the protagonist through his own 
real-life experience. Fictional discourses of masculinity are thus given an 
extra-diegetic layer that explicitly refers to the process of datsu-sara, the 
escaping of the salaryman.  
Because of the connection between the salaryman and machines, I have 
included the Tetsuo films in the group of films that explores scientific 
masculinity. The salaryman in the films becomes pure technology through his 
metalmorphosis,26 offering an absurd picture of a country that has called for 
the need to create “A Science-Technological Nation” to regain economic 
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power. 27  In addition, the transformation of the salaryman takes place in 
relation to the telepathic will of the Metal Fetishist, Yatsu. In the second and 
third installations, Taniguchi and Anthony are also comparable to the victims 
of mad scientists, with the narrative replaying that of Frankenstein and his 
monster.  
All of the films incorporate a few basic motifs to a varying degree: the 
presence of the salaryman, transformation, mechanical imagery, oppressive 
cityscape and sexuality. The basic plot structure of each of the films is that in 
the beginning a salaryman is living his normal, everyday life. Through events 
that differ from film to film, he undergoes a transformation into a giant man-
machine. In the process a loved one is killed. At the beginning the salaryman 
feels scared and fights his metamorphosis, but ultimately he embraces his 
monstrous form. These seemingly simple narratives are visualized in 
Tsukamoto’s exhilarating style with the use of a hand-held camera, quick 
editing, distinctive use of color and extreme close-ups. However, whereas the 
first Tetsuo film makes use of the theme of vengeance as a sort of curse that 
spreads through the salaryman’s body, metamorphosis in the second and the 
third films occurs because of the actions of a mad scientist. As Brown (2010) 
points out, the Tetsuo films are direct descendants of the Henshin ningen 
films.28  
Tetsuo paints a grotesque but pleasurable image of a man-machine 
interface. 29  It is a revitalization—or reincorporation—of the theme of 
representing the monstrous effects that scientific discourse has on the body, 
which, according to Nakamura, is the true essence of the uncanny. 30  The 
Tetsuo films present “a frenzy of metamorphosis” that is ultimately 
empowering.31 They can be analyzed within the framework of body horror, 
defined by Kelly Hurley as a hybrid genre that recombines the narrative and 
cinematic conventions of the science fiction, horror, and suspense film in order 
to stage a spectacle of the human body defamiliarized, rendered other.32 Body 
horror texts tend to offer “gruesome yet crucial insights into shifting concepts 
of corporeal, social and national cohesion, exposing a larger socio-political 
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28 See Brown, Tokyo Cyberpunk, 2010.  
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30 Nakamura, Monstrous Bodies, 11. 
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body in a state of cultural crisis.” 33  In this case, the cultural crisis is the 
dissolution of the postwar system, emblemized by the salaryman himself.  
Connell suggests that true masculinity is often thought to proceed from the 
male body.34 The fictional male body thus becomes not only a representation 
in the long line of cultural products regarding transformation but also a site 
where gender politics and, subsequently, national politics, too, are played out. 
Saitō and Kume discuss the process of busō, or suiting-up, a type of 
metamorphosis reserved for boys to make them warriors. Suiting-up is also 
the process of becoming a salaryman; the suit is his most important symbol. 
As a hegemonized form of masculinity, the salaryman must look and act like 
one in a highly prescribed manner.35  
The salaryman’s suit is representative of the embodied process of 
socialization.36 Brian McVeigh argues that socialization into Japanese society 
takes place on three levels: uniformization, de-uniformization and re-
uniformization. By this he refers to the way children start wearing uniforms 
once they enter school life and abandon them during their university years, 
only to re-emerge as model citizens in suits. Uniforms are used to link an 
individual to existing political structures. To wear the same standardized set 
of clothing every day is to reinforce values that “maintain the rationalizing 
projects of the state and economic interests,” although an individual might not 
in fact agree with these projects.37 The salaryman’s “suiting-up”—wearing the 
symbols of a suit, a tie and a briefcase—conforms to the process of re-
uniformization, where the self is crafted through bodily practices.  
In all of the Tetsuo films, the salaryman’s suit is replaced by the process of 
suiting-up for battle. This mechanization is a tangible creation of shinjinrui, a 
past buzzword referring to young people who differed from “their conservative, 
corporate-culture parents” in combining “[n]ihilistic attitude … with 
aggressive materialism.”38 The concept of “aggressive materialism” is taken to 
a whole another level in Tetsuo. The films are stories about an emerging 
human-machine system, where technology is integrated as a part of being a 
“new man” in Japan. This is done in an ironic manner, however. Watanabe 
and Hemmert point out that the machinery industry was one of the main 
sectors contributing to Japan’s high economic growth rates.39  As the man 
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becomes machine, the two are no longer distinguishable. If “technology 
consistently substitutes for labor,”40 the transformation in Tetsuo visualizes 
the ultimate extreme. A man does not create machines—a man becomes one. 
The salaryman’s changed form is pure technology that has “maximized its 
potential performance … in a socio-economic system that fundamentally 
supports its development.”41 
Examples of scientific masculinity are said to have been adamant about 
categorizing female bodies, overlooking the borders and understanding of the 
male one.42 Tetsuo remedies this situation. The body is often promoted as a 
“fundamental feature in forming male identities”;43 “salarymanization,” too, is 
a process embedded in bodily practices.44 Tetsuo inscribes the rebellion of a 
salaryman onto the body. Nakamura Miri points out that “mechanical bodies 
have always held a special place in the discourse of the uncanny,” where “the 
fear of automata and robots arises from the blurring of the natural body and 
the artificial body, the mistaking of the machine for an actual human.”45 She 
calls this “the mechanical uncanny,” a mode of fear that captures the incursion 
of the mechanical into the biological. 46  With robotics and information 
technology having become key growth strategies for the nation and the 
contemporary emergence of new digital technologies and new digital media, 
the contrasting emergence of Tetsuo, the modern mechanical uncanny, is 
surprising but not totally unheard of. It is, after all, “a critique of rampant 
economic modernization.”47 In Tetsuo, this is achieved by the process of re-
uniformizing, which takes place as the cyborgization of an individual.  
In Tetsuo II, the protagonist Taniguchi’s original salaryman body is weak. 
He goes to the gym and, cheered on by his family, does his best at weightlifting. 
Although not directly addressed, it is implicit in the narrative that his weak 
body is a manifestation of his weak mind, a fine example of salarymen as 
“spineless slaves of the system.”48 Through the mechanization of the body the 
mind, too, becomes stronger. Mellström points out that especially the 
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professions of mechanics and engineers require bodily learning, because it is 
the body that creates and changes artifacts. The cultivation of the body is seen 
as a process of “continuous incorporation of bodily and cognitive 
knowledge.”49 In Tetsuo II, processes of bodily cultivation are supported by 
processes of mechanization in order to create a superior form of technologized 
masculinity. Robertson states that humanoid robots are used as “a rhetorical 
foil for highlighting social problems.”50 Nowhere is this more clearly visible 
than in the form of the salaryman-cyborg in Tetsuo. Itō points out that initially 
robotization had diminished the meaning that men could take in their 
physicality. 51  Robots replaced them and physical activities that had been 
connected with labor had to be found elsewhere. Tetsuo II presents a quest for 
the lost feeling of physicality, only this time through robotization.  
According to Mellström, “the symbolic relationship between technology 
and masculinity is … a relationship filled with a number of connotations and 
varying forms for gendering in and gendering of technology as masculine.”52 
In Tetsuo II, technology becomes gendered in the salaryman model, being 
literally injected in order to form a tangible representation of masculine 
technology. This is a way of reaffirming and regaining patriarchal power 
because, as Mellström further suggests, machines and technology are 
metonymical for patriarchal responsibility. 53  As a weak salaryman 
unconnected to technology, Taniguchi was unable to save his son from death. 
In fact, he killed him. Through the injection of pure machinery, however, he 
reestablishes his authority, symbolized by his wife who quite adoringly decides 
to follow him. His patriarchal power is also manifested in the way he becomes 
the leader of an underground bodybuilder horde. In the beginning he is 
psychically weak, but his transformation allows him to gain bodily power, 
ultimately conquering the “fascist thugs.” 54  This physicality is “a primary 
resource for masculine power and esteem.”55 The immersion of Taniguchi into 
the realm of the flesh and raw emotions is what causes him to 
metalmorphosize. Consumed by violent emotions, Taniguchi becomes 
unwilling to revert back to his previous human shape. Yet, his newly found 
physicality is a far stretch from the idealized clean and hygiene physicality of 
the salaryman suit. It is cold, hard and destructive.  
If the image of the salaryman paralleled Japan’s national image, its 
metamorphosis contributed to a distorted national image. As Napier suggests, 
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portrayals of disaster have changed from negative outlooks to celebrations of 
it.56 This is a celebration of alternative identities. The machine men in Tetsuo 
are ultimately symbols of solidified emotions, 57  which in this case include 
frustration, anger, and, ultimately, the sense of freedom that the film suggests 
an individual in contemporary society yearns for. These are not pacifist 
scenarios, where Japan is constructed as a peace-loving nation in the world. 
Rather, Japanese nationhood is portrayed as oppressive and exploitative. The 
films are a call for aggression in order to create a new—and better—world, 
making a new beginning through a symbolic apocalypse. However, like with 
all the other Tetsuo films, this empowerment is highly problematic. The basic 
condition of superhumans is that they are antithetical to the Utopia ideology, 
where the entire society evolves together. In the superhuman stories, an 
individual “evolves apart from, or even in opposition to, his society.”58 In this 
case, the true threat is the evolution of the salaryman—namely, the face of 
Japan and an important part of its national identity—into something Other. 
Consequently, this is bound to transform the face of Japan itself. This is, after 
all, all about “the externalization of personal or social identity.”59  
Tetsuo provides an entry point into a new world that is chaotic, destructive 
and utterly, exhilaratingly liberating. The stance toward scientific masculinity 
is twofold. The salaryman-cum-man-machine demonstrates not only the 
machine-like nature of Japan’s “working bees,” but because of the monstrous 
nature of the metamorphosis it also provides an ironic expression of liberation 
from state policies and the ideology of hegemonic salaryman masculinity. This 
is an ultimate expression of technology as an end product, only in this case the 
product will destroy its creators. Morris Low proposes that male dominance is 
encoded in the machines themselves. 60  By morphing into a machine, the 
salaryman in Tetsuo overcomes the very system that has created him. He is 
not a representation of scientific masculinity—he is masculine science itself.  
In Tetsuo, scientific masculinity is something irrational and negative. 
Although vital for Japan’s economic growth, in the post-bubble era this 
connection is severed in these narratives of crazy scientific masculinity that 
seem to destroy the salaryman. However, in Tsukamoto’s opinion this 
destruction is not a bad thing. The function of the transformed salaryman’s 
scientific masculinity is to offer liberation fantasies for the ones being 
constrained by their suits. Liberated salarymen-as-machines are destructive 
change agents, and this is how the fusion of man with a machine, the 
paramount representation of scientific masculinity, is portrayed as an 
oppositional alternative to the salaryman lifestyle, a crazy and freakish escape 
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from the full life of the everyday, where the true needs of an individual must 
be repressed. This freedom is cast in spatial terms, too, as a symbolic escape 
from the technologized city. Tetsuo allows its protagonists to become masters 
of the streets, but Doppelgänger allows its protagonist to flee, as discussed 
further in Chapter 6.3. 
6.1.2 MENTALMORPHOSIZING HATARAKIBACHI 
The mechanization of the human body in the films analyzed in this thesis takes 
place both psychologically and corporeally. Tetsuo presents scenes of the latter 
while Kurosawa Kiyoshi’s Doppelgänger, a film about the bright but 
overworked research scientist Hayasaki who works to build a mechanized 
chair for the disabled, is an example of the former. Both films use the 
salaryman suit as an imaginary basis to convey a feeling of obedience and 
dedication. In Tetsuo, the business suit is replaced by a battle suit—an ironic 
expression of becoming a corporate warrior. In Doppelgänger, the protagonist 
Hayasaki, in turn, is the antithesis of the orderly salaryman in his disheveled 
lab coat and clothes. Constantly working under the threat of his research 
funding being cut, he works to the brink of madness in order to deliver an 
exosuit chair for people suffering from a spinal cord injury. The chair, although 
not really working yet, is already being promoted as the latest super-
innovation from the company, to which Hayasaki has figuratively sold his soul 
in order to get funded. Everything changes when he meets his doppelgänger, 
who wrecks havoc on his life but ultimately ends up freeing him from all 
constraints.  
One main factor behind the stagnation of the salaryman image was the 
effect that the recession had on Japan’s labor market: the number of regular 
employees declined while unemployment rates rose. The young became 
restless and dissatisfied, faced with difficulties in finding meaningful jobs.61 In 
1993, Anne Allison proposed that the meaning of being a man in Japan is 
situated within the realm of work. 62  However, Slater and Galbraith call 
contemporary Japan “a world where work is no longer constitutive of social 
identity or personal fulfillment, where work no longer provides intimacy with 
coworkers or the social respectability that once allowed one to find a mate.”63 
The idea of the white-collar lifestyle as an expression of mature manhood has 
ceased to be of interest for the younger generations.64 This shift to irregular 
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work has brought on a wide array of anxieties, because regular work has been 
a mainstay of middle class identity, sociality and masculinity.65  
This sense of crisis and turmoil has had an enormous effect on long-
standing beliefs, relationships, attitudes and patterns of behavior. 66 
Nakayama describes this as a situation where the Japanese people have long 
“sacrificed their own interests for the benefit of the state and corporations,” 
hoping that at some point “such benefits will … be shared by the people.”67 
This was not, however, the case. As Yoshikawa explains, “people were shocked 
and confused as a wave of anxiety and pessimism rapidly pervaded Japanese 
society,” something which he also describes as a “feeling of being locked inside 
a box with no exit in sight.”68 The economic empire created by the salarymen 
was revealed to be a phantom.69 While the hegemonic salaryman masculinity 
is still the ideal, fewer and fewer are able to reach it. Kurihara notes that the 
prolonged recession has led to the structural breakdown of one of Japan’s 
fundamental institutions, the enterprise society.70 
Doppelgänger presents Japan’s structural failings as Hayasaki’s personal 
failings. It toys with the idea of a scientifically minded salaryman. Hayasaki’s 
position at a private research company represents the way many contemporary 
masculinities have absorbed aspects of the salaryman masculinity into their 
lifestyle. 71  Thus, scientific masculinity can also be analyzed within this 
framework. In fact, as Vogel points out, it is not such a far-fetched assertion to 
draw a parallel between scientific masculinity and the salaryman, because 
having gone to universities, the salarymen were, in the broad sense of the word, 
“scientifically trained.”72 Penney explicates that GDP growth and visions of 
Japan as a technological superpower were closely linked before the 1990s, and 
it would have indeed been difficult to draw clear distinctions between 
economic and technological nationalism. However, during the Lost Decade the 
assumption of Japan’s superior technology and technological superiority 
became important. But, as Penney concludes, assumptions of this 
technological superiority only masked poor planning and structural failings.73 
In addition, the initial “strong positive interaction between capital investment 
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and technological advance” diminished in importance as funds for research 
and development were cut.74 This is the starting scenario of Doppelgänger. 
Whereas in Tetsuo liberation takes form in the mechanization of the 
salaryman’s body, in Doppelgänger it is a process of breaking free from a 
mentally oppressive situation. Hayasaki as a figurative salaryman, who has 
dedicated his life to the company, creates a parallel with a man-machine of 
sorts, “a prototype of new robots.”75 Hayasaki can be seen as a flesh-and-blood 
version of a karakuri, or automaton. Despite being inherently different, 
karakuri are often tied together with Japan’s robot discourse.76 They were 
“part of the world of the strange,” “denuded of function and working away in 
emptiness,” as well as “mechanical devices that perform a single set of 
operations.” 77  These descriptions all apply to Hayasaki. As a karakuri he 
works to the brink of collapse. He is not too different from a type that Victor 
Frankenstein represented, “the narrowly focused workaholic”; like 
Frankenstein, he is “too preoccupied with his experiment’s goal to pay 
attention to his health,” projecting “a disastrous case of tunnel vision.”78 In a 
way, Hayasaki can be seen as an ironic emblem of reversed techno-orientalism, 
which, according to Morley and Robbins (1995), originally meant that whereas 
Japan has become controlled by robots, the “West” maintains its humanism 
and cultural integrity.79 In the world of Doppelgänger, people are valuable 
only if they work relentlessly to create surplus. There is no space for human 
feelings, as cultural integrity, too, is merely a technological matter.  
Karakuri stands for the importance of the hidden and complex interior 
behind an outside form. 80  Working alone in emptiness and upon failure 
denuded of function, Hayasaki’s existence takes on a metaphorical meaning. 
After meeting with his doppelgänger, Hayasaki starts to change, his insides 
symbolically twisting. He starts acting on his emotions, wants and needs in 
order to reach personal goals, to liberate himself from the restraints of 
contemporary society. Out of this newly found freedom, monstrosity emerges 
also. This challenges the popular idea and nationwide political rhetoric that 
science is a positive force and the agents of science are intellectually and even 
morally superior people to whom ordinary standards of judgment do not 
apply.81 Scientific masculinity in the case of Hayasaki is a break from both 
Japan’s technonationalist agenda and the salaryman ideal.  
The dissolution of Hayasaki’s mental mechanization is represented against 
the robot body that he works to create. Whereas in Tetsuo the man becomes a 
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machine, in Doppelgänger the man tries to create a machine that can merge 
with people. The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) report of 
2015 suggests that robots should not be regarded as simple human 
replacements, but rather as tools that supplement humans and partner with 
them to help them move into a more value-added phase.82 In a way, Hayasaki’s 
robot chair does exactly this: it helps Hayasaki to achieve a more value-added 
phase in his life. Yet, there is something uncanny about it. According to the 
biocultural reading, robots are scary only if they demonstrate some kind of 
intentionality.83 Sontag points out that it is not the result that is suspicious, 
but the creator, the scientist. This, as Sontag concludes, tells about how the 
“most ingrained contemporary mistrust of the intellect is visited, in these 
movies, upon the scientist-as-intellectual.”84 The intentions of Hayasaki are 
problematic, with the character acting as an unwanted mirror for Japanese 
society. In the final scene of the film, the robot chair self-destructs, 
demonstrating intentionality for the first time. This is the final release of 
Hayasaki from the constraining salaryman-like scientific masculinity used for 
national purposes.  
6.2 FAMILY TROUBLE  
Family is one of the key concepts in the understanding of contemporary Japan. 
This subchapter looks at the way scientific masculinity is used to discuss 
masculinity within the real or imaginary family, and how these images 
correlate with national ones. It is important to not only analyze the way 
characters are represented as scientists but also the way they are depicted 
against the dedicated others within the family: women and children. This 
paints a picture of the perceived state of patriarchy in a country that R.W. 
Connell describes as “the most impenetrable patriarchy among the major 
powers.”85 
The structuration of the family unit officially started with the Meiji 
Restoration as part and parcel of the modernization of Japan. Central to the 
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conceptualization of the Japanese family structure and Japanese masculinity 
was, and still is, the notion of ie. Hirai Shōko refers to ie as a psychological unit 
that is meant to last for eternity.86 Although often referred to as a traditional 
Japanese family model, it was constructed and promoted after the Meiji 
Restoration as a means of institutionalizing the family and creating roles for 
all individuals in Japan’s nation-building project.87 Before that, as pointed out 
by Yuzawa (2005) and Hirai (2008), Japanese marriage traditions were varied 
and divorce was common. In his detailed study on the creation of the modern 
household in Japan, Jordan Sand points out that the form “a family” had taken 
in premodern Japan had been fluid because of “a network of intersecting 
relations of obligations” that were not connected with the family.88 According 
to the new Meiji Civil Code of 1896, effective in 1899, marriage, divorce and 
inheritance were promoted as important parts of the law; through these 
reforms, the ie ideology started to apply to everyone in Japan.89 In addition, 
Ochiai emphasizes that ie is first and foremost a stem family system, which 
can be found in other countries, too. Despite this, many Japanese scholars 
have promoted ie as the model form of a stem family, not seeing it in a global 
perspective. In addition, even within Japan regional diversity pertains.90 
According to ie ideology, home was defined as the “microcosm of Japanese 
nationhood”91 and “omnipresent beyond space and time.”92 All members were 
to contribute to the creation of the Japanese empire. It was a highly gendered 
structure with three distinctive objectives: 1) to take care of the family wealth 
through the occupation held by the ie and 2) to make sure the genealogy of the 
ie stayed untainted, which was accomplished through 3) making sure there 
was a proper person to inherit the ie.93 This was all based on the fact that 
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household industries were the main contributors to Japan’s industrialization 
process.94 In addition, ie promoted the division of labor between the sexes, 
where men were expected to work outside for the family and women were 
supposed to take care of it as ryōsai kenbo, good wives and wise mothers. 
These expectations were quite class-specific until World War I, the subsequent 
urbanization and the emergence of the new middle-class with husbands that 
started commuting from the suburbs to the city.95 This contributed to the 
nuclearization of the family. As early as the 1920s, already around 55 per cent 
of families were nuclear families, although ie was still regarded as the official 
structure.96 Even now, Tomiko Yoda argues, the ie structure is a principal form 
of “tradition” popularized by the nihonjinron as an organizing structure of 
Japanese society.97 
Whereas ie laid emphasis on the temporal aspect of the family and the 
continuation of the family line, katei (household) underlined its spatial 
dimension. Discussed at length by Sand (2003), katei was originally 
introduced by Protestant missionaries but later shed its Christian 
connotations. It emphasized the spatial boundary between inside and outside, 
uchi and soto, and served to strengthen the emerging middle-class ideal.98 
Eventually, the term kazoku was coined to translate the term “family,” and the 
structure of the unit was defined administratively by koseki, Japan’s family 
registration system.99 The koseki is one way that the legacy of ie persists even 
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in contemporary society, although it was officially abolished after the Pacific 
War and a new democratic model of the Japanese family was constructed.  
Concepts like the “modern-style family” and “democratic family” embodied 
the notion of transition from the feudalistic ie to the modern-style democratic 
family envisioned in the 1948 Civil Code. According to Ochiai, the modern 
family structure consists of the following features: separation of the domestic 
and public spheres, a strong emotional relationship between family members, 
the centrality of children, a gender-based division of labor, strengthening of 
the group solidarity of the family, the establishment of privacy, exclusion of 
non-relatives and existence as a nuclear family.100 Ueno, however, calls this 
logic a trap. Ie is constructed as something premodern, although it was, in fact, 
a modern structure: “a historical, social construct in the formative period of 
modernity.” 101  In addition, the modern family was by no means a neutral 
creation. As Koikari argues in her “Gender and Power,” the way the Japanese 
family was “democraticized” was modeled on the American family system. In 
other words, it was an Occupation-era political and ideological tool with which 
to create a certain type of family structure in Japan. 
6.2.1 FATHER FIGURES 
Works of the speculative spectrum often connect scientific masculinity, 
paternity and, to some extent, emotional detachment. In literature, Yumeno 
Kyūsaku’s book Dogura Magura (1935) already featured a scientist father who, 
in the name of science, framed his son for the murder of his wife and the 
mother of the protagonist.102 In Tetsuwan Atomu (Astro Boy), the seminal 
manga and anime work by Osamu Tezuka, the robot boy is a creation by an 
intelligent scientist who lacks emotional intelligence. When his son asks him 
to build a robot, he immerses himself in the project. With this single-minded 
approach he fails the most important thing: to provide emotional stability for 
his son, who runs away and is killed. The unfortunate robot is sold to a 
traveling circus and later rescued by a kind professor.103  
Kaiki eiga, too, includes many real or symbolic fathers who embody 
scientific masculinity. In Ringu, Ryūji, the ex-husband of Asakawa Reiko, is a 
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university lecturer whose rational attitude helps the duo to solve Sadako’s 
mystery. Despite his helpfulness and dedication to the cause itself, his attitude 
toward his son seems to be indifferent at best. He is then killed by Sadako. In 
Kōrei (Séance, 2000), the inability of the male protagonist to care for a girl he 
finds hiding among his technical equipment leads to her death. The male 
protagonist and his supernaturally inclined wife are later arrested by the police 
for murder. Clasen suggests that “even the glare of scientific progress and 
general enlightenment are insufficient to kill off the supernatural menaces that 
stalk us in the stories we consume.”104  
In the second and third Tetsuo, the father of the salaryman protagonist is 
also a homegrown Mad Scientist. Especially Tetsuo II is quite interesting 
regarding this matter. On the one hand, it suggests that the salaryman 
transforms because of the experiment by the scientist-leader of the 
bodybuilders; on the other, a flashback reveals that the mutation takes place 
because of his inherently violent nature. Nonetheless, he is able to achieve 
these hidden monstrous skills because of the manipulation that he undergoes 
on the part of his father. He then accidentally murders his own son. These 
stories of detached and sometimes murderous fathers seem to suggest the idea 
of paternity in danger. Anne Allison traces “the collapse of the paternal 
authority” to the end of the Pacific War and “the desacralizing of the emperor 
[and] the national condemnation of the military leaders who had misled the 
country into a disastrous war – a discrediting of fathers that trickled down to 
the male soldiers who returned to the family and household, where adult men 
no longer commanded ultimate respect.”105 The quest for economic wealth 
further removed fathers from the picture, eroding patriarchy as a whole “as 
the grounding authority of family and state.” 106  Zoya Street divides the 
portrayals of Japanese fatherhood into three main images: “the idealized past, 
when fathers received the proper respect from their families based on 
Confucian teachings; the dystopic present, when fathers are weak, dominated 
by women at home and faceless bureaucracies at work; and the future ideal, 
when fathers might have more fluid working patterns and be more involved 
with child-rearing.”107 It is clear that dealing with this dystopic present is the 
core concern of kaiki eiga.  
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Susan Sontag points out that science fiction “supplies morally acceptable 
fantasies where amoral, even cruel, feelings are given an outlet.” 108 
Furthermore, Wee points out that “the most malevolent actions are often 
grounded in recognizable acts of social or familial betrayal.” 109  Indeed, 
betrayal has been one of the most recurrent motifs in the films discussed in 
this thesis. Kurosawa Kiyoshi’s Sakebi (2005) portrays a chilling depiction of 
a 48-year-old local doctor, Sakuma, who murders his arrogant teenager son. 
Sakuma tries to escape by committing suicide but does not succeed. When he 
is arrested and interrogated by Detective Yoshioka, he flatly states that “the 
boy was beyond parental control. He was a good boy until junior high. It was 
probably my way of upbringing him that failed.” In saying this, he admits a 
lack of paternal responsibility as the main factor in his son’s behavior. In 
general, it can be said that the devotion of Japanese men to their work has 
diminished their presence at home, also affecting their role as caregivers for 
their children.110 Expressions such as “working bee” (hataraki bachi) fathers 
and “gung-ho employees” (mōretsu shain), as well as absent fathers 
(chichioya fuzai) or the lack of paternal authority (fusei no ketsujo), are 
emphasized in discussions about paternal responsibility. 111  The practice is 
more universal, however. If masculinity is defined as “anything not feminine,” 
and if femininity is linked with the private sphere, this works to define boys 
and men outside the family.112 
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Sakuma’s narrative calls for multiple interpretations. The child has played 
an important role in the nuclear family and the ascription of gender role 
divisions. Childbirth was a natural and inevitable outcome of marriage in the 
postwar generation, strengthening the role of “reproductive egalitarianism.”113 
However, men were excluded from the private sphere once the modern family 
ideology came to be associated with the mother devoting herself to the care of 
the children. Despite their individual hopes and wants, men have also been 
largely removed from childrearing activities due to the sheer amount of work 
assigned them.114 Should a father really dedicate himself to childrearing, his 
only option was to get an irregular job or completely drop out of Japan, Inc.115 
This would have meant becoming marginal and a loss of the power that 
hegemonic masculinity accorded. Nonetheless, this attitude is changing, as 
demonstrated by Dasgupta in his Re-reading the Salaryman (2008).  
Emphasis on fatherhood introduces the child as the other to adult 
masculinity.116 Sakuma’s narrative ties the discourse of scientific masculinity 
to the question of responsibility. When interrogated, Sakuma finally admits 
that he must take responsibility for his actions. Responsibility means maturity. 
If posited against the narratives of the early 1960s, with their questioning of 
national responsibility through fictional tropes, Sakebi suggests that the issue 
has still not been addressed properly. Yoda draws from Asada Akira in stating 
that “while modernization was identified with the process of maturation in 
human history, fostering ‘adult’ individual subjects that bear responsibility for 
their actions, Japan never really matured/modernized according to this model 
shaped through the evolution of industrial capitalism. Moreover … Japan 
appears to have grown progressively infantile rather than mature.” 117  This 
points to the central importance of Sakuma’s actions. The salaryman as a 
representation of hegemonic masculinity represents smoothly running 
capitalism. Sakuma is his twisted mirror image. His scientific masculinity 
makes him a rational representation of responsible adult subjectivity, an 
exemplary of Japan’s modernization. With his actions, this image of matured 
modernity is disrupted.  
Sakuma tries to escape his responsibility twice: first by murdering his 
annoying son and second by trying to kill himself in order to not get prosecuted. 
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For him, this double betrayal is the only way he could make things right. “I 
would cancel out my responsibility,” states Sakuma himself, “I owe him. That’s 
why I was supposed to die together with him.” His plans are disrupted by the 
emergence of his son as a ghost. Vivian Sobchack points out that the child is a 
privileged figure that “initiates and condenses a contemporary and pressing 
cultural drama, which is marked by the related disintegration and 
transfiguration of the … bourgeois family.”118 Child ghosts are normally what 
Noël Carroll would call “full of contradictions, violations of nature, 
metaphysical misfits.”119 The child ghost is a central figure in Japanese horror, 
too. Wee states that child ghosts are representative of potentially dangerous 
new identities that are characterized by detachment from the larger 
community.120 This ties the motif together with the “youth problem” debate in 
Japan, which is representative of the large generation gap.121 In addition, it 
highlights the issue of domestic violence.122 When his son appears as a ghost, 
Sakuma loses his mind. This is a prime example of the dissolution of rational 
masculinity and, as such, a dissolution of the modern nation and its patriarchy 
on an imaginary level. This is in accord with Sobchack’s realization that a 
powerful child suggests that patriarchy itself is in danger, whereas a powerful 
father points toward threatened paternity.123 
But it is not only the young who are to blame. Sakuma can be referred to as 
a millennial monster, a concept developed by Anne Allison. According to her, 
the 1990s comprised an era during which a feeling of threat came to be 
associated with the inside in the form of millennial monsters. There are two 
prominent types. First, the youth who attack the sense of national security are 
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the “ordinary perpetrators,” stemming from the postwar social situation and 
family model. Second, as Allison points out, “Abundance has turned inside out, 
and Japan is being eaten up now by inner demons.”124 Sakuma’s status as an 
elite rational citizen highlights the sheer despair of his actions. His actions 
underline what Wee sees as the core of contemporary horror: a fear linked to 
a widening range of collapsing boundaries. His is the narrative of the strain of 
maintaining the daikokubashira ideal in a satisfactory way, a demonstration 
of “the psychological instability at the center of individual men’s sense of their 
own masculinity.”125 His is the narrative of failure. This is “a nightmare of 
capitalism,” a depiction of the loss of social and economic stability together 
with “a lingering sense of masculine pride and middle class propriety.”126 
According to Sobchack, a patriarchy without power is terrifying and refuses 
parental responsibility if not rewarded with the benefits of patriarchal 
authority. 127  This is exactly the case with Sakuma. In addition, his case 
visualizes what Roger Goodman calls “the discovery of child abuse.”128 In the 
beginning of the 1990s, the majority of Japanese people believed that there 
was virtually no child abuse in Japan. This positive outlook shifted as a result 
of pressure from various interest groups, and especially because of the 
multitude of media stories that were published on the issue.129 As Goodman 
concludes, “Parents were no longer seen as being ‘naturally’ and 
unquestionably good and it was no longer unthinkable that they might, in 
certain circumstances, resort to abusing their children.”130 Sakuma’s character 
calls for an interpretation of the film as an attempt to visualize how a nation 
might end up abusing its subjects.  
6.2.2 HOMOSEXUALITY AND HOMOSOCIALITY 
Dasgupta emphasizes that in order to perform successfully as a salaryman, one 
needs to perform successfully as a heterosexual.131 Allison’s (1994) findings 
support this claim, that this is one of the cornerstones of the general definition 
of hegemonic masculinity. Thus, the salaryman masculinity is often negotiated 
vis-à-vis women. Within the job context, against the office lady he represents 
male privilege, dominance, and centrality in the company and society. In the 
family context, he is opposite from the sengyō shufu, or housewife.132 This 
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duality is referred to as “heterosexual complementarity,” where hegemonic 
masculinity finds its counterpart in emphasized femininity, the way 
masculinities are socially constructed against real or imaginary models of 
femininity. Indeed, as mothers, wives, schoolmates, sexual partners, 
colleagues and so forth, women are central and complicit for the construction 
of masculinity. In particular, new configurations of femininity affect the 
construction of masculinities. 133  In the more specific context of Japan, 
emphasized femininity can also be defined as a manifestation of unequal 
domestic relationship maintained by the non-involvement of the salaryman in 
household matters due to his role as the main breadwinner. 134  Thus, the 
salaryman must both contribute economically to the good of the nation and 
perform a certain type of masculinity in the private sphere. The Tetsuo films 
combine these features in order to subvert the salaryman ideal and, 
consequently, the idea of Japan as an economic superpower. Issues of 
sexuality are central.  
Yoda Tomiko calls Japan “a patriarchal but matricentric society,” 135 
highlighting the important role women have played behind the scenes. The 
treatment of women in each film is different.136 In the first film, the salaryman 
kills his girlfriend. Their relationship is sexual, foregrounded in the images 
within the film. After hitting Yatsu with their car, they have passionate sex at 
the scene of the accident. The film does not, however, promote heterosexual 
interpretation. A first hint is given in a fantasy dream had by the salaryman, 
where his girlfriend dances erotically with a giant wire attached to her groin. 
She penetrates the salaryman, after which he wakes up startled. It is after this 
scene that he finds the first metallic spike on his cheek. This is an external 
manifestation of an inner corruption—or “penetration.” The salaryman is then 
lustfully chased by a female metal-mutant at the train station and once back at 
home with his girlfriend he rapidly starts to transform. Escaping to the 
bathroom in the throes of his shameful transformation, his girlfriend tries to 
assure him that she will not go anywhere. The salaryman then emerges in a 
mutated form with a giant drill-penis. 
Laura Miller (2006) discusses cultural forms of masculinity that are 
“constructed in relation to imagined female desire.” These are often 
comfortable but still subversive portrayals of masculine sexuality.137 In Tetsuo, 
this notion is taken a step further. The salaryman drills his girlfriend to death 
in a grotesque form of lovemaking. This scene presents an exploding 
monstrous masculine sexuality, as opposed to Miller’s subversive yet beautiful 
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forms.138 It recalls the hidden sexual nature of salaryman masculinity.139 As 
Allison notes, the hard-working, loyal man of the company is required to 
participate, if not in the act of having sex itself, at least in situations where it 
is strongly implied. This logic also works in an opposite way, as Slater and 
Galbraith point out in their description of the “sexualization of failure” where 
the failure to attain the status of a regular worker is linked to failure as a 
man.140 The ability to perform economically is related to the ability to perform 
sexually, which is already visible in the films of the previous period: the most 
respectable of the men were those with proper girlfriends. Tetsuo both 
visualizes and subverts this hidden aspect of the hegemonic salaryman 
masculinity. If Japan is based on a system generated by heterosexual males 
engaging in friendships, 141  Tetsuo dissects this very system by offering an 
escape from homosociality to homosexuality in “an undoing of the fantasy of 
domination over nature and individual autonomy that cluster together under 
the alibi of ‘natural’ systems of patriarchal kinship and hetero-normative 
sexuality.”142 It is thus a symbolic destroying of the patriarchal ideology that 
has accompanied Japan’s economic growth.  
Hegemonic masculinity sees women as potential sexual objects for men, 
whereas other men are strongly negated as sexual objects for men.143 Tetsuo 
strongly disrupts this image. The aforementioned homoerotic scene of 
penetration is the first to imply this, and the theme is taken further in the 
relationship between the salaryman and Yatsu. Tetsuo starts with a man, 
referred to as the metal fetishist (or Yatsu) and played by Tsukamoto himself, 
first walking the streets of Tokyo and then stabbing himself with a piece of 
scrap metal and inserting a screw into the wound. All the while, the camera 
shows photos of sports athletes and their virile and strong bodies, which are 
pasted on the walls of this place, filled with wires and metallic paraphernalia. 
Yatsu then realizes that his wound is infected with maggots and runs to the 
street, only to be hit by a car driven by the salaryman. The camera pans to a 
text saying “NEW WORLD.”  
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Like many other cyberpunk works of the 1980s and 1990s, Tetsuo also 
demonstrates “themes of body and mind invasion.”144 After the salaryman has 
killed his girlfriend, Yatsu emerges from her corpse. This is a quite tangible 
replacement of the feminine object of desire with a masculine one. In the end, 
after their seemingly endless battle, Yatsu and the salaryman fuse into a huge, 
phallic, tank-like entity with two heads (upper and “lower”); an uncontrollably 
monstrous phallus parody.145 In his discussion on the connection between the 
state, masculinity and nationalism, Morris Low suggests that the battlefield 
and encounters with the enemy served as alternative masculine reference 
points (both racial and cultural) for Japanese soldiers. These encounters 
challenged the basis on which the ideal of Japanese manhood were based.146 
Tetsuo visualizes this. The merging of the salaryman and Yatsu into a giant 
battle-machine is the battlefield promotion of an alternative identity that 
significantly differs from the hegemonic salaryman ideal.  
After the fusion of Yatsu and the salaryman, the latter grunts in a satisfied 
tone that he “feels awesome.” Yatsu, in turn, proclaims that with their love they 
will turn the world into metal and rust. The text NEW WORLD appears once 
more. In various instances throughout the film, Yatsu is seen beckoning the 
salaryman, who is responsible for the accident, to “come on,” to enter the new 
world; these are the lines he utters right before the final encounter between 
the two, which ends up in their fusion. This is a new world in which the future 
is technological. Reproductive sexuality and the male creation myth are 
replaced by a form that problematizes them both. If gayness is “symbolically 
expelled from hegemonic masculinity,” Tsukamoto’s vision is an ironic one: 
with the help of technology, the hardworking male—the cornerstone of the 
Japanese economic miracle and key feature of state policies—is now out of 
control, having immersed itself in homosexual desire. This is about 
symbolically queering the established national image. 147  In addition, the 
coupling of the two has contributed to the creation of both personal knowledge 
of the world and knowledge of something new that the man-machine is willing 
to spread. The definition of scientific masculinity thus applies.  
6.3 MORPHING SPACES  
If daikokubashira ideology ties masculinity together with the home, another 
important space is present as well. The relationship between filmic 
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representations of the capital of Japan, Tokyo, and the middle-class, white-
collar salaryman who often occupies a critical position in fictional narratives 
is highlighted by Romit Dasgupta. According to him, snapshots of Tokyo 
provide “very real, indeed sensory, insight into the socio-cultural dynamics at 
play at particular moments in Japanese history, including dynamics of gender, 
sexuality, family, work, and other societal institutions and discourses.” 148 
Moreover, the representations of Tokyo in relation to scientific masculinity 
can be located across Cybwrisky’s (2005) timeline of the three rebuildings of 
Tokyo. Matango and Tanin no kao can be understood within the process of 
“Tokyo’s second rebuilding,” which took place before the Olympic Games of 
1964.149 Matango was released a year before the Olympics; while Tanin no kao 
was released only in 1966, Abe’s original novel was published in 1964, the same 
year as the Olympics.  
The Tokyo Olympics became a drama of Japan’s recovery staged by the 
nation itself, a sign of bodies that were finally detached from memories of loss 
and cleansed of the nation’s dirt. The city itself was also tangibly cleaned.150 
The official image of Tokyo in the wake of the Olympics was one of progress. 
Nonetheless, as I have already pointed out in Chapter 4, Tanin no kao presents 
the city as a place where no one really cares. This is especially prevalent in the 
final scene, where Okuyama murders Hira. In the final shot of Matango, too, 
Tokyo itself—a cleansed space ready for a worldwide spectacle—is made ugly, 
unattractive and hostile to everyone, especially those who differ in their looks 
or thoughts. If Kenji had stayed on the mushroom island, his liberation would 
have been perfect. However, because of his unfortunate return to the city, it is 
ultimately blocked. The postwar society, so adamant about economic 
development, has no space for deviations. Nowhere is this better described 
than in the process of a university professor becoming monstrous—a professor 
responsible for socializing young Japanese into society. The manifestation of 
his scientific masculinity is not comparable with the present city.  
While in the films analyzed in this thesis some of the monsters are visibly 
different, many are not. Rather, their monstrosity is found on the level of the 
perceived difference from social norms and values. The word “monster” thus 
comes to mean not only weird creatures marked by bodily difference but 
something—or someone—that goes against the current knowledge and 
perceived status quo. In addition, the meaning of the monster is not 
“monstrous” in the conventional sense in all cases. Through the acquisition of 
a monstrous identity, Kenji finally understands the futility of his 
contemporary life in Tokyo. In the process he becomes “other” than the 
postwar democratic citizen and, because of the implicit origins of the 
mushroom men as radiation monsters, a gruesome reminder of past horrors 
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during a time when memories like this should have been hidden beneath the 
preparations for the Olympics.  
John Mock argues that this “other” Japan “remains an important arena of 
identity politics in a nation that has experienced massive socio-economic 
convulsions.”151 Kenji is an embodiment of this otherness. After the doctors 
note that he should be happy to be back, he answers by stating that “Tokyo is 
not very different. People are inhuman.” Kenji’s last words echo in the viewers’ 
ears as the camera pans across dark, nightly Tokyo with its neon signs: “I 
would have been happier there.” The implicit message is that the postwar 
society is still recovering, faced with its inner grotesques. The image of Japan’s 
superior progress is thus unmasked with narratives of me(n)ta(l)morphosized 
individuals, who lose themselves to the postwar society.  
The Tetsuo films, in turn, are to be analyzed in the aftermath of “Tokyo’s 
third rebuilding,” in which old neighborhoods were torn down in order to 
maximize the profits of the real-estate industry during the 1970s. 152  Both 
processes provide a spatial framework for the construction of monstrosity. In 
Tetsuo II, the traditional landscape of the first version has changed into an 
unwelcoming blue-hued corporate world with high-rise office buildings as its 
landmarks. In particular, regarding the urbanization of the Greater Tokyo 
Area, “the concentration of offices, forms and stores makes communication 
between organizations less costly and time-consuming, and promotes 
efficiency in interorganizational networking and coordination.”153 Especially 
in this case, the urban scenery is important for the construction of masculinity, 
foregrounding the “modern man’s relation to his lifeless and numbing urban 
environment.” 154  Taniguchi the salaryman finds his liberation from the 
underworld; it is representative of the way Serizawa existed in his 
underground laboratory. Tong Lam suggests that “abandoned places seem to 
be the antithesis of Japan’s ultramodern image,” and that the economic 
miracle has “actualized landscapes of devastation and unfulfilled promises.”155 
These images and sites of industrial ruins, created by the recession and 
population decline, lie beneath the official image of cherry blossoms. They are 
the “scars of industrialization.”156 With Taniguchi’s metalmorphosis, it is not 
only the image of Japan as an economic world power that is destroyed, but also 
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the technological feature upon which it was largely based. After a stint in the 
underworld, this technological, mechanical man-machine travels the streets of 
Tokyo, regaining control of the streets that had engulfed and oppressed its 
previous self.  
All the Tetsuo films are representative of the “industrial dehumanization of 
an anonymous, middle-class, post-industrial businessman.”157 The portrayal 
of the city recalls Kawana’s modern concerns that the haphazard growth of 
Tokyo and the constant influx of people from rural areas made long-time city 
dwellers feel like strangers in their own town, creating many “uncanny”—
familiar but unfamiliar—places. 158  According to Wada-Marciano, these in-
between spaces are derelict. On the one hand, they enrich the megalopolis with 
“history and nostalgia”; on the other, they are “dysfunctional and archaic.” 
They are uncanny, contradicting spaces that are both familiar but foreign, 
relics of disappearing history waiting to be discarded in order to introduce 
something new.159 To posit the metalmorphosis of the salaryman against these 
already destroyed symbols of economic superiority doubly underlines the 
imaginary construct of the ideology and the sacrifices needed to uphold it. 
In Kairo, addressed further in the next chapter, every home becomes a 
dysfunctional, uncanny space. The film ties together discourses of 
technological advancement, scientific masculinity, consumption and spatiality. 
In Kairo, the people located inside the multiplying akazu no ma (forbidden 
rooms) ultimately commit suicide. One of the most disturbing images the 
protagonists Harue and Kawashima encounter on a computer screen is of a 
boy with his head in a plastic bag. He is sitting on a chair in front of a wall, on 
which he has written “Tasukete” in ragged kanji a number of times. Harue 
seems fascinated and watches as the boy slides closer with his chair, takes off 
the paper bag and shoots himself. This is exactly the same way in which Harue 
later kills herself.  
Akazu no ma have the function of public space “as a source of mystery for 
urbanites,” trivial spaces of transition that become disturbing sites of 
transgression.160 They represent a technological prison that can be escaped 
only through death. Chikako Ozawa-de Silva argues that “the rising rate of 
‘Internet suicide pacts’—a new type of suicide in Japan—has led to widespread 
concern about the presence of such Internet sites and questions about the 
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nature of group suicides and suicide pacts in Japan.”161 Furthermore, “Internet 
suicides” are “characterized by severe existential suffering, a loss of the ‘worth 
of living’ (ikigai), or its absence in the case of many Japanese adolescents and 
young adults, and a profound loneliness and lack of connection with others.”162 
In Kairo, one of the very tangible ghosts rattles “shi wa eien no kodoku da” 
(death is eternal loneliness) upon encountering Kawashima in an abandoned 
warehouse. As Ozawa-de Silva points out:  
Loneliness and an absence of meaning in life seem to be closely 
connected …  and both are given as reasons for suicide. There is often 
a sense of inner conflict: on the one hand, they experience intense 
loneliness when by themselves, but on the other hand, they feel 
mistrustful of others and do not like to be in social settings. In certain 
cases, these feelings seem to combine in the wish to die with others—in 
other words, to escape the pain of loneliness and absence of meaning 
in this life but, at the same time, to do so in connection with another 
person or persons, because to die alone would be too painful.163  
 
The representation of information technology in kaiki eiga directly addresses 
these fears. It reflects Marshall McLuhan’s scenario, where new technologies 
impose themselves on societies long habituated to older technologies, 
resulting in anxieties of all kinds.164 This can be analyzed as the shift to an 
information society that relies on the latest technology. Kairo illustrates the 
anxieties of this process, painting a culture-specific picture of a universal 
feeling of uneasiness. Instead of wanting to contribute to the creation of a 
better nation, young men and women merely want to vanish. This is the end 
of Japan.  
If Kairo paints a bleak picture of possible absolution, Doppelgänger ends 
on a more positive note. Liberation is correlated with spatiality and spatial 
freedom. Whereas corporate warriors are often so dependent on their 
companies that they can lose their sense of self after retiring,165 Hayasaki’s 
response is exactly the opposite. He feels relief after his symbolic retirement. 
He decides to leave his old life behind, corresponding to the wider notion of 
desired masculinity, to become a wanderer.166 Tom Gill notes that Japanese 
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masculine fantasies frequently stress the mobile: the sportsman, the traveler, 
the man of action, the magically endowed superhero. One paramount example 
is Tora-san of the Otoko wa tsurai yo series.167 This is because in real life, 
masculinity is very much located in relation to the home: the role of 
daikokubashira promotes not only the ideals of reliability and strength but 
also stasis.168 As Vogel points out, the “daily life of the salaryman is the essence 
of regularity.”169 This is in contrast to the premodern era, when the male life 
course, in fact, often consisted of a large amount of mobility.170  
The end of Doppelgänger challenges this, promoting a picture of masculine 
mobility that is different from the singular way in which salarymen have been 
able to achieve mobility: the tanshin funin system.171 Hayasaki’s embarking 
onto the life of a wanderer parallels the role of drifters, who, as wandering 
outsiders and rōnin, are located on the fringes of society as symbolic others 
against “a modern, conformist and compromising citizen.”172 Hayasaki is a 
contemporary rōnin, a masterless scientist unwilling to work for the good of 
the state, which has traditionally been the most important feature of kagaku 
gijutsu. The scientific masculinity he represents is presented as an alternative 
to the hegemonic model, an alternative through which to immerse oneself in 
mobile fantasies that are in stark contrast with the reality of the salaryman. 
For most men today, masculine mobility is an escapist fantasy; immobility, or 
involuntary mobility, is a dull, immovable reality. 173  Scientific masculinity 
seems to provide some means to combat this dreaded feeling, even if it means 
abandoning the quest for economic power.  
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6.4 CONCLUSIONS 
Whereas some postwar films still provided quite favorable imaginings of 
savior-scientists, more recent films question the rationality of scientific 
masculinity and, even more importantly, the relationship between men and 
technology. Shifting Japanese masculinities call for an analysis of shifting 
national images. Even more than in the previous two chapters, the 
characterization of scientists and their monsters can be located on the 
ideological axis of hegemonic masculinity and its counterparts.  
The salaryman model of masculinity has been problematized as a result of 
the social and personal costs of contributing to the creation of Japan as an 
economic superpower.174 Scientific masculinity is used to challenge this ideal 
in a multitude of ways, such as via technologized cyborgs and research 
scientists that either embrace or escape the hegemonic ideal of a work-
oriented and dedicated individual male. Representations of scientific 
masculinity are also related to the differing aspects of the daikokubashira 
ideology: that of a diligently working member of a society as well as a husband-
father. Regarding the first, the salaryman ideal and its downfall provide a real-
life context in the aftermath of the bursting of the economic bubble. Husbands 
and fathers, in turn, are discussed within the framework of the history of the 
family in Japan. These spheres have contributed to both the upholding of the 
patriarchal ideal and the image of “Japan as No. 1.”  
The Tetsuo films used technology to allow their protagonists to rebel 
against the system that upholds the salaryman lifestyle. In Doppelgänger, the 
robot-building project of the overworked scientist was, in fact, an identity-
building project that ended with the self-destruction of the old and 
introduction of the new. Both narratives called for an analysis of the role of 
individual sacrifice in light of Japan’s economic growth. In both cases, the 
ultimate result of the mechanization of the self—or the process of becoming 
monstrous—is the liberation of an individual from his prescribed social role. 
Especially Doppelgänger correlates with advances by the Ministry of Economy, 
Trade, and Industry in robotics. 175  Hence, to abandon the project means 
liberation from state norms and the idea of Japan as an economic and 
technological superpower.  
Both the Tetsuo and Doppelgänger films should be seen as contributing to 
the overall challenging of the national image of Japan as an economic 
superpower. Strongly present are the worries and anxieties caused by the 
recession of the 1990s and Japan’s Lost Decade. As Audeguy points out, 
monsters change shape according to time and need. They are both made of 
beliefs and continue to represent these beliefs.176 In other words, as beliefs 
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change, monsters change as well. Both films ultimately subvert the idea of the 
dedicated salaryman. In a society that works to create robots, even individuals 
become robotized. They become what Robertson refers to as “Robo Sapiens 
Japanicus.” This is formalized as the iconic “suiting-up” of the salaryman in 
the three Tetsuo films, an ironic reference to the term “corporate warrior.” 
These narratives, together with Doppelgänger, visualize the will to “escape the 
salaryman” (datsu-sara). Hayasaki’s mentalmorphosis clearly demonstrates 
the unleashing of subversive potential, namely, the transformation of an 
automaton to an individual. Unlike women, who do not receive the benefits of 
the lifetime employment system and have been freer to criticize the system,177 
men have been pressured to conform. It is this process of deviation from the 
norm, from the state-supported scientific masculinity, that finally allows 
Hayasaki the possibility for criticism. The image of a techno-nationalist 
superpower is problematized because of the toll it takes on the individual.  
On a more private note, Japan’s status as an economic superpower is also 
subverted by the way in which the Tetsuo films and Sakebi illustrate the 
downfall of the patriarchal head of the household. The films critique the 
system that created a norm out of absent fathers and a lack of paternal 
authority, a theme that is especially prevalent in Sakebi. Tetsuo is also free 
from the state-required heterosexual role that the salaryman-as-
daikokubashira was supposed to perform. Highlighting the relationship 
between men and machines, it discusses not only the salaryman ideal in 
general, but the underlying heterosexual ideology in particular.  
Finally, in Matango the city oppresses everyone, fitting them into the same 
mold, providing a spatial framework and a spatial context for the 
personification of the monstrous of the esteemed male figure. In Matango, 
this is the final survivor, Professor Kenji Murai, whose wish to have remained 
on the island with the other metamorphosized people echoes in the audience’s 
ears. More recently, the function of scientific masculinity in Tetsuo and 
Doppelgänger is to contrast the ideals of techno-economic nationalism and 
promote freer existence and mobility. This corresponds to the trend that 
appeared in salaryman manga in the late 1980s, where the escape was not only 
about chasing freedom but also chasing dreams.178 It was a perfect fantasy in 
the period of economic upheavals, where permanent employment and serving 
as the primary breadwinner of the family were becoming more and more 
difficult.179
                                                 
177 See Ogasawara, Office Ladies, 11–12 for a discussion. 
178 Shinjitsu, Sarariiman manga, 71. 
179 Romit Dasgupta, “The ‘lost decade’ of the 1990s and the shifting masculinities in Japan,” Culture, 
Society and Masculinities 1, no. 1 (2009): 83–84; Hidaka, Salaryman masculinity, 89.  
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7 TECHNOLOGICAL FUTURES  
In the previous chapter I analyzed scientific masculinity as the representation 
of a multitude of national images: imperialist-militarist, pacifist, and being 
economically superior. The scope ranged from international to interpersonal, 
from an admiring perspective to a highly critical one. This chapter deals with 
the representations of scientific masculinity that most clearly subvert, 
challenge and, interestingly, also sustain the way Japan has promoted itself as 
a techno-scientific superpower. If technology was seen as vital for the 
development of a modern nation, this chapter illustrates some concerns 
regarding its application in the future, as well as the potential cost for both 
individuals and nation.  
Samuels points out that the discourse of becoming a technological 
superpower started with imperialist “military technonationalism,” which 
aimed at strengthening both the economy and the military.1 Between 1945 and 
1973, the growing economy was supported by industrial development, 
technological innovation (gijutsu kakushin) and capital investment that 
promoted the application of new technologies. Promoted as a national 
mandate in an Economy White Paper in 1956, the idea of connecting postwar 
economics with technological innovation was something that the postwar 
citizens themselves agreed on.2 Before the war, the goal had been to make 
Western technology “fit” Japan, but the postwar understanding was such that 
technology could and should be improved and adapted. This provided a basis 
for a form of wakon (Japanese spirit) that allowed a new sense of national 
pride to emerge.3 This “virtuous cycle” between the economy and technology 
mobilized the postwar Japanese “for the process of creating surplus” through 
the introduction of a range of technologies, creating a brand-new 
psychological framework and purpose for one’s life, fueled by displays of 
American materialist affluence.4 Najita Tetsuo even argues that postwar Japan 
                                                 
1 Samuels, Rich Nation, 33; Koizumi points out that whereas in the U.S. technological development 
took place in the spheres of both the military and consumer goods, it was only in the postwar era and 
with the introduction of goods from the U.S. during the Occupation that the latter came to be regarded 
as an important factor in Japan (“In Search of Wakon,” 33).  
2  Morris-Suzuki, Technological Transformation, 208; Koizumi, “In Search of Wakon,” 31; 
Yoshikawa, Lost Decade, 7, 133; Penney, “Nuclear Nationalism,” 5; Anderson, Science and Technology, 
26; Watanabe and Hemmert, “Technology and Economy,” 37. Koizumi points out that since Japanese 
prewar technological policies had not emphasized the improvement of technology, Japanese language 
initially lacked the word “innovation” (“In Search of Wakon,” 43). 
3 Koizumi, ibid., 30–31. 
4 Watanabe and Hemmert, “Technology and economy,” 37; Ross Mouer, “Work Culture,” in The 
Cambridge Companion to Modern Japanese Culture, ed. Sugimoto Yoshio (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), 114; Koizumi, ibid., 31, 41. 
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started to ideologize technology in terms of “culture,” drawing a parallel 
between “technological excellence” and “cultural exceptionalism.”5 
The creation of a scientific Japan is a vision employed exclusively for 
present-day Japan.6 Because of the oil shocks in 1973 and 1978, the industrial 
structure of Japan changed from heavy industry to high technology based on 
knowledge. In other words, Japan transformed into an information society.7 A 
new type of scientific nationalism was deeply built into this ideal. As the 
Japanese government sees it, the future of Japan lies in becoming a 
“technology-oriented” nation or “a country built on science and technology,” a 
nation that continues to both carry out innovative technical research and 
export it to other advanced countries.8 A MITI report in 1980 was the first to 
use the word gijutsu rikkoku (techno-nation).9 Gijutsu rikkoku as a national 
policy “carries a nationalistic implication,” leveraging Japan’s technology as a 
bargaining tool against the technology of the U.S., which was conceived of as 
“an enemy.” All in all, as Nakayama points out, the vocabulary of the new 
policy was quite warlike.10 In the 1990s, similar opinions were combined into 
a national imperative, the building of a Science-Technological Nation (kagaku 
gijutsu sōzō rikkoku). This all-encompassing national strategy was a 
continuation of what Penney defines as “conservative technological 
nationalism,” the unyielding trust in Japanese technology even decades earlier, 
a trust that has made accidents seem impossible.11 Resource-poor Japan only 
                                                 
5 Najita Tetsuo, “On Culture and Technology in Postmodern Japan,” in Postmodernism and Japan, 
ed. Miyoshi Masao and Harry D. Harootunian (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1989), 13. 
The emphasis on technological excellence is by no means limited to Japan but rather a feature of many 
a modern society. 
6 Mizuno, Scientific Nationalism, 40, 182, 186–187. 
7 Kuwahara, “Women Scientists,” 209; Morris-Suzuki, Beyond Computopia, 8–9; Morris-Suzuki, 
Technological Transformation, 211; Low, Nakayama and Yoshioka, Science, Technology, and Society, 
134–140. The postwar society was an “export or die” society. Because of the shock, the price of oil rose, 
which affected the price of raw materials and, consequently, manufacturing costs. With the Japanese 
economy being heavily supported by and reliant on international trade, industrial robots were first 
introduced as a means of cutting costs and increasing productivity (Schodt, Robot Kingdom, 92, 120). 
8 See Penney, “Nuclear Nationalism,” 3–4; Anderson, Science and Technology, 29; Schodt, Robot 
Kingdom, 43. Cockburn and Ormrod demonstrate this with a statement by a British advertiser working 
for a Japanese client: “The Japanese … fascination with technology for its own sake” (Gender & 
Technology, 80). Fredrik Schodt, in turn, quotes a comment from a producer of the Japan Expo of 1985, 
who suggests, “As a race the Japanese are extremely receptive to technology” (Robot Kingdom, 13–14). 
This tells about the way in which this ideology of promoting science and technology was internalized by 
the people. 
9 Morris-Suzuki, Technological Transformation, 211. 
10 Nakayama, Science, Technology and Society, 200. 
11 Penney, “Nuclear Nationalism,” 4, 10. 
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had technology to strengthen its role in the world,12 and it serves as a “powerful 
horizon to mobilize people’s hopes and dreams.”13 Robertson calls this a form 
of “technology-mediated ‘nationalist internationalism,’” which works toward 
the creation of so-called gijutsuteki sakoku, a technologically closed country.14  
Technological nationalism is discussed in three specific ways: in relation to 
Japan’s robot policies, the redefinition of gender and science, and the newly 
found scientific glory present in advances of Japan’s space technology. Tetsuo 
III deals with the first issue, whereas discourses of gender and technology are 
reworked in Kurosawa Kiyoshi’s Kairo. Finally, the HAYABUSA films create 
an imagined community based specifically on glorious masculine agents of 
science and Japan’s technological superiority.  
7.1 ROBOTS OVER OTHERS 
Robotics is one of the central fields of the techno-nationalist agenda, being 
designated as a “target” industry under the 1971 Extraordinary Measures Law 
for the Promotion of Specific Electronic and Machinery Industries, as well as 
the 1978 Extraordinary Measures Law for the Promotion of Specific Machinery 
and Information Industries.15 Historically, in “the export-or-die economy” and 
with “a national goal of catching up with the west economically and in science 
and technology,” big businesses were better equipped to understand the full 
power of robots. 16  Like with any other national goal, the benefits of the 
companies had to benefit the state. The government aggressively began to 
promote robotization in 1980 with the introduction of the term robotto fukyū 
gannen (the wish to propagate robots), coined by a former employee of MITI. 
                                                 
12 Morris-Suzuki, Technological Transformation, 211; Nakayama, Science, Technology and Society, 
201; Samuels, Rich Nation, 34. For a summary of how technology was used to achieve “a sustainable 
development despite numerous handicaps,” see Watanabe and Hemmert, “Technology and Economy,” 
42.  
13 Moore, Constructing East Asia, 233. 
14 Robertson, Robo Sapiens, 27. This is closely tied to nationalism, as is apparent in the Innovation 
25 project, where a fictional “Lee-kun” from China narrates how his family has been able to continue 
farming in a deserted area because of advanced Japanese biotechnology. In the future, Lee wants China 
to become a country like Japan, which can harmoniously combine environmental protection schemes 
and economic development. Japanese technology as internationally superior underlies the project. For 
a detailed discussion about the Innovation 25 project, see Robertson, ibid., 33–79 and Sone, Robot 
Culture, 81. For the actual report, see “‘Inobeeshon 25’ nakama torimatome” 「イノベーション 25」仲
間とりまとめ [Innovation 25: Putting together its comrades], Cabinet Office, accessed August 5, 2018, 
http://www.cao.go.jp/innovation/action/conference/minutes/minute_intermediate/chukan.pdf. For 
the original version of the fictional manga, see “Inobeke no ichinichi” Cabinet Office, accessed August 5, 
2018, http://www.cao.go.jp/innovation/action/conference/minutes/inobeke.html. 
15 Schodt, Robot Kingdom, 122.  
16 Ibid., 122, 125. 
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This raised the national consciousness around robots and robotization,17 and 
it was not long before both small and big businesses in Japan started to use 
robots; their manufacturers mainly remained large corporations.18  
Despite the fact that the majority of robots are industrial robots, the very 
image of a robot for many is that of a humanoid. Robertson (2018) points out 
that whereas humanoid robots are generally manufactured and distributed 
less than industrial robots, their existence and presence “serve as 
technological indices of the country’s dominance.” 19  However, as in many 
other robot and cyborg narratives worldwide, these humanoid robots do not 
always act according to their creators’ wishes.  
In the Tetsuo films, robotics is correlated with the exploration of gender 
and nationality. Robertson points out that “the discourse on robots […] is as 
much, if not more, about social engineering as about nuts-and-bolts 
robotics.”20 Flowers argues, “The focus on external Others reinforces the idea 
of a homogeneous Japan and suggests that multicultural policies can contain 
external Others and perhaps provide an opening to recognizing internal 
Others.”21 Racial issues reappear in relation to the robot discourse in Tetsuo 
III. The protagonist of the film is Anthony, a half-Japanese salaryman married 
to a Japanese woman. The central premise of postwar nihonjinron writings, 
especially in the 1970s and 1980s, is that the Japanese are a homogeneous 
people (tan'itsu minzoku) who constitute a racially unified nation (tan'itsu 
minzoku kokka). 22  This image is maintained by consciously ignoring the 
presence of minorities in Japan. 23  Chris Burgess mentions that tan’itsu 
minzoku has been an important political tool even throughout the 1980s, 
1990s and 2000s. This was an answer to the postwar considerations of what it 
means to be Japanese, which reflected “not only the need to recover a sense of 
identity and pride amongst the Japanese after the loss of empire and the 
experience of occupation but also the increased visibility of the ‘Other’.”24 
Consequently, “Postwar Japan is neither an immigrant-friendly nor an 
                                                 
17 Schodt, Robot Kingdom, 122, 125 
18 The Advanced Robot Technology (ART) project, which started in 1983, introduced a model where 
corporations that participated in the project were able to use the results to benefit their businesses, 
whereas the know-how and patents reverted to the state (Schodt, ibid., 114–115, 213, 222).  
19 Robertson, Robo Sapiens, 17. However, it must be noted that the hype around robots, especially 
humanoid ones, must be separated from their actual status (Robertson, ibid., 31). 
20 Robertson, ibid., 62. 
21 Petrice Flowers, “From Kokusaika to tabunka kyousei: Global norms, discourses of difference and 
multiculturalism in Japan,” Critical Asian Studies 44, no. 4 (2012): 523. 
22 Ross E. Mouer and Sugimoto Yoshio, Images of Japanese society: A study in the structure of 
social reality (London: KPI, 1986), 406; Robertson, ibid., 122. Yoshino defines tan’itsu as “uniracial” 
(Cultural Nationalism, 24). 
23 Yoshino, Cultural Nationalism, 24–25. 
24 Burgess, “Homogenous Japan,” 2. He refers to zainichi Koreans in this particular case.  
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immigrant-dependent nation-state.”25  This does not apply only to postwar 
Japan: in the Meiji period, the idea of foreigners as dangerous was widely 
circulated, and it was heightened by the lack of government control over 
foreigners due to international agreements. Furthermore, difference in 
general is considered a threat in Japan.26  
Tetsuo III toys with the aforementioned idea. A result of a scientific 
experiment made by his megalomaniac American father, Anthony ties the 
irregular form of the “foreign salaryman” to the irregular form of Japanese 
national identity. He is a racial Other to the Japanese. Tetsuo III focuses on 
external others in order to strengthen the idea of inner homogeneity. The 
importance of robots lies in the way automation in general is preferred over 
migration, especially in elderly care. This is because, unlike migrant workers, 
humanoid robots know no cultural differences, nor do they inhabit any 
historical (wartime) memories. 27  Because robots are preferred above 
foreigners, the mutation of Anthony into a cyborg, or the revelation of him as 
a cyborg, is a warped process of incorporation into society. Simultaneously, 
this process unleashes his subversive power to challenge the nation from 
inside, revealing the underlying militaristic nature of his robotization. 
Following Robertson’s insights, robots can be Japanese, while foreigners are 
eternally Others. Anthony’s machinic origins must be made visible because “a 
machine” is preferred to “a half-Japanese,” a very explicit Other. This is 
demonstrated by the fact that a foreigner cannot be registered in the Japanese 
family register (koseki) as such, although he can be mentioned as a spouse or 
a father of a half-Japanese offspring in the “remarks” section.28 However, as 
Robertson notes, in 2010 the seal-shaped care robot Paro received his own 
koseki, granted by Nanto City in Toyama Prefecture, confirming the robot’s 
citizenship as Japanese. 29  Although half-Japanese and not completely a 
foreigner, Anthony gains his subversive powers only through his robotization.  
Whereas the first two Tetsuo films ended with the rampage of the man-
machines, the third installment allows for the reversal of the monstrous 
masculine form, leading to a situation where a character appears to be 
ordinary but the spectator knows he is actually somehow different. It is, 
however, impossible to decide if this is true or not since his bodily difference 
                                                 
25 Robertson, Robo Sapiens, 122. 
26  Flowers, “Tabunka kyousei,” 523. More recently, tabunka kyōsei (multicultural community 
building/multicultural integration/multicultural coexistence) has become an important part of policy 
discussions about diversity and difference in Japan (ibid., 529). 
27 Jennifer Robertson, “Gendering Humanoid Robots: Robo-Sexism in Japan,” Body & Society 16, 
no. 2 (2010): 9; Robertson, Robo Sapiens, 19. 
28 See “Kokusaikekkon, kaigai de no shussei nado ni kansuru koseki Q&A,” 国際結婚、海外での出
生等に関する戸籍 Q＆A [Koseki Q&A regarding international marriages and births abroad], Ministry of 
Justice, accessed August 5, 2018, http://www.moj.go.jp/MINJI/minji15.html. 
29 Robertson, Robo Sapies, 138–141. As noted, the concept of universal human rights and the process 
of their actual distribution over Japanese and non-Japanese residents is quite dubious (ibid., 142). 
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is never obvious. This confusion leads to anxiety that permeates the 
narrative.30 In Tetsuo III, it is only in the very final scene that it is suggested 
that Anthony has changed from the inside, despite the fact that he has reverted 
to his human form. The anxiety that permeates does not concern the fictional 
narrative but the real society. It is something very alike to the concerns present 
in the Henshin ningen films and Tanin no kao. To draw from Nakamura, as a 
result of mechanization—which itself in Tetsuo III is a parody of acquiring 
citizenship —the identity of both the individual and nation become uncertain. 
Anthony comes to realize he is not what he thinks he is (a normal salaryman). 
Subsequently, the image of a nation, too, is not as it is promoted. Rather, it is 
a split national identity, the revelation of the heterogeneous nature behind the 
official image.31  Tsukamoto’s metalmorphosis is a parody of a society that 
grants rights to robots but not foreigners. In order to gain rightful status in 
Japan, one has to become a cyborg, a hybrid. As a man-machine, Anthony is 
symbolically Japanized. However, this is not a tame sort of Japaneseness but 
a destructive, alternative, oppositional one. It is, in a way, an incorporation of 
the old thematic of “their dangerous science,” except in this case there is no 
brilliant Japanese science to conquer the threat. If the narrative (as anime, 
manga, fantasy and robot expos, among others) manifests what Sone calls “an 
anticipation of relationships with robots” as “products and producers of the 
social,” the anticipated relationship is quite monstrous, placing the monstrous 
salaryman as its center. If robots are used for “spectacularly showcasing 
Japanese science and technology,”32  all the Tetsuo films act as ironic and 
twisted counterparts.  
The robotics industry is trusted with the addressing of the country’s labor 
shortage in the face of a shrinking and rapidly aging society (shōshi kōreika).33 
In Tetsuo III, it is not only the salaryman who is robotized; his wife, too, is 
symbolically robotized. Recently, Deputy Prime Minister Asō Tarō suggested 
that one of Japan’s biggest problems consists of “those who didn’t give birth.”34 
In 2007, the health, labor and welfare minister Yanagisawa Hakuo 
unfortunately used (and glorified) the term umu kikai (child-bearing machine) 
when talking about the role of women.35 In Tetsuo III, Anthony is a machine-
                                                 
30 Nakamura, Monstrous Bodies, 2. 
31 Nakamura, “Horror and Machines,” 11. 
32 Sone, Robot Culture, 61. 
33 Ibid., 2. 
34 “Deputy PM Taro Aso apologizes after blaming childless for rising social security costs and graying 
population,” The Japan Times, last modified February 5, 2019, 
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35 Robertson, Robo sapiens, 75. This is closely related to the wartime policy of treating women as 
kodakara butai (fertile womb battalions) with the duty to produce offspring for the nation (Jennifer 
Robertson, “Robo Sapiens Japanicus: Humanoid Robots and the Posthuman Family,” Critical Asian 
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bodied offspring and his wife presumably works to create a new generation of 
machine-bodied offspring. The film thus utilizes not only the male myth of 
creation in the narrative between Anthony and his father, but also the socially 
questionable idea of women as child-bearing machines in the narrative 
between Anthony and his mother. Anthony’s second child, who is biracial, 
emphasizes the discussion around national borders and citizenry36 through 
the trope of a cyborg, much like his father.  
In 1937, pro-eugenicists called for the legalization of eugenics and racial 
improvement (minzoku yūsei hogo hōan), a proposal that was later 
implemented in 1940 as the National Eugenics Law (kokumin yūsei hō). With 
a long war looming on the horizon, the law promoted the nurturing of strong 
soldiers through healthy maternal bodies.37 Tetsuo III brilliantly ironizes this 
discourse. It should be noted that although eugenics as such belongs to history, 
contemporary society is by no means unaffected.38 Tessa Morris-Suzuki has 
put this brilliantly in the following:  
It would be more comforting … to believe that Japan's wartime 
expansion was driven by simple and unquestioned myths of a racially 
pure “family state” with the emperor as father figure. Such an image 
allows us to draw reassuring lines between past and present and 
between Japan and the rest of the world. Even if wartime myths of 
racial purity are seen as having survived into postwar Japanese 
society, this image still enables us to envisage such myths simply as 
bizarre relics of a receding past, whose influence might be expected to 
weaken over time. A closer look at wartime debates about race, 
however, forces us to confront the complexities of prejudice, 
ethnocentrism, and nationalist ideology and the multiplicity of the 
legacies of midcentury ideology for the late twentieth-century world.39 
 
Possibly the most important point that Robertson makes in her research on 
Japanese robotics is that they are currently being introduced into society and 
the consciousness of the general public as adopted members of the household. 
                                                 
Studies 39, no.3 [2007]: 371), as well as the ume yo, fuyase yo (propagate and multiply) movement by 
the Ministry of Welfare during the war (Robertson, “Biopower,” 337).  
36 Koikari, “Gender and Power,” 329. 
37 Fujino, Nihon fashizumu, quoted in Kawana, “Mad Scientists,” 112.  
38 See, for example, Ogino, “Reproductive Technologies” and Sone, Robot Culture. The postwar 
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39 Morris-Suzuki, Racial Science, 374. 
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Such is the role of Anthony. In addition, household robots are especially 
important for the government’s agenda, because they are seen as a means for 
providing elderly and child care, thereby making marriage and motherhood a 
more attractive choice for women.40 This is a neat manifestation of the general 
understanding of the way social circumstances shape technological change.41 
Tetsuo III robotizes both the mother and the wife of Anthony, making them an 
umu kikai. They become household robots. But this narrative is questioned 
through a sub-narrative where robot-girls give birth to internal others.  
The Tetsuo films are about evolution. In fact, Grossman calls the whole 
Tetsuo series “a Darwinian tango of natural selection.”42 And this is never 
merely a masculine matter. Society evolves with the help of robotics, but not 
necessarily in the direction willed by the government and enabled by science 
and technology. Historically, the overenthusiasm of scientists and the fervor 
that surrounded science has led to overconfidence in scientists and their 
methods, causing some real-life scandals regarding ethical medical practices. 
Consequently, the idea of science as omnipotent shifted to a more cautious 
stance.43 In 1989, a connection between Unit 731 and two respected postwar 
institutions, the Green Gross Corporation and the Institute for Preventive 
Medicine, was discovered. Especially what is referred to as “The Green Cross 
Corporation Scandal” set the public opinion against science; it was considered 
that for scientific purposes human life is taken too lightly.44 A similar stance is 
visible in the attitudes toward new reproductive technologies, as argued by 
Ogino (2007). According to her, there is a possibility that new reproductive 
technologies “can be utilized conveniently by either the state [sic], market, 
medicine, or even women themselves in such a way as to legitimize choices 
that are discriminatory or exploitative of some people.”45  
Released over fifty years after Chikyū bōeigun, the picture Tetsuo III paints 
of Japan’s attitude toward racial mixing is problematic. Whereas in Chikyū 
bōeigun Japanese women were ultimately saved from their horrible destinies 
by scientists, and they maintained their status as respectable women, Tetsuo 
III does not allow this to happen. Women lose their respectability due to their 
willingness to mate with foreigners and bear biracial offspring who, in the case 
of Tetsuo III, are doubly monstrous because of their blood has been tainted by 
scientific experimentations as well as foreign blood.46 Indeed, the mixing of 
races comprises the mixing of blood. As Yoshino points out, “The idiom 
                                                 
40 Robertson, Robo Sapiens, 11, 29. 
41 Wajcman, Technofeminism, 33. 
42 Grossman, “Tetsuo,” 140–141. 
43 Kawana, Murder Most Modern, 123–124. 
44  See Igarashi, Bodies of Memory, 179, 180. In 1999, hemophiliac patients received blood 
contaminated with the human immunodeficiencly virus, resulting in 200 people becoming infected.  
45 Ogino, “Reproductive Technologies,” 228. 
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‘Japanese blood’ is used in popular speech to refer to that aspect of Japanese 
identity which tends to be perceived as immutable by the Japanese.”47 This 
ideology is linked to imperialism and the idea of Japan as a nation state where 
everyone is related to each other and the emperor by blood. Jennifer 
Robertson notes that blood is a metaphor for shared heredity or ancestry, and 
that even the postwar constitution of 1947 underlined that Japanese 
nationality and citizenship were “matters of blood.” 48  Although a social 
construction itself, “Japanese blood” evokes a sense of stable national identity, 
an “us.”49  
7.2 CONSUMER MASCULINITIES 
To paraphrase Yoshino, after the war Japan lost its national pride and purpose 
because those were tied to the imperialist agenda and institution. Business and 
economic growth were seen as new national goals, beginning in the mid-1950s. 
This can be called “economic nationalism,” where GNP growth was used as a 
symbol for restored national pride. 50  Economic nationalism, however, is 
challenged through the portrayals of masculinities that are not concerned with 
economic activities. These perceived problematic forms of masculinities 
include hikikomori and consumer masculinities such as otaku. Hikikomori, a 
term originally coined by Saitō Tamaki in 1998, refers to “the phenomenon of 
social withdrawal or reclusiveness.”51 The phenomenon itself is quite new, 
because the act of being isolated as a model form of behavior has had different 
meanings over time. In the 1960s, because the labor market, schools and the 
family were all very different, the idea of hikikomori as currently 
conceptualized would probably have received little attention. Thus, the 
connotations represented by the hikikomori “are specific to a particular time 
and process,” with the notion of being isolated itself changing “according to 
historical and spatial location.”52  
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Kurosawa Kiyoshi’s existential kaiki film Kairo illustrates the hikikomori 
problem, tying the discourse together with considerations of national images 
and a model of scientific masculinity not previously discussed in this thesis. 
Whereas in the films discussed previously agents of scientific masculinity were 
social creators and producers, in Kairo they are consumers.  
In Japan, the meaning of a man’s home has shifted from a symbol of good-
natured workaholism to a place of consumption. According to Tessa Carroll, 
“the devotion of young Japanese to mobile phones, text-messages and the 
expansion of e-mail have increased concerns that they are less comfortable 
with face-to-face communication, which could be true especially in the absent 
father/working mother families.” 53  These are obviously normal features of 
contemporary family life all over the world, but also “consequences of social, 
economic, cultural and technological change.”54 The uncanny emergence of 
mass media in one’s living conditions has transformed the home: it becomes 
“both ordinary and familiar, and yet isolated, neglected, and dreadful.”55 This 
technological invasion has led to a situation where Others can no longer be 
avoided,56 disturbing the “belief in the sanctity of the home, the inside, the 
space inhabited by family, the familiar, the trusted, which exists in opposition 
to the dangerous, corrupted, unknown, threatening outside.”57 
In Kairo, everything seems to be related to computers and the menacing 
digital world of the Internet. The plot is structured along two parallel 
storylines of Kudō Michi and Kawashima Ryōsuke. First, Michi’s workmates 
start disappearing or committing suicide. Then Kawashima buys a computer 
with Internet access. Eventually Kawashima’s computer logs into a weird 
website, asking if he is willing to meet a ghost (yūrei). While looking for help 
for his IT problems, he meets a fellow student, Harue, to whom he becomes 
attached. Despite the two growing closer, Harue also vanishes. Michi and 
Kawashima meet by accident in a deserted Tokyo, where the apocalypse is 
about to occur, and escape together to a small ship with an unknown 
destination. 
In Kairo, Kawashima is unwilling to become a “proper” salaried worker. 
While not a hikikomori per se, the discourse is recalled as a symbol of this 
exclusion from the activities of society. As Horiguchi, drawing from Saitō, 
points out, the most critical part of the hikikomori condition is the inability or 
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unwillingness to participate in society.58 Concepts such as hikikomori, otaku 
and sōshokukei danshi (herbivore man)59 call for an investigation of the moral 
panic around young men’s resistance to the hegemonic salaryman idea. As 
Slater and Galbraith point out, “Masculinity in Japan is not about exercising 
natural or animal potentials, but rather being willing to take part in, and 
contribute to, some collective project.”60 In these cases, the projects can be 
seen as a contribution to the economic growth of Japan, or a contribution to 
the tackling of its demographic crisis. The rise of irregular workers, according 
to Slater and Galbraith, showcases “the dissolution of key components of the 
postwar Japan national project in an age of precarious labor.”61 
This is exemplified by Kawashima. Instead of producing technology, he 
consumes it. Clammer describes late-1990s Japan as a society “apparently 
committed to consumption as a way of life.”62 This is also related to class and 
stratification, which, according to Clammer, is based on symbolic status 
competition heavily implicated in acts of consumption in everyday life. 
Clammer sees status competition being pursued largely through the 
acquisition, display and exchange of things in everyday life.63 This role has 
traditionally been reserved for women, because men have been the creators of 
goods that women consume. As noted by Itō, the emergence of Japanese 
consumer society (together with service and information society) initially 
meant the promotion of women as important economic agents, and it worked 
to diminish male power.64 In fact, Asada Akira locates the feminine (maternal 
principle) at the very heart of Japanese capitalism.65 
Related to the postwar national imagery is the symbolic “feminization” of 
Japan. Japanese feminist scholar Ueno Chizuko argues that both the policy of 
opening up the country by force during the Meiji Restoration and imposing 
unequal treaties which favored the West and U.S. Occupation were 
comparable to the rape of Japan.66 Koikari Mire opts to use the rhetoric of an 
invader versus the invaded. 67  The logic continues in Igarashi Yoshikuni’s 
writings, which argue that in the immediate postwar period, the United States 
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was gendered as a male who rescued and converted Japan who played the role 
of a desperate woman. Hirohito’s so-called divine decision to end the war 
participated in this drama by accepting the superior power of the United 
States. 68  This process of feminization was halted by the period of high 
economic growth and the image of the kigyō senshi, the fighting Japanese 
salarymen. However, as Japan was faced with the serious recession of the 
1990s, this masculinized nature of Japan itself came to be questioned. Slater 
and Galbraith propose that such instability symbolically “feminizes” men, 
which is why compromised class and work statuses erode the foundations of 
male respectability.69 
If Japanese masculinity has been about escaping the perceived 
feminization after WWII, to place emphasis on the consumer side of 
masculinity stands in exact contrast. Already in the 1960s, the way Japanese 
dandies paid attention to their looks was a departure from traditional 
masculinity. Men were not supposed to care about their style, nor were they 
supposed to consume. This illustrates a shift from the state-promoted ideal of 
corporate masculinity to market masculinity, which also posits men once more 
as feminine. 70  Hence, consumer masculinities are problematic. They 
contradict the idea of patriarchy, supported in everyday life by the 
daikokubashira.  
In Kairo, contemporary anxiety spreads through computers as a curse of 
loneliness. Nakayama highlights unemployment, work alienation and 
infringement of privacy in a controlled society as the main three types of 
negative social impact of computers.71 All are highlighted in Kairo in an ironic 
take on what Moore calls “technological imaginary,” the means of power that 
operates also on the level of people’s hopes and desires, directing them toward 
nationalist objectives by harnessing technology.72 In Kairo, technology and 
technological nationalism work with exactly opposite logic. Technology 
becomes a form of power of excluding oneself from productive social practices, 
a means of consumption, in complete opposition to the ideal of men as creators, 
which has persisted in the real-life ideologies and fictional narratives 
discussed in this thesis. As Iles points out, “this lost feeling of ‘being at home’ 
is in fact a lost sense of self, a lost sense of identity operational within one 
particular generational group which had previously been highly motivated by 
a strong sense of devotion to a national agenda of growth and reclamation of 
economic stability.”73 
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Consumer masculinities such as Kawashima’s are especially worrisome 
because, as suggested by Billig, through patterns of consumption national 
identities can be transcended. Because consumers can change these patterns, 
they can switch between identities. This leads to the diminishing of “the 
nationally imagined identity,” because consumers are no longer loyal to the 
national community but their “imagined ‘life-style’ groups of consumers.” 
Billig concludes that “the processes of globalization, which are diminishing 
differences and spaces between nations, are also fragmenting the imagined 
unity within these nations.”74 If the transformation of Japan to a consumer-
oriented nation started as early as the immediate postwar era, 75  the 
transformation is complete in Kairo.  
In one scene of the film, Kawashima is in a game center; once exiting, 
however, he finds it completely empty. Lam argues that the entertainment 
venues and leisure businesses symbolized the bubble economy (1986–1991) 
and were hit the hardest by the following recession.76 Kawashima’s solitary 
moment in the game center, surrounded only by the bling of the machines 
themselves, emphasizes the loss caused by economic nationalism. This 
vanishing of the patriarchal imagery and, subsequently, of the image of Japan 
as No. 1 is especially prominent in the way Kawashima simply fades away at 
the end of the film, paving way for the emergence of strong women in creating 
the Japan of the new millennium. Kairo presents the connection between 
technological nationalism and scientific masculinity as absurd. In fact, when 
discussing the character of Kawashima, it can be argued that what he 
represents is in fact “unscientific masculinity.” Kawashima can be regarded as 
symptomatic of the otaku phenomenon, promoted as one of the new leading 
developments of masculinity in Japan. 77  Previously, Susan Napier has 
analyzed Densha otoko, a television series from 2005, whose protagonist she 
sees as an embodiment of so-called “technologized masculinity” or 
“technomasculinity.” The series promotes technomasculinity of otaku as 
something lighthearted—a vision where technology can be an important way 
of mediating human emotions such as love.78 Napier sees the message of the 
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series as “a national wish-fulfilling fantasy” that tries to ensure that humanity 
still exists behind all recent applications of technology.79  
The outlook by Kairo, released four years before Densha otoko, is quite the 
opposite. Kairo portrays a technological apocalypse. The film uses 
Kawashima’s unscientific masculinity to highlight the fact that the ideal of a 
technological utopia has failed, that technology has transformed preferable 
gender roles into ones that no longer support societal growth. In Kairo, 
consumer masculinities trespass on virtual boundary spaces and use them to 
create transnational identities that no longer work for the concrete purpose of 
strengthening national interests. Schnellbächer points out that in hard science 
fiction, the role occupied by oceans, interstellar space and cyberspace is 
essentially the same. 80  In addition, Lowenstein explains that while 
technologies are marketed as strategies for erasing boundaries between people, 
“in the process it is not just the boundaries that are erased, but people as well.81 
Thus, the shift from cyberspace to the vast, empty ocean is symbolic. This 
draws a parallel to Schnellbächer’s commentary about the Pacific as one of the 
most important topoi in Japanese science fiction. The ocean symbolizes a new 
beginning, not a past system. The current order must be annihilated in order 
for something new to be born.  
7.3 SCIENTIFIC FEMININITY 
Technology and gender hegemony are closely tied together. In this case, 
technology can refer to the sphere of science as a whole, quite distinctly lacking 
a female presence, as demonstrated previously in this thesis. The situation is 
illuminated by Gojira, which, despite being politically critical, takes a 
conservative stance toward gender. Rational men want to keep secret Gojira’s 
emergence and the connection between the H-bomb, radioactivity and the 
monster, while women want to inform the public. A quarrel ensues. The scene 
not only demonstrates the effects of the foundational narrative, but also points 
to the way in which women were pioneers in the anti-nuclear movement in 
Japan in the 1950s, demanding action against the United States in the wake of 
the Bikini incident. 82  As Dudden points out, the Bikini crisis was a 
manifestation of the government’s failure to provide official compensation for 
the victims of common disasters.83 Thus, women represent the victimized side, 
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whereas the whole discourse works to promote a state-led mission of scientific 
excellence. 
Comparing the original Gojira and Shin-Gojira also makes clear the 
changing attitudes toward gender. In the first film, women are quite directly 
excluded from the sphere of science. In Shin-Gojira, however, an alternative 
way of participation is promoted by Yaguchi, the only politician who, once 
facing the huge wreckage and destruction caused by Gojira’s first form, pays 
his respects to the dead. He is helped by (Japanese) scientists who, in this case, 
are no longer only male. Rather, one of the central scientists is a female, 
comparable in status with the men around her. Shin-Gojira promotes hybrid 
models of gender in contemporary Japan, emphasizing one’s abilities over sex 
and age. Furthermore, in Nihon chinbotsu (2006), despite being somewhat of 
a pastiche, order is taken by a female politician upon the death of the Prime 
Minister. She then works together with a masculine agent of science (her ex-
husband) in order to solve the crisis, creating a multileveled model of 
male/female participation in areas previously deemed masculine (politics and 
science).  
Frühstück and Walthall argue that hikikomori is a crisis of masculinity that 
demonstrates the oppression of men by other men. 84  Kairo suggests that 
hikikomori and other problematic young masculinities are also representative 
of the oppression of men by women. Wee proposes that contemporary horror 
privileges technology, emotion, uncontrollable femininity, supernatural anger, 
and death over more stereotypical views of technology as implicitly masculine, 
scientific, and rational. 85  This corresponds to what Connell states as a 
common theme in the patriarchal ideology, namely, that men are rational and 
women are emotional.86 This subsection argues otherwise. Technology is a 
system of power: 87  “While technology might appear gender neutral, 
technological innovations often serve to empower some groups in society and 
marginalize others.”88 In Kairo, men are subordinated and marginalized while 
women are empowered. By highlighting the fact that suicide images on 
computers are masculine, it is clear that the film is willing to disturb the notion 
of technology as a predominantly masculine domain. It promotes a situation 
where Japan’s “knowledge-intensive” society disintegrates.89  
To paraphrase feminist scholar Donna Haraway, technologies and 
scientific discourses can be understood as instruments for enforcing meanings. 
Especially new technologies reformulate “expectations, culture, work, and 
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reproduction.”90 As Haraway and Shioda discuss, rapid technologization of 
the growth era meant the development of robotics and automated technologies 
that replaced the experienced male workforce with unskilled female labor. 
This means that men in advanced industrial societies have become vulnerable 
to job loss and it is this vulnerability—the possibility of being disassembled, 
reassembled, and exploited—that comes to signify the feminization of work.91 
This feminization takes place in Kairo, where Kawashima and Harue’s 
relationship proceeds to disturb the coding of gender in relation to technology.  
Kawashima represents an antithesis of the rational, intellectual scientific 
masculinity that especially the 1950s and 1960s films projected. His 
masculinity is a type of “unscientific masculinity,” an alternative not only to 
the hegemonic masculinity in Japan but also to the rational, scientific 
masculinity demanded by technological nationalism. He does not contribute 
to the creation of knowledge, he consumes it. In breaking away from both 
visions, Kawashima becomes an antithesis to Japan’s vision of becoming a 
technological superpower. Interestingly, his whole existence is portrayed as a 
counterpart to that of Harue. In Japan, men wield symbolic power, but women 
have the micro-power that controls everyday life. 92  As Attebery notes, 
constructing the masculine self is immensely more complicated when women 
become autonomous, when being a man does not only mean being not 
womanish. 93  Thus, to exaggerate by generalizing, the postwar ideal of a 
corporate warrior might have been an easy choice because manliness, in that 
model, equaled not being womanish. In the recent light, however, Kawashima, 
although sympathetic, also portrays many characteristics that are considered 
problematic.  
Emma Cook points out that masculinity is not merely parallel to one’s job 
status, but “the provision of stability and ability to care for families.” 94 
However, as Mathews demonstrated, playing the role of a breadwinner is no 
longer enough. 95  Despite this, men who for some reason or other do not 
achieve the status of a salaryman may face a variety of social pressures, 
because, as McLelland puts it, “social respectability” is achieved in the act of 
conforming to social expectations. 96  Martinez points out that men in the 
margins are considered dangerous, and this danger is neutralized by their 
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becoming white-collar workers. 97  Thus, men are attributed the double 
responsibility of providing both emotional and economic support. Although 
Kawashima excels at the former, he lacks in the latter. In a way conforming to 
Barrett’s archetype of “a weak, passive male,” his are not the shoulders on 
which the future of Japan lies.98 
Kurosawa promotes an answer in the form of his women. Low notes that 
gendered socialization can sometimes be seen in differential access to new 
technologies.99 Because of the Internet’s ability to “transform conventional 
gender roles,” it can be thought of as a site where freedom is gained from the 
traditional patriarchal world.100 In Kairo, Harue is portrayed as a tech-savvy 
and even economically independent young woman, her manshon being thrice 
the size of Kawashima’s small apaato.101 She incorporates the technological 
knowledge traditionally received for men. 102  To paraphrase Kuwahara, the 
nationalistic promotion of science and technology in the 1980s was combined 
with the deep-rooted notion of gender that promoted science and technology 
as men’s sphere. This “techno-nationalism combined with masculine ideology” 
led to many women losing interest in science and technology and thus, to their 
exclusion from the field. However, Japan cannot afford this any longer. The 
Third Industrial Revolution, also known as the Digital Revolution, is at hand, 
calling for fundamental changes in the nature of labor. Kuwahara concludes 
that it just might be that under these circumstances, “the barriers that have 
limited the participation of women may collapse.”103 Consequently, this might 
change society at large; as Cockburn and Ormrod note, “The more women 
engineers, the more likely it is that the technological outcome will be 
different.”104  
Drawing from Huyssen (1986), Sone discusses the female robot in Fritz 
Lang’s Metropolis (1927). Some of these insights about women and technology 
can be adjusted to fit the debate about Kairo. Harue is portrayed as a machine-
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woman, an emblem of the wish to create “an ideal woman through 
technological means.”105 This practice, however, is “fraught with anxiety about 
both woman and technology,”106 as Harue’s case demonstrates. Whereas the 
machine-woman has symbolized the harnessing of the feminine (creational) 
power by men, Harue transcends this, mastering the use of technology herself. 
This is not a narrative of creating an ideal woman through technological 
means—the ideal woman becomes the technological means, the creator. She 
exceeds men in her capabilities, incorporating both modes of creation into 
herself. She is the beacon for the future of Japan. However, Harue’s 
technological abilities do not save her from the curse of loneliness and death. 
Kurosawa directly addresses not only the gender-specificity of science and 
technology but also the situation in society. Morris Low suggests that, 
ultimately, there “are aspects of Japanese society and culture that work against 
the Japanese realizing their hopes for a hi-tech future.”107  
Kairo ends after Michi and Kawashima, having accidentally met, find out 
that Harue, too, has succumbed to the wave of suicides. They manage to escape 
to a ship heading for Latin America. Affected by Harue’s suicide, Kawashima 
loses his will to live and becomes but a stain on the wall of the ship. During an 
era when, despite all the alternatives, the notion of “becoming a man” 
(ichininmae ni naru) seems to be fundamentally unchanged, Kawashima’s 
silent revolution is to no avail.108 Reality of the contemporary Japan has never 
been portrayed more bleakly than through Kurosawa’s fantastic lens. 
Kawashima is too far gone to even become a monster. He just disappears. His 
unscientific masculinity that goes against every state ideal—except, perhaps, 
the fact that he is more kind than anyone else—does its best to reveal the cost 
of a particular image of a nation that Japan has done its best to uphold.  
7.4 SPACE FANTASIES  
Space research in Japan has been carried out simultanously at academic 
institutions and at the Science and Technology Agency, but only recently have 
serious attempts been made to coordinate all Japan’s space activities. 109 
HAYABUSA is one of the most prominent successes Japan has achieved in the 
field. HAYABUSA was a Muses-C project space probe created by the Japan 
Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA). It was launched in 2003 and reached 
its destination, the asteroid Itokawa, in September 2005. It managed to collect 
samples from the asteroid but was damaged in the process. Various system 
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malfunctions, such as an engine failure, led to HAYABUSA’s prolonged 
journey back home, the probe reaching Earth only in June 2010. A four-year 
mission had turned into a seven-year one. The story of the probe was barely 
known to the public during its early years, although the collecting of samples 
from Itokawa managed to attract some attention. However, because of the 
challenging and adventurous nature of its mission, a “world’s first” mission of 
a sort, its imminent landing on Earth drew the full attention of the public.110 
With the aim of filming the probe’s success story, JAXA immediately started 
collaboration with no less than three production companies. HAYABUSA, 
Hayabusa – haruka naru kikan and Okaeri Hayabusa were released within 
the space of six months. 
The three HAYABUSA films were released during a period when Japan was 
under the admonishing gaze of the rest of the world. This gaze was centered 
not only on the country’s politics but also on its technology. As McGormack 
puts it, referring to the catastrophic unraveling of events at Fukushima in 2011, 
“for the country whose scientific and engineering skills are the envy of the 
world to have been guilty of the disastrous miscalculations and malpractices 
… and then to have been reduced to desperate attempts with fire hoses and 
buckets to prevent a catastrophic melt-down in 2011, raises large questions not 
just for Japan but for humanity.”111 The reputation of Japan as a technological 
superpower was at stake. 
The films introduce an intriguing combination of economic, cultural and 
technological nationalisms in order to create the picture of a contemporary 
savior-scientist, who symbolizes Japan as a phoenix rising from the ashes of 
the recession. Morris Low argues that once businessmen were promoted as 
“modern-day warriors,” attention was taken away from the role scientists 
played in the making of a new Japan.112 This is despite the fact that capitalism 
is inherently interested in the application of new technologies, because with 
their help it can control the labor force and maximize profitability. 
Technological revolution itself can be seen as a feature of the capital 
accumulation process. 113  The HAYABUSA films redeem this situation, 
promoting Japanese scientists as the nation’s modern-day heroes and warriors. 
As opposed to the models of alternative masculinities and liberation fantasies 
provided by many other kaiki eiga, HAYABUSA films strengthen the idea of 
hegemonic masculinity and the power of patriarchy.  
I have categorized the HAYABUSA films as fictions of science rather than 
science fiction. The notion of speculation will be addressed later. The films 
should be analyzed as a cluster in order to construct a picture of 21st-century 
Japanese society, including its challenges and scenarios for the future. In the 
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first one (HAYABUSA), the main character is a young woman who finds 
purpose for her life through her employment at JAXA. Shōchiku’s Okaeri 
Hayabusa, in turn, is reminiscent of Shōchiku’s production strategy of 
shomingeki films, established already in the 1950s when Kido Shirō became 
CEO of the company.114 The importance of family becomes a key element, 
while as an outside force manipulated by Japanese superior scientists 
HAYABUSA makes these familial bonds stronger. On the contrary, Hayabusa 
– Haruka naru kikan is possibly most concerned with the issue of masculine 
working ethics and the battle of science between the U.S. and Japan. Families 
are referred to but not really addressed, apart from the relationship between 
the female journalist Inoue and her space-enthusiast father.  
7.4.1 THE SAVIOR-SCIENTIST RE-EMERGES 
In the previous subchapters I have demonstrated how the underlining anxiety 
around symbolic “feminization” appears to be an important part of the 
postwar model of masculinity. There is always the threat of feminization, 
unless a man dedicates himself to his work as a kigyō senshi. The HAYABUSA 
films halt this process of feminization, providing empowerment fantasies 
mediated by scientific masculinity. This discourse is especially prominent in 
Haruka naru kikan, which thoroughly works toward the remasculation of the 
Japanese male and the reestablishment of power and authority at his hands.  
The HAYABUSA films present the complete transformation of a Japanese 
male from emasculated salaryman to an empowered individual who leads the 
Japanese toward new glory. All of the films are situated against the backdrop 
of scientific nationalism or technonationalism. In the films, Japan is 
represented as a mighty technological world power created through the hard 
work of scientifically minded men. The probe itself is a manifestation of “the 
staging of Japanese technologies against the West for the Japanese audience, 
with ideological goals.” 115  As Schodt notes, “Having adjusted to Japan’s 
‘overnight’ economic miracle [the rest of the world] must now come to terms 
with the emerging Japanese technological superstate.”116 If economic success 
solved Japan’s immediate postwar problems, technological success will solve 
its 21st-century problems. To cite Tsutsumi Yukihiko, the director of 
HAYABUSA,  
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I think the relentless spirit of the project team as they pushed ahead 
made an impression on us all. There was a time in Japan when we said 
"Japan is Number One," but after the economic bubble collapsed in the 
late 1980s, they say that we lost hope. I believe that sort of thinking is 
still extremely prominent in Japanese society nowadays, but I think 
the effect of this project, which started out with some serious 
disadvantages, is that it gave hope to the Japanese people. I myself 
received a message of hope from HAYABUSA.117 
 
Hope, in this case, is not merely about “rescuing” Japan, but also establishing 
the country as a worthy technological opponent of the U.S. The awe before 
Japanese technology is echoed and internalized by Yoshikawa of JAXA: “All 
the asteroids the United States has explored are tens of kilometers in diameter, 
while Itokawa is only 535 meters wide. Itokawa is so different from the ones 
I’ve seen, maybe because it’s such a small asteroid. Anyway, I was 
astonished.” 118  Even Tsutsumi commented, “The budget was small. There 
were all kinds of factors against Japan being able to launch a space probe. 
Another thing is that Japan’s space exploration program is small compared to 
America’s and Russia’s. I think the really wonderful thing about the 
HAYABUSA project is that it used good ideas to overcome all these 
disadvantages.” 119  This tells about the deep-rooted belief in Japan’s 
technonationalism, which should be mediated by men, that lies at the center 
of the films.  
The poster of Hayabusa – Haruka naru kikan showcases a bunch of 
Japanese engineers with Watanabe Ken pompously standing in the middle 
with the sleeves of his uniform, the eponymous white shirt, rolled up. One has 
to look very closely to see “the token female,” the reporter Inoue, standing 
among the men. Above the group there is a text: “Nihon no otoko wa, 
akiramenai” (Japanese men don’t give up). By putting a comma between the 
theme clause and the verb akiramenai, even more emphasis is placed on the 
fact that it is specifically Japanese men who do not give up. In the course of 
the film, these men fight for their nation via the means of science. Their 
existence provides hope for the ever-ailing Japanese people.120  
In Okaeri Hayabusa, families are shown watching the television broadcast 
on HAYABUSA’s return to Earth. One of the “families” consists of a lone 
Japanese middle-aged man, who sits alone in front of his computer. His 
position is eerily similar to the sealed-off people in Kurosawa’s Kairo. 
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However, with the success of HAYABUSA, everything changes. “I will go back 
to work!” he shouts out loud after hearing about the extraordinary 
achievements of Japanese men. If being a hikikomori is defined as “the 
struggle with or resistance to growing up,” 121  then Japanese science and 
technology is posited as the vessel for maturity. In HAYABUSA, the female 
protagonist also journeys through a metamorphosis, from an awkward girl to 
an experienced lecturer with an aura of expertise. Her metamorphosis is 
obviously a result of the superiority of the characters around her, who embody 
scientific masculinity.  
The function of scientific masculinity is that of a ganbariya, 122  to 
encourage the Japanese (men) to work harder because only hard work brings 
results and pride to the nation. Scientists are there to elicit emotions of loyalty 
toward the state and pride in a very ie-esque sense. Thus, their stance toward 
the hegemonic ideal is utterly conservative. The emphasis on “Japanese” in 
“Japanese men” also calls for an inspection about the “J-culture.” The critic 
Asada Akira (2000) has argued that the use of the letter “J” helps to anchor 
anything including it into a certain time of Japanese history. He sees the 
emergence of the so-called “J-culture” as a response to the postmodern 
cosmopolitan capitalism of the 1980s during the economically unstable Lost 
Decade of the 1990s. 123  Asada talks about J-kaiki, “the return to the J,” 
obviously referring to the “Nihon e no kaiki” movement of the 1920s and 1930s, 
which, according to Hutchinson and Williams, meant “the return to Japan” 
after years of Westernization, leading to a situation where “the often obsessive 
patriotism of the war years elevated ‘Japaneseness’ to an almost consecrated 
state of being.”124 In the context of the HAYABUSA narrative, this process 
should be seen not merely as a process of empowering Japanese men but, in 
the larger context, as a process of promoting a strong national identity after a 
period of adversities. Out of the films discussed in this thesis, the HAYABUSA 
films most prominently engage with the creation of a certain type of an 
imagined community. 
The process of empowerment is portrayed not only at the level of the 
characters, but also at the level of the probe itself. In the first film HAYABUSA, 
on the arrival of the probe on Earth, it is noted that the project director 
Kawabuchi called HAYABUSA “HAYABUSA-kun” for the first time. The suffix 
-kun is normally reserved for addressing young males, and hence it is clear 
that HAYABUSA is finally masculinized.125 HAYABUSA offers insight into this 
process by visualizing the journey of the probe in almost an eroticized manner. 
After its launch, HAYABUSA sheds its outer layers in what I call “a techno-
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representation” of an act of undressing. The camera revolves around the probe, 
creating an almost voyeuristic tone in the scene. Scientists are shown admiring 
the probe like men admire the female body. HAYABUSA has also been given a 
voice of its own—a clearly female voice although it does refer to itself as boku, 
the “I” that young males commonly use. As long as HAYABUSA malfunctioned 
and experienced technical difficulties, it was primarily associated with the 
feminine. At the point of its final success, however, it became masculinized.126 
This event is noteworthy enough to be highlighted by various lines, such as 
“Director Kawabuchi finally called ‘him’ HAYABUSA-kun!” This is only after 
HAYABUSA’s return, once the mission has been accomplished.  
7.4.2 STASIS AND RETRO-TECH 
Sone argues that robots provide a fantasized medium “that perversely reveals 
something of Japan’s reluctance in the present to let go of its once-gleaming 
dreams for the future.” 127  In Tetsuo, the robotized male cyborg and the 
destruction of the salaryman mark the end of these dreams. HAYABUSA-as-
a-robot, in turn, emphasizes these dreams. In the films, robots can be seen as 
metaphors “for the relationship between the Japanese people and their 
technology.”128 It is clear that the view offered by the HAYABUSA films is a 
way to connect “Japan’s cultural past to its technologized future.” 129  This 
technologized future, however, is very retro-tech.130 Regarding the Innovation 
25 project discussed at length by Robertson, technology is used not to create 
new solutions but to renew old values. Robertson calls this “a future imagined 
as an improved […] version of the past” and “the application of advanced 
technology in the service of traditionalism.”131 As Schodt notes, technology is 
becoming less and less culture-specific, but “the application of technology, the 
way in which it is approached, and the direction in which it is pushed can be 
profoundly influenced by people’s collective expectations, their history, and 
their culture.”132 This is exactly the goal of the films. In the process they create 
an image of a nation that is trying to build a future based on past glory. This is 
exemplified by the ways in which scientific masculinity is constructed as a type 
of rational, salaryman-based ideal—an ideal that the young nowadays question.  
Gordon Mathews has explored the shifting Japanese masculinity during a 
span of twenty years. Around the year 1990, being a man in Japan consisted 
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of working for the family with no room for personal hopes and needs. Twenty 
years later, the same men stressed the growing importance of the family for 
manhood. As Mathews notes, it might be assumed that this shift is an 
unambiguously good thing: both husbands and wives are freed from their 
separate spheres and can thus become more equal and finally share their lives 
fully with each other. However, in many cases the disconnection between old 
expectations and new ideologies has only created interpersonal strains.133 Men 
feel like they have been forced to change more than women, because The Lost 
Decade has seriously cut their prospects and possibilities; 134  permanent 
lifetime employment, for example, is no longer so certain, even for employees 
of relatively elite organizations.135 The family is still a site of potentially large 
personal failures. Greater choice brings about greater existential pain, as is 
visible in the films analyzed in this thesis. Hence, the HAYABUSA films place 
its protagonists purely in the sphere of work, where no new anxieties can be 
felt.  
As Dasgupta notes, “Sites of pop culture serve to produce and reproduce 
the hegemonic discourse.”136 The HAYABUSA films offer a fantastic view on 
this. The protagonists of HAYABUSA are middle-aged men devoid of any 
youthful sentiments of rebellion. They are the very models of what Sontag 
describes as a “technocratic man, purged of emotions, volitionless, tranquil, 
obedient to all others.”137 In the HAYABUSA films, space technology offers a 
means for promoting hard-working, scientific masculinity as superior to other 
masculinities. The fictional boys’ world can be seen to function as what 
Dasgupta calls “an important means of instruction in how to correctly perform 
salaryman masculinity both within and outside the workplace.”138 Young men 
learn a lesson in the ways of the future corporate soldiers and the logic of Japan, 
Inc. through fights in the boys’ world. A similar point is made by Kume Yoriko, 
according to whom the boys’ and girls’ worlds function as imitations of their 
mothers’ and father’s lives. Suiting-up—wearing the salaryman’s tie and suit—
is their metamorphosis, a transformation for which the only aim is to maintain 
conservative social values. 139  This is one more expression of the inherent 
cultural essentialism in the films. 
Timothy Iles notes that gender in Japanese cinema “is often understood as 
a device to maintain the privilege of masculinist hegemony.” 140  The 
HAYABUSA films paint a picture of a patriarchal culture which is 
simultaneously male-dominated (cultural institutions are overrepresented by 
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men), male-identified (people utilize male norms to determine values and the 
worthiness of a human being) and male-centered (members of a culture 
largely focus on men’s activities). 141 Hidaka argues that the reason behind 
Japan’s strong patriarchal system is that men from the mid-1920s to the 
present day are socialized in various contexts (families, schools, work) into 
thinking that they are superior merely because they are male. This also means 
socialization into the idea that paternity is based on their ability to provide for 
the family, which subsequently leads to the strong will to maintain their status 
as “corporate warriors.” This not only retains their position in the family but 
in society.142 And, as this thesis shows, this is ultimately representative of the 
will to retain the position of Japan in the world.  
While the works analyzed in this study generally subvert this model, the 
HAYABUSA films explicitly promote it. Herein lies their antithetical stance. 
They are not antithetical in relation to science and technology, but in relation 
to inexorable changes in society. They represent exactly “the persistence of the 
middle-class masculine ideals.” 143  While projected as an ideal model of 
contemporary Japanese masculinity, this static view of middle-agedness is, in 
fact, quite uncanny in a literal sense of the word. It is a model that is not only 
terrifying but terrifying exactly because of the eerie feeling of familiarity. The 
worldview of the films is drawn from Saitō’s “boys’ world,” where the central 
feature is an international military organization in which all the members from 
top to the bottom are Japanese. Technology often equals weapons and robots, 
and the ones who develop them are genius scientists; these doctors and senior 
researchers are bound to cause awe in everyone. Like true geniuses, they do 
everything from planning to building themselves—and within a very limited 
time. In addition, the social structure of these organizations is not a 
democratic one, but instead takes a pyramid shape and is thus representative 
of a tate-shakai.144  
The HAYABUSA films promote masculine superiority and authority, as 
well as a lingering sense of ie-esque loyalty. Haruka naru kikan emits an aura 
of distinctive nationalism, where technology is used as a means of revitalizing 
the Japanese society and the hierarchical relations that were also promoted by 
the ie model.145 After a breakthrough in solving the difficulties encountered by 
the probe, sempai Fujinaka invites his kōhai Kamata to share a bottle of wine 
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with him, bestowed upon them by Yamaguchi.146 Kamata declines, stating that 
he has promised to help his son with his mathematics homework. Fujinaka 
rolls his eyes and with a stern voice states that “your son has a genius as a 
father, he needs no help!” Having been assured of the lack of necessity of 
returning home, Kamata looks somewhat relieved. “Okay,” he says, and the 
two wander off to enjoy the wine. 147  This particular scene emphasizes the 
importance of homosociality. In order to gain the full status of a salaryman, 
the relationships between colleagues and bosses became more important than 
those with the family.148 Broken promises mean nothing if the alternative is 
the perfection of a masculine corporate relationship. Women exist but only 
men can save Japan. This suggestion seems to be very fantastic indeed.  
Technology as such is neither scary nor monstrous. In Grodal’s terms, it 
lacks intentionality. But it can be made to represent some monstrous life form 
of its own, a situation where “the increasing penetration of (digital) 
technologies” is seen as greatly affecting the younger generation.149 Cockburn 
and Ormrod refer to this as “technofear,” “an alienation towards technology; a 
fear of its unknown powers; and a nervousness concerning one’s ability to 
understand and use it.”150 Still, there is nothing unusual about this so-called 
“anti-science disease,” because it has, in fact, been with mankind ever since 
the earliest applications of technology. 151  This fearful stance toward the 
application of technology is, however, in stark contrast with Japan’s vision of 
becoming a technological superpower. Based on the discussion above, I am 
willing to suggest that in this case it is actually about technology in relation to 
repressed forms of masculinity that is inherently worrisome. As Yoshikawa 
argues, “Our image of the future does rely on technology.”152 This technology, 
however, needs to be free from gender politics.  
It should be noted, however, that the HAYABUSA films do, in a way, 
challenge the hegemonic salaryman ideal despite promoting patriarchal 
hegemony. This is where the idea of a hybrid masculinity comes under closer 
scrutiny. Although not really salarymen per se, the scientists work for their 
(big) company (JAXA) and sacrifice their family and personal lives in the 
process. With a stable income, their role as a daikokubashira is implied. As a 
                                                 
146 Sempai and kōhai are Japanese terms that denote the hierarchy between two people. Sempai is 
the “upperclassman,” the senior at work, or, for example, parenting. Kōhai is the more unexperienced 
person. Situations in which these terms appear are varied, but in all cases they emphasize seniority and 
hierarchy.  
147 In this particular scenario, the compulsory drinking is emphasized. A closer inspection of this 
custom and its social effects is called for. It is analyzed in detail, for example, by Borovoy (2007) and 
touched upon by Allison (1993), but it is out of the scope of this thesis, however. 
148 Shinjitsu, Sarariiman manga, 45. 
149 Wee, American Remakes, 77. 
150 Cockburn and Ormrod, Gender & Technology, 121. 
151 Kimura, Science Edge, 28. 
152 Yoshikawa, Lost Decade, 219. 
 211 
machine, HAYABUSA is a symbol of “a long-lasting homosociality among men 
and between men and machines,” a form of masculinity where “machines and 
the knowledge of machines serve as a focal point in which different forms of 
hegemonic masculinity are maintained.”153  
This new ideal is a fusion of scientific rational masculinity and salaryman 
masculinity, a model that is shown to supersede all other masculinities. Hybrid 
masculinities are often suggested to promote models where men are free to 
assimilate nontraditional attributes into their masculinities without losing 
their patriarchal power and status as “men.” In the HAYABUSA films, the new 
hybrid model is one that is based on the previous model of the hegemonic 
salaryman masculinity, spiced up with a techno-scientific understanding that 
strengthens Japan’s status as a technological superpower among world 
nations. Men create “truly gendered spaces through their interaction and 
relationships with machines,” constructing “a form of hegemonic masculinity 
based mostly on mechanical skills.”154 This is a call for a real-life superman, 
whose basis in reality should be seriously questioned.  
This hybrid model of masculinity promotes the image of a nation that 
relentlessly works to be the best. This is also a call for a hybrid form of national 
identity, a mixing of economic and technological policies to create a superior 
state. However, science fiction scholar Tatsumi Takayuki does not see it in 
such a positive light. In fact, he refers to the “hybridized” Japanese people as 
“Japanoids,” meaning a shift of national identity from something divine into 
something monstrous and hybrid.155 If some parts of the realism of science 
fiction “resides in the fact that we can recognize it as a possibility for our 
future,”156 this is not the case with the HAYABUSA films. Or, if it is, this reality 
is quite worrisome. The films reflect a reality that blindly promotes “old” 
values and fails to acknowledge the shifting nature of gender role expectations. 
By juxtaposing “reality” and fiction, the films offer solutions that the “real” 
world cannot.157 The question remains, what do these solutions tell about the 
reality of 21st-century Japan? Attebery sees science fiction as “an essentially 
realist mode” that, through its convincing construction of faked histories, is 
able to explore “history’s shifting alignments of power.”158 A similar point is 
promoted by Martinez in her “Introduction” to The Worlds of Japanese 
Popular Culture. HAYABUSA narratives do not construct a fake history but 
rather a fake present. 
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7.4.3 THE RETURN OF THE REPRESSED 
If hybrid masculinities ultimately contribute to the maintaining of the 
patriarchal hegemony, the image of Japan as a hybrid nation aligns the 
country as superior to other countries. The films draw from the concept of 
hybrid masculinity in order to project an image of a hybrid nation that 
relentlessly works toward nationalist goals. In his discussion about Japanese 
disaster and monster movies, Kalat notes, “The message that we can all unite, 
overcome our differences, and save each other through science and progress, 
is uniquely Japanese.”159 Whether true or not in comparison with the science 
fiction films of other countries, the HAYABUSA films underscore this. They 
promote a strand of cultural nationalism that is seemingly innocent enough 
but, in fact, deals with a topic that is highly loaded in contemporary Japan: the 
ever-continuing sense of battle. It is necessary to bear in mind that the space 
industry is “a strategic sector that underpins civil, commercial, scientific, and 
security concerns for all great nations.” Thus, the dual nature of space 
technology (civil/military, defensive/offensive, scientific/commercialist) 
should never be forgotten.160 HAYABUSA was originally built as “a technology 
demonstration spacecraft,” its main goal being the establishment of new 
technologies. 161  However, it is heavily interwoven with militaristic 
connotations. First, “Hayabusa” was the name of a fighter jet produced by 
Japan during World War II.162 Second, as Pekkanen and Kallander-Umezu 
argue at length, despite Japan never making it explicit that she had any will at 
all toward the militarization of space, it nonetheless has acquired advanced 
space-technological prowess that draws attention to its space-based military 
capabilities. In fact, Pekkanen and Kallander-Umezu see HAYABUSA’s 
reentry capsule amounting to the testing of “an extremely high-speed ballistic 
reentry technology.”163 This seems to correspond to Samuels’ realization that 
the Japanese technology process has been characterized by the fusion of 
civilian and military technologies. 164  And, as pointed out by Robertson, 
“robotic components are now being weaponized in university and corporate 
laboratories. Academics might be ambivalent about the military applications 
of robotics, yet they appreciate the financial incentives offered by the Ministry 
of Defense at the time of deep budgetary cutbacks.”165  
Because of the military connotations briefly illuminated above, the 
uncritical celebration of the scientist-savior in the HAYABUSA films should 
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not go unnoticed. In addition, the films engage with the ever-lingering notion 
of two worldpowers—Japan and the U.S.—constantly in battle. Mizuno points 
out that in some postwar anime, such as Uchūsenkan Yamato, the American 
presence is eliminated and Japanese men are cast as protectors. She calls this 
a “fantasy against the dominant narrative of postwar Japan.”166 Some films, 
too, as I have demonstrated, project Japanese men as protectors. They do not, 
however, suggest the victory of Japan in the war but rather scientific 
masculinity and technological development as a means for success in the 
postwar world. Indeed, speculative anime envisions the victory of Japan; more 
importantly, this is not just any fantasy but rather a male fantasy.167 
HAYABUSA takes this male fantasy one step further. Japan is not merely 
the provider of scientific knowledge; rather, the contemporary narrative 
directly challenges the United States. Haruka naru kikan (and Okaeri 
Hayabusa, to a lesser degree) directly names the U.S. as Japan’s competitive 
Other and construct a picture of the U.S. as Japan’s symbolic enemy. Even 60 
years after the Occupation, the Japanese present is still shown to be dominated 
by the overarching presence of the United States. Haruka naru kikan boldly 
challenges the U.S., promoting Japan as the science-technological superpower 
in the world. This is a reinforcement of the 1970s’ theme of “the threat of 
Japanese technology” and the American conceiving of Japan in the 1980s as 
an “economic hypothetical enemy” due to the rising power of its science and 
technology.168 HAYABUSA creates a success story that strengthens the role of 
robotics as “the industry that will sukuu (rescue) Japan,”169 and it reimagines 
its national image within the world. Fredrik L. Schodt refers to this as 
“collective infatuation with advanced technology that is supported by Japan’s 
government and corporations.”170 
If cultural nationalism “aims to regenerate the national community by 
creating, preserving or strengthening a people’s cultural identity when it is felt 
to be lacking, inadequate or threatened,”171 the HAYABUSA films quite directly 
confirm this. Saitō suggests that the hero in the male narratives is a “soldier” 
who is loyal to his organization. In the HAYABUSA films, he is a corporate 
warrior fighting for Japan within a web of international relations. This strong 
scientific masculinity, which correlates with a strong national identity, is best 
embodied by astrophysicist Yamaguchi Shunichirō, the leader of the team in 
Haruka naru kikan. In the beginning of Haruka naru kikan, a member of 
NASA is seen visiting the launch site in Japan. A contrast is made between the 
great technological advancement of the probe itself and the shabby 
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surroundings of the site. The team’s low budget is underscored and 
emphasized by the conversation between the NASA member and Yamaguchi. 
Implicitly the scene projects an aura of scientific superiority that can, despite 
the lack of resources, create internationally acclaimed technology. This is all 
embodied by Watanabe Ken’s omnipotent character, who functions to convey 
a highly distinct vision of cultural excellence.172  
Later on in the film, when HAYABUSA runs into problems that have 
affected the funding of the project, Yamaguchi is seen visiting the NASA 
headquarters. Embodying a role similar to businessmen who are constantly in 
contact with non-Japanese people, Yamaguchi is able to “participate in the 
construction of the image of the Japanese.” 173 Maruyama Masao and Katō 
Norihiro explain Japan’s “cultural hybridity” as an idea conceived as an 
answer to the changes after the Pacific War, which led to an imaginary cultural 
idea that the West was incapable of understanding Japan whereas Japan was 
able to understand the West. 174  During a meeting where Yamaguchi is 
presented alone with many members of NASA, he manages to convince the 
Americans to keep contributing to the project by letting JAXA use their 
communication satellites. With his rolled-up sleeves and bulging muscles, he 
stares at them and, in clear English, utters, “We don’t give up!” Afterwards a 
NASA team member comes to Yamaguchi, sharing his surprise and awe before 
Yamaguchi’s steely demeanor and dedication. This is an imaginary portrayal 
of the awe that America feels toward Japan.  
The films project an image of “our difference” from the world, the 
“particularistic cultural differences of Japan from the universal civilization.”175 
Japan is seen as a country existing outside the East/West binary,176 which 
directy makes the tone of the films quite nationalistic. Within the nihonjinron 
genre, some works promote Japan as unique because of its “cultural hybridity.” 
Igarashi argues that the creation of such an ideology was due to the enormous 
historical disjuncture of the relationship between Japan and the U.S. after the 
Pacific War and the subsequent Allied Occupation.177 Japan longed to keep its 
past traditions, although it was subjected to a democratization process and 
Western influences by the Occupation. This stance is quite worrisome, because 
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it tells about the popularity of such fictional images of nationhood and cultural 
myths. This can be seen as “cultural essentialism in reverse form.”178  
However, if the nation is “an imagined political community,” 179  this 
imagining, according to Orbaugh, is colored with a hue of inferiority and self-
imposed othering. The HAYABUSA films are an answer to this inferiority 
complex—or the Frankenstein complex, in Orbaugh’s terms. The films create 
a simplified picture of a very complex struggle for domination between two 
nations whose histories have become intertwined. They simultaneously 
contribute to the neo-conservative creation of the history of contemporary 
Japan, which “should present the kind of narrative that Japanese youths can 
be proud of—that is, a narrative devoid of any wrongdoing by the Japanese 
state.”180 The HAYABUSA films, in other words, overturn the Frankenstein 
syndrome. The probe became not only a demonstration of the capability of 
JAXA and Japan’s space sciences, but also the superiority of Japanese men. 
Political rhetoric does not define national identity, but politicians attempt to 
set the tone for an acceptable public expression of what constitutes community, 
norms, and values.181 Robots represent commitment to advanced science and 
technology, and HAYABUSA-as-a-robot corresponds to the need for Japan to 
achieve what the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry refers to as Japan’s 
robot revolution.182  This is clearly also about revolutionizing the image of 
Japan in the face of the world after the decades of recession.  
The heroes in the HAYABUSA films are “ultimately the heroic victims of 
this world, which is exactly the way many Japanese like to picture 
themselves.” 183  They are like the heroes of ninkyō yakuza films, where 
Japanese men (as opposed to a foreign threat) are portrayed as “virtuous, loyal 
and pure,” their spirit being stronger than the flesh. 184  Especially 
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representative is Watanabe’s Yamaguchi. Like the ninkyō heroes, he, too, is 
essentially a loner. He is portrayed with a wedding band but not once is his 
family shown. Neither does he participate in company dinners and drinking, 
but instead is pictured sitting solemnly alone at a Shinto shrine. The 
HAYABUSA films represent prime examples of science fiction as “a form of 
popular romance” that “exploits, channels, and stimulates desires.”185 In this 
case, this is a desire to reinforce a past social structure and intermittently 
continue with the current order. It is also a projection of a fantasy where Japan 
finally beats the U.S. and gains true legitimacy as a global superpower. This is 
achieved through the success of scientific masculinity. Thus, the HAYABUSA 
films speculate, which is why I ultimately included them in this thesis. For each 
idealized, even naïve, narrative there has to be a counter-narrative, because 
the consequences of these heroic fantasies can be serious, as demonstrated by 
the discussion on anime and war. The HAYABUSA films, however, provide 
retro-nationalist fantasies in the realm of the real. Engineers reemerge as 
creators of a sense of national pride and technology—again—emerges as a 
rational means of improving society. Considering the history of scientific 
nationalism and war in Japan, this is an uncanny return of the repressed from 
the past. 
7.5 CONCLUSIONS 
Despite decades having passed, the idea of contemporary Japanese society as 
being to some extent based on Western modernity, the anxiety regarding 
foreign nations and Japan’s role in the world, as well as a felt sense of crisis, 
seem not to be easily dissolved.186 The films in this chapter centered on these 
concerns. On the one hand, there were the ironic portrayal of Japan’s robot 
policies, correlated with the will to internalize external and internal others, 
and the general confusion around the changing gender roles in society, 
represented here as the changing gender roles within the sphere of science and 
technology. On the other hand, some films explicitly provided positive 
alternative scenarios, where Japan finally “beats” the U.S. and resumes its 
status as a technologically—and economically—superior country.  
First, Tetsuo III presented a scenario where the dangerous Other, Anthony 
the half-American, was symbolically tamed in the context of Japan’s robot 
policies. Having become one of the key areas of kagaku gijutsu sōzō rikkoku, 
the building of a scientific-technological nation, robotics is used as a means of 
unifying people living in Japan as homogeneously “Japanese.” The question of 
technological futures is also present in some re-considerations of the 
relationship between technology and gender. Drawing from the context of 
Japan’s robot policies, it is possible to analyze the wife of the half-Japanese 
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salaryman Anthony as a so-called umu kikai, a shell whose role is to give birth. 
This also concerns his mother. Tsukamoto parodies this notion, showcasing a 
scenario where it is exactly the external Others that are important for the 
future of Japan, despite the country’s resistance.  
The relationship between technology and gender is also examined, 
especially in Kurosawa Kiyoshi’s Kairo. If technological nationalism is based 
on a myth of creation where male scientists and engineers create exportable 
technology that is used to construct an image of Japan as a technological 
superpower, Kairo problematizes this, first by correlating femininity and this 
very myth. In addition, it relates masculine consumption with technological 
advances. Kairo not only problematizes gender roles within the field of science 
and technology, but it also reverses these roles. Despite their relationship with 
technology, consumer masculinities cannot be analyzed as a form of scientific 
masculinity. They do not contribute to the creation of knowledge; they 
consume it. This is, thus, a complete annihilation of the function of scientific 
masculinity in society. Kairo suggests that a society created by men is a society 
of the past. It locates “the scientific” within the realm of the feminine, calling 
for a category of a knowledge-creating female presence. Harue’s brilliance is 
not left unnoticed, but the film ultimately portrays a society that is not 
prepared for this change. Masculine technology overcomes her and results in 
her death. The essence of Kairo is about presenting fictional accounts of a role-
reversal in society, which, were it to exist in real life, would greatly affect the 
future of Japan.  
Alternatives to the common understanding are also present in the 
HAYABUSA films. The HAYABUSA narrative provides a fantasy of 
scientifically minded hegemonic masculinity, where men relentlessly work for 
the company and for the good of the nation. In other words, they project a 
hybrid masculinity that maintains the hegemonic ideal and patriarchal power. 
This hybrid masculinity is also used as a symbol for a superior national identity, 
which, given the history of Japan, is quite troublesome. The films present an 
alluring array of scenarios that emphasize the role of Japan as a scientific 
superpower: international negotiations, the ability of HAYABUSA to draw 
hikikomori from their homes, and the overall emphasis on patriarchy as the 
fundamental organizing structure for a future Japan. These films promote not 
only scientific nationalism but in many cases mere “good old” nationalism. 
Ideas of nihonjinron are engaged with and implemented. In addition, these 
films build an essentialist representation of ideal Japanese masculinity. The 
function of scientific masculinity in this case is to encourage Japanese men to 
work harder, because only hard work brings results and pride to the nation. It 
can be questioned, however, whether this really is the reality of 21st-century 
Japan.  
Hybridity in HAYABUSA maintains the institutional nature of gender 
regimes, contributing to the pertaining overall dominance of men over women 
and some men over other men. They are not emergent revolutionary new 
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models, but in fact residual expressions of gender and sexual inequality.187 
During a time when fewer and fewer men are able to access hegemonic 
masculinity in Japan, the ideal is anchored by “the play of masculine imagery 
in the symbolic realm.”188 Thus, instead of fictional fantasies the HAYABUSA 
films provide some very real fantasies indeed, portraying the Japanese 
engineer not only as “as a master of machines but as a potential manipulator 
of all industrial relationships.” 189  These are, in other words, stories of the 
Japanese male scientist figuratively saving the entire nation. Reality and 
ideologies, however, do not often meet. The picture painted by the films of 
Japan is quite scary. It is a picture where women have no role and where work 
is only meaningful for an individual. In a way, HAYABUSA as a state-led robot 
project works to cyborgize everyone around it. Implicitly, the picture the films 
paint of Japan is one of a country that wants total control and the absolute 
dedication of its citizens, without any nails that should be hammered down. I 
find the national image portrayed by the HAYABUSA films to be, in fact, the 
most disconcerting of all the films. First, the wholly uncritical way the films 
deal with the subject matter is alarming. It tells about the deep will to 
internalize this given image. Second, the story is not just any fantasy—it is a 
very real fantasy that affects the future of Japanese society.  
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8 DISCUSSION   
This thesis has traced the depictions of scientific masculinity in Japanese kaiki 
eiga. All of the films discussed in this thesis have relied on techno-scientific 
imaginary in order to negotiate possible futures for Japan. These negotiations 
have taken place in the form of mad and other scientists, as well as their 
monsters. Ranging from the outright lunatic Dr. Sano to the astute but 
troubled Dr. Serizawa, from the overworked Dr. Hayasaki to the savior-like 
scientists in the HAYABUSA project, scientific masculinity and especially the 
results of their experiments narrate imaginings of themes central to postwar 
Japanese social and cultural history. It is clear that kaiki eiga actively 
participates in negotiating a multitude of salient national images: imperialist, 
pacifist, racial, technological, economic and, last but not least, patriarchal. 
These images reflect the changes Japanese society has undergone after the end 
of the Pacific War, as well as those that, according to the filmmakers, the 
society should undergo.  
I set out with the ambitious task of tying together several interrelated fields: 
the study of the history of science in Japan, the study of Japanese cinema in 
general and Japanese horror cinema in particular, the study of the fantastic 
and weird, the study of Japanese postwar cultural and social history, and the 
study of masculinities. Research gaps were plenty. First, the field of Japanese 
film studies has acknowledged Japanese horror cinema as an important field 
of study only in the last 15 years or so. Within Japanese horror film studies, in 
turn, emphasis has been on certain types of films, such as ghost stories. Films 
with scientifically created male monsters have yet to receive full attention. 
Second, the history of science in Japan seems to have existed as its own, quite 
separate field. Apart from a few seminal studies, it is rarely mentioned in 
popular culture studies, although the works themselves might involve a 
myriad of portrayals of techno-scientific innovations and scientists. This 
particular history becomes interlinked with the general history of postwar 
Japan, including its successes and challenges.  
At the outset of this research I had three particular research objectives, 
which fundamentally stemmed from my dedicated field of focus. First, my aim 
was to contest the canonical approach to the material by redefining kaiki eiga 
as an all-encompassing category of speculative cinema within which it is 
possible to analyze works that contain both the supernatural and the scientific. 
This also helps to understand the trans/crossmedial nature of the topic. 
Second, this thesis put the previously underanalyzed men of horror at the 
center of the study, arguing that it is through them that fictional narratives 
portray and mediate potential, past or future images of nationhood. An 
exploration of these images through scientific tropes became the third 
objective of this thesis.  
Discussion 
220 
8.1 FINDINGS  
In the introduction, I outlined three specific research questions that I set out 
to answer. First, how should one define kaiki and what is it actually? Second, 
what is scientific masculinity and what kind of function does it have in the 
films? Third, what kind of contexts do the films draw from? My main 
hypothesis—that scientific masculinity is used as a means of navigating 
national images—stemmed from these. I found this to be the case, and I will 
now elaborate on the results. 
8.1.1 REFLECTING ON THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Japanese kaiki eiga presents a topic that is immensely wonderful and 
intriguingly multilayered. Many of the narratives in the films under study are 
closely connected with the Japanese literary tradition and overall discourse of 
the weird and the fantastic. The departure point for this research came when 
I encountered Henshin ningen films. Although not “lost” in the literal sense of 
the word, these films were generally not referred to within the horror film 
discourse. I wanted to dissect the meaning of these films, but first I had to find 
a context within which they could be properly approached. It was quite clear 
that Japanese horror film studies, despite its prevalence and recent popularity, 
did not offer a suitable interpretative framework. Thus, one of the overarching 
aims of this study was to be able to together analyze works that had previously 
been placed within separate generic categories, and which had been missing 
from the more traditional field of Japanese horror film studies.  
The answer to my first research question appeared already in Chapter 2. I 
drew from previous literature in fantastic studies, as well as from science 
fiction and horror film studies, in order to discuss the general nature of 
fictional weirdness. I came to the conclusion that the best definition for kaiki 
eiga is speculative fiction. It is not only about departing from what we consider 
real; it is also about speculating what could be. To analyze kaiki eiga as 
speculative fiction allows for the inclusion of works that share similar themes 
and motifs, but which have been regarded as different genres. Thus, kaiki eiga 
is an umbrella term for a wide array of weird, speculative, fantastic and horrific 
narratives, as suggested by the approach in Uchiyama Kazuki’s seminal 
volume. Despite the social constructivist approach that underlies this thesis, I 
also utilized Torben Grodal’s biocultural framework to deepen the 
understanding of how and why certain motifs—fantastic, scientific, and 
monstrous—travel across cultures. This is related to the overall question of the 
popularity of such narratives. According to this reading, these motifs help us 
as human beings to deal with things that are related to our living environment. 
The fear of losing and regaining control, for example, is a paramount feature 
of fictions of science. This can be seen as analogous with losing and regaining 
national identities.  
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Within speculative cinema there exists a body of works that places men in 
the center of the narrative. These films are, more often than not, techno-
scientific in nature. Even when they are not, at least the male character seems 
to be scientifically inclined. My second research question of what is scientific 
masculinity arose from this observation. As part of my conceptual framework, 
I promoted terminology with which to discuss masculinities in cinema in 
general, as well as scientific masculinity in particular. First, scientific 
masculinity primarily means male characters that embody a rational 
worldview: academics, research scientists, university lecturers, doctors and, in 
some cases, even detectives. They contribute to the creation of knowledge in 
society. I also discovered that the concept of hegemonic masculinity, as 
discussed at length by R.W. Connell, James Messerschmidt and Romit 
Dasgupta, among others, was quite important for the understanding of the 
male characters in the films. Scientific masculinity revolved around this 
concept, sometimes intersecting while sometimes directly opposing and 
challenging. I came to the conclusion that within scientific masculinities there 
were models that contributed to the hegemonic ideal, promoted hybrid forms 
of masculinities that nonetheless worked to reinstate patriarchy, or actually 
disrupted the ideal with subordinated and marginalized male forms. 
Especially the monsters of the scientists conformed to the last type, not 
necessarily incorporating scientific masculinity themselves but rather being 
outward manifestations of possibly dangerous (national) identities mediated 
via science. Like in the case of Mizuno and Sano in Gasu ningen, this 
disruption could be interpreted as a questioning of the emerging hegemonic 
masculine ideal. In other words, the films track the emergence of the idea of 
hegemonic masculinity, ending with the despairing scenarios of recessionary 
Japan, where this hegemonic form of masculinity has been made an Other, 
inverting the very logic of “hegemony.” Kaiki eiga provides the vehicle for 
subversion and struggle. 
I deduced that since science and technology have been paramount features 
of the modern nation-building project in Japan, like Chapter 3 demonstrated, 
men that deal with these in fiction can be analyzed as embodiments for testing 
various, even contrasting, images of nationhood or national identities. If 
narratives that center around the feminine often belong to the realm of the 
private and that of the family, male narratives highlight public concerns. The 
relationship between characters and reality could be defined as oppositional, 
conservative or problematic, as Gregory Barrett suggested. Underlying almost 
all of the fictions was the Frankenstein myth and the underlying assumption 
of succumbing to Sharalyn Orbaugh’s so-called Frankenstein Syndrome. Both 
have continued to exert power over fictional narratives. I also came to the 
conclusion that the films portray Japan as haunted by a need to constantly 
reassess its role in the world, never allowing for merely one simplistic 
interpretation of the country as “a victim,” “a hero” or “a monster.”  
In the films, scientific masculinity was used to negotiate these ambiguities, 
providing a micro-level representation of the macro-level concerns. These 
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macro-level workings are manifested as national concerns regarding Japan’s 
militarist past, its pacifist stance vis-à-vis  the postwar society, the way it 
embarked on the path of high economic growth only to be shaken to its core 
by the Lost Decade and, finally, how techno-scientific nationalism was starting 
to be promoted as an answer for creating a better—and more superior—future. 
Thus, scientific concerns correlated with the wider framework of social change 
from a militaristic society to a democratic one, as well as the more recent shift 
from an economic superpower to a society battling stagnation and various 
social anxieties. On a more “micro” level, it became clear that individual men, 
through the shift in their roles from soldiers to demilitarized soldiers to 
corporate warriors, were constantly used to negotiate these broader societal 
shifts.  
8.1.2 ELABORATING THE RESULTS 
The analytical chapters started with an exploration of how Japan’s military 
past was engaged with and recalled in speculative cinema. Chapter 4 dealt with 
scientific masculinity as a way of encountering Japan’s military past. The films, 
drawing from the otoko no kaijin tradition introduced by Shimura Miyoko, 
introduced a multitude of methods of using scientific masculinity to negotiate 
the image of Japan as a militarist and aggressive nation. Central issues 
included the fear and ambivalence surrounding the presence and role of ex-
soldiers in the postwar order and questions of responsibility. The scientists in 
Gojira, Densō ningen and Gasu ningen were promoted as fukuinhei and the 
science practiced by them as destructive. In many cases, the films also 
portrayed the lurking imperial system in the democratized society, a system 
that was still terrifying despite the democratization of the Emperor himself. 
With weapons development and subsequent human victims comprising the 
main narrative material, these films most closely correspond to the universal 
Frankenstein myth and the Mad Scientist trope.  
In some cases, an unsound or physically damaged body, such as Dr. 
Serizawa’s, played an important role. His wounded body became an 
ambivalent marker of the past: a hero or a monster, a symbol of victorious 
Japanese science or a reminder of its dangers. Gasu ningen and Densō ningen, 
in turn, were more directly concerned with the potentially dangerous nature 
of Japanese wartime science. The films painted downright monstrous 
portrayals of science at the hands of fukuinhei unable to fully integrate into the 
postwar order. And, whereas Dr. Serizawa himself was a monstrous reminder 
of the past, this destructive science also paved the way for external monsters, 
such as Mizuno and Sudō. Thus, scientific masculinity functioned to make the 
audience ponder the consequences of Japan’s militarist agenda. The human 
experimentation projects present in fiction, such as in Tanin no kao, mediated 
the issue around (wartime) responsibility.  
In the 1950s and 1960s, portrayals of scientific masculinity could be 
contradictory even within the same film, as is the case with Gojira. The will to 
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negotiate both pacifist and militarist images tells not only about the inherent 
ambivalence regarding science itself but also the changing Japanese national 
image. Chapter 5 illuminated how the underlying ambiguity of postwar society 
and the sudden shift in the roles between the U.S. and Japan were manifested 
in the films of the 1950s and 1960s through images of Japan as a pacifist nation. 
These considerations functioned to make people reassess Japan’s relationship 
with the West and its role in the new world order. An ultimate beacon for this 
newly found identity was Dr. Yamane of Gojira, completely excluded from the 
sphere of politics and promoting science only for the sake of science. 
In addition, pacifist narratives can often be located on the axis of “us” 
versus “them”: the savior-scientists save “us” from “them” or promote a 
positive picture of “us” in front of “them.” Consequently, films such as Bijo to 
ekitainingen and Chikyū bōeigun introduced the character of a savior-
scientist. Both Bijo and Densō ningen featured not only dubious scientific 
developments but also characters that nullified that threat. In Bijo, this role 
was allotted to Dr. Masada, whose rationality was presented as an overall 
favorable feature. He was even given the chance of becoming a daikokubashira, 
the new favorable type of working male. In Densō ningen, it was the reporter 
Kirioka who worked as the intermediary between science and the public. 
Important for the promotion of Japan as a pacifist nation was the nuclear 
discourse and the way it allowed Japan to conceive of itself as a victim. The 
films present scenarios of bad (American) nuclear science, which is countered 
with world-saving Japanese science in the nation’s striving for democracy. But 
not everything is as rosy and harmonious as it seems. Matango twists the use 
of the nuclear narrative to portray Japan’s inner grotesques instead. Scientific 
masculinity is used to reveal the price ordinary Japanese had to pay for the 
emerging economic growth and to maintain the image of a pacifist nation. 
Whereas in the late 1950s scientific masculinity functioned as a means to 
separate men from their past deeds and to reestablish Japanese men as 
integral parts of society, the picture became more despairing and hard to 
support by the mid-1960s.  
Chapter 6 dealt with the image of Japan as an economic superpower, being 
“No. 1.” This period of high growth started in the late 1950s, along with the 
earliest moments of the hegemonization of the salaryman. The films discussed 
in this chapter all challenged this notion. In addition, scientific masculinity 
was also used to dissect the two differing aspects of the daikokubashira 
ideology: that of a working (salaryman) masculinity and that of a husband-
father. The films take these two forms of masculinities, place them within the 
realm of science and manage to destroy the idea of Japan as a patriarchal 
nation where men wield ultimate power. This is a direct representation of the 
concerns that were present during the Lost Decade(s) and the long recession. 
These are scenarios where scientific masculinity becomes an embodiment of 
Anne Allison’s “millennial monstrosity.” Scientific masculinity in these films 
is also used to address concerns around the idea of the husband-father. The 
scene in Sakebi where Dr. Sakuma murders his own son becomes highly 
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representative of the suppressed feelings of contemporary citizens. Tetsuo, in 
turn, challenged the daikokubashira ideology by promoting homosexuality 
instead of homosociality, an important attribute of the salaryman masculinity.  
The image of Japan as a nation with its members dedicated to working and 
economic growth is questioned in Tetsuo and Doppelgänger. In Tetsuo, the 
stance toward scientific masculinity is twofold. On the one hand, the 
salaryman-cum-machine demonstrates the machine-like nature of Japan’s 
“working bees.” On the other hand, because of the monstrous nature of the 
metamorphosis it becomes an ironic expression of liberation from state 
policies and hegemonic salaryman masculinity. Bodily transformation results 
in the total liberation of the self, although in the process the self becomes 
monstrous in a social context. This liberation takes place in Doppelgänger, too. 
Dr. Hayasaki’s anxious scientific salaryman masculinity is deconstructed 
through his encounter with his own identical doppelgänger and his own 
research project: an exo-suit chair for the disabled. In both films, scientific 
masculinity functions as a form of liberation fantasy from the suited-up form 
of a salaryman. In Tetsuo, the salaryman is literally re-suited.  
Chapter 7 mediated attitudes around Japan’s technological nationalism, 
where technology is promoted as the means of rescuing Japan from the 
recession and establishing it as an important world power in a compelling way. 
First, in Kairo, the image of Japan as a technological utopia is dissected by the 
hikikomori-like characters. In the film, scientific masculinity is correlated with 
consuming, not producing. Considering the export-or-die nature of the 
Japanese economy, this picture is alarming, and it also correlates with the 
worldwide fear around new technologies. Second, Kairo revolutionizes the 
gender discourse around technology, suggesting that Japan needs its women 
in order to thrive. Harue becomes a fine representation of scientific femininity, 
a form that is yet to fully manifest on the real-life stage. In a similar way, robo-
nationalism is recalled in order to pacify possibly dangerous Others as 
members of Japanese society. The films paint a picture of a patriarchal and 
closed nation that will not allow its technological future to fully materialize. In 
addition, these narratives tell about the deep-rooted concerns around the 
future workforce in an aging society.  
Interestingly, if the stance against hegemonic ideas is oppositional or at 
least problematic in the previous narratives regarding technonationalist ideas, 
the HAYABUSA films promote an exactly opposite logic. They use scientific 
masculinity as a conservative model of masculinity that promotes science and 
technology not only as the primary means of “bettering” Japan but also as a 
means of enforcing a retroactive idea of the relentlessly working male. 
Scientific masculinity functions to encourage the Japanese (men) to work 
harder—only hard work brings results and pride to the nation. The image of 
the nation that the film builds is indeed glorious. It is a nation that has the 
characteristics of a salaryman: loyalty and diligency. But, on top of this, it is 
also ambitious and possesses top-notch knowledge. Scientific masculinity in 
the HAYABUSA films mediates this extremely positive societal outlook in an 
 225 
extremely retroactive way. With the need to look forward and promote new 
models of working and acting out genders, the films speculate on a highly 
disjointed vision of the future.  
As I have demonstrated, scientific masculinity in speculative cinema is used 
in a multitude of ways to discuss the past and present of Japan and how the 
country sees its role in the world. Always teetering on the brink of the horrific, 
these narratives do not allow for purely positive national images to emerge. 
Rather, they challenge the spectator, highlighting the ever-important and 
always ambiguous nature of both the nation and science itself. They promote 
ways in which science can either save or destroy a nation and, finally, how 
masculine agents wield the power of science in fiction as in real life. Quite often 
these masculine agents are comparable to salarymen. This is the ultimate 
meaning I have located in these works. The films definitely call for a further 
exploration of the relationship between nation, science, gender and cinema. 
8.1.3 SUBFINDINGS 
Apart from my main findings, this thesis also provided a few interesting 
subfindings. First, it is evident that the concept of mutation in cinema has 
shifted. Whereas the films of the 1950s and 1960s were concerned with a 
corporeal transformation, contemporary cinema often illustrates the change 
of the psyche. It was not merely the outer appearance that had changed, but 
rather the individual identity had been replaced by something completely 
different. This can be seen to be due to differences in bodily paradigms. In 
prewar and wartime society, there was great emphasis on the creation of the 
healthy body, both individual and national. However, despite the fact that this 
emphasis on a healthy body continued into the postwar era, there was the 
possibility of mutation caused by radiation. Bodily ambiguity was thus a 
central feature of 1950s’ and even 1960s’ society, disappearing later with the 
introduction of consumable bodies. The psychological sense of threa remained, 
however. In the films, this is visible regarding the shift from the H-Men, 
seemingly devoid of any real psychological layer, to the salarymen in Tetsuo, 
whose outside transformation was an indicator of psychological change.  
Second, spatiality figured greatly in the consideration of national images. 
Many of the films are also concerned with boundary spaces—the ocean, 
interstellar space and cyberspace—and posit scientific masculinity against 
them. Works such as Bijo to ekitainingen, Gojira, Chikyū bōeigun, Matango, 
Kairo and the HAYABUSA films all utilize this boundary-crossing motif. The 
films of the 1950s and 1960s most often use the first two in their discussions 
about postwar Japan, whereas cyberspace appears in a threatening form in 
some works of the 2000s. As spaces that separate Japan from the rest of the 
world, their representations in cinema should not go unnoticed. All the 
aforementioned films are explicitly interested in the different types of national 
identities promoted by Japan: military, pacifist and techno-supremist. They 
all refer to the world beyond Japan’s borders, positioning the nation against 
Discussion 
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this symbolic “Other.” This is not to say, however, that the image of Japan is 
always positive—quite the opposite. In addition, spatiality also plays a role in 
the containing of Japan’s internal others, most prominently in the pictures of 
Tokyo in Matango, Tanin no kao and Tetsuo. The urban atmosphere of Tokyo, 
the center of Japan’s economic activity, becomes an oppressive entity against 
which the struggle of the agents of scientific masculinity is posited.  
8.2 FURTHER RESEARCH AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
There are multiple directions into which this research could be developed. 
First, I have deduced that many Japanese fantastic films make use of 
commonly known characters—or types—which are used to convey the 
director’s views about the society around them. The roles and functions of 
these characters may change in due course of time but this change, too, 
provides valuable information about what is perceived as socially acceptable 
or problematic behavior. The types I have found to exist in Japanese kaiki eiga 
are the Scientist, the Detective, the Husband-Father, the Instrumental Woman 
and, possibly, the Salaryman. In this thesis I have discussed, to some extent, 
all of the above and how scientific masculinity is manifested in them (or 
obviously not, in the case of the Instrumental Woman). A more in-depth study 
of these characters is needed within a framework that does not emphasize 
science only, but rather takes into account other areas of Japanese culture and 
society, too. This would develop the theme in the directions already 
established by Gregory Barrett, Isolde Standish and Ian Buruma.  
Second, excavating the field of masculinity studies or critical men’s studies 
more deeply could be highly beneficial for an in-depth understanding of the 
characters and their social meanings. This is also related to the first point, as 
many other types of masculinities apart from scientific masculinity are also 
present. At this point I have largely decided to exclude global studies of 
fictional or cinematic masculinities, concentrating mainly on studies of 
Japanese men, as well as the study of fictional types, such as the Mad Scientist 
motif. A more in-depth reading of the films could yield a deeper understanding 
of how cinematic masculinities have been analyzed worldwide and how these 
ideas have traveled to and from Japan. Hence, a cross-cultural study of 
scientific masculinity in world cinema is direly needed. Also to be explored are 
potential correlations between the director’s own experiences and the fictional 
material. Inclusion of anime should also be considered.  
Third, regarding the field of science, there is room for a deeper 
understanding of the history of science in Japan and how, beyond the films 
discussed here, it is related to the topic matter of other products of popular 
culture. For example, the cyborg narrative as it is played out in the Tetsuo films 
would make an interesting comparison with many works of anime. Being a 
vast field in itself, I did not have enough space to include cyborg studies in this 
thesis, although Tetsuo—and quite possibly Doppelgänger—could easily be 
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included in that category. Naturally, this line of research would also take into 
account the various anime adaptations that discuss the themes I have reviewed 
in this chapter but which I have decided to exclude from this particular study.  
I am personally interested in further developing the connection between 
science and popular culture in Japan, establishing it as a relatively new field 
of research within the field of history of science as well as the field of popular 
culture studies. This thesis utilized an interdisciplinary approach that 
introduced and incorporated multiple fields of research, any one of which 
could yield material for a lifetime of scholarly research. I hope many scholars—
myself included—will be able to follow this new path, which this thesis has 
illuminated. 
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APPENDIX: PLOT SUMMARIES OF MAIN 
WORKS 
Gojira (Godzilla, 1954)  
The films begins with the destruction of a ship in the sea near Ōdoshima 
island. The islanders tell the story of an ancient sea monster Gojira who later 
appears and wrecks havoc. The Japanese government decides to look into the 
strange events and sends an expedition to the island. The investigation team 
is led by paleontologist Yamane (Shimura Takashi) and also includes his 
daughter Emiko (Kōchi Momoko) and Emiko’s friend Ogata (Takarada Akira). 
On the island they find radioactive footprints before Gojira attacks again.  
Back in Tokyo, Yamane shares the results of the investigation: Gojira is a 
large sea creature that has been disturbed by hydrogen bomb testing. The 
government is not keen on disclosing any information but as ships keep 
disappearing at sea it becomes impossible to hide the truth. Yamane is not 
happy with the military counter-attack measures taken against the monster. 
He wants it studied. His daughter, Emiko, however, escorts a newspaper 
reporter to Yamane’s apprentice Dr. Serizawa (Hirata Akihiko) to whom she is 
betrothed and whose work is implied to provide a solution to the Gojira 
problem. He blandly refuses to tell the reporter anything. After the reporter 
leaves, Serizawa demonstrates Emiko what he has been working on. Emiko 
faints with a scream.  
Gojira attacks Tokyo again and the SDF plan action. At this point it also 
becomes clear that Emiko and Ogata are in a relationship. Emiko decides to 
tell his father about her intentions of marrying Ogata instead but is interrupted 
when Yamane and Ogata start arguing over whether to study Gojira or to kill 
it. Yamane tells Ogata to leave. At the same time Gojira attacks Tokyo again in 
the paramount scene of the film, emerging from the sea and stomping across 
Tokyo, destroying the National Diet Building in the process. The destruction 
is shown in immaculate detail as are the counter-measures by the SDF. These 
are futile and Gojira returns to the sea, leaving a trail of destruction and 
wounded behind.  
Emiko decides to break her promise to Serizawa and tells Ogata about a 
weapon, oxygen destroyer, created by Serizawa. The couple faces Serizawa 
over the use of his weapon. Serizawa and Ogata fight and, when Emiko tends 
to a wound on Ogata’s head, it dawns on Serizawa that Emiko has no interest 
in marrying him. At the same time a television program broadcasts the tragedy 
of Japan while a girl choir laments in the background. Serizawa changes his 
mind but throws all his research notes into a fire in order to make sure no one 
will be able to rebuild the weapon. In the final scene Ogata and Serizawa 
descend into the ocean to use the oxygen destroyer. Serizawa, upon unleashing 
the weapon, cuts off his oxygen and tells Ogata to be happy with Emiko. Gojira 
is destroyed together with Serizawa. When people onboard the naval ship 
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mourn Serizawa, Yamane issues an ominous warning that another Gojira 
might appear if humans continue with H-bomb testing.  
 
Chikyū bōeigun (The Mysterians, 1957)  
The film begins with a local festival near Mt. Fuji. Attendees include 
astrophysicist Dr. Shiraishi (Hirata Akihiko) and his friend Dr. Atsumi (Sahara 
Jōji), accompanied by both Shiraishi’s fiancé Hiroko (Kōchi Momoko) and his 
sister (Shirakawa Yumi). Shiraishi behaves in an aloof manner, telling Atsumi 
that the relationship between him and Hiroko is over. He gives no other 
reason. The festival is interrupted when a huge fire starts in a forest. Shiraishi 
disappears. The next day the village is destroyed in a huge earthquake, 
followed by the emergence of a giant robot with superior weapon technology. 
Atsumi investigates the incident with the police, but the robot kills everyone 
except Atsumi and one other police officer. The SDF, too, are unable to fight it 
with their weapons. The robot is finally destroyed when it crosses a bridge that 
is detonated.  
The giant war robot seems to be connected to a newly-found asteroid called 
Mysteroid which Shiraishi had been studying. Atsumi briefs governmental 
officers that the robot contains materials that are not from this world. It is not 
before long when Mysterians emerge near Mt. Fuji, tearing the ground open 
with their huge ship. They ask for a meeting with five top scientists, one of 
whom is Atsumi’s supervisor Adachi (Shimura Takashi). At the spaceship they 
tell their story; how their planet was destroyed by a nuclear war and the 
inhabitants were forced to escape to Mars. Because of the presence of 
strontium-90, much of their population was left deformed. They request a 
small area of land as well as a right to mate with the women of the Earth in 
order to re-create their race in a healthy way. Japan, of course, refuses. It is 
then revealed that some women, including Shiraishi’s sister, have already been 
captivated. A battle ensues but Japan is unable to fight back with their inferior 
weaponry. Instead, they send a request for help to the United Nations. Help is 
readily given but to no avail. Instead, a video manifest from the derailed Dr. 
Shiraishi, in which he rambles about the victory of science itself, is broadcast.  
Atsumi decides to embark on a solitary mission himself. He finds an 
entrance to the ship and the captivated women. When they try to escape, they 
are encountered with Shiraishi in a Mysterian costume. He tells Atsumi and 
the women that he had been led astray by the Mysterians who must be 
destroyed. He sacrifices himself and rescues his comrades, also helping the 
United Nations to use a specially-built weapon from inside the ship. Before his 
sacrifice he hands his research results to Atsumi, telling him to hand them to 
Adachi. The ship is destroyed but a few spaceships escape. Humankind must 
be prepared, states Adachi.   
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Bijo to ekitainingen (The H-Man, 1958)1 
Bijo to ekitainingen begins with a scene straight out from hell: an explosion, a 
flash of orange light and then a news announcement of the many lives this 
nuclear experiment has taken in the South Pacific sea. The film cuts to Tokyo, 
where rain is pouring down.  A man, Misaki (Itō Hisaya), is suddenly hit by a 
car, but there is no body to be seen – just empty clothes and a stash of drugs. 
The lead takes the police to Misaki’s girlfriend, cabaret singer Arai Chikako 
(Shirakawa Yumi). At the cabaret club Detective Tominaga (Hirata Akihiko) 
sees his old friend from the university, Masada (Sahara Jōji), approaching 
Chikako. He decides to interrogate them both. Masada, who is currently a 
professor at a local university, explains that he is interested in the strange 
effect hydrogen radiation might have on human beings; that a human body 
might melt under strange conditions. Only after Masada takes Tominaga with 
other members of the police to meet two victims of the nuclear explosion they 
really believe him. The unfortunate events of the ship are introduced in a 
horror-filled flashback where a human being after another mutates into a fear-
inducing liquid being. After that Masada demonstrates this on a test animal.  
The H-Men then appear in Tokyo with newspapers spreading fear among 
people. The film’s finale starts when the H-Men appear at Chikako’s cabaret 
club. It is finally revealed that Misaki, too, has become one of the monsters. In 
the end Chikako, who has gotten closer to Masada along the way, is kidnapped 
and taken into the very sewer system where the police is planning on scorching 
the H-Men. It is up to Masada to save Chikako. After a high intensity rescue 
scene, Tokyo is in flames. The film ends with the ominous promise of the 
return of the H-Men. 
 
Densō ningen (The Secret of the Telegian, 1960)2 
When a man is brutally murdered in an amusement park attraction, 
newspaper reporter Kirioka (Tsuruta Kōji) and his girlfriend Akiko (Shirakawa 
Yumi) are some of the first ones to try to solve case together with the police. 
Their only lead is a military badge found from the site. It seems that the 
murder has something to do with a group of ex-soldiers: Taki (Sakai Sachio), 
Ryū (Tajima Yoshibumi), Ōnishi (Kawazu Seizaburō) and the murdered 
Tsukamoto (Ōtomo Shin). They have all been sent a badge similar to what 
Tsukamoto had with him. The three gather together in a club owned by Ryū 
and try to tackle the issue of their own imminent deaths. Once they start 
listening to a voice recording adhered to them, a voice from the past begins to 
haunt them again. ‘I am Sudō, the one you killed during the war,’ tells the 
voice, after which Sudō (Nakamaru Tadao) himself appears. He shoots Ryū 
but once the police start chasing Sudō, he disappears. 
                                                 
1 This description is modified from my chapter in The Encyclopedia of Japanese Horror Cinema, 
edited by Salvador Murguia (Lanham, Boulder, New York, London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016). 
2 Ibid.  
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Even though Ryū, Ōnishi and Taki have initially promised not to reveal 
anything about the past, Taki, in the presence of Ōnishi, finally tells the police 
what happened during one fateful day after the Second World War. Taki’s story 
is shown in a flashback. He, Ōnishi, Tsukamoto, Ryū and Sudō were all 
working at a military laboratory under the command of teleport and 
telekinesis specialist Dr. Niki (Sasaki Takamaru). Ōnishi wants to sell the gold 
used in building the experimental machines, but Sudō and Niki refuse. Both 
are seemingly killed in the following battle and the collapse of the cave where 
the men were. Ōnishi and his companions survive but find no bodies in the 
cave. Instead, now Sudō is there to take revenge against those who wronged 
him.  
Kirioka and Akiko investigate the cabin in idyllic Karuizawa where Sudō 
and his mentor Niki have been living since the accident. Sudō kills Niki who 
already has lost both of his legs in the previous accident. Nearby a volcano is 
showing signs of an eruption and the following earthquake almost destroys 
Niki’s underground laboratory. This doesn’t prevent Sudō from realizing his 
plan, first killing Taki and then going after Ōnishi. Ōnishi, surrounded by his 
loyal men, has sought safety in his country house. The police, too, is after Sudō 
but he manages to stab Ōnishi with a sword. But when Sudō tries to teleport 
himself back to the Karuizawa cabin, the volcano finally erupts and destroys 
Niki’s house. Sudō dies in the liminal space he is currently in.  
 
Gasu ningen daiichi-gō (The Human Vapor, 1960)3 
A bank in downtown Tokyo is robbed, but the perpetrator is nowhere to be 
seen. A quick-paced chase follows, but the police is at their wits end when he 
vanishes into thin air. After the second robbery everything points to the 
direction of the Kasuga residence. The Kasuga clan is one of the most famous 
clans of Nō actors in Japan. Currently upholding the name is the last of the 
line, beautiful Fujichiyo Kasuga (Yachigusa Kaoru). Detective Okamoto 
(Mihashi Tatsuya), the main character of the film, tries questioning her, but 
Fujichiyo only provides vague answers. Okamoto’s girlfriend Kyōko (Sata 
Keiko), a magazine reporter for a local paper, does not succeed any better. 
Okamoto, however, cannot shake off the feeling that Fujichiyo is somehow 
connected to the robberies and starts following her one day when she drives to 
a library in downtown Tokyo. In spite of his efforts Fujichiyo spends her time 
only conducting research on Nō plays. Later, however, the stolen money is 
found from the Kasuga residence and Fujichiyo is arrested. Angered by the 
unfair arrest of Fujichiyo, the real culprit, Mizuno (Tsuchiya Yoshio), 
materializes in front of the police and the bank representatives. He can not 
only transform into gas himself, but also use gas as a weapon. ‘I’m not a human 
being, so I won’t obey rules made by humans,’ he states and kills the general 
manager of one targeted bank by strangling him with electric blue smoke. 
                                                 
3 This description is modified from my chapter in The Encyclopedia of Japanese Horror Cinema, 
edited by Salvador Murguia (Lanham, Boulder, New York, London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016). 
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Mizuno’s ultimate aim is to free Fujichiyo from prison. He strangles the guards 
and helps the prisoners to escape, but the innocent Fujichiyo decides to stay 
in prison. She is eventually released.  
Little by little Mizuno’s horrifying story, too, starts to unravel. Before his 
transformation he was just a normal library assistant working at a university 
library. He had a dream of becoming a pilot in Japan’s Self-Defense Forces, 
but failed the entrance exam. Feeling bitter and fed up with his life he accepts 
researcher Kyūko Sano’s (Murakami Fuyuki) suggestions of becoming his 
research assistant in a space development project. Sano promises to enhance 
Mizuno’s body, to build it afresh cell by cell. Mizuno is given an injection after 
which he remembers sleeping a total of 240 hours. When he wakes up, he has 
transformed into a human vapor, which comes as a shock to Sano as well. 
Mizuno kills Sano in a fit of rage after discovering how many other victims 
Sano has sacrificed in order to create his vision of an ultimate human being. 
The police come to the conclusion that just by existing, Mizuno causes anxiety 
in the orderly society and must be killed.  
In the meanwhile Fujichiyo is planning to use all her money on her final Nō 
show. The Kasuga clan has been suffering economically. Mizuno came to know 
Fujichiyo from his days as a library assistant, fell in love and now wants 
nothing more than to use his new abilities to support. The connection between 
Mizuno and Fujichiyo is revealed in the press, and Fujichiyo’s prestigious Nō 
show is turned into an exhibition which people only attend in order to catch a 
glimpse of Mizuno. The police, in turn, plan on destroying Mizuno after the 
show, but Fujichiyo beats them to it. After her brilliant final dance she and 
Mizuno embrace, after which she blows up the whole building, herself and 
Mizuno included.  
 
Matango (1963) 
Matango begins with a shot of a hospital, where university professor Murai 
Kenji (Kubo Akira) is locked behind bars. He starts narrating his story to the 
listeners on the other side.  Kenji, together with his student and girlfriend 
Akiko (Yashiro Miki), has been on a sailing trip with his assistant Koyama 
(Sahara Kenji), writer Yoshida (Tachikawa Hiroshi), singer Sekiguchi Mami 
(Mizuno Kumi) and Kasai Masafumi (Tsuchiya Yoshio), a celebrity owner of 
the yacht. Together with them is also the skipper of the yacht, Sakuda (Koizumi 
Hiroshi). A pleasant sail turns into something else as a storm engulfs the ship, 
resulting in a shipwreck on a mysterious faraway island. The group starts 
exploring the island and finds a forest of mysterious mushrooms which Sakuda 
warns them not to eat despite their hunger. Further on they find a shipwreck 
where they seek shelter. Days pass and the crew grows anxious and hungry. In 
addition, they start wondering about the possibility of the ship being a part of 
a nuclear experimentation. There are quite a many mysterious jars and diary 
remarks that support the claim.  
Hunger causes conflicts among the crew. Kasai steals food from their 
storages whilst Yoshida resorts to eating the mushrooms. They are also 
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attacked by freakish mushroom-like humanoids. Ultimately, Yoshida 
threatens the rest of the crew with a gun. He is then locked away, later to be 
freed by Mami. They try to overtake the ship, killing Koyama. Kenji and Akiko 
manage to drive the two away from the ship but later Mami returns, luring 
Kasai with him to the mushroom forest. There Kasai realizes that everyone 
who eats the mushrooms turns into one himself. He is attacked by the 
mushroom people in the lush and wet forest. When Sakuda, too, kills himself, 
only Kenji and Akiko remain on the ship. Akiko is attacked and kidnapped by 
the mushroom people. When Kenji finally finds her, he realizes she, too, has 
eaten the mushrooms and fallen to the curse. She smiles and asks Kenji to do 
the same so that the two can remain happily together on the island. Kenji, 
rational to the end, escapes both Akiko and other mushrooms, finally fleeing 
the island by himself. Days after he is rescued and taken to the hospital in 
Tokyo. The film ends when Kenji turns to face the listeners – and spectators – 
in order to reveal his half-mutated face. He states that he would have been 
happier there on the island with Akiko as humans and the mushroom 
monsters are not so different at all. The film ends with a shot of Tokyo and its 
neon signs.  
 
Tanin no kao (The Face of Another, 1966)  
Tanin no kao starts with the film showcasing a selection of plastic body parts, 
charts of the human anatomy and a talking x-ray of a human skull. After these 
the film introduces its main characters, Okuyama (Nakadai Tatsuya) and his 
wife (Kyō Machiko). Okuyama’s face has been destroyed in a work-related 
accident and he has bandages wrapped around his head. Only the eyes are 
visible. Okuyama’s marriage is in crisis because of the accident and the shame 
Okuyama feels about his face. Depressed Okuyama decides to visit Dr. Hira 
(Hira Mikijirō), a psychiatrist, from whom he seeks help. Hira promises to help 
Okuyama by creating a bio-mask for him. Okuyama would then be able to start 
a new life. After visiting his former workplace and discussing with his former 
colleague, he decides to accept Hira’s idea of a mask. Together with Hira they 
start looking for a model face and, after finding a suitable candidate, Hira 
creates the mask. With Okuyama’s new face finally in place, the two go out 
celebrating.  
Finally liberated, Okuyama visits malls, restaurants and bars, sometimes 
accompanied by Hira. His identity is however compromised when he meets a 
girl he has helped when wearing the bandages. Not remembering his new face 
he accidentally mentions the meeting between the two but is able to talk his 
way out of this. The incident nonetheless makes him realize that he might not 
be as anonymous as he would like to be. Renting a new flat, Okuyama decides 
to seduce his wife while wearing the mask. After the two get intimate, 
Okuyama breaks down, reveals himself and blames her for cheating on him. 
His wife, however, says that she knew it was him all along and that she thought 
the mask was there only to make her more comfortable. Even though Okuyama 
is willing to make amends, his wife leaves angrily. Okuyama is left alone. The 
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finale of the film portrays him wandering the streets of Tokyo. He tries to 
violate a woman but is caught, which does not bother him. The police call Hira, 
who says Okuyama is a patient from his hospital and of no danger. Okuyama 
disagrees, begging the police to take him into custody. When released with 
Hira’s help, he then kills Hira in the middle of an anonymous crowd.  
Intersecting the actual story, the film also introduces a young girl whose 
face has been mutilated in the bombing of Nagasaki. Working at a group home 
for war veterans, her life is full of hardships. Ultimately she drowns herself in 
the ocean.   
 
Tetsuo: The Iron Man (1988)  
The film opens up with Yatsu (Tsukamoto Shinya) thrusting a giant metal rod 
into his thigh. The wound is then infected with maggots. Running to the 
streets, he is hit by a car and left to die. The next scene is of the salaryman 
(Taguchi Tomorowo) shaving. Suddenly a metal thorn appears from his cheek. 
All attempts of the salaryman to remove the thorn are futile. Everything seems 
to be connected to his weird industrial dreams. On his way to work he is chased 
by a metal-mutated lady with glasses. She follows the salaryman to a public 
toilet where the salaryman is finally able to escape by stabbing the woman with 
a pen. He later defeats her once and for all.  
The next scene is of the salaryman dreaming of his girlfriend (Fujiwara Kei) 
dancing erotically with a giant penis-like hose attached to her crotch. The 
couple have sex with the girlfriend using her paraphernalia to penetrate the 
salaryman. He wakes up and discovers that his transformation has escalated. 
Rather than worrying, his girlfriend finds the transformation sexy. The couple 
have sex, after which the salaryman mutates with a greater speed. Ultimately 
his penis mutates into a giant drill-penis with which he kills his girlfriend. 
Yatsu emerges from her corpse, taunting the salaryman. At this point it is 
finally revealed that the salaryman and his girlfriend are the ones responsible 
for hitting Yatsu with their car. They hid his body in the woods and proceeded 
to have sex on the scene. Everything leads to the final encounter between Yatsu 
and the salaryman, where Yatsu declares he will show “New World” to the 
salaryman. Finally the two merge into a huge phallic tank-like creature that 
takes the roads of Tokyo on a mission of turning the world into metal and rust.  
 
Tetsuo II: The Body Hammer (1992)  
Taniguchi (Taguchi Tomorowo) is a salaryman living with his wife Kana 
(Kanaoka Nobu) and their son (Tomioka Keinosuke). He has lost memory of 
his early childhood. One day, after having breakfast and leaving for work, 
Taniguchi is followed by two skinheads. This soon becomes a wild chase across 
streets, corridors and escalators until Taniguchi is injected with some 
substance. Taniguchi spends time with his family, trying to build up some 
muscle at the gym. One day, however, he finds his son gone. He chases the two 
skinheads taking his son to the rooftop of his building. He ultimately kills his 
son with a gun emerging from his arm.  
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Taniguchi is then taken to an underground hideout of skinhead 
bodybuilders, where a mad scientist (Utazawa Toraemon) wants to build a 
horde of human weapons. He uses Taniguchi’s body as a test object. A man, 
Yatsu (Tsukamoto Shinya), then kills the scientist and gains control of the 
group of bodybuilders. They lure Taniguchi’s grieving wife to the hideout, 
simultaneously revealing mutating Taniguchi’s history to both Kana and 
Taniguchi himself in a flashback. Yatsu and Taniguchi are, in fact, brothers 
with a father (Kim Sujin) who is trying to create a bio-mutant human weapon. 
Taniguchi kills both of their parents in a fit of rage when finding them violently 
having sex. This violent nature is now utilized to form a man-machine, a 
perfect human weapon. Yatsu and Taniguchi battle and the already tank-like 
Taniguchi finally kills his brother. He rides into the streets of Tokyo with Kana 
sitting on his lap and the bodybuilders on tow.  
 
Tetsuo III: The Bullet Man (2009)  
Anthony (Eric Bossick) is a normal exhausted salaryman with a wife and a 
child, riding a full rush hour train that smells of sweat and makes Anthony gag. 
Similarly, people at the office smell and disgust him. Work exhausts him. 
However, he loves his wife Yuriko (Monō Akiko) and Yuriko loves him. This is 
the reason why Anthony is able to go on with his miserable working life. 
Whenever Anthony has time off, he likes to spend time with his son. One day 
the two are out when a car emerges. At the same time Anthony’s phone rings. 
It is his boss who even calls him on his day off. Looking frustrated, Anthony 
answers. Upon finishing, he sees a Western man smirking at him from the car 
window, after which the man drives his car into Anthony’s son, killing him 
instantly.  
Anthony mutates from rage. His limbs become guns and overall he starts 
resembling a machine gun man. He starts chasing the laughing killer intending 
on not only killing him but also taking his anger out on innocent bystanders. 
It is revealed that in the past, both Anthony’s father and his mother had 
participated in a so-called “Tetsuo project”. When Anthony’s mother became 
sick with cancer she wanted Anthony’s father to have a child with the Tetsuo 
cyborg. That child was Anthony. Despite his rage, Anthony is able to return to 
normal because of an apocalyptic vision he receives should he kill Yatsu 
(Tsukamoto Shinya), who has kidnapped his wife. The film ends with Yuriko 
being pregnant once more and Anthony, seemingly in human form, going 
about his life. However, something in the very last expression in his face makes 
the spectator think that The Bullet Man is still lurking inside him. Unlike his 
predecessors, Anthony is able to contain this side.  
 
Doppelgänger (2006)  
A young woman, Yuka (Nagasaku Hiromi), sees her brother while on a grocery 
run. Surprisingly, her brother is also at home when she gets back. A phone 
rings and Yuka is informed that her brother has just passed away. She realizes 
that the figure at home is, in fact, a mysterious double. The story then cuts to 
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a promotion video by Medical SciTech, a company where Dr. Hayasaki Michio 
(Yakusho Kōji) develops an innovative artificial chair that could mobilize 
paralyzed people. Stressed and constantly in a bad mood, it’s been ten years 
since Hayasaki last invented breakthrough technology. He is pushed on by his 
superiors, who promise to get him funding, but only if he agrees on giving a 
demonstration of the chair. Ultimately the demonstration goes well, although 
the chair is nowhere near finished.  
Burdened Hayasaki then encounters his doppelgänger, who nonchalantly 
enters his life and takes control. His team member Takano (Satō Hitomi) tells 
him about Yuka, who also has experience with doppelgängers. The two meet. 
Meanwhile it becomes apparent that Hayasaki’s doppelgänger is anything but 
him in nature. He gets Hayasaki fired by breaking into his lab. He drinks, 
smokes and seduces. After having been let go, Hayasaki steals the chair from 
his old lab and gets a new assistant with whose help (and that of the 
doppelgänger) he is finally able to finish the chair.  Yuka becomes a team 
member, too, also falling in love with Hayasaki himself. When Hayasaki, Yuka 
and his assistant, Kimishima (Yūsuke Santamaria), finally kill Hayasaki’s 
double, they embark on a road trip with the finalized chair. On their trip they 
encounter a former boss of Hayasaki, Murakami (Emoto Akira), who has been 
fired for embezzling development funds. He wants to partner with Hayasaki in 
order to economically benefit from the chair. Hayasaki declines. Kimishima 
then steals the chair, leaving Hayasaki and Yuka to chase after him. When 
Hayasaki reaches him, Kimishima drives his van over Hayasaki, supposedly 
killing him. After this he steals Murakami’s billions and continues his escape 
with the chair. Yuka is then saved by Hayasaki, but at this point it is impossible 
to say which one of the Hayasakis it is, as both have seemed to die in the course 
of the film. The final scene between Hayasaki and Kimishima sees the two 
fighting in an abandoned house and finally chased by an enormous disco ball.  
The film ends when Hayasaki takes his chair to a rival company Medicom 
Industry. After hearing that they want to utilize it to their market benefit and 
in the process maybe also help the disabled, Hayasaki changes his mind. He 
and Yuka drive to a seaside cliff and take the chair out of their van. The chair 
starts gliding towards the cliff, ultimately self-destructing. Hayasaki and Yuka 
walk into the sunset, hand in hand.   
 
Sakebi (Retribution, 2006)  
Detective Yoshioka (Yakusho Kōji) is assigned to a case where a victim after 
another is found drowned in sea water. The first murder is that of a woman in 
high heels and a red dress. The murder is shown but the killer’s face is not 
known. Yoshioka’s team starts investigating the murder, finding on the body a 
fingerprint that belongs to Yoshioka. They deduce that Yoshioka has touched 
the body without gloves and continue on. The second murder is of a youngster, 
killed by his father, Dr. Sakuma (Nakamura Ikuji). The boy had asked Sakuma 
for drugs to pay for his debt, which he refuses. Instead he kills his son, 
drowning him into a pool of water. Next day Yoshioka and his team place 
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Sakuma under arrest, suspecting him of the first murder, too. Sakuma breaks 
down during the interrogation, seeing ghosts and ultimately losing his mind.  
In the night Yoshioka is visited by a ghastly woman in red (Hazuki Riona). 
“Why didn’t you stay with me?” she asks before exiting through the door. She 
later appears in front of Yoshioka when he is alone by a wharf, declaring that 
Yoshioka killed her. Puzzled and terrified, Yoshioka seeks comfort from his 
girlfriend (Konishi Manami). The next scene is of Ms. Yabe Miyuki (Okunuki 
Kaoru) and her manager Onoda (Nomura Hironobu), with whom she has been 
having an affair. Onoda tells her he is going to leave his wife. Later that day 
Miyuki is witnessed filling canister after canister with sea water, pouring 
everything into her bathtub. When Onoda comes there and starts talking about 
their future and future children, Miyuki hits him with a club and drowns him 
in the bath. The identity of the first victim, Shibata Reiko (Akiyoshi Sakiko), is 
also discovered. When Yoshioka talks to her mother, she describes her as a 
wild child without a stable income, blaming herself for everything. Yoshioka 
and his team ultimately arrest Reiko’s ex-boyfriend for the murder.  
However, the ghost in red keeps appearing to Yoshioka. She is a figure he 
has seen from afar while riding a ferry. She blames him for leaving her to die 
alone. The police then figure out that all of the culprits have taken the same 
ferry route that Yoshioka when he saw the ghost in red, except Miyuki, who 
encountered her in a mirror. Yoshioka sends his girlfriend away and takes a 
ferry to the building where he first saw the ghost. He finds her remains there 
and she tells him she forgives him. Back at home, however, he discovers yet 
another ghost – that of Harue, his girlfriend. Yoshioka, too, has been affected 
by the ghastly rage and killed his girlfriend whose body is there in his 
apartment. She forgives Yoshioka who disappears into a lonely existence with 
the bones of the ghost in red.  
 
Kairo (Pulse, 2001)  
Kudō Michi (Asō Kumiko) is an employee of a botanical company where she 
works together with Yabe (Matsuo Masatoshi), Junko (Arisaka Kurume) and 
Taguchi (Mizuhashi Kenji). Taguchi has been absent for a few days and Michi 
goes looking for him. At his home she witnesses him hanging himself. She also 
discovers a disc from Taguchi’s computer which includes a shot of him staring 
blankly at the screen with a ghost staring at him. Elsewhere Kawashima 
Ryōsuke (Katō Haruhito) has purchased a computer which, upon establishing 
an Internet connection, takes him to an unknown website asking him if he 
would like to meet a ghost. In the night the computer logs onto the site by itself. 
Puzzled, Kawashima goes to the computer lab of his university where he meets 
Karasawa Harue (Koyuki). She suggests he prints the page in order for her to 
be able to see what is really happening with Kawashima’s computer.  
The film then cuts to Yabe, who gets a phone call saying “Help me”. He goes 
to Taguchi’s apartment to find a black stain on the wall and a ‘forbidden room’ 
sealed with red tape, which he then enters. He encounters a ghost, becomes 
depressed and later vanishes. The same pattern happens with Junko. Michi 
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tries to help her but in vain. Kawashima, in turn, is unable to get a screen cap 
or use the print screen command. Harue comes to help him after which the 
two go to the computer lab. Harue explains an installation made by her sempai 
where dots move across screen bouncing off or self-destroying if coming too 
close. This is, according to her, representative of human relationships. 
Kawashima then goes to the university library where he meets a child ghost. 
At the same time forbidden rooms multiply all over Tokyo and people vanish. 
Kawashima goes to find Harue out of control. He begs her to escape with him, 
which she does, but ultimately runs away from Kawashima.  
Michi and Kawashima meet in a deserted Tokyo where a ghastly apocalypse 
is about to occur. When getting gasoline from an abandoned warehouse, 
Kawashima finds Harue. She shoots herself in the head. Kawashima then 
encounters yet another ghost in a forbidden room. “Death is eternal 
loneliness,” rattles the ghost. Kawashima loses his will to live, but with Michi’s 
help is able to escape. They drive through burning Tokyo and continue their 
escape by a boat, further rescued by a ship heading towards Latin America with 
a few survivors. Similar events are, nonetheless, happening all over the world. 
Kawashima vanishes while Michi continues on living. 
 
HAYABUSA (2011) 
In 2002, nerdy and clumsy Mizusawa Megumi (Takeuchi Yūko) attends a 
public talk by Matoba Yasuhiro (Nishida Toshiyuki), a chief of JAXA’s PR 
section. Her late brother had always been a space enthusiast, a reason behind 
Mizusawa’s interest. Later, she is hired by JAXA. Mainly, her job is to explain 
about JAXA’s technology to young children. She does this by drawing manga 
about the experiences of the team working with HAYABUSA. Pages of 
Megumi’s manga are turned into fantastic narrations on screen throughout the 
film. The probe’s story is illuminated through these images. The launch of 
HAYABUSA successfully takes place in May 2003 despite the limited budget 
of the project. Two years later HAYABUSA reaches the asteroid Itokawa and 
manages to take a photo. Mizusawa rejoices together with the rest of the team. 
The probe, however, is unable to make a proper landing and a quarrel ensues 
whether the probe should immediately return to Earth to avoid further 
damage, or continue its mission of acquiring a sample. The team goes for the 
latter option, after which the probe disappears from the radar.  
After HAYABUSA’s disappearance the project is in a state of confusion and 
Mizusawa’s feelings are torn. She confronts her fears and insecurities on her 
brother’s grave, where her mother tells her to keep on exploring space and 
science not for her brother, but for herself. Soon after HAYABUSA is found, its 
engine broken. The JAXA team is able to re-program it for a long return home. 
The film ends with Mizusawa giving a public talk about HAYABUSA, having 
grown from a shy and withdrawn young woman into a confident expert.  
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Hayabusa – Haruka naru kikan (2012) 
Haruka naru kikan starts with the launch of HAYABUSA. Members of NASA 
are seen visiting the base at Kagoshima, where the project leader Yamaguchi 
(Watanabe Ken) constantly apologizes for their shabby base. It is made clear 
that this is a world’s first-type of a mission, a project for exploring the origins 
of the Earth. The launch is successful. Watching it from afar is also reporter 
Inoue Mari (Natsukawa Yui). The plot follows not only the project team, but 
also Inoue’s life. She is a single mother who has an estranged relationship with 
her widowed father (Yamazaki Tsutomu).  
The film follows HAYABUSA’s trip to space quite meticulously. Failure and 
success follow each other, Yamaguchi’s team solving the problems as they go. 
Yamaguchi is seen visiting NASA in order to request JAXA’s use of their 
communication satellites. His team members Fujinaka (Eguchi Yōsuke) and 
Moriuchi (Yoshioka Hidetaka), on the other hand, are able to solve some large 
problems regarding the probe, celebrating with a bottle of wine given by 
Yamaguchi. Yamaguchi himself, a solitary leader often seen visiting a jinja 
shrine, makes the final decision of trying to get HAYABUSA back. The mission 
succeeds with the whole team celebrating it. Inoue, too, who has been covering 
the travel of the probe, is able to make amends with her father, both of them 
uniting over the wish for HAYABUSA’s success.   
 
Okaeri Hayabusa (2012)  
It is the year 2003 and the launch of HAYABUSA is at hand. Responsible for 
the project is Dr. Emoto (Ōsugi Ren) with junior staff, including the 
protagonist assistant space engineer Ōhashi Kento (Fujiwara Tatsuya). 
Kento’s father, Ōhashi Isao (Miura Tomokazu), has been in charge of the 
previous Nozomi project, where the team tried sending the probe Nozomi to 
Mars. The project fails and Kento’s father becomes depressed and leaves 
JAXA. Two years later Kento’s colleague Iwamatsu Daigo (Tanaka Naoki) is 
giving a speech about HAYABUSA at a school. Soon after HAYABUSA’s engine 
fails. With Kento’s resourceful thinking and engineering skills, the team is able 
to overcome the trouble, but not everyone is happy with the situation. Kento 
is encountered by a new female member of the team, who reprimands him for 
treating the probe like a toy and blaming Kento for his arrogance.  
It becomes then clear that Daigo’s wife Tami (Moriguchi Yōko) is critically 
ill. Meanwhile HAYABUSA approaches Itokawa, takes a picture, approaches it 
and manages to collect a sample at the price of losing some of its vital 
technology. Kento’s father Isao is still mourning the failed Nozomi project, 
facing unhappy public opinion of wasting tax payers’ money on nothing. Kento 
visits his father who is in the throes of an existential crisis, having dedicated 
his whole life to a failed project. The film then takes a darker turn. When 
Kento’s ideas are applied once more on the HAYABUSA project, he hears some 
members of his team bad-mouthing him and his father. The illness of Daigo’s 
wife worsens as well. Together with his son they dream about HAYABUSA’s 
success. Daigo ends up leaving JAXA because the family needs to travel to The 
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U.S. for an organ donation. Emoto seeks advice from Isao, who states that 
there is nothing they can do. Kento confronts his father about his fixation with 
the Nozomi project.  
Suddenly, the JAXA team is able to get into contact with HAYABUSA. 
Together they come up with a way of getting the probe back to Earth. Upon the 
probe’s return, Kento calls his father to thank him for everything. Daigo’s 
family, too, is happily waiting for HAYABUSA’s return after Tami’s successful 
operation. Hope is also present in a scene where a hikikomori-like salaryman 
states that he will finally get a job.  
